11 Nov '07 21:27>
One post per person please!
Originally posted by vistesdAlso, isn't it bordering on the circular to define lying in terms of deceiving?
A deliberate attempt to misrepresent the facts in order to deceive.
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeDoes the attempt have to succeed?
Also, isn't it bordering on the circular to define lying in terms of deceiving?
One might define lying at intentionally attempting to bring about in another a belief that one knows to be false.
But I can think of one type of counterinstance. Can you?
Originally posted by vistesdI was thinking of a magician: he tries to bring about a false belief in his audience, but he is nonetheless not lying. Still, it's not a fully-fledged false belief; it is sort of belief between quotations marks. So perhaps an amended definition with belief meaning "full belief" would work here. However, your counterexamples suggest that lying must also involve the explicit or implied claim that not-P, alongside the intent to create the belief in another that not-P, when one knows that P.
[b]Does the attempt have to succeed?
No.
Also, isn't it bordering on the circular to define lying in terms of deceiving?
You’re right: that was circular. 🙁
But I can think of one type of counterinstance. Can you?
I’m probably going to over-complicate this, but my immediate thought is telling someone the truth knowing that ...[text shortened]... es argue—and hence realize—the truth; this might be a part of certain therapeutic situations.)[/b]
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI think in the stage magician’s case, there is an implied contract of “suspending disbelief” on the part of the audience.
I was thinking of a magician: he tries to bring about a false belief in his audience, but he is nonetheless not lying. Still, it's not a fully-fledged false belief; it is sort of belief between quotations marks. So perhaps an amended definition with belief meaning "full belief" would work here. However, your counterexamples suggest that lying must also ...[text shortened]... ot-P, alongside the intent to create the belief in another that not-P, when one knows that P.
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI largely agree, but I wonder sometimes why we should stipulate that the liar knows that P. Why should we not weaken it to he believes that P? This opens the possibility to lies the propositional contents of which are true, which may seem awkward. But on the other hand, I don't really see why the person who believes that P and intentionally tries to bring about the belief that ~P in another doesn't demonstrate the same degree of moral failing as the person who knows that P and tries to instill the belief that ~P.
lying must also involve the explicit or implied claim that not-P, alongside the intent to create the belief in another that not-P, when one knows that P.