25 Dec '11 17:19>3 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloFirst, the study does not even remotely find that unconscious brain activity predicts decisions perfectly.
[b]"How can I call a will 'mine' if I don't even know when it occurred and what it has decided to do?"
As far as I can tell, the work only shows that under the conditions tested (where subjects are tasked, in a supposedly congenial setting for it, to make a series of spontaneous decisions regarding the same left/right options, which is a task with atic for the compatibilist. So, I think Glannon's last statement here is just wrong.[/b]
Of course, hence the “if”—but the studies thus far seem interesting enough to pursue the question further, so the investigations are likely to continue. Perfection may not be had at any rate, but the question is whether more refined studies might produce greater predictability with statistical significance. I don’t see that Glannon was taking this study as conclusive.
Second, even if it did, it's not clear to me that this would be problematic for the compatibilist. So, I think Glannon's last statement here is just wrong.
Agreed entirely; though, as you note, it would undermine libertarian notions of free will (which, however, I think are already sufficiently undermined).
In any event, the interesting aspect for me is not the compatibilist/libertarian freewill question, or the studies’ impact on that—but the tendency to assume that we, strictly, consciously choose to think/believe whatever it is we say that we think/believe (which assumption, however, underlies libertarian freewill). From the standpoint of introspective meditation/contemplation, that seems to be false. For example, if one cannot consciously predict her next thought (or potential thoughts) before she thinks it—and it seems to me trivially clear that one cannot—, and if that also includes thoughts that affirm or reject prior thought, then how can one say that the conscious “I” is in charge of whatever one thinks/believes? So I see the claim, that is sometimes made, that we consciously choose all that we think/believe, the content of our formed character, etc.—to simply be wrong.
And although I think a focused introspection is sufficient to lead to that conclusion, which the science may support, it is that which makes me suspect that it will, but the science may also defeat that hypothesis—in which case I will have to revise my view; the preliminary evidence certainly fails to defeat the hypothesis, and with statistical significance, though with fairly low (but nonrandom) predictability. The empirical question for further experimentation, then, seems to be whether greater predictive power can be discovered with sufficient statistical significance.
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What really interested me was the thoroughgoing Zen nature of the hypothesis that all our thoughts, rather than being strictly consciously formed, arise from what the Zennist might call the mind-ground; and the recursive dynamics that I mentioned (for lack of a better phrase) would be another aspect of the Buddhist principle of “mutually arising”. And since the mind-ground is itself not a thought-form (gestaltic figure/ground stuff), then blackbeetle properly references the Buddhist notion of emptiness (which is “emptiness of figures/forms”, whether extrospective/objective or introspective/subjective ). Of course, it is as impossible to really separate figure and ground as it is to separate the gulfstream from the ocean, and vice versa; so that is just a way of speaking—the “emptiness” is really the nonseparable fullness.
The “pure Zen” response to my little koan is, of course, the one given by ChessPraxis. 🙂