Originally posted by twhitehead
I am going to need a lot more detail.
What is 'personal'? If your choice is determined by brain cancer (a part of your person) is it still personal? If you are not conscious of how the choice was made, is it still personal? Sam Harris is treating consciousness as the 'person' and all other brain function as external to that.
When you say 'not determin ...[text shortened]... hink I have now, so answer my questions above and ask for further clarification where necessary.
What is 'personal'? If your choice is determined by brain cancer (a part of your person) is it still personal? If you are not conscious of how the choice was made, is it still personal?
The levels we function upon are, indeed, many.
But to claim that our wills are not free is essentially saying we lack a will altogether: he makes the repeated case how anything dependent upon anything else is somehow no longer free.
Is the lamp independent of the table, or must it be identified by the thing which holds it aloft?
So if for example the choice of city in Sam Harris's question was determined by life experience, then that would not be free will, but if it was determined by a truly random quantum dynamic effect in the brain, then that would be free will?
Absurd.
He told the audience to
think of a city.
One can only think upon things they already know.
If he'd told the audience to think of a phlorentiem--- any phlorentiem--- the audience would have been scratching its collective head: none would know what he is referencing.
They would be free to imagine what a phlorentiem is and then think of all the ones they know, but the result would still be a massive blank.
His failed experiment folded in on itself, as he asked them to consider things they know and then randomly pick one of the things they know.
In doing so, they were free to think on any one of the cities which came to their minds.
His contention that whatever came to their minds was an example of their brain functioning on its own irrespective of their conscious determination is superfluous: a systematic analysis of every city known to each of them would still result in the eventual (inconsequential) choice of a city.
To highlight a subconscious act as anecdotal evidence of one's inability to freely choose is sophomoric at best.
Try again, and this time think about how you made your choice of city. Did your consciousness make the choice? Using what process? How many cities did you consider?
Even better: consider whether or not you're going to answer the question.
A free person is able to make the determination.
Being free, some people opted to think on a city name, others did not.
To what extent did those limitations affect the results?
We have free will in the face of many obstacles.
It just seems to me that theism puts a lot of stock in free will but doesn't put forward a coherent concept of what it is - and most theists are quite confused about the subject as a result.
I think part of the problem is the over-think; the concept isn't really all that complex.
When someone of Harris' obvious learning puts forth such erudite sounding arguments to say something so patently absurd and glaringly self-contradictory, what was once crystal clear and obvious becomes muddled and confusing.
Here's another issue which appears to elude Harris' thinking.
His claim is based upon the timing of measurable activities within the brain, relative to the supposed appearance of the thought upon the stage.
Is he sure he's seeing the precursor and not the result?