Originally posted by Scriabin
logic is a creature of language and is human made.
it is meaningless to posit any premise that depends on the existence or characteristics of that which may or may not have made the physical universe, which we as yet cannot comprehend,
so the original question using the word "bound" or "binding" is meaningless.
every proposition depends on languag ...[text shortened]... et of music and the discussion might then stay in tune.
It is rather atonal, right now.
Yes, it is rather atonal. The theists that I referenced in my opening post generally use the word “God” to mean something like a supernatural being who created the cosmos and transcends it. Neither the phrase “transcends logic” nor the phrase “is not bound by logic” are original with me. But they have been used from time to time by some theists when confronted with a statement about their God that is logically contradictory.
My opening post was an attempt at a humorous questioning of what a God-being who can violate the rules of logic might be like—what that might mean, what kind of contradictory nature such a God might display. The first case was just a logical contradiction, the second case just illustrates that one can construct a “valid” (not the scare quotes)grammatical sentence that is meaningless ( a whimsical example of what Wittgenstein referred to as being bewitched by one’s own language into thinking that one is making some kind of sense).
You are, of course, correct that a valid logical argument need not be true; but an invalid logical argument cannot be true. (I perhaps should have specified that I was referring to deductive logic.)
Thus the question was not about truth, but about coherence: can it be in any way coherent ( can it make any sense) to reference, say, “the colorless red”? Can it make any sense to say: “God is a being who
exists outside of
space-time dimensionality”? Whatever else one thinks about the plausibility of an actual referent in this case? I certainly don’t object to your expanding on that to considerations of actual truth claims—so let’s go there…
When you say “it is
meaningless to posit any premise that depends on the existence or characteristics of that which may or may not have made the physical universe, which we as yet cannot comprehend”—in what way are you using that word “meaningless”? Do you mean to say that positing such a referent (or, I would say, positing a supernatural category) has no use-value for explaining what we cannot now comprehend of the natural universe? Do you mean that such a referent can only exacerbate incomprehensibility? Do you mean that there is simply no epistemic warrant for positing such a referent (that has been my position generally)? Or would you say that the notion of a supernatural being is itself incoherent?
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Note, behind all the fun and games on here, I’m basically a Zennist. My “bedrock referent” is simply the just-so-suchness (
tathata) of reality, of which I also inseparably am, prior to all our thinking/concept-making
about it. Adding a supernatural category is, for me, what is called “painting legs on a snake”. So is metaphysical speculation generally. You can imagine the Zen response to questions such as “why is a chair a chair?”. You’ve got some background there yourself, if I recall correctly.