28 Aug 06
1 edit
EDIT to prior post:
I did not intend, at this point, to preclude at the outset that any particular metaphysical speculations (Level 5) might not turn out to be correct. But they do seem to require a “leap” beyond the basic phenomenal ground of our existence.
Rather like the man who complained that he could find no wife, and that his life felt unfulfilled without such a relationship. The man’s friend said that he could help him find such fulfillment, if the man would do exactly as he recommended. “Anything,” the man replied. “Well,” said his friend, “let’s start by assuming that you, in fact, have a wife—and reason from there...” 😉
28 Aug 06
Originally posted by ngeisler88Truth is justified assertability. However, what counts as justification can vary from situation to situation, and probably lacks any common feature. Hence, truth may lack any essence, and the search for it may be in vain.
Heres some questions to think about. (1) What is real? What is truth? Define them witout citing synonyms please. (2) Can truth about reality be known? (3) Is there any absolute standard to weigh truth against? If so, whos right is it to or who should establish that standard? Or has it already been established? (4) Lastly, what should we believe in if we a ...[text shortened]... debate, and not get off on too many tangents. Thank you, I appreciate your time and your input.
28 Aug 06
Originally posted by vistesdInteresting thoughts, as always. But what this account leaves out - one might even say takes for granted - is the acquisition of language. Do you see language as a neutral interface between man and the world?
[b]Level 0: Just being, and being aware, before all images, thoughts, concepts, identifiers, labels, words... No “making-thinking,” just being aware of the phenomenal world and myself in/of that world. Not even naming things; just being present to the suchness in my own suchness which is also “of” that... Just here, in just-here. The sense of separ ...[text shortened]... rueness,” coherence, harmony...).
These are just some conjectures from my own explorations...[/b]
28 Aug 06
4 edits
Originally posted by dottewellThanks, dottewell. I don’t know enough about language theory, but I would say that it definitely does not represent a neutral interface. Our acquisition of a particular language takes place within a particular cultural complex—wouldn’t Wittgenstein say that the language of chess has meaning only within the context of the rules of that game? And that the meaning of the word “King,” for example, depends on its use in a certain game or context?
Interesting thoughts, as always. But what this account leaves out - one might even say takes for granted - is the acquisition of language. Do you see language as a neutral interface between man and the world?
I note, for example, you used the words "interface" and "between." Is not such language itself creating that "between"? Does the "experience" of "between" come before or after conceptualization—what I call making-thinking? At what level does this "between" make its appearance? (See the koans below...)
Yes, I did ignore/assume language acquisition. I was not speaking developmentally, however—though that was probably not clear. The real point I was after has to do with Level 0 Zen experience as a kind of irreducible empirical ground, and that language application comes in when we have already moved from that point and begun to think about it...
Most of the time, we tend to read the world through the veil of acquired concepts/language. We have acquired certain game-rules for such reading, and have learned perhaps how to develop others—but many seem largely to accept the game-rules they acquired developmentally with little question. In terms of my (skeletally sketched) “levels,” discussions of “what is truth?” seem to take place almost solely between levels 3 (maybe 2) and 5—Level 0 is forgotten.
From the Zen perspective, Level 0 is the territory, beyond which we cannot get, which is essentially ineffable and, therefore, which our maps cannot really capture. The best they can do is point. In his discussion about the family resemblances of various games, Wittgenstein says, “Don’t think. Look!” Now, I shamelessly read W. in a Zen way, and so am making my own spin that may not be his. Or, rather, I apply W. somewhat when I think about Zen. There seem to be some grounds for supposing that the Tractatus aimed at getting to what I have called here Level 0 by going through philosophical language—I can’t see that W.’s later work repudiates that aim, though my reading has been anything but systematic. (Am very happy to be corrected on W., though, since I sense a certain kindred spirit.)
___________________________
I am grappling clumsily with language to try to point to the ineffable. I keep trying to come up with workable koans in English, without the cultural trappings of some of the traditional koans. Just for whimsy, here is a traditional koan that I think W. might appreciate—
“Once upon a time, a man kept a goose in a large glass bottle. By and by, the goose grew too big for the bottle and became trapped inside. The man did not wish to break the bottle, nor did he wish to hurt the goose.
How will you let the goose out of the bottle?”
Anything you answer before the goose is out will just be making-thinking. The koan smacks you—if you are willing to engage it personally—right into the conceptual wall. It is not about metaphysics. There is no philosophical answer. It is a language game aimed at collapsing your language games. The “answer” is experiential. The koan is not a reflection, it is a metaphorical pointer, and a shove toward the pre-conceptual territory.
Another (non-traditional) koan:
“A man was gazing at the reflection of the moon in a pool of still water. The Zen master pushes him in—splash! The ‘moon’ is broken into pieces. The Zen master asks: ‘Where is the moon now? Have you got it?’”
__________________________
In a way, everything I have written here is part of the same big koan, and should be read as such. (Too many words, though!) So, is the goose out of the bottle...?
28 Aug 06
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdYes, I did ignore/assume language acquisition. I was not speaking developmentally, however—though that was probably not clear.
Thanks, dottewell. I don’t know enough about language theory, but I would say that it definitely does not represent a neutral interface. Our acquisition of a particular language takes place within a particular cultural complex—wouldn’t Wittgenstein say that the language of chess has meaning only within the context of the rules of that game? And th be read as such. (Too many words, though!) So, is the goose out of the bottle...?
I thought that was what you meant. I asked because from a Wittgensteinian perspective, our public, shared language would be both the starting point and, in a sense, the finishing point for a discussion about experience and knowledge. In other words, the idea of detaching experience from the language we learn and use would be rejected as meaningless. The example Wittgenstein usually uses is pain, because this seems such a vivid example of a private experience, and we want to say that we talk of the pain we have just undergone we are, as it word, sticking a label on a (private) thing. But he points out:
"Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant -- so that he constantly called different things by that name -- but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain" -- in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.
I should point out it's the later Wittgenstein I've been talking about. (Although I think the connections with the Tractatus are greater than some believe.) In terms of the relationship with Zen, I know virtually nothing about Zen (to my shame); but it's interesting that you say: "Level 0 is the territory, beyond which we cannot get." Wittgenstein might say: "Language is the territory, beyond which we cannot get." He repeatedly described himself as either a tour guide, or a cartographer, or similar - the point being he thought the aim of philosophy was simply to describe; to remind us how our language actually functions. At that point, he believed, the supposed problems of philosophy would fall away, revealed as simple confusions about the way our language actually works. (The "bewitchment" of the intellect by language.)
Chess was indeed one of Wittgenstein's pet examples. And yes, we show that we understand what e.g. a king is (in the context of chess) by showing that we understand the rules governing the king. And it is the rules which define what a chess king is.
Anyway, as I said, it's great to see you posting again.
28 Aug 06
3 edits
Originally posted by dottewell...from a Wittgensteinian perspective, our public, shared language would be both the starting point and, in a sense, the finishing point for a discussion about experience and knowledge.
[b]Yes, I did ignore/assume language acquisition. I was not speaking developmentally, however—though that was probably not clear.
I thought that was what you meant. I asked because from a Wittgensteinian perspective, our public, shared language would be both the starting point and, in a sense, the finishing point for a discussion about experience what a chess king is.
Anyway, as I said, it's great to see you posting again.[/b]
The key words in this sentence are “discussion” and “about.” What I have called Level 0 is not “about.” It is directly experiential, unmediated by language—before all images, thoughts or words.
Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.
Beautiful!
(Although I think the connections with the Tractatus are greater than some believe.)
That has been my sense as well.
In terms of the relationship with Zen, I know virtually nothing about Zen (to my shame); but it's interesting that you say: "Level 0 is the territory, beyond which we cannot get." Wittgenstein might say: "Language is the territory, beyond which we cannot get."
Language may be the territory beyond which we cannot get while we’re thinking—I would rather say it is a map that we cannot map beyond: it is the limit of our ability to describe the territory. At Level 0, there is no “thinking” (note, however, that I acknowledged the a priori nature of our perception).
I agree with the whole rest of this paragraph. I do not think W. and I are in such disagreement here. Once you have gone as far as you can “philosophizing,” don’t move to Level 5—move to Level 0, “whereof one cannot speak.” Those Zennists that dare to speak, try to speak in paradox and metaphor and koans—but their speaking is to point beyond the map, not to describe what cannot be described.
Whether or not you know about Zen, my friend, is not the matter. The matter is to get the goose out of the bottle, then she can come and go as she pleases...
(The “goose in the bottle” was the first koan I ever engaged, by the way—for years. I do not know if being familiar with the cultural background of the metaphor is helpful or not. If it is too familiar, it becomes too easy to just think about and say, “Yes, I understand that...” If it is too alien, perhaps you can’t engage it at all. If this is the case, I will offer another... Because that’s what I’m really about here.)
EDIT: Forgive me if I explain things badly. I am not a roshi; I am just some schmoe who has been to Level 0 and knows how to move in and out from there (albeit often clumsily yet). If I am misunderstood, I take the fault as mine, and simply try a different angle. One way we become bewitched by language is analogous to the Zen saying about pointing at the moon--too easily we, like a cat, become bewitched by the finger...
28 Aug 06
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdThis, then is a key point of difference between you and (later) Wittgenstein. For him, the supposed "private, unmediated experience" is itself the wheel that turns nothing in the mechanism of language.
The key words in this sentence are “discussion” and “about.” What I have called Level 0 is not “about.” It is directly experiential, unmediated by language—before all images, thoughts or words.
It's a fundamental difference, of course; but (like the early and later Wittgenstein), the fact there can be a fundamental difference between two people doesn't mean there can't be much (sometimes very much) in common.
28 Aug 06
1 edit
Originally posted by dottewellThe direct experience I’m talking about may not, and perhaps cannot turn anything in “the mechanism of our language”—in which case it seems that our language is totally ungrounded in experience, and grounded only in public, cultural games.
This, then is a key point of difference between you and (later) Wittgenstein. For him, the supposed "private, unmediated experience" is itself the wheel that turns nothing in the mechanism of language.
It's a fundamental difference, of course; but (like the early and later Wittgenstein), the fact there can be a fundamental difference between two people doesn't mean there can't be much (sometimes very much) in common.
I can buy that.
But that just makes our language games even worse at attempting to map the real, experiential territory.
Reading the menu is not tasting the food. Menus are useful. There is a tendency to judge the food, not by whether it is tasty and nutritious and satisfying, but by whether it fits with the description on the menu—what I said about judging the territory by the map, rather than the other way ‘round. People tend to fear to put down their menus, and spend more time reading the menu, comparing their menus, than tasting. “Oh, that can’t be good—it’s not on my (religious, philosophical, culturally-programmed, whatever) menu.” Or worse: "You can't really eat (or taste); you can only understand the menu."
I’m saying, put the menu down for awhile... The menu is not the meal.
28 Aug 06
3 edits
Originally posted by ngeisler88Something being a word does not make it artificial or not real. It simply makes it a word. What is a word? It's a symbol for something else, whether in the form of a sound or in the form of a visial pattern of colors on a contrasting background. It is not that something else itself. The word "truth" is not the concept that the word "truth" represents.
Ok then, if I could ask a fw questions, then what is the defining line between something being a "word" implying being artificial and between something being more than a "word".
Or is it just that "artificial" is just a word, a mere construct of our brain. And is the fragment "a mere construct of our brain" just a "word," implying being "artificial," on and is meaningful.
Illogical, I'm sorry. But I'm open to your defense.
So what is the "something else"? Well, that's what definitions are for. Thus my initial response to the initial post.
There is a big difference between asking "what is truth?" and "what is true?". There is also no reason to capitalize the word "truth" - people do this to make it seem as though they're discussing something more profound and deep than what people who actually speak English mean by the word "truth" - but then they won't define what is symbolized by this different word "Truth". In addition, it seems like people who capitalize the word can't make up their mind whether "Truth" is the same as "truth" or not. If it makes "Truth" seem more profound to be the same as "truth" then it's the same word, yet it's capitalized because it's even MORE profound than "truth"...but all these attempts to communicate depth, profundity and importance rely on vagueness; a refusal to clarify what the heck you're actually talking about but instead using implications and hints that you really are referring to some deep secret to the universe which cannot be spoken about clearly for some reason which is itself vague and unclear. "Secret to the universe", by the way, is another meaningless phrase, like "Truth", that is intended to suggest "I am being profound and insightful" by being vague and unclear and not really saying anything at all. The kind of content that language was invented to communicate is sacrificed in order to make the speaker seem like he's really wise and deep when he's actually not. I think there's a lot of ego involved whenever people use "profound" words and phrases like "Truth" or "meaning of life" which have no meaning that English speaking (or whatever language) people can agree upon and put in a dictionary.
If you want to know what I feel has the characteristic of being true - well, those things I directly perceive are true. For example, it's true that I can see and feel my hands (and indirectly my arms, etc) two-finger typing as opposed to typing "properly" with all my fingers...(a few seconds go by)...and now it's true that I remember two finger typing several seconds ago. Note that even though it's true that I have this memory, it doesn't mean that the event which I remember actually occurred. All I know is that the memory itself exists. It could have been implanted by God, little green men from Mars, or the CIA - or all three.
Anything that I do not directly experience has only a probability of being true as far as I am concerned. The best I can do is estimate the probability of the truth of any statement with my intuition aided by those experiences I've had and models that I've developed of what those perceptions suggest about that which is not me.
28 Aug 06
Originally posted by AThousandYoungSo what is the "something else"?
Something being a word does not make it artificial or not real. It simply makes it a word. What is a word? It's a symbol for something else, whether in the form of a sound or in the form of a visial pattern of colors on a contrasting background. It is not that something else itself. The word "truth" is not the concept that the word "truth" repr ...[text shortened]... what those perceptions suggest about that which is not me.
Just-this, now—before the words...
28 Aug 06
Originally posted by vistesdBut "meal" is a concept in our (shared) language!
The direct experience I’m talking about may not, and perhaps cannot turn anything in “the mechanism of our language”—in which case it seems that our language is totally ungrounded in experience, and grounded only in public, cultural games.
I can buy that.
But that just makes our language games even worse at attempting to map the real, experiential terr ...[text shortened]... derstand the menu."
I’m saying, put the menu down for awhile... The menu is not the meal.
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
28 Aug 06
Originally posted by AThousandYoungwell, those things I directly perceive are true.
Huh?
By the way, I've editted and added to my post since you posted. My modifications probably don't change what you meant by your response - whatever that meaning was. I can't tell.
What we know are the perceptions, since our sensory apparatus and our brains participate in the perception, and we are not simple receptors. What that direct experience is, I call “just-this” (a Zen phrase)—what you’re feeling, sensing, etc, right now, before you begin to apply words, analysis, description. I use the phrase “just-this” in order to recognize that inescapable entanglement or participation in that experience. That’s all. I wasn’t disagreeing (my rec there).
It’s just that when we use our normal language of “I” and “those things,” etc., we can get the notion that we are somehow separate from the world in which we live, or that our perceptions are not conditioned by our being very much ofthis world. I’m not saying you have that notion, because I don’t think you do. But take, for example, the theist who thinks that divine revelation somehow permits us to have a privileged “view from elsewhere” (the divine realm), unconditioned by our own being in and of the world. Or philosophers who may talk about the universe as if it were a thing that they could examine from outside...
If that’s still confusing: my fault...
28 Aug 06
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeIs one's view of the nature of truth something that can be either true or false?
Is one's view of the nature of truth something that can be either true or false? If so, does that create any extra complication?
Good question.
Descriptively, no I don’t think so. Normatively, however, yes I think so. Normatively may be the only way we can speak self-consistently on the construct of truth. Something like "This, I propose, is how we ought to view truth." Then, provided that you are a moral cognitivist, I don't see any obvious complication here: views on truth could themselves be truth-apt.