If I say "the earth is flat". I know you will not believe me, so I can hardly be said to be intending to deceive. So is my untrue statement therefore not a lie?
Originally posted by twhitehead If I say "the earth is flat". I know you will not believe me, so I can hardly be said to be intending to deceive. So is my untrue statement therefore not a lie?
If you know we won't believe it, I'd say it's a joke rather than a lie.
Originally posted by twhitehead If I say "the earth is flat". I know you will not believe me, so I can hardly be said to be intending to deceive. So is my untrue statement therefore not a lie?
I would tend to say no. It certainly wouldn't be a prototypical lie.
Originally posted by LemonJello I largely agree, but I wonder sometimes why we should stipulate that the liar knows that P. Why should we not weaken it to he believes that P? This opens the possibility to lies the propositional contents of which are true, which may seem awkward. But on the other hand, I don't really see why the person who believes that P and intentionally trie ...[text shortened]... an you give me some reasons why I should restrict the lie concept to only false content?
You're right, of course. I was using "know" loosely to mean "strongly believe".