A question to atheists

Originally posted by lucifershammer
One cannot make a prediction as to what would happen in an unprecedented situation and one cannot enquire into what might be causing a particular effect. If one cannot do that, then one cannot do experimental science.

What is Hume's "sceptical solution"?

EDIT: Here's a reasonably good essay on the point I'm making:-
http://www.friesian.com/hume.htm

No; we can and do make predictions, as Hume made clear. This is part of our idea of causation.

The sceptical solution can be read here:

http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/7.html

There is a reasonable summary (causation: the positive phase and necessity, connection and the definition of cause) here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/

The essay you posted doesn't makes the point you think. When the author writes:

That proteins, vitamins, carbohydrates, minerals, etc. explain the basis of human nutrition, and that electromagnetism and atomic, nuclear, and particle physics explain much of the fundamental behavior of matter, are not just things that escaped Hume's imagination -- they escaped everyone's imagination until the discovery of them was effected -- but they are things that occupy a cognitive space whose very existence Hume explicitly denied: They do not correspond to "impressions" any more than God or the soul do. By Hume's criterion they are "without any meaning or idea".

...the point is that in these cases there is a lack of "impressions", i.e. (roughly) "sense-data". The author is saying that for Hume, such impressions are necessary to form an idea of causation.

Originally posted by dottewell
No; we can and do make predictions, as Hume made clear. This is part of our idea of causation.

The sceptical solution can be read here:

http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/7.html

There is a reasonable summary (causation: the positive phase and necessity, connection and the definition of cause) here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume ...[text shortened]... s saying that for Hume, such impressions are necessary to form an idea of causation.

From the essay I posted:

The desire to know that drove Galileo, Newton, or Einstein cannot be addressed by a philosophical theory of knowledge that denies that any such knowledge can be had. No one who thought that "knowledge" was simply a "device for calculation" would bother to spend years in purely theoretical research; nor would anyone bother to trouble themselves with all the difficulty of mathematical study and scientific research if they believed the next step in nihilistic theory, that scientific "knowledge" is an arbitrary construction of power relationships. In that case, "knowledge" would tell us nothing either about the world or about practical results but simply would embody the power relationships that distribute goods according to the race, class, and gender construction built into it.

While Hume does not go as far as much more recent theory, it is rarely recognized, as it was by Kant, that he shut off much of science as well as religion with his empiricism. Since many great defenders and devotees of science in the 20th century, like the Logical Positivists, thought that Hume's philosophy was very nearly sufficient for a proper philosophy of science, this has been a very dangerous oversight....

And then the author makes the point about sense impressions.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
From the essay I posted:

The desire to know that drove Galileo, Newton, or Einstein cannot be addressed by a philosophical theory of knowledge that denies that any such knowledge can be had. No one who thought that "knowledge" was simply a "device for calculation" would bother to spend years in purely theoretical research; nor would anyone bothe ...[text shortened]... erous oversight....

And then the author makes the point about sense impressions.

But I don't recognise any of this as good criticism of Hume, as properly understood.

"The desire to know...", "nobody would bother..." - these are not serious arguments.

And as for knowledge as "arbitrary construction of power relationships" - clearly Hume himself would disagree entirely with this.

Originally posted by dottewell
But I don't recognise any of this as good criticism of Hume, as properly understood.

"The desire to know...", "nobody would bother..." - these are not serious arguments.

And as for knowledge as "arbitrary construction of power relationships" - clearly Hume himself would disagree entirely with this.

The philosophical foundation of science is that it is possible to know underlying causes (be they forces, particles, laws etc.) of effects. That is what defines and drives the scientific quest. Hume rejects that possibility.

Deductive logical arguments are not the only form of "serious" argument.
EDIT: If Hume's account of causation "removes the chair under" science (philosophically speaking) then one or the other must give way. Besides, my original argument stands - if Newton, Galileo and other fathers of modern science had accepted Hume's account of causality, the scientific quest would have come to an early end.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Deductive logical arguments are not the only form of "serious" argument.


EDIT: If Hume's account of causation "removes the chair under" science (philosophically speaking) then one or the other must give way. Besides, my original argument stands - if Newton, Galileo and other fathers of modern science had accepted Hume's account of causality, the scientific quest would have come to an early end.

It's not a bad argument because it isn't a "deductive logical" argument; it's a bad argument because it's based on a misunderstanding of Hume's view both of causality and human nature.

Why would scientists who adopted Hume's view not continue to look for causes, particularly if doing so could prove to be of use (in treating disease, in building tools and machines, etc.)?

And who's to say an "underlying cause" isn't just an observable, but as-yet-unobserved, cause?

Originally posted by dottewell
It's not a bad argument because it isn't a "deductive logical" argument; it's a bad argument because it's based on a misunderstanding of Hume's view both of causality and human nature.

Why would scientists who adopted Hume's view not continue to look for causes, particularly if doing so could prove to be of use (in treating disease, in building tools an ...[text shortened]... to say an "underlying cause" isn't just an observable, but as-yet-unobserved, cause?

That's the whole point of Hume's argument - causes aren't observable; therefore it's simply a matter of habit that we think they're real. If it isn't real, then there's no reason to expect, for instance, that the next time you give quinine to a patient with malaria he will get better.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
How nice of you to resort to stereotypical barbs!

Not only do the majority of the world's Christians believe (as a matter of doctrine) that everyone does not deserve hellfire, but they also believe that non-Christians can, indeed, go to heaven.

Your comment was either a result of ignorance or a deliberate ploy to score brownie points in t ...[text shortened]... structively contribute to (what I thought was) the reasonably polite discussion we were having.

My impression was that Christianity was about how everyone is a sinner, and that the just and righteous consequence for sin is Hell. Jesus died on the cross to save us from our own deserved fate as sinners by taking the sin upon himself. Am I incorrect?

Whether or not non-Christians can go to Heaven does not affect whether or not they deserve Hell for their sins, since Jesus supposedly saved people from this fate.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
My impression was that Christianity was about how everyone is a sinner, and that the just and righteous consequence for sin is Hell. Jesus died on the cross to save us from our own deserved fate as sinners by taking the sin upon himself. Am I incorrect?

No - but you're using the word "Hell" in two different ways (not to mention you used the inflammatory "hellfire" last time around). The word "hell" can be used to refer to a state of exclusion from God - and that's the sense you're using here. Hellfire as punishment, on the other hand, is about mortal sin (a deliberate, grave offence against God or man). Every sin is not mortal sin and does not deserve hellfire.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
No - but you're using the word "Hell" in two different ways (not to mention you used the inflammatory "hellfire" last time around). The word "hell" can be used to refer to a state of exclusion from God - and that's the sense you're using here. Hellfire as punishment, on the other hand, is about mortal sin (a deliberate, grave offence against God or man). Every sin is not mortal sin and does not deserve hellfire.

I see. I had no idea that one could be in Hell without Hellfire - yet Hellfire still has a place in the Christian worldview.

If I had said "Hell" instead of "Hellfire" would my post have been correct in your estimation?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
That's the whole point of Hume's argument - causes aren't observable; therefore it's simply a matter of habit that we think they're real. If it isn't real, then there's no reason to expect, for instance, that the next time you give quinine to a patient with malaria he will get better.

Again, you simply show that while you understand Hume's problem of causation, you haven't read (or perhaps understood) his sceptical solution.

We CANNOT DO OTHER than believe that - given a certain observed pattern of A, followed by B - that given A on this occasion, we shall see B. We will continue to do so even if, on closer inspection, we have no REASON to so do.

Originally posted by dottewell
Again, you simply show that while you understand Hume's problem of causation, you haven't read (or perhaps understood) his sceptical solution.

We CANNOT DO OTHER than believe that - given a certain observed pattern of A, followed by B - that given A on this occasion, we shall see B. We will continue to do so even if, on closer inspection, we have no REASON to so do.

What you're saying is closer to Kant than Hume.

Hume's point is never that we cannot but believe - his point is that our belief is (normally) strengthened by constant conjunction (or the idea is strengthened by constant conjunction - eventually becoming belief). Nevertheless, we can easily conceive that, given A, we shall see something other than B.

So, a Humean doctor who encounters another patient with malaria may expect his dosage of quinine to be followed by improvement -- but would not be surprised if no improvement followed. In fact, such an event would weaken the belief in the constant conjunction of quinine and improvment of malaria symptoms. This doctor has no reason(!) whatsoever to look for another cause for the worsening of this patient's situation.

This is the basic point - Science always tries to answer the question "Why?"; Hume says it has no answer (or no answer that is knowable).

Originally posted by lucifershammer
What you're saying is closer to Kant than Hume.

Hume's point is never that we cannot but believe - his point is that our belief is (normally) strengthened by constant conjunction (or the idea is strengthened by constant conjunction - eventually becoming belief). Nevertheless, we can easily conceive that, given A, we shall see something other than B to answer the question "Why?"; Hume says it has no answer (or no answer that is knowable).

No; all I am trying to do is explain to you what Hume actually said. I do wish you would read the links.

Hume thinks we cannot but believe that, given that "custom and habit" has led us to infer a causal link between various occurrences of A and various occurrences of B, that a further occurrence of A will lead to a further occurrence of B. We cannot but believe because this is INSTINCTIVE. It has nothing to do with reason (cf. Kant).

"as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding.

Of course we can conceive of A followed by "not B". We can't however BELIEVE it will happen.

Originally posted by dottewell
No; all I am trying to do is explain to you what Hume actually said. I do wish you would read the links.

Hume thinks we cannot but believe that, given that "custom and habit" has led us to infer a causal link between various occurrences of A and various occurrences of B, that a further occurrence of A will lead to a further occurrence of B. We cannot bu ...[text shortened]... course we can conceive of A followed by "not B". We can't however BELIEVE it will happen.

For completeness, I should add that I have never personally taken a Humean approach to causation, or indeed anything else.

But if you are going to criticise someone, you should at least know what it is that he or she actually said, and do them the courtesy (and yourself the favour) of trying to understand it.

Originally posted by dottewell
No; all I am trying to do is explain to you what Hume actually said. I do wish you would read the links.

Hume thinks we cannot but believe that, given that "custom and habit" has led us to infer a causal link between various occurrences of A and various occurrences of B, that a further occurrence of A will lead to a further occurrence of B. We cannot bu ...[text shortened]... course we can conceive of A followed by "not B". We can't however BELIEVE it will happen.

Thanks for the clarification.

Returning to my original point - do you think science would've progressed under a Humean conception of causality?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Thanks for the clarification.

Returning to my original point - do you think science would've progressed under a Humean conception of causality?

To be frank, I don't know enough about the history of science (and particularly recent science). But - although it is a deeply uninspiring and barren account - from a practical point of view, certainly in Hume's day, I find it difficult to see that it would have made any great difference whether a scientist was Humean or not.