Originally posted by EcstremeVenomGoogle "right to self-autonomy".
tell me if you can find self-autonomy in a websters dictionary. so you allow abortion to happen simply because it is none of your business? the benefits a woman gets from abortion, are the same as one gets for putting the kid up for adoption. the only difference is the kid lives in adoption, which is definitely the better choice. also, isnt "life" one of the inalienable rights? i believe that makes abortion unconstitutional.
Thank you for your learned opinion as regards the unconstitutionality of abortion.
Originally posted by EcstremeVenom...the benefits a woman gets from abortion, are the same as one gets for putting the kid up for adoption.
tell me if you can find self-autonomy in a websters dictionary. so you allow abortion to happen simply because it is none of your business? the benefits a woman gets from abortion, are the same as one gets for putting the kid up for adoption. the only difference is the kid lives in adoption, which is definitely the better choice. also, isnt "life" one of the inalienable rights? i believe that makes abortion unconstitutional.
Is that a fact, or are you merely giving your opinion? You'd be surprised to know that many, many women who opted to abort did it after weighing the pros and cons, and arriving at the conclusion that abortion's still the best action to take. For example, rape victims and baby found to have some sort of disease that renders it unlikely to survive anyway.
the only difference is the kid lives in adoption, which is definitely the better choice.
Do you know that as a fact, or that is only your opinion? How sure are you that it is 'definitely the better choice'?
i believe that makes abortion unconstitutional.
What is constitutional and unconstitutional depends on the constitutions of each country.
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Originally posted by BigDoggProblemKellyJay's posts have more of a sing-song quality, a rote recitation of how anyone who disagrees with him on the permissibility of abortion is really just a vicious supporter of baby killing. I'm surprised KJ hasn't shot an abortion doctor or blown up an abortion clinic since he claims to sincerely believe that the former are mass murderers and the latter equivalent to Auschwitz. Guess he either: A) Doesn't believe his own swill; or B) Is a moral coward.
I can't tell the difference between him and KellyJay.
Originally posted by EcstremeVenomThis doesn't make any sense. Why would his wife slap him for letting her decide? If she were against abortion, the situation would never come up. And if she decided to have an abortion, she'd obviously not be against it. Or do you think women who decide to have an abortion really do it because they want to test their husband and see if he intervenes? That's just absurd. Well, maybe she'd slap him because she'd find his assumption that she needs his authorisation condescending.
you would allow your wife to kill your baby? she would slap you for saying that, so would your mom
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Originally posted by dj2beckerThe putative father doesn't get a veto or a power to force an abortion since the entity is not residing inside the confines of his body. Whether he gets a "say" or not is up to the person who does have the entity inside the confines of her body.
Does the father get a say?
Originally posted by no1marauderThe Kate Bush song
The putative father doesn't get a veto or a power to force an abortion since the entity is not residing inside the confines of his body. Whether he gets a "say" or not is up to the person who does have the entity inside the confines of her body.
The man with a child in his eyes
has an important bearing on this debate.
| child is conceived as an act of communion between two people. Why should only one of these two people then be allowed to decide on his or her fate.
Everyone focuses on the moment of conception, which the Americans have shown occurs in a supermarket 45 minutes later, but for me it is the pre conception moment, namely
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Originally posted by LemonJelloYou gave a necessary but not sufficient condition -- there are numerous cases where this condition would be fulfilled, but it would obviously not be a person; the cadaver being case in point.
What do you mean? It's not surprising that these discussions often focus on necessary conditions because in order to make my point, it is enough to show that the young fetus lacks even one necessary condition for moral consideration. A formal criterion (which is not necessary for this discussion in my opinion) would outline necessary and sufficient cond ...[text shortened]... , bbarr, I, and others (Nemesio too I think) participated in discussion more along those lines.
I see our positions as differing on the following: there are obvious cases where "persons" aren't functioning as "persons" -- I claim that their personhood is thus grounded in their being -- you claim that this is rather grounded in some necessary causal conditions being fulfilled.
Here's the problem: by definition, when there is a state of non-function, functional sufficiency has not been achieved. In other words, some of the necessary criterion may be fulfilled, but they haven't culminated in a functional person. In the case of deep sleep, consciousness is missing. In the case of the cadaver, the neural structure is present, but there is no life. So.... what happens when we create robots that can function as persons? Do we create an entirely new set of criterion: charged battery, CMOS, > 200GHz microprocessor, operating system 1.0 or later? How about when an intelligent alien race arrives that has an entirely different bio-chemical makeup? Do we simply expand the criterion and require a certain percentage to be met to qualify?
As I see it, you've made two large interdependent categories of criterion: functional criteria, and causal criteria -- personhood being decided by latent qualification in the first and active qualification in the second. The first would probably include, but not be exhausted by criteria such as reasoning, deciding, imagining, talking, experiencing love and beauty, remembering, intending. I can provisionally accept the functional criteria.
The second set of criteria is where I think your "personhood qualification standard" runs aground:
Firstly, it is clumsy and arbitrary. It would seem that with the current causal criteria, only humans would qualify – since what may be necessary for human persons is not necessary for electronic persons and vice versa. Isn’t this exactly what the personhood argument is trying to overcome? I think that I made quite a good case for personhood being ontologically grounded rather than in some trumped up “necessary causal criteria”.
Secondly, it fails to come to terms with the developmental process of all persons. Personhood has become some arbitrary line in the sand decided upon by the intellectual “elite” where one moment a developing being is a “non-person” and then the next that same being becomes a “person”.
Btw, you’ll notice that for the sake of argument, I took the fetus at 7 weeks rather than a zygote because at this stage all the organs are already in development – i.e. some of your “causal criteria” should have been met by now.
Originally posted by amannionJack and Jill are marooned on an otherwise deserted island. A mentally healthy Jack is quadriplegic and is therefore entirely dependent on Jill for his life -- she picks berries and feeds him, etc. By your definition, Jack is expendable and can be wantonly 'bumped off'.
You all seem to be misunderstanding me. There is nothing different about the foetus before the birth or the baby after, except for the fact that before the birth the foetus is entirely dependent on the mother for its life, after the birth you could discard the mother and the baby can still survive.
That's what I mean by the obvious difference. The key is the relationship with the mother. Before birth the mother is everything. After, not so much.
Sounds like a variation of the Nazi T-4 program.
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Originally posted by HalitoseYou gave a necessary but not sufficient condition
You gave a necessary but not sufficient condition -- there are numerous cases where this condition would be fulfilled, but it would obviously not be a person; the cadaver being case in point.
I see our positions as differing on the following: there are obvious cases where "persons" aren't functioning as "persons" -- I claim that their personhood is thus eady in development – i.e. some of your “causal criteria” should have been met by now.
I know. In this discussion, I just need to show that the young fetus lacks even one necessary condition for personhood. I claim that the capacity for consciousness, for example, is one that it lacks. Of course, you're the one who would need to show something about sufficiency in order to make your point.
there are obvious cases where "persons" aren't functioning as "persons"...you claim that this is rather grounded in some necessary causal conditions being fulfilled.
That is certainly not what I claim. Our positions here differ over the status of the early fetus. I think it's clearly not a person because it lacks necessary conditions for personhood. You think it's a person, but honestly I don't really understand what sufficient conditions you think the early fetus satisfies.
functional sufficiency
Functional sufficiency (as in the sense you mean, as in the state of exercising capacities at least minimally relevant to personhood) is not the issue. No sensible person would claim that a fully developed human being who is sleeping and not exercising consciousness is therefore not a person. What's so difficult about this concept? A sleeping person nevertheless possesses the capacity to exercise consciousness; a zygote doesn't.
So.... what happens when we create robots that can function as persons?
I don't understand your questions here. If a robot satisfied conditions for being a person, it would be a person. If an alien satisfied conditions for being a person, it would be a person. If a piece of mud satisfied conditions for being a person, it would be a person. What's the problem here?
I think you're just largely confused because you take my discussion about minimal or necessary conditions to be a discussion of a criterion of personhood or a discussion about the definition of a person, which of course it isn't. In this thread, I have only argued that the fetus lacks necessary conditions (What more do I need to argue? If it lacks necessary conditions for personhood, then definitionally it cannot be a person.).
As I see it, you've made two large interdependent categories of criterion: functional criteria, and causal criteria -- personhood being decided by latent qualification in the first and active qualification in the second.
I don't know what you are talking about. You're wrong in any case because my own view of a criterion of personhood denies 'latent' qualifications because it is concerned with actual possession of certain capacities. If you really want to know my view on a criterion of personhood, it would be similar to the one discussed in that other thread: a person is some thing that possesses the capacity for rudimentary rationality, self-consciousness and suffering. Obviously, when I talked earlier about the capacity for consciousness, I was talking about more or less minimal considerations: as in, if the fetus doesn't have it, well then it's certainly not a person.
I don't understand your other points about robots and aliens. If a robot had the capacity for rudimentary rationality, self-consciousness and suffering, then I would consider it a person. Same goes for an alien or any thing. Also, a disclaimer here would be that I certainly do not think personhood exhausts all morally relevant considerations: I think we have at least prima facie obligations concerning all pain and suffering.
It would seem that with [your] criteria, only humans would qualify – since what may be necessary for human persons is not necessary for electronic persons and vice versa.
You can plainly see above that my own view on personhood has absolutely nothing to do with species membership. It doesn't even have any necessary connection with biological life.
I think that I made quite a good case for personhood being ontologically grounded
Honestly, I'm not sure I understand your case to be anything other than an appeal to potentiality. What exactly is your case concerning the status of the fetus? Better yet, why exactly is the zygote at conception -- a single diploid cell -- a person?
Secondly, it fails to come to terms with the developmental process of all persons. Personhood has become some arbitrary line in the sand
My view is not arbitrary, unlike some theo-teleological views on this subject (I'm not pointing any fingers at you here btw; I'm just saying).
Btw, you’ll notice that for the sake of argument, I took the fetus at 7 weeks rather than a zygote because at this stage all the organs are already in development – i.e. some of your “causal criteria” should have been met by now.
Hopefully after reading this post, you will see now how you mischaracterized my view and confused my discussions on minimal considerations with something like a discussion on a formal criterion. And no, the embryo at 7 weeks is not a person.
Originally posted by HalitoseSounds like yet another red herring to me.
Jack and Jill are marooned on an otherwise deserted island. A mentally healthy Jack is quadriplegic and is therefore entirely dependent on Jill for his life -- she picks berries and feeds him, etc. By your definition, Jack is expendable and can be wantonly 'bumped off'.
Sounds like a variation of the Nazi T-4 program.