Originally posted by ColettiNo apology neccessary..
OK. I went back and read nicknomo's post. His argument was fine, it was his "reply" section where he claims that the lack of human free-will removes human responsibility.
Thank you for accepting bbarr - I hope nicknomo will also. ...[text shortened]... predeterminism.
I disagree that this removes God's free-will.
Its funny though how you bring up the implications of such. Calvinists tend to agree completely with my proof, but differ on the implications... That is fine.
I think we do have responsibility for our actions in the sense that is our will and our decisions causing the events.. But I also think that God has the higher responsibility, since he would be our creator in every respect.. In essence he determined our will and decisions.
Of course, that is my subjective opinion. It is my interpretation of the proof, and merely that. I don't personally see how it could be any other way... but its not really part of the formal logic.
As you said though, that discussion is better left for a different thread.
My intention was to give Bbar some reasoning to help prove his weaker points in the proof... that's why I posted mine here. I thought he might have had the potential to come up with something more solid if he saw a different insight. Our attempted proofs are somewhat related. Instead, he seems to have taken offense to my posting...
Either way, its been a pleasure discussing, and I thank you for your kind words. Take care!
Originally posted by nicknomoI agree with the a lot of what you are saying. In fact, if you look on pg. 12 of this thread you will find me arguing that if this is the best of all possible worlds then libertarian free will is impossible. As a matter of fact, even if the world was not deterministic, even if there were no God, libertarian free will would still be impossible. The only defensible notion of free will is a compatibilist notion, and it is an open question whether compatibilism is consistent with moral responsibility (see the "Human Free Will" thread in the debates forum for an interesting discussion of this).
[b]The general point is that you must apply the same reasoning you are applying to humans to God as well. If God's omniscience precludes free will, then it precludes any creature from having free will, God included.
Let me get something off my chest first. Free will is nonsense. It is an argument used by people to try to justify purpose in their ...[text shortened]... omniscient, than he is also bound by predeterminism...
Now let me get to your objections.
[/b]
Originally posted by nicknomoYour categorical mistake is to think that one of God's acts is so different in nature than a human act that God can be responsible for his actions even though he could not have done otherwise. You are flat out contradicting yourself, nicknomo. You should just give up the claim that God is responsible for anything in anything other than a causal sense, just as we are responsible for certain things in a causal sense, as our actions are often the causal antecedents of events. You can't have it both ways without adverting to arbitrary, ad hoc stipulation. If omniscience is imcompatible with free will, then it is incompatible with God's having free will. If omnscience is not incompatible with all free will, then you will need a further argument that shows that God can have free will while humans can not. So far, you have given no such argument, but merely asserted that acts of God and acts of humans are somehow, mysteriously, of a different kind.
For #1
Well, many theists also believe #1. God is static in nature, his mind was made up for all eternity. After all, this is the nature of an omniscient god. God will only do what he has already decided to do... he has no reason to ch ...[text shortened]... ng about predtermination if it matches perfectly with god's will.
Let's look closely at your mistake. You posted the following:
In a deterministic system where the cause of everything else is the first link in the chain, the first chain is not bound by any previous influence.
Either the first link in the chain has causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about or it does nothave such antecedents. Since by stipulation it is the first link, it follows that it can have no causal antecedents. But an event with no causal antecedents is random. No person can be responsible for a random event.
essentially, the first chain has the unique ability to control the future however he (or she) pleases.
If this is rights, then the acts of God will always have causal antecedents. These antecedents will be a function of God's character. Either God's character is causally sufficient for God to act in the manner he does, it his character is not sufficient. If God's character is causally sufficient, then God could not have done otherwise than that which he in fact did. If his character is not causally sufficient for his actions, then God's acts are random. Either way, God is not responsible for his acts (unless you adopt a compatibilist notion of free will and responsibility).
Since this omniscient being always knew what he was going to do, his actions are also predetermined. However, and important distinction should be made... what is predetermined is based on this beings will, not on any events that came before him (since there were none).
This is your biggest error. You think that it makes a relevant difference whether the acts of God are a function of his will. Now, if it is sufficient for one to be responsible for an act that that act follow from one's will, then humans will often be responsible for their acts (and you will be advocating a compatibilist notion of responsibility). Further, these states of willing the precede God's acting are themselves events, and hence are either caused or random. Either way, you don't get responsibility out of the equation unless you adopt compatibilism.
Originally posted by ivanhoeThe difference between the content of philosophical inquiry and the content of spiritual experiences is that the former is effable. Have you ever read any of the contemplatives in your own tradition, like Meister Eckhart, or St. John of the Cross?
BBarr: "I have no interest in discussing these matters with those who have not taken the time to educate themselves."
Imagine what would happen if you were to expand this policy to all of the fields of your interests ........ You would only be talking to the creme de la creme of academia ......
Either the first link in the chain has causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about or it does nothave such antecedents. Since by stipulation it is the first link, it follows that it can have no causal antecedents. But an event with no causal antecedents is random. No person can be responsible for a random event.
Firstly, let me remind you are arguing my interpretation of the proof. The logic itself merely states that God chose all the events in the universe based on his will...
Now are you arguing that his will was determined by something else, other than his own nature? This doesn't contradict the proof, but it is an interesting interpretation. Are you assuming the christian concept of a static, omniscient god?
If you are arguing the concept that God could simply not exist without beginning and with a self made existence and will, your problem is not with my proof, it is with christian theology. The concept that God has always existed, he is his own cause, and eternally static would be the belief you are holding into question. To most Christians, God has no cause nor previous influences (nothing existed prior to him). Keep in mind that I've started with the assumption that God exists. I've also started with common assumptions as to god's abilities and worked forward from that. You can't expect me to go backwards and justify those initial premises, especially since I'm an atheist.
Either way, God is not responsible for his acts (unless you adopt a compatibilist notion of free will and responsibility).
I'd like you though to explain how god's will has been predetermined by something other than himself, and why.
I'm guessing that you do actually agree that God would have chosen all of humanity's future before the universe was created, but are insisting what he chose was not in his control?
Sorry if I'm a tad bit confused, I'm not quite sure what implies god needs to be influenced by your description of antecedents... By Chrisitan theology there can be nothing prior to God's existence.
Originally posted by bbarrOr God is God's first cause. God being the first cause can not have a cause by definition. But God being essential a mind and will does not need to be random. God is God. The first cause is the first cause.
Either the first link in the chain has causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about or it does nothave such antecedents. Since by stipulation it is the first link, it follows that it can have no causal antecedents. But an event with no causal antecedents is random. No person can be responsible for a random event.
You must presume that time goes back infinitely - but I presume God was the first cause of time (the creator of time). God being supernatural can violate physical laws (think miracles). If God can do that, then there is no reason why He is restricted to time.
Since causal relationships are time dependent, God is not effected by them.
And if time can be traced backwards to infinity - the implication is there is no such thing as a truly random events. Correct? Randomness is really a concept we use to describe event that we find impossible to predict, like turbulence, or rolls of dice. But that is only due to a limit in our knowledge and ability to measure all the possible inputs. A robotic arm could be designed to roll snake-eyes every time. Someday they won't let people with computer controlled prosthesis into casinos.
Originally posted by bbarrI think this is the heart of your objection, if I read correctly?
Either the first link in the chain has causal antecedents sufficient to bring it about or it does nothave such antecedents. Since by stipulation it is the first link, it follows that it can have no causal antecedents. But an event with no cau ...[text shortened]... nts is random. No person can be responsible for a random event.
If you can prove this, then you will turn my proof into one that disproves god's existence.
You are working backwards from predetermination, and saying that God cannot make a random action based on nothing. But there is nothing before god. That would imply a contradiction about god not having a cause. Also contradiction of determinism, disproving some of gods abilities... I'm not sure it is provable. Dealing with time goin backwards until infinity (infnite regression) is something I wouldn't know how to work around..
Originally posted by bbarr
The difference between the content of philosophical inquiry and the content of spiritual experiences is that the former is effable. Have you ever read any of the contemplatives in your own tradition, like Meister Eckhart, or St. John of the Cross?
A long long time ago ......
In 1985 the Pope, John Paul II, said: "Did not Eckhart teach his disciples: 'All that God asks you most pressingly is to go out of yourself - and let God be God in you'? One could think that, in separating himself from creatures, the mystic leaves his brothers, humanity, behind. The same Eckhart affirms that, on the contrary, the mystic is marvelously present to them on the only level where he can truly reach them, that is in God."
Originally posted by ColettiAnd if time can be traced backwards to infinity - the implication is there is no such thing as a truly random events. Correct?
Or God is God's first cause. God being the first cause can not have a cause by definition. But God being essential a mind and will does not need to be random. God is God. The first cause is the first cause.
You must presume that time goes back infinitely - but I presume God was the first cause of time (the creator of time). God being supernatural can ...[text shortened]... es every time. Someday they won't let people with computer controlled prosthesis into casinos.
Incorrect. Quantum mechanics I believe leaves room for true randomness. It's possible that no matter how much knowledge and intelligence we have, we can not predict certain things.
I know this is getting off topic, but I've wrestled with that notion for a while now.
Its a tricky question... We can never practically have enough knoweledge to answer a lot of things.. But what if we assume omniscience? Can things be random then? By definition it would seem like a no... unless something is not knowable. But does that negate omniscience in itself then?
It actually goes much deeper than that... but it is a harder question than one might imagine.. to ask whether or not something can be random. I still haven't made up my mind.
Originally posted by nicknomoI think omniscience would be "knowing everything that doesn't result in a paradox" - such as knowing something that was unknowable. That's the standard sort of way to define omnipotence.
I know this is getting off topic, but I've wrestled with that notion for a while now.
Its a tricky question... We can never practically have enough knoweledge to answer a lot of things.. But what if we assume omniscience? Can things be random then? By definition it would seem like a no... unless something is not knowable. But does that negate omniscien ...[text shortened]... ight imagine.. to ask whether or not something can be random. I still haven't made up my mind.
Right, but the idea that something can happen and is not knowable leads to a deeper question. If something can happen that has no cause or reason, nor logical explanation, can we truly know anything? The whole concept of why things are happening as well as the logical system we concieve to be in place could be fictious. It could contradict omniscience because what is known could be put into doubt. Then we really wouldn't "know" that its true. If we really can't know much of anything, then the term omniscience would be pointless.
Not my thoughts here, but this is how some of the arguments have gone... I haven't really made up my mind on it...
Originally posted by nicknomocan we truly know anything?
Right, but the idea that something can happen and is not knowable leads to a deeper question. If something can happen that has no cause or reason, nor logical explanation, can we truly know anything? The whole concept of why things are happening as well as the logical system we concieve to be in place could be fictious. It could contradict omniscience beca ...[text shortened]... s is how some of the arguments have gone... I haven't really made up my mind on it...
All a person (for example, me) can know is that I exist and that my perceptions exist.
Now, if we assume we know a lot of things we infer from our perceptions, the randomness of quantum mechanics allows us some knowledge of the universe because the chance that a particular event will come out a certain way can be known. For example, if we created an experiment where a quantum mechanical state had to make a 'choice', then we could do this many, many times and discover the odds that it will make a particular choice. Using probabilities we can make guesses about the future that can be extraordinarily accurate.
