Originally posted by shavixmirInside her is life... she would be killing life...thats not on....sure...its her choice....but still she would be killing a life.....murder.....thou shalt not kill.....
That's EXACTLY what I'm saying.
So, she can do with her body what she wants.
If she wants to kill herself. Fine.
If she wants to chop a leg off. Fine.
If she wants an abortion. Fine.
If she wants to grow her hair down to her toes. Fine.
Up to her.
*shrugs*
Originally posted by ivanhoeThe relevant issue here is whether you assume one's identity as a human being can change during one's life, or that at some time in one's life, which as you seem to agree with starts at conception, one does not have an identity.
"Identity" is of course a controversial term, but it could be described as "I am who shall be", or "He or she is who will be".
The relevant issue here is whether you assume one's identity as a human being can change during one's life, or that at some time in one's life, which as you seem to agree with starts at conception, one does not have an identity. ...[text shortened]... at he or she is not what he or she will be ?
Where are the "break-off" points ?
First, I'm not sure what is meant specifically by "identity as a human being". I'm interested to know in what you think your identity consists. Identification as a human being is a more trivial, ersatz sort of identification (whether it is a member of Homo sapiens sapiens, or not). For example, I agree completely that a human organism; a human being; exists at conception. But I do not agree that one's life starts at conception. For example I do not think I was ever a zygote, just as I do not think you were ever a zygote. Again, I'm interested in knowing what you think comprises one's identity. If you claim that you were once a zygote just after conception, then whatever your notion of your identity is, it seems it cannot make reference to psychological properties because the zygote has no psychological properties.
My notion of identity is based on psychological features and it would include a unique psychological continuity relation (overlapping chains of psychological 'strong connectedness'😉. In other words, when I say that I am now the same person I was 3 years ago, I mean that there is a unique set of overlapping chains of conscious experience that "connects" these points. The individual chains would consist of memory, for one, but also in resemblance of psychological properties, persisting beliefs and intentions, abiding features of character, etc.
I just wonder how it makes sense for you to say that you were once a zygote when a zygote simply has no mentality.
Originally posted by LemonJelloFor example, I agree completely that a human organism; a human being; exists at conception. But I do not agree that one's life starts at conception. For example I do not think I was ever a zygote, just as I do not think you were ever a zygote.
[b]The relevant issue here is whether you assume one's identity as a human being can change during one's life, or that at some time in one's life, which as you seem to agree with starts at conception, one does not have an identity.
First, I'm not sure what is meant specifically by "identity as a human being". I'm interested to know in what u to say that you were once a zygote when a zygote simply has no mentality.[/b]
Huh?
Your parents conceived a human being -- you conceed that. Are you saying that, at some point, the conceived human being ceased to exist and another human being (i.e. you) took its place? If not, then does it not follow that your identification with the human being you are automatically implies identification with the zygote you once were?
It's the dreaded B-word again.
Originally posted by lucifershammerI am identical with the person instantiated in this human organism, but not identical with this human organism. I came into existence sometime after my mind came into existence, and my mind came into existence sometime after my body came into existence. Where is the problem?
[b]For example, I agree completely that a human organism; a human being; exists at conception. But I do not agree that one's life starts at conception. For example I do not think I was ever a zygote, just as I do not think you were ever a zygote.
Huh?
Your parents conceived a human being -- you conceed that. Are you sa ...[text shortened]... cally implies identification with the zygote you once were?
It's the dreaded B-word again.[/b]
Originally posted by bbarrAre you the ghost in the machine then? Do you hold to a three substance theory of self, mind and body?
I am identical with the person instantiated in this human organism, but not identical with this human organism. I came into existence sometime after my mind came into existence, and my mind came into existence sometime after my body came into existence. Where is the problem?
The problem is with how many beings (the B-word) we are talking about here? One (bbarr)? Two (bbarr and bbarr's body)? Three (bbarr, bbarr's mind, bbarr's body)?
Originally posted by lucifershammerNo, I'm a monist. I am composed of one substance, but there are properties I have that are not essential to me. I am the person instantiated in this body. Many changes to my body are insufficient to destroy me or to change me to a different person (hence I am not personally identical to my body).
Are you the ghost in the machine then? Do you hold to a three substance theory of self, mind and body?
The problem is with how many beings (the B-word) we are talking about here? One (bbarr)? Two (bbarr and bbarr's body)? Three (bbarr, bbarr's mind, bbarr's body)?
Well Ivan, that article doesn't prove or disprove anything. It certainly doesn't prove WHEN life begins. Which is --again-- what the entire abortion debate comes down to for me.
The writer sums up his position with this final statement -
"And that is the foundation of rights: the chief of which is that innocent life shall not be killed." I agree. And I would ask him to prove when that "innocent life" began.
I don't take quite the same view as Shav does, his is a little too far for my tastes, but unless someone has absolute proof when life begins then the abortion debate will continue and a woman's right to choose should prevail over anyone else's concerns.
You can't accuse someone of murder until you can prove the person they supposedly murdered was once alive. AND the actions of the accused cause their victims demise. Any court in the US will tell you that. And that's how it should be.
Originally posted by lucifershammer"The dreaded B-word"? I do realize that there are some who use 'human being' in a normative sense, but I do not. To me it doesn't seem to imply anything beyond membership in a particular species, which I do not consider relevant to the discussion. It's probably better for me to use 'human organism' instead to avoid that confusion. In response to the rest, I would echo bbarr's comments, which I think are clearly presented.
[b]For example, I agree completely that a human organism; a human being; exists at conception. But I do not agree that one's life starts at conception. For example I do not think I was ever a zygote, just as I do not think you were ever a zygote.
Huh?
Your parents conceived a human being -- you conceed that. Are you sa ...[text shortened]... cally implies identification with the zygote you once were?
It's the dreaded B-word again.[/b]
I fail to see how the zygote has properties that suffice for personal identity. So I'm really just trying to understand what the author means when he says that identity exists from conception. He takes this point as "critical" to the discussion; so I am hoping it's not something trivial like identity as unique genetic makeup. The zygote has no psychological properties. So, unless I'm missing something, the claim that personal identity is present from conception is either committed to a reductionist view of identity breaking down to only physical properties/facts; or to a nonreductionist view (maybe related to a particular notion of Cartesian ego or soul or something along those lines).
I really do not at all understand ivanhoe's notion of identity as "I am who shall be". Maybe I'm missing something, but it does not seem to suggest that I can trace my personal identity back to something like the zygote. It only seems to suggest that once personal identity comes into existence, there is constancy of identity throughout its existence.
Originally posted by LemonJelloOr I guess I would add also a reductionist view that admits potential properties.
So, unless I'm missing something, the claim that personal identity is present from conception is either committed to a reductionist view of identity breaking down to only physical properties/facts; or to a nonreductionist view (maybe related to a particular notion of Cartesian ego or soul or something along those lines).
Originally posted by wibhmmm ... it's open season on babies, then .... bust into a hospital nursery and whack 'em all ...
Well Ivan, that article doesn't prove or disprove anything. It certainly doesn't prove WHEN life begins. Which is --again-- what the entire abortion debate comes down to for me.
The writer sums up his position with this final statement -
"And that is the foundation of rights: the chief of which is that innocent life shall not be killed." I agree. A ...[text shortened]... victims demise. Any court in the US will tell you that. And that's how it should be.
oops, the Supreme Court says it's not.
Originally posted by zeeblebotThe Supreme Court certainly did not say anything new in the recent case about the moral status of fetuses. What they did was ban a specific procedure. If there was another procedure that could be used in cases where D&X abortions are now used, the recent ruling would not apply to it.
hmmm ... it's open season on babies, then .... bust into a hospital nursery and whack 'em all ...
oops, the Supreme Court says it's not.