Originally posted by twhitehead
Validity is not based on people opinion. If the earth is a sphere not flat then it is so whether or not different societies believe it to be so. When the Jews commited genocide in the OT, it was wrong whether or not they, you or God believed it to be right.

validity of scientifical facts are not based on people's opinions(sometimes even those are relative)

the fact that you say that jews commiting genocide is wrong only demonstrates the relativity of moral rules because the jews said it was right. in their society killing people of other faith was right. they were a nomadic tribe, no home so they needed a place. so they killed instead of asking them nicely to leave their homes, or to allow them to live which would have caused change in their society. the killed people didn't think it was right. but the jews did. and unless you get an outside arbiter to comment on the rightness or wrongness of the act(which relative means), the act was right.

the fact that you can say it was wrong and should have been morrally wrong for the jews as well is irrelevant. the jews did what was right for their survivability.

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
in their society killing people of other faith was right.

No it wasn't. They simply believed it was right.

the fact that you can say it was wrong and should have been morrally wrong for the jews as well is irrelevant. the jews did what was right for their survivability.
Suvivability has nothing to do with morality. The Jews themselves probably didn't think it was right. It was only later appologist who decided that it must have been a commandment of God. Its rather like the Iraq war where a lot of americans think it was wrong even though they still supported it (for the oil, self protection etc) of course Bush claims God told him to do it.

But you refuse to hear what I am saying, so I'll stop bothering.

Originally posted by twhitehead
No it wasn't. They simply believed it was right.

[b]the fact that you can say it was wrong and should have been morrally wrong for the jews as well is irrelevant. the jews did what was right for their survivability.
Suvivability has nothing to do with morality. The Jews themselves probably didn't think it was right. It was only later appologist wh ...[text shortened]... ms God told him to do it.

But you refuse to hear what I am saying, so I'll stop bothering.[/b]

you had the last say so you win

Originally posted by Zahlanzi
you had the last say so you win

I'm not trying to win or loose. I am trying to discuss (not just debate) certain issues so that I can learn from others and they can learn from me.
If someone has valid points, then I am willing to learn from them. You however seem to be quite happy arguing something that makes no sense, and you apparently dont believe either.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I'm not trying to win or loose. I am trying to discuss (not just debate) certain issues so that I can learn from others and they can learn from me.
If someone has valid points, then I am willing to learn from them. You however seem to be quite happy arguing something that makes no sense, and you apparently dont believe either.

Here are two questions that should be answered before a debate like this is meaningful:

(1) What class of normative propositions is at issue?

(2) What would count as evidence in favor of the claim that the class of normative propositions at issue is relativistic?

Originally posted by bbarr

(1) What class of normative propositions is at issue?

(2) What would count as evidence in favor of the claim that the class of normative propositions at issue is relativistic?

This sort: "You may (not) execute a person for committing adultery".

Evidence: Adultery could be punished by stoning in Biblical times and can still be in, eg., northern Nigeria, but is absolutely not countenanced in modern countries with different legal norms.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Evidence: Adultery could be punished by stoning in Biblical times and can still be in, eg., northern Nigeria, but is absolutely not countenanced in modern countries with different legal norms.

Although legal norms do often reflect the norms of the populace, it is not neccesarily the case. There are also circumstances which may affect the situation. For example the death penalty may be more desirable if incarceration is not an option.

I personally do not dispute that people have different moral codes. That is obvious (and all that you are showing in your statement). What I do dispute is the way people were phrasing it to imply that morals are some sort of entity in themselves and that they are changing over time. I also dispute that it is reasonable to apply morals differently by date eg anyone who says "It was OK to stone adulterers in Biblical times but is not OK nowadays". They then present as evidence the moral codes of a person from biblical times and a person from nowadays - which is a different thing altogether.

In addition I believe there is a set of moral codes that is absolute - and that is my moral code. I believe that anyone who violates my moral code is doing something 'wrong'.
If that was not the case it would hardly be a moral code.

Originally posted by bbarr
Here are two questions that should be answered before a debate like this is meaningful:

(1) What class of normative propositions is at issue?

(2) What would count as evidence in favor of the claim that the class of normative propositions at issue is relativistic?

Alternatively:

1. The set of normative propositions implicit in my moral code.

2. The existence of moral codes different from mine.

My response might be based on a misconstrual of 'normative proposition'; I'll wait and see.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
This sort: "You may (not) execute a person for committing adultery".

Evidence: Adultery could be punished by stoning in Biblical times and can still be in, eg., northern Nigeria, but is absolutely not countenanced in modern countries with different legal norms.

O.K. Let's call the proposition you specify above 'P'. You claim that it is evidence for relativism that P has been denied by other cultures. But what is the evidential relation here? The fact that cultures disagree about the nature of the world does not entail, or even bear an evidential connection to the claim that facts about the world are in any way determined by cultures, or agreement within cultures, or agreement between cultures. Why should it be any different with propositions such as P? Note that what is at issue here is not whether P is true or false, but rather whether the truth conditions for P rest upon or are determined by facts about what beliefs are endemic to a culture.

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K. Let's call the proposition you specify above 'P'. You claim that it is evidence for relativism that P has been denied by other cultures. But what is the evidential relation here? The fact that cultures disagree about the nature of the world does not entail, or even bear an evidential connection to the claim that facts about the world are in any way de ...[text shortened]... tions for P rest upon or are determined by facts about what beliefs are endemic to a culture.

I don't understand the relevance of truth conditions for P. Within a given set of culturally determined rules, P or -P (is that how you do it).

I also regard cultural norms as part of facts about the world (it is a fact that a given culture has given rules that constrain behaviour).

I have great difficulty with your analytical mode of thinking but I'll appreciate it if you'll bear with me.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
I don't understand the relevance of truth conditions for P. Within a given set of culturally determined rules, P or -P (is that how you do it).

I also regard cultural norms as part of facts about the world (it is a fact that a given culture has given rules that constrain behaviour).

I have great difficulty with your analytical mode of thinking but I'll appreciate it if you'll bear with me.

Maybe some basic terminology would help:

Descriptive Propositions are those that state some non-normative matter of fact.

Normative Propositions are those that have evaluative or prescriptive content. These propositions purport to tell us what to value, what our reasons are, how we should deliberate, what we should do, etc. They typically use evaluative or normative terminology like "ought", "should", "right", "wrong", "good", "bad", "valuable", "obligatory", "forbidden", "permissible", etc.

Descriptive Cultural Relativism (DCR): Different cultures disagree about the truth of propositions like P. More generally, different cultures disagree about the truth of various normative propositions. DCR itself is a descriptive proposition. It tells us nothing about what is right or wrong, good or bad, but merely that cultures disagree about these things.

Normative Cultural Relativism (NCR): For a subject S, who is a member of culture C, an act A is permissible for S just in case it is a generally accepted norm of C that A is permissible. Similarly, A is respectively obligatory or forbidden just in case it is a generally accepted norm of C that A is respectively obligatory or forbidden. NCR is an ethical theory that aims to specify what we should do. It recommends that we hew to the norms of our culture, and (if you think that normative propositions like P actually have truth-conditions) entails the following proposition:

Metaethical Cultural Relativism (MCR): The truth-conditions for propositions like P are culturally relative; they derive from what is generally accepted by individual cultures. On this view it makes no sense to ask whether propositions like P are true or false without first answering the question "for whom?". We can ask whether P is true for those in ancient Jerusalem, or for those living in modern-day Houston, but not whether P is true simpliciter. On this view, what makes propositions like P true are facts about what a culture generally accepts or generally does not accept.

Does all this make sense?

Originally posted by bbarr
Maybe some basic terminology would help:

Descriptive Propositions are those that state some non-normative matter of fact.

Normative Propositions are those that have evaluative or prescriptive content. These propositions purport to tell us what to value, what our reasons are, how we should deliberate, what we should do, etc. They typically use evaluativ ...[text shortened]... rally accepts or generally does not accept.

Does all this make sense?

It makes sense if one is a lawyer, or a philosopher, but to the average human being it's just alot of words to explain what someone with a little common sense knows intuitively. Knowing the difference between right and wrong, good and evil, or what is moral or immoral, doesn't require experience or education. Even a child knows the difference.

Originally posted by josephw
It makes sense if one is a lawyer, or a philosopher, but to the average human being it's just alot of words to explain what someone with a little common sense knows intuitively. Knowing the difference between right and wrong, good and evil, or what is moral or immoral, doesn't require experience or education. Even a child knows the difference.

We are not talking about whether there is a difference between right and wrong nor how one comes to know such a difference. So it is pretty clear that you don't understand what is going on in the post above or this debate generally.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Alternatively:

1. The set of normative propositions implicit in my moral code.

2. The existence of moral codes different from mine.

My response might be based on a misconstrual of 'normative proposition'; I'll wait and see.

Contrast:

(1) The set of descriptive beliefs I have about the physical world.

(2) The existence of descriptive beliefs, incompatible with my beliefs, that others hold.

Is the second claim evidence for relativism concerning the set of descriptive propositions about the physical world?

Originally posted by twhitehead
In the thread Thread 94960 a lot of people are arguing that morals are not absolute. I am not convinced by the arguments.
For example:
Originally posted by FabianFnas
[b]I don't think there are absolute moral laws. Every moral law is subject to the culture.
In my culture female circumcision is awfully morally wrong, but in other c ies to be totally wrong. Either morals are absolute or they are unique to every individual.

What do you mean by "absolute" ? To me if a moral absolute (eg X is wrong) is true then it means that even if everyone in the world thought X is right , X would still be wrong.

A moral can be ..

a) an opinion (either held by a majority or a few)
Or

b) a moral fact established by moral realities which transcend human opinions.

To use your raping a child analogy. Would raping a child become "right" if everyone in the world thought it was , or would it still be a moral absolute (eg a factual truth).

So what you need to ask yourself is whether morals are....

a) ultimately opinions which do not correspond to any objective reality that cannot be absolute because there is no external objective verification possible. (eg- is De vinci's work or Angelo's the most beautiful?)

OR

b) an actual objective reality or real moral law which exists independent of men's opinions or views. (eg- the view that the world was flat can be verified against an objective truth , the world is round and no amount of opinion can change it)

To me b) is "absolute" --- any thing less than b) can always be reduced down to nothing more than human subjective opinion. I could argue that Hitler was right and even if I am the only one , if there is no "absolute" moral truth then no-one can really argue that I am wrong . Just in the same way as I could argue De Vinci 's work is more beautiful than Angelo's , how could I be proved wrong?

The only way to believe in absolute morals is to believe in an absolute moral reality.