Originally posted by Pawnokeyhole
lying must also involve the explicit or implied claim that not-P, alongside the intent to create the belief in another that not-P, when one knows that P.
I largely agree, but I wonder sometimes why we should stipulate that the liar knows
that P. Why should we not weaken it to he believes that P? This opens the possibility to lies the propositional contents of which are true, which may seem awkward. But on the other hand, I don't really see why the person who believes that P and intentionally tries to bring about the belief that ~P in another doesn't demonstrate the same degree of moral failing as the person who knows that P and tries to instill the belief that ~P.
I guess the example I have in mind is a person who, say, believes genuinely that P, where P is in fact false. Of couse he doesn't know that. He tries intentionally to bring about the belief that ~P in another. Under your formulation it is not a lie because he did not know that P (since P is false). I'm not really sure if such a situation should be termed an instance of 'lying', but it would seem he stands in desert of as much reproof as your liar (excepting the fact that he, contrary to his intent, actually uttered truth). Geez, it almost seems worse: he has the deviousness of character that the liar has, and he also has this false belief in P. I'm not sure about this, but I've been wondering about it. Can you give me some reasons why I should restrict the lie concept to only false content?