12 Nov 07
Originally posted by vistesdAlso, isn't it bordering on the circular to define lying in terms of deceiving?
A deliberate attempt to misrepresent the facts in order to deceive.
One might define lying at intentionally attempting to bring about in another a belief that one knows to be false.
But I can think of one type of counterinstance. Can you?
12 Nov 07
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeDoes the attempt have to succeed?
Also, isn't it bordering on the circular to define lying in terms of deceiving?
One might define lying at intentionally attempting to bring about in another a belief that one knows to be false.
But I can think of one type of counterinstance. Can you?
No.
Also, isn't it bordering on the circular to define lying in terms of deceiving?
You’re right: that was circular. 🙁
But I can think of one type of counterinstance. Can you?
I’m probably going to over-complicate this, but my immediate thought is telling someone the truth knowing that they will disbelieve you based on, say, your past history with them. (Or, under similar circumstances, lying to them so that they will themselves argue—and hence realize—the truth; this might be a part of certain therapeutic situations.)
12 Nov 07
Originally posted by vistesdI was thinking of a magician: he tries to bring about a false belief in his audience, but he is nonetheless not lying. Still, it's not a fully-fledged false belief; it is sort of belief between quotations marks. So perhaps an amended definition with belief meaning "full belief" would work here. However, your counterexamples suggest that lying must also involve the explicit or implied claim that not-P, alongside the intent to create the belief in another that not-P, when one knows that P.
[b]Does the attempt have to succeed?
No.
Also, isn't it bordering on the circular to define lying in terms of deceiving?
You’re right: that was circular. 🙁
But I can think of one type of counterinstance. Can you?
I’m probably going to over-complicate this, but my immediate thought is telling someone the truth knowing that ...[text shortened]... es argue—and hence realize—the truth; this might be a part of certain therapeutic situations.)[/b]
12 Nov 07
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI think in the stage magician’s case, there is an implied contract of “suspending disbelief” on the part of the audience.
I was thinking of a magician: he tries to bring about a false belief in his audience, but he is nonetheless not lying. Still, it's not a fully-fledged false belief; it is sort of belief between quotations marks. So perhaps an amended definition with belief meaning "full belief" would work here. However, your counterexamples suggest that lying must also ...[text shortened]... ot-P, alongside the intent to create the belief in another that not-P, when one knows that P.
My therapeutic (psycho-therapeutic) counter-example implies stating that ~P, in the hopes that the patient will, in struggling against that, come to realize that P. (I think I’ve been on the receiving end of that one; the therapist must, of course, adjust as necessary.)
Otherwise, I think your offering on this is correct, and better-put than mine was.
13 Nov 07
3 edits
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI largely agree, but I wonder sometimes why we should stipulate that the liar knows that P. Why should we not weaken it to he believes that P? This opens the possibility to lies the propositional contents of which are true, which may seem awkward. But on the other hand, I don't really see why the person who believes that P and intentionally tries to bring about the belief that ~P in another doesn't demonstrate the same degree of moral failing as the person who knows that P and tries to instill the belief that ~P.
lying must also involve the explicit or implied claim that not-P, alongside the intent to create the belief in another that not-P, when one knows that P.
I guess the example I have in mind is a person who, say, believes genuinely that P, where P is in fact false. Of couse he doesn't know that. He tries intentionally to bring about the belief that ~P in another. Under your formulation it is not a lie because he did not know that P (since P is false). I'm not really sure if such a situation should be termed an instance of 'lying', but it would seem he stands in desert of as much reproof as your liar (excepting the fact that he, contrary to his intent, actually uttered truth). Geez, it almost seems worse: he has the deviousness of character that the liar has, and he also has this false belief in P. I'm not sure about this, but I've been wondering about it. Can you give me some reasons why I should restrict the lie concept to only false content?