Originally posted by twhiteheadIt's not avoidance but focus. The mechanisms are distinct. If I were studying human swimming behavior, would you criticize the work for avoiding the topic of submarines?
'I don't want to address the issue of whether or not that is swimming so I'll avoid studying any such behaviours to avoid confusion'..
Originally posted by wildgrassThe mechanisms of free will are irrelevant to some key questions about free will because free will is not confined to one mechanism.
Isn't that what you keep coming back to, by saying that the mechanisms of free will are irrelevant?
If we were to ask 'is it possible to swim backwards?' we would not study the mechanism of every possible swimming thing then draw a conclusion, we would instead, look carefully at the definition and see if it allows it.
Originally posted by wildgrassI only criticise you for making pronouncements that you shouldn't be making with regards to submarines swimming. I also criticise you for various illogical inferences you have drawn.
It's not avoidance but focus. The mechanisms are distinct. If I were studying human swimming behavior, would you criticize the work for avoiding the topic of submarines?
Originally posted by twhiteheadIs it logical to take an ambivalent position on the "can submarines swim?" question? Is swimming an accurate description of its behavior?
I only criticise you for making pronouncements that you shouldn't be making with regards to submarines swimming. I also criticise you for various illogical inferences you have drawn.
Originally posted by wildgrassYes.
Is it logical to take an ambivalent position on the "can submarines swim?" question?
Is swimming an accurate description of its behavior?
Clearly that depends on your definition of 'swimming. What submarines do falls well within dictionary definitions:
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/swim
Originally posted by twhiteheadI think you've probably answered 10 posts in this thread with "that depends on the definition of......" It seems like this discussion is completely mired in the philosophy of words and semantic theory, as opposed to the practical and functional usage of words to accurately describe things and advance scientific concepts.
Yes.
[b]Is swimming an accurate description of its behavior?
Clearly that depends on your definition of 'swimming. What submarines do falls well within dictionary definitions:
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/swim[/b]
I guess I don't really understand this mentality, so I'll avoid discussing further.
Originally posted by wildgrassThe point, which you seem incapable of grasping, is that definitions matter, and the practical and functional usage of words to accurately describe things and advance scientific concepts is only possible with clear definitions. You seem to dismiss definitions and what they are all about, then end up all confused and contradicting yourself because you refused to address that problem.
I think you've probably answered 10 posts in this thread with "that depends on the definition of......" It seems like this discussion is completely mired in the philosophy of words and semantic theory, as opposed to the practical and functional usage of words to accurately describe things and advance scientific concepts.
One simply cannot make explicit statements using vaguely defined words. It is incoherent to do so.
The fundamental issue with discussions of 'free will' is there are some people that have a rough idea of what they think it is, but refuse to pin it down because doing so would demonstrate that their ideas about it are logically impossible. They basically don't want determinism and don't want arbitrariness but refuse to address the fact that there is no third option.
What your position is on the matter is far from clear, but it seems that pinning it down worries you. All the studies you have cited are about the question of whether or not the consciousness is 'the decision maker' or just a bystander watching it all happen. An interesting question for sure, but quite distinct from the 'determinism/arbitrary' issue.
Originally posted by twhiteheadOf course definitions matter, but you're imagining a fake problem with the way science defines free will. The determinism/arbitrary "issue" is completely unsolvable philosophical nonsense, and yet you seem to think answers can be found in computers. The propositions laid out don't seem meaningful or testable in any fashion, and cannot be extrapolated to understand mechanisms of free will (which for some reason, you think is irrelevant).
The point, which you seem incapable of grasping, is that definitions matter, and the practical and functional usage of words to accurately describe things and advance scientific concepts is only possible with clear definitions. You seem to dismiss definitions and what they are all about, then end up all confused and contradicting yourself because you refu ...[text shortened]... en. An interesting question for sure, but quite distinct from the 'determinism/arbitrary' issue.
I guess if you had to 'pin me down' against my will, I did some googling and I think I'd be friends with this guy, as his point of view here seems smart and logical: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Carnap. I guess that makes me a 'Compatibilist' (whatever that means). Who cares. I still can't stand philosophy and this discussion has turned me into a nihilist (whatever that means).
‘Predictability and compulsion are two different things. It is compulsion only when one is forced by outside agents to do something against one’s desire. But if the act springs from one’s own character in accordance with the laws of psychology, then we say that one acts with free will, that is, personal preference of selecting one out of many possibilities. If no compulsion is involved, which means that the choice is based on his own preference, arriving out of his own character, there is no reason for not calling it free choice. It is true that his character caused him to choose as he did and this in turn is conditioned by previous causes. But there is no reason to say that his character compelled him to choose as he did, because the word ‘compel’ is defined in terms of outside casual factors. Free choice is a decision made by some one capable of foreseeing the consequences of alternate action and choosing that which he prefers. There is no contradiction between free choice understood in this way and determinism, even of the strong classical type. - Carnap
Originally posted by wildgrassScience does NOT define free will. Not only do definitions matter, but understanding the concept of what a definition actually is matters.
Of course definitions matter, but you're imagining a fake problem with the way science defines free will.
The determinism/arbitrary "issue" is completely unsolvable philosophical nonsense,
It is neither unsolvable, nor is it philosophical nonsense. Also, it is the key issue in most discussions about free will, so dismissing it without consideration leaves you in the wrong thread.
The propositions laid out don't seem meaningful or testable in any fashion, and cannot be extrapolated to understand mechanisms of free will (which for some reason, you think is irrelevant).
Maybe they don't seem meaningful or testable because you have dismissed them without bothering to understand what is being talked about.
I still can't stand philosophy and this discussion has turned me into a nihilist (whatever that means).
Well you shouldn't be doing science if you can't stand philosophy.
But I suspect you don't even know what 'philosophy' actually is. Science, is after all, Natural Philosophy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy
But there are areas of philosophy that are not Natural Philosophy, but whose understanding would greatly aid you in doing science better.
I too generally agree with Carnap. But one should not rush too hastily from agreeing with him to assuming that everyone else who says 'free will' does too. Further, his description in your quote would clearly qualify advanced computers as having free will, and maybe, at a push, even the 'if' statement too.
Originally posted by humyI had asked if When talking about the meanings of words, science has NOTHING to say about it? You reply that (paraphrase) other than a science that is 'all about the psychology of what people mean', it is correct to say that science has nothing to say about the meanings of words.
unless that science is specifically all about the psychology of what people mean by words, correct. Most people including laypeople already know this as an unremarkable fact.
You really should study philosophy and also what is conventionally called "scientific method" which is what all valid science is based on. Start here;
https://en.wikipedia.org/w ...[text shortened]... s of words SHOULD be; which has absolutely NOTHING to do with the process of scientific method.[/b]
On one hand, science invents words routinely, and of course it defines those words.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_terminology
On the other hand, science books routinely give glossaries, where they list the words used and the definitions intended by their use.
So you are wrong.
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Originally posted by twhiteheadMaybe if I speak through the voice of a legit athiest philosopher we can avoid vague accusations etc. and refute most of your point about determinism being "a key issue". This Carnap guy speaks my language:
Science does NOT define free will. Not only do definitions matter, but understanding the concept of what a definition actually is matters.
[b]The determinism/arbitrary "issue" is completely unsolvable philosophical nonsense,
It is neither unsolvable, nor is it philosophical nonsense. Also, it is the key issue in most discussions about free will, s ...[text shortened]... alify advanced computers as having free will, and maybe, at a push, even the 'if' statement too.[/b]
...with the advance of modern science we have learned that explanation does not necessarily or even usually coincide with familiarization.... this is no longer the trivial all-embracing thesis of a vague naturalism but a testable hypothesis, or at least a research program whose success can be appraised in the light of empirical evidence. The introspectively impressive "efficacy" of intentions and volitions must then be explained in a manner compatible with physicale principles. Epiphenomenalistic parallelism was never a plausible doctrine. Voluntary action, the role of attention, as well as psychosomatic phenomena, such as hysterical symptoms, appeared as strong evidence against a doctrine which would make mental events a causally superfluous and inefficacious by-product of neurophysiological processes. For this reason various double aspect, double knowledge, double language or identity theories strongly recommended themselves to scientifically oriented thinkers. This sort of solution of the old puzzle has been very plausible also because it harmonized well with the familiar analytic clarification of the free-will problem. Once the notorious confusions of the free-will perplexity were removed, it became clear that it makes perfectly good sense to say that our volitions are free to the extent that they are determined by our basic personality, i.e., to the extent our interests, knowledge and deliberations are causally effective in the actions we perform....I believe that the issue of determinism vs. indeterminism is totally irrelevant to whether becoming is a significant attribute of the time of physical nature independently of human consciousness. - Carnap
I wish I could have a beer with this guy, but alas he died in 1970.
Originally posted by apathistThat will hardly help given your penchant for using words in non-standard ways.
Open some dictionaries. Start with a few standard definitions for comparison, graduate to technical ones for more details and nuances.
By standard definitions, humans do have volition (obviously). But I bet that what you think you can conclude from that doesn't actually follow.
Originally posted by twhiteheadI don't use words in non-standard ways. This is a common tactic you use, such as in the compatibilism thread here
That will hardly help given your penchant for using words in non-standard ways.
By standard definitions, humans do have volition (obviously). But I bet that what you think you can conclude from that doesn't actually follow.
http://www.chessatwork.com/forum/science/compatibilism.173137/page-2
The notion of uncaused events is illogical. If something happened, there were causes. That's all I'm saying. I agree with science.