31 Mar 05
1 edit
Originally posted by pcaspianThe Christian God can and does sin.
The Christian God cannot commit a sin.
Consider the flood and the sixth commandment.
Now, if you say that when God breaks his own commandments, He's not really sinning because He's God, then sinning is something that is logically impossible for God, and thus his inability to sin does not take away his omnipotence as defined in the first post. You can't have it both ways.
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by pcaspianI like the "logically possible" definition. Is it logically possible for God to sin? No. But that is by definition of sin. God can not sin, because anything God does would, by definition, be good. So for God to sin would be logically impossible.
sigh.
The Christian God cannot commit a sin.
i.e. the Christian God is not Omnipotent. As the Christian God is not Omnipotent, by your definition He is not a God.
As this will not satisfy you (i.e. you are not defining the 'Christian God'😉, lets redefine your definition of 'logically impossible'. For now you would need to redefine what is log ...[text shortened]... is logically possible for me to do. Omnipotence is irrelevant in your definition.
Have fun 😉[/b]
It all depends on your definition of sin, doesn't it. 😉
Can a triangle be a circle - it's not logically possible because a triangle is not a circle by definition.
You are seeing where this whole thing is heading. All this hinges on the definitions: of moral, common good, evil, sin, etc.
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by Coletti
I like the "logically possible" definition. Is it logically possible for God to sin? No. But that is by definition of sin. God can not sin, because anything God does would, by definition, be good. So for God to sin would be logically impossible.
It all depends on your definition of sin, doesn't it. 😉
Can a triangle be a circle - it's not lo ...[text shortened]... hing is heading. All this hinges on the definitions: of moral, common good, evil, sin, etc.
It all depends on definitions and most (not in math for instance, .... ahaaa .... ) most definitions only use words to describe the object of definition. Words are inherently more or less vague. Therefore definitions using words are inherently more or less vague. Reasoning based on definitions using words is therefore vague. Conclusions reached using vague reasoning must be necessarily vague. Therefore reasoning based on definitions using words suffers more or less from the Falacy of Vagueness or Ambiguity and must therefore be looked upon with a wagonload of scepticism.
Philosophers, or philosophers to be, trying to reason in a way described above, must therefore be looked upon with a wagonload of scientific scepticism and professional suspicion.
31 Mar 05
4 edits
Originally posted by ivanhoeLOL. All of mathematics and its definitions can be entirely expressed in words.
It all depends on definitions and most (not in math for instance, .... ahaaa .... ) most definitions only use words to describe the object of definition. Words are inherently more or less vague. Therefore definitions using words are inhe ...[text shortened]... nd must therefore be looked upon with a wagonload of scepticism.
The symbols that are often used are only a convenient shorthand for the words.
Any symbolic expression of mathematics can be unambiguously rendered in natural language.
Do you exhibit a wagonload of skepticism when you see an airplane, designed using rigorous mathematics of engineering, flying in the air?
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
LOL. ...
Do you exhibit a wagonload of skepticism when you see an airplane, designed using rigorous mathematics of engineering, flying in the air?
Mathematic symbols exists meaningfull lives only within a mathematical framework. We are not granted that luxury in debate.
pc
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by pcaspianSure you are. Bbarr has gone to the trouble of constructing a clear and well-defined framework in which to hold arguments in the greatest of luxury. Reading the first post in this thread was like taking a much-needed bubble bath after slogging through the typical tripe in this forum.
We are not granted that luxury in debate.
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by ColettiNo, you are still confused.
You non-definition is the key to premise (2).
"2) There has occurred at least one event E such that E brought about unnecessary suffering; suffering not logically necessary for the bringing about of greater good. "
In premise (2), you have placed the violation of your 'non-definition'.
In (2) you have three premises in one.
a) E is an even ...[text shortened]... be ethically neutral once you define moral.
(P.S. "jab." I missed you too scrib! 😀)
Premise (2) relies on no definition at all. Premise (2) consists of the conjunction of the following theses:
2a) There is some E such that E is an event.
2b) E brought about suffering.
2c) The suffering E brought about was logically unnecessary for the maximization of the good.
The term 'the good' in (2c), as with the term 'greater good' in (2), is neutral as to any ethical theory. As has been noted any number of times both by me and others in this thread, you may define 'greater good' in any manner you see fit. It is perfectly consistent with any non-skeptical ethical theory.
The argument is not incomplete without a definition of 'moral', because the term 'moral' can be filled in by whatever no-skeptical ethical theory you endorse.
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by ivanhoeIf the only possible options are choosing between two evils, then yes. If there is another option available that does not require choosing an evil, then moral perfection requires choosing the option that is not an evil.
So choosing an evil, in the case of choosing between two evils, is consistent with your definition of being "morally perfect" ?
31 Mar 05
Originally posted by NemesioSince God is omniscient, then given any set of potential actions He will know which is morally preferable (whatever you take that to mean). Since He is morally perfect, He will prefer the morally preferable action and act accordingly. No problems so far.
I'm not sure.
Either I think it is redundant (an omnipotent being is never faced
with 'making a choice' (of A over B) because, being omniscient, they
will know what the 'best' course of action is and, being omnipotent,
impose A);
or I think it is untestable (an apparently 'less moral' act may have
positive ramifications that we, being limit ...[text shortened]... aven't seen the full body of your proof. I am just raising
some preliminary flags.
Nemesio
I have no idea why you think that testability is at issue here. It is surely possible that any apparently bad event may, in fact, be logically necessary to bring about "positive ramifications". For any event, either it is the case that it is so necessary or it is not the case that it is so necessary. If you agree that there is at least one event that is not so necessary, then you agree with premise (2). If you think that all events are so necessary, then you reject premise (2). If you are unsure, then you are unsure about premise (2).
Once confusions about definitions are out of the way, I'll give you some reasons why you should accept premise (2).
01 Apr 05
Originally posted by pcaspianYou are deeply confused about the nature of logical possibility. An event E is logically possible if and only if the occurrence of E does not entail a contradiction. This is what logical possibility means. Hence, it is simply false that you can do all that it is logically possible for you to do. It is logically possible that you bring about the tranformation of all dogs into cats, merely be wishing it. Of course, this is not something you can actually do, it is merely logically possible that you could do it. In short, you are mistaking nomological possibility (possibility within the bounds of natural law) with logical possibility.
Originally posted by bbarr
[b]
Omnipotent (def.): An entity G is omnipotent if and only if G can do anything that is logically possible.
sigh.
The Christian God cannot commit a sin.
i.e. the Christian God is not Omnipotent. As the Christian God is not Omnipotent, by your definition He is not a God.
As this will not satisfy you ( ...[text shortened]... is logically possible for me to do. Omnipotence is irrelevant in your definition.
Have fun 😉[/b]
01 Apr 05
1 edit
Originally posted by ColettiWow, I can't believe this is so hard for you to understand.
I like the "logically possible" definition. Is it logically possible for God to sin? No. But that is by definition of sin. God can not sin, because anything God does would, by definition, be good. So for God to sin would be logically ...[text shortened]... ges on the definitions: of moral, common good, evil, sin, etc.
Once more, please read slowly:
Nothing in the argument depends upon any particular definition of 'moral'. The argument is constructed so that you may construe the terms 'morally preferable', 'greater good', and so according to your own definitions.
Jeez.
😕