Originally posted by bbarrCont. from before, in response to Coletti's attempted criticism (one page back) of my defense of premise (2):
Are you defining good now as that which makes the world a better place? I suppose you would have to say what the world is and what makes it a better place. I merely have to assert it is better, and leave it to you to show it is not on my terms. Otherwise, my definition of good as long as it is consistent.
Do you see me use the phrase ‘better place’? No ...[text shortened]... X.
Got it? These ways of putting the point are all exactly the same.
More to come...
[/b]
Careful now. You said you the good is neutral. You seem to be implying that less violence is good. Butcan not make that assertion without defining good.
No, this is a mistaken inference on your part. The idea here is that less violence will bring about less suffering.
Getting close to defining good again. Don't know how you can make this statement without asserting some sort of moral principles. Not all moral principles will make the same choices. If you assert preventing X is good, you need to define good or you are begging the question.
No, I am not. Consider the quote that you are responding to:
Hence, God could have intervened in at least one case of moral evil without violating the freedom of our wills. Hence, explanations of evil the rely on the freedom of the will fail.
Nothing in this quote “gets close to defining good”. Nothing in this quote relies upon presupposing any moral principle at all. I don’t know where you get this stuff. Am I asserting that ‘preventing X is good’ in this quote? No, I am not. Seriously, I think you’ve just lost the thread of argument here. Either that, or you are in the grip of some nasty hallucinogen. Please read this quote slowly again, and revise your opinions accordingly.
Well. You have argued against three common theistic arguments. However, you have not shown that unnecessary suffering is necessarily a fact.
I don’t need to, and I never intended to. There is no logical contradiction involved in believing in God, because it is possible that all evil is logically necessary. The point I’m making is that the theist can identify no greater good that suffering is logically necessary for, and that their rejection of (2) is to that extent unjustified.
You attempt to place the burden of proof on the theist by giving emotional examples of suffering and demand the theist to prove that are necessary. I say I am not making the argument - so prove they are not.
Sorry, I don’t play this game. If you have no account of that which suffering is logically necessary for, then there is no reason to take your position on these matters seriously. Your view reduces to the claim that suffering is necessary for something or other, but damned if you or anybody else know what it is.
But you can not make of choice of what is good without defining a moral principle for making that choice. According to your argument, you can not tell which is morally preferable - raping or feeding the poor. I assert that the greatest good for God is that which God wills. You can not counter this without first establishing a non-neutral position. Once you do that, you need to justify it. And once you do that, your argument becomes circular.
First, please don’t use the term ‘circular’ anymore. You don’t know what it means and it hurts me deep inside to see you mangle such a beautiful notion.
Second, this is even further evidence that you don’t really read my posts, but merely skim them and pick things out to bitch about, even though you don’t understand them. I have already addressed this definition of ‘greatest good’ back on pg. 12, in my defense of premise (5). Look it up.
Originally posted by bbarrLet me then make it clear. I think your argument is circular due to premise 2 - 2 is merely asserted - and is at face value not justified. It is formally invalid - but it begs the question.
You seem to think that if a deductive argument has a premise that is not the conclusion of some other deductive argument, then the deductive argument that this premise is a premise of can not, in fact, be deductive. This is a flat out mistake on your part.
But you defense of 2. was not deductive - as you acknowledge. And your defense of 2 has many problems besides being formally invalid. Not the least of which is you assertion that the theist needs to prove 2 is false and that you can not make a case for 2. without defining good and evil - thus defeating a key element of your main argument.
But if you want to use modal logic - then you should say the it is logically possible the there is suffering that is not morally preferable. That is, you can assert that in some possible world - suffering would not be needed. But that is not the case in all possible worlds. Thus it is not by definition necessarily true. (That is my suggestion. It improves your argument - even if it does not save it.)
2 edits
Originally posted by ColettiFirst, That is not what 'circular' means! Ugh. Please get this right. You've screwed this up three different times now in this thread, even after having been corrected. Please, please stop misconstruing circularity.
Let me then make it clear. I think your argument is circular due to premise 2 - 2 is merely asserted - and is at face value not justified. It is formally invalid - but it begs the question.
But you defense of 2. was not deductive - as ...[text shortened]... estion. It improves your argument - even if it does not save it.)
Second, the original argument is formally valid.
Third, premise two does not presuppose the falsity of theism because it does not entail that God does not exist. Hence, it does not beg the question.
Fourth, the justification for premise (2) can be found on pg. 12.
Fifth, since the argument for premise (2) was not deductive, it's invalidity is not a problem. Every non-deductive argument is invalid. Every single one of them.
Sixth, I never said that the theist needs to prove that 2 is false, and I defy you to show otherwise.
Seventh, I don't need to define good or evil in order for the defense of 2 to stand. The substantial claims I make about suffering, relate to the defense of premise 5, not premise 2. Seriously, go look this up.
Eigth, and again, the modal operators are interdefinable, it makes no difference whether I use the modal operator of necessity or that of possibility. Saying that some suffering is logically unnecessary for the greater good is logically equivalent to saying that it is logically possible that the greater good to be realized without that suffering occuring. These two claims mean the exact same thing. There is absolutely no reason to prefer one over the other. No reason at all, full stop.
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrYou're simply repeating yourself now. My criticisms are valid, your defense is of 2. is weak. I have shown that you are trying to shift the burden of proof - and you come back that you have not - and I must therefore still prove the opposite. It doesn't work the first time, nor the second. It's still your argument to make, not mine.
Sorry, I don’t play this game. If you have no account of that which suffering is logically necessary for, then there is no reason to take your position on these matters seriously. Your view reduces to the claim that suffering is necessary f ...[text shortened]... od’ back on pg. 12, in my defense of premise (5). Look it up.
I have show that merely arguing against the oppositions positions is poor when you have not used the best arguments they have.
I have given a valid definition of good and evil that invalidates 2 and gives some objectivity to "morally preferable" - and you have given a subjective definition that gives your argument formal validity only.
I have shown that the framework from which one defines good and evil easily makes 2 invalid - and you have merely denied it. Just because the term good and evil is not explicitly stated - does not remove the fact that the definition of good and evil is implicitly necessary to determine anything moral.
You are stuck. It is not that I do not understand your argument, it is that I have taken it apart, and you are in denial.
And please define circular instead of using an abuse ad hominem. I have defined it and no one has given a solid counter to it.
(If not prove then justify - which you have failed to do).
3 edits
Originally posted by ColettiI defined 'circular' on the previous page! Jesus Christ! Here is it again, though since you didn't read it the first time I don't know why you'd read it now:
You're simply repeating yourself now. My criticisms are valid, your defense is of 2. is weak. I have shown that you are trying to shift the burden of proof - and you come back that you have not - and I must therefore still prove the oppo ...[text shortened]... nem. I have defined it and no one has given a solid counter to it.
The actual notion of circularity is as follows:
An argument is circular if and only if there is at least one premise the justification offered for which presupposes the truth of the argument's conclusion.
Your criticisms, when not incoherent, are deeply confused.
You haven't actually provided any objections against the reasons I provide in support of 2. All you are doing is saying "well, that still doesn't show that 2 couldn't be false". Apparently, you will only be satisfied by a defense of 2 that takes the form of a deductive proof. Well, sorry! That's not what I was attempting to do in my defense of premise 2. As I've said before, the negation of 2 is logically possible. I am not attempting to show that 2 must, by necessity, be true. I am presenting reasons for thinking that 2 is true, based upon pointing out consequences of rejecting 2 that are seemingly absurd and wildly counterintuitive (e.g., if one less person had been killed in the holocaust, then, of logical necessity the world would have been worse!). If you are perfectly happy accepting all these entailments of the rejecting of 2, fair enough.
Your definition of good and evil doesn't invalidate 2 at all, because 2 is completely consistent with any definition of good and evil. Seriously, go look up premise 2 and show me the contradiction between it and your definition. You can't. You know why? Because they are consistent! If we take your definition of good and evil, premise 2 will read as follows:
There has obtained at least one fully specified state of affairs S such that S included as a constituent suffering logically unnecessary for the bringing about of God's will.
See? When I remove the terms 'greater good' and replace them them 'God's will', premise 2 still makes perfect sense. So, you are simply confused in your claim that your definition invalidates 2.
Besides, I've already argued against your definition in my defense of premise 5 (which is really what you should be arguing against). So, look for my response there. This is the second time I've pointed this out to you.
As should have been obvious to you by now, the substantial normative claims I make are made explicitly in premise 5 on the first page. The defense of this premise is on pg. 12. If you want to argue against those claims, then you are barking up the wrong tree by focusing on premise 2.
You don't understand my argument, you don't understand either first order logic or modal logic. You don't even understand the basic notion of circularity. You certainly don't understand what I've been saying to you for pages now. How could you, you barely read it!
I'm done with you for the night. Hopefully you'll begin making sense tomorrow.
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrFurther corrections of Coletti's wayward thinking would be redundant with yours, and I've already filled my clutter quota for this thread.
Damn you Scribbles. Why didn't you jump in when Coletti started massacring basic notions of logic? Nothing I said got through, perhaps you could have done better.
Besides, you've never specified what moral theory your argument is based on. We should resolve that first.
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrSo many pages ... For reference, here is an index of relevant topics and arguments in this thread:
Sigh.
Did you not read the response to Coletti I provided on pg. 21? Here are the relevant parts again:
Morally Perfect (def): An entity G is morally perfect if and only if for two states of affairs A and B, where A and B are speci ...[text shortened]... cally unnecessary for the bringing about of greater good.
[/b]
A General Argument from Evil, version 1 (AGAEv1) - p.1
Implications of premise (5); BUS and COG - p.12
Defence of premise (2) (DP2) - p.12
Meaning of logical necessity; CFW and NPG - p.12
Modified definition of Moral Perfection (MPv2) - p.15
Modified premise (2) (2'😉 - p.21
Have I missed anything out?
Originally posted by bbarrThanks, but my question still holds - is A such a constituent in (2'😉? To put it another way, if we assume that the three states I've specified comprise the universe of possible states, does the state (A,~B) where A causes suffering satisfy (2'😉?
Sigh.
Did you not read the response to Coletti I provided on pg. 21? Here are the relevant parts again:
Morally Perfect (def): An entity G is morally perfect if and only if for two states of affairs A and B, where A and B are specified as fully as G’s cognitive faculties allow, if A is morally preferable to B then G prefers that A obtain rather than ...[text shortened]... s a constituent suffering logically unnecessary for the bringing about of greater good.
[/b]
2 edits
Bennett:
I think I am probably way over my head here, but what is the fallacy in the following line of reasoning? I am trying specifically to work only in the framework of your initial post, working strictly from mutual definitions – ethical theories out the window.
Consider that we know only your current definitions of “God”, “omniscient”, “omnipotent”, and “logically necessary”, and I am trying to approach it as a person who is completely indifferent to any ethical or religious theories, and even to the overall conclusion of your argument.
Premise (2):
There has occurred at least one event E such that E brought about unnecessary suffering; suffering not logically necessary for the bringing about of greater good.
If Premise (2) is false, then everything from here on is irrelevant; but if we suppose Premise (2) is true, then from the definition of “logically necessary” we thus know that it is at least logically possible that at the time E obtained, another event F could have obtained instead which would have brought about the same degree of greater goodness without the unnecessary suffering that occurred in E.
Therefore, from Premise (2), at the instant E obtained, it was a true proposition that “it is logically possible that E obtains", and it was a true proposition that "it is logically possible that F obtains.”
Being “omniscient,” God knew these true propositions. Being “omnipotent,” at the time E obtained, God could have caused either E to obtain or F to obtain, as both are logically possible.
If Premise (2) is true, then God chose E over F, E obtained, and Premise (5) is therefore false (unless we state that God preferred F over E and acted accordingly but E obtained anyway – but this violates the definition of “omnipotent” since F is logically possible; also, if E obtained because God was indifferent between E and F, then Premise (5) is also still false).
If Premise (5) is true, then God chose F over E, acted accordingly, and because God is omnipotent, F obtained, and Premise (2) is therefore false.
Therefore, Premise (2) and Premise (5) cannot both be true.
I suppose, working strictly from the definition of “logically necessary”, one could argue that Premise (2) only implies that it is logically possible for such F to exist, but does not imply that such F does exist. But in that case, if no such F exists, then I fail to see how the suffering in E is unnecessary and would argue that Premise (2) is therefore false.
I do not claim to be all that educated in logical reasoning, so I should probably apologize in advance for my ignorance in this post; but I would sincerely be interested in your honest critique of this argument.