A General Argument from Evil.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
That proposition expresses a definition, but depending on the axioms of the system in which that proposition lives, it could have a value of 'true' or 'false'. You can't simply make it be 'true' because it expresses a definition, for you may be able to deduce its falsehood from the axioms.

Contrast this with what I mean by 'definition'. ...[text shortened]... n' entails that definitions have truth values with respect to the
other axioms of the system.

O.K., we're in agreement. Nothing hinges on this, as far as the argument is concerned. I could have expressed the definitions as axioms (e.g., God exists if and only if He can do anything that is logically possible).

Originally posted by bbarr
LOL, do you think one of these definitions is inaccurate? If so, which?

Sack, take your pic !

PS: You really need to edit a 1 liner twice 😉 ?

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., we're in agreement. Nothing hinges on this, as far as the argument is concerned. I could have expressed the definitions as axioms (e.g., God exists if and only if He can do anything that is logically possible).

Very well. Perhpas we'll return to this in the future, as I'm not sure that converting definitions to axioms yields an equivalent system.

But for now, on with the show at hand.

I really just wanted to get in a good jab at Coletti for old times' sake.

If you have a problem with one of these definitions, pcaspian, then please tell us all what it is. If you can't articulate your objections to these definitions, maybe you should think about it quietly for awhile. If you're just posting to be snarky, then perhaps you should take a time out. 😴

Cheers!

Originally posted by Nemesio
What Bennett is doing, for the sake of not getting waylaid on a side-
track discussion (too late!), is granting whatever definition anyone
wants to define 'morally perfect' for the purposes of his argument.
The only stipulation is that a morally perfect entity will always choose
the greatest good available.

The problem I have with the argument is tw ...[text shortened]... the 23rd
century, but we have no way of knowing (or even testing) this proposition.

Nemesio

I also reject premise (2) because of the reasons stated by Nemesio, esp. his second bullet point.

You non-definition is the key to premise (2).

"2) There has occurred at least one event E such that E brought about unnecessary suffering; suffering not logically necessary for the bringing about of greater good. "

In premise (2), you have placed the violation of your 'non-definition'.

In (2) you have three premises in one.

a) E is an event in which suffering occurred.
b) The suffering was unnecessary for the "common good".
c) That which is for the "common good" is that which is morally preferable.

But here we go again, "common good" is not defined either. So the argument is still circular.

I can reject premise (2) since there is no definition of "common good" or the inferred premise b) and c) for the same reasons. Without a definition of "moral" the argument is tautological.

Saying that "moral" is for the "common good" is still useless. What is "common good"?

Your argument is incomplete without a definition of moral, and you cannot be ethically neutral once you define moral.


(P.S. "jab." I missed you too scrib! 😀)

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., we're in agreement. Nothing hinges on this, as far as the argument is concerned. I could have expressed the definitions as axioms (e.g., God exists if and only if He can do anything that is logically possible).

Everything hinges on your axioms.

Carry on.

Originally posted by Coletti

Your argument is incomplete without a definition of moral, and you cannot be ethically neutral once you define moral.

Oh my God. Bbarr is giving you free reign on the definition of moral. You can choose any definition you want! Perhaps you should just state one and argue in terms of that, while those of us more abstractly inclined can simply view it as a placeholder having no bearing on the argument.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Oh my God. Bbarr is giving you free reign on the definition of moral. You can choose any definition you want! Perhaps you should just state one and argue in terms of that, while those of us more abstractly inclined can simply view it as a placeholder having no bearing on the argument.

OK. A thing is morally preferable if it is in accordance to the will of God.

Originally posted by bbarr
Yes, this definition of 'moral perfection' is consistent with choosing the lesser evil (if the lesser evil is morally preferable than the greater evil, which seems clear).

So choosing an evil, in the case of choosing between two evils, is consistent with your definition of being "morally perfect" ?

Originally posted by ivanhoe
So choosing an evil, in the case of choosing between two evils, is consistent with your definition of being "morally perfect" ?

If the evils are the only choices available and if one is more evil than the other then yes, I believe that to be correct.

EDIT: Because the action of being morally perfect is (in Bennett's arguement) chosing the position of moral preferability and surely thatis the lesser of the evils.

Originally posted by ivanhoe
So choosing an evil, in the case of choosing between two evils, is consistent with your definition of being "morally perfect" ?

For something to be described as 'evil' there would need to be a moral basis on which to gauge the action. I presumed that this was something that is irrelevant to the discussion. Unless you are using 'evil' as a term which is synonomous with 'less good'.

I'm confused... 🙁

Originally posted by bbarr
So, you reject premise (2), correct?

I'm not sure.

Either I think it is redundant (an omnipotent being is never faced
with 'making a choice' (of A over B) because, being omniscient, they
will know what the 'best' course of action is and, being omnipotent,
impose A);

or I think it is untestable (an apparently 'less moral' act may have
positive ramifications that we, being limitedly-scient, would be unable
to discern).

I'm waiting for the coup de grace. I'm not rejecting it outright
because I haven't seen the full body of your proof. I am just raising
some preliminary flags.

Nemesio

Originally posted by Nemesio
coup d' grace.

This is a false contraction!

Originally posted by bbarr

Omnipotent (def.): An entity G is omnipotent if and only if G can do anything that is logically possible.

sigh.

The Christian God cannot commit a sin.

i.e. the Christian God is not Omnipotent. As the Christian God is not Omnipotent, by your definition He is not a God.

As this will not satisfy you (i.e. you are not defining the 'Christian God'😉, lets redefine your definition of 'logically impossible'. For now you would need to redefine what is logically possible for a God. As that is impossible to determine, your definition falls apart. Is anything logically impossible for God ?

No. - > Then God can create a boulder heavy enough that He himself cannot lift. But then something is logically impossible for God. Paradox.

Yes. -> Ok, well then I too am omnipotent. I can do everything that is logically possible for me to do. Omnipotence is irrelevant in your definition.

Have fun 😉