Absurd Escapism

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't think moral facts get "established" at all in the sense you mean, just like I don't think facts in any other realm of discourse get "established". I think facts as entities are rather sui generis. However, I don't make any special pleading for the case of moral facts, as opposed to any other sorts of facts. On my view, facts deal with wa ...[text shortened]... r to plausibility and much deeper in explanative substance than a subjectivist views like yours.

As I get this argument I think Fetchmyjunk is appealing to some sort of ideal observer theory, although I'm not sure it does exactly what he wants it to do. There's an assumption that the ideal observer knows all the relevant facts and has moral preconceptions which are ideal. So the properties of the ideal observer entail ethical reality, in other words that there are ontological objects that are morals. So either you are right and Fetchmyjunk has a sort of unipolar subjectivist account, with a single moral superpower and moral choices reduced to a decision on whether to "get with the program" or not, or he can't avoid making an ontological claim for morals being real in some sense.

Theft makes a useful specific example of something we might intuitively think of being immoral, in English law it's defined as taking without consent with the intention to deprive permanently. The second part of the definition concerns criminal intent and is objective, the ideal observer knows all the relevant facts including the state of mind of the accused so can make an objective call on the presence of mens rea. The first part has an action, taking some object, and a reference to a protocol surrounding the taking of objects. The action is clearly a fact, either the accused took the object or not. The protocol assumes an ownership relation between objects and people that entail exclusive rights over the object. Suppose the object stolen was a book, the owner entered a bookshop, handed the chosen book to a shop assistant who used a scanner to read information about the book, the person handed over a small rectangle of plastic and information on distant computers changed. The assistant put the book and a piece of paper with a record of the changes on the distant computers into a bag and this somehow generated the ownership relationship between the book and the person. Had either the taker had the owner's consent to take the book or had the book not had an owner then the taking of the book would not have broken the consent protocol and couldn't be construed as being immoral. The data on the distant machines concerned amounts of money but, although there may be a record of the purchase the identity of the thing bought is not necessary to the accountancy procedure. So the question of whether our ideal observer could know all the relevant facts given the legal definition and make a decision based on what English law seems to make it an objective procedure. The problem is that what the law is is well defined whereas in assessing the morality of the situation we have no way of deciding whether an ideal observer recognizes the ownership relation and associated protocol as being relevant to deciding the morality of the situation. Unless one insists that the taking of books is always wrong then the only facts are the owner's rights over the property and the protocol regarding respecting those rights. I don't see any plausible reason that an ideal observer should necessarily agree that the way humans generate protocols for their social structures has any bearing on moral questions. So, although the question of whether an action is moral or not seems at least in part to surround whether a protocol has been followed its not clear that an ideal observer should of necessity agree that the requirement to follow protocols determines the moral status of an action. That taking without consent is immoral seems to hang on whether a protocol needs to be followed in a given situation. So Fetchmyjunk's position seems to make a huge ontological claim that a requirement to follow protocol is somehow built into the fabric of the universe which seems absurd.

Originally posted by DeepThought
As I get this argument I think Fetchmyjunk is appealing to some sort of ideal observer theory, although I'm not sure it does exactly what he wants it to do. There's an assumption that the ideal observer knows all the relevant facts and has moral preconceptions which are ideal. So the properties of the ideal observer entail ethical reality, in ot ...[text shortened]... uirement to follow protocol is somehow built into the fabric of the universe which seems absurd.

I doubt Fetchmyjunk's view qualifies as a form of ideal observer theory, though. One of his main assertions is that in the absence of an "unchanging moral lawgiver" there are no moral absolutes. He later qualified this somewhat by asserting that in the absence of God, no morals are absolute. So, his view seems to hold that morals or their predication depend in some substantive way on the existence of God. And that's generally inconsistent with ideal observer theory, which is more in the vein of hypothetical construct. The ideal observer is defined in some way, and ethical predication proceeds through dispositional analysis of the ideal observer; but it's essentially irrelevant whether or not the ideal observer exists. Contrastingly, somehow on Fetchmyjunk's view, whether or not God exists is relevant. Again, this points toward a form of subjectivism regarding moral ontology, whereas ideal observer theory, properly construed, is objectivist in an ontological sense.

Here's a good paper by Roderick Firth that gives some description of the general characteristics of ideal observer theory ( Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer , 1952). He argues that it is absolutist, dispositional, objectivist, etc, etc, and so forth. Of particular relevance here, toward the bottom of page 320 Firth outlines three flavors of absolutist dispositional accounting. Ideal observer theory concerns flavor #2, whereas I think Fetchmyjunk's probably falls under #1.

http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/104_Master_File/104_Readings/Firth/Firth%20-%20Ideal%20Observer.pdf

Originally posted by DeepThought
So Fetchmyjunk's position seems to make a huge ontological claim that a requirement to follow protocol is somehow built into the fabric of the universe which seems absurd.

There are two main meanings for the word 'morality'. One refers to how you treat others, specifically the basic rule of not causing unnecessary harm and the other refers to following societal norms. The two are strongly related and overlap.
If we take the first meaning, then it would follow that theft is typically wrong, but it would not require the basic moral law to include all the intricacies of English law. Rather the 'fabric of the universe' would contain a very small set of very simple statements about when it is morally wrong to cause harm or allow harm to come to another. The actual details of a given situation may be worked out for the unique situation and would not be considered part of the moral law - just as English law on theft does not detail every single possible situation.

I wonder, is digital piracy theft?

LJ- do you believe certain actions are always universally morally wrong? Yes or No?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
LJ- do you believe certain actions are always universally morally wrong? Yes or No?

I'm really not sure what you are asking me. What does it mean to say a certain action is "always universally morally wrong"?

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm really not sure what you are asking me. What does it mean to say a certain action is "always universally morally wrong"?

If you were to give an educated guess as to what I am asking, what would it be?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
If you were to give an educated guess as to what I am asking, what would it be?

To get the ball rolling, actions that are always universally morally wrong are those that are always universally morally wrong. No other wording is needed, nor will it be accurate and complete.

Now: how can we tell if an action is an action that is always universally morally wrong? Are there criteria? What are they?

Must it have occurred? IOW, can an action that has not occurred be "always universally morally wrong? Hypothetical constructs such as "taking a loaf of bread without paying" tend to be simplifications compared to actual events.

How does an action come to be always universally morally wrong?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
If you were to give an educated guess as to what I am asking, what would it be?

Well, I do not really know, which is of course why I asked. The only time when I felt like you were clear in your terminology is when you stated previously that at issue is whether or not there are actions that are morally evil (or good) irrespective of conceivable circumstance. If pressed, I would guess that is what you are still going on about, but it's honestly confusing to me that you would redescribe it as actions that are “always universally morally wrong”. Hence my question of clarification, which you deflected instead of answering. Supposing this is what you intend, it's also a bit tiresome, since I have answered that question – not once but twice – already in this thread. It would show an alarming lack of respect on your part for failing to pay attention to what your interlocutor says, that I would have to repeat myself multiple times in answer to the same question of yours.

So, assuming you're just asking me the same question over and over, I'll oblige you one more time. So, for the third time now, no my view does not recognize any actions that are morally evil (or good) irrespective of conceivable circumstance (assuming this is what mean, in your willful lack of clarifying what exactly you mean by an action that is "always universally morally wrong" ). The reason my view does not recognize any such actions is because my conception of 'action' is tied fundamentally to intentionality, which in turn concerns a host of circumstantial factors. And those factors tie into my theory of action – that is, into my explanative program of action. And I simply do not think such factors can be ignored in moral assessment of an action. The relevant factors regarding intentionality include things like the reasons and motivational states of the actor, as well as circumstantial setting. In other words, the conceptual content of 'action' minimally only outlines what an agent (intentionally) does. But, what I am saying is that the details of the intentionality morally matter. The same act in description can be done for lots of different reasons, under lots of different mental states of the actor, and in lots of different circumstantial settings. The idea that you can simply ignore such considerations in assessment of the moral status of actions generally, or even certain actions in particular, strikes me as implausible. If that were the case, we could have some simple codification of action-based moral rules that are inviolable and invariant with respect to contextual matters. And I consider that a fantasy, given the complex nature of moral situations.

For instance, you could try the following claim:

(1) It is "always universally morally wrong" to kill a fellow person.

That's obviously very dubious. After all, one can point to any number of conceivable circumstances where the claim does not seem to hold. Justified self-defense, hypothetical cases involving coercion or invoking the doctrine of double effect, perhaps justified cases of mercy killing, etc, etc. The list of counterexamples would go on and on, some more debatable than others, and such counterexamples affirm the fact that the underlying circumstances of intentionality matter. The counterexamples point to reasons on the part of the actor and other circumstantial factors that lend moral justification to the action.

You could try a different approach that might insulate the claim from these sorts of objections, such as:

(2) It is "always universally morally wrong" to kill a fellow person for no good reason.

And while (2) may turn out to be true, it would not suffice to show that there are certain actions that are morally wrong irrespective of conceivable circumstance. On the contrary, it is perfectly consistent with the denial of this idea because (2) has a built-in delimitation on the circumstances: it basically excludes out of hand potential cases where the actor does have a good reason, which is at best question-begging. So (2) would be a non-starter with respect to your intent.

Similarly, something like (3) fails for the same kind of reasons that (1) fails:

(3) It is "always universally morally wrong" to bring harm and suffering on a fellow person.

Similarly, something like (4) fails for the same kind of reasons that (2) fails:

(4) It is "always universally morally wrong" to bring gratuitous harm and suffering on a fellow person.

Now, quid pro quo. Discussions are a two-way street. Please provide an explicit example of a certain action that you would claim is "always universally morally wrong". Please also provide some reasons why you think the action qualifies as such. If I disagree, I’ll be happy to rebut.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Well, I do not really know, which is of course why I asked. The only time when I felt like you were clear in your terminology is when you stated previously that at issue is whether or not there are actions that are morally evil (or good) irrespective of conceivable circumstance. If pressed, I would guess that is what you are still going on about, but it ...[text shortened]... some reasons why you think the action qualifies as such. If I disagree, I’ll be happy to rebut.

100 quid he resurrects the old 'torturing babies for fun' scenario.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Well, I do not really know, which is of course why I asked. The only time when I felt like you were clear in your terminology is when you stated previously that at issue is whether or not there are actions that are morally evil (or good) irrespective of conceivable circumstance. If pressed, I would guess that is what you are still going on about, but it ...[text shortened]... some reasons why you think the action qualifies as such. If I disagree, I’ll be happy to rebut.

The Ghost jumped the gun. So I'll modify the question. In which context would you regard it not to be morally wrong for one person to rape another person for the sole purpose of having fun?

Some people view 'having fun' as a perfectly good reason to do things.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
The Ghost jumped the gun. So I'll modify the question. In which context would you regard it not to be morally wrong for one person to rape another person for the sole purpose of having fun?

Some people view 'having fun' as a perfectly good reason to do things.

What you don't see is that it is possible to morally disapprove of an act in the strongest possible terms, without exception, without belief that it is "always universally morally wrong". This is the difference between contemplating in the abstract and acting in a real situation. In a real situation the moral justification need not be philosophically justified. It need only be an act that I cannot abide.

Originally posted by JS357
What you don't see is that it is possible to morally disapprove of an act in the strongest possible terms, without exception, without belief that it is "always universally morally wrong". This is the difference between contemplating in the abstract and acting in a real situation. In a real situation the moral justification need not be philosophically justified. It need only be an act that I cannot abide.

Surely if you are going to claim that it is not 'always universally morally wrong' you should easily be able to think of a circumstance where it is morally acceptable.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
The Ghost jumped the gun. So I'll modify the question. In which context would you regard it not to be morally wrong for one person to rape another person for the sole purpose of having fun?

Some people view 'having fun' as a perfectly good reason to do things.

If the rapist is mad then it would be difficult to describe it as morally wrong. The act was a result of insanity and not immorality, since the perpetrator is, by assumption, not responsible for their own actions. Note that 'not morally wrong' is not the same as 'morally right', I don't think the law of divided middle holds here. If a branch from a tree kills someone during a storm we don't make complaints about how the storm or the tree were immoral. Basically it's always possible to form a counterexample.

Your argument seems to be along the lines of:

"If God does not exist then there can be no moral absolutes, there are moral absolutes, so by modus tollens God exists."

Even if we accept the first sentence, which I don't for reasons that have been discussed above, your line of argument suffers from the problem that you are appealing to people's moral intuition and so the best you can hope for is:

"If God does not exist then there can be no moral absolutes, our intuition is that there are moral absolutes, so by modus tollens it is intuitive to believe that God exists."

So the best you can hope for is a weak conclusion and you still have to justify the notion that God is necessary for the existence of moral absolutes.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
Surely if you are going to claim that it is not 'always universally morally wrong' you should easily be able to think of a circumstance where it is morally acceptable.

Continuing the discussion of moral absolute as "always universally morally wrong"..you ask for an example of when rape is morally acceptable.

Let me use a less politically charged (in these forums) example, for starters.

Is robbing banks morally acceptable? Suppose I kidnap your daughter and threaten to kill her unless you (with a fake gun) rob a bank and deliver the money to me. The kidnapping and threat are real. You are convinced one of them will happen. Is it morally acceptable for you to rob the bank?

Now you may believe that if is not morally acceptable for you to rob the bank under any circumstances -- it is a moral absolute. The stakes can be different, the threat could be rape and not murder, or rape and murder, the act could be shoplifting a loaf of bread, not bank robbery. So is it always morally unacceptable to violate a moral absolute, to prevent another violation from occurring, no matter what the moral acts are? Or are there some moral rules that are absolutes and some that are not?

Here is a proposed moral solution -- always choose the path to the lesser evil, to the best of your ability. Shall we call that an absolute?.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
The Ghost jumped the gun. So I'll modify the question. In which context would you regard it not to be morally wrong for one person to rape another person for the sole purpose of having fun?

Some people view 'having fun' as a perfectly good reason to do things.

First, how exactly does your example describe an action irrespective of conceivable circumstance? Again, a standard concept of 'action' only concerns what an agent intentionally does (or unintentionally does but the intentional case is formally more fundamental). It is not committed to any account regarding the intentionality. So, the point you have to realize it this: when you provide the bare action of what the person does (rape another person) but have to further specify aspects of the intentionality behind it (done for sole purpose of having fun) in order to make your point, then it is already debatable whether or not your description qualifies as one of an action irrespective of conceivable circumstance. You're already kind of making my point of rebuttal for me, since you are affirming that the contextual specifics of intentionality matter and that it is not good enough to look to the content of bare action in and of itself. At any rate, even this example of yours that does further specify context regarding intentionality probably fails to be "always universally morally wrong". DeepThought has already outlined a locus of counterexamples, regarding insanity. Another locus of counterexamples would be hypothetical circumstances suggesting the intentionality somehow fails to be genuinely sourced by the agent, perhaps implanted somehow by a third party. No, I don't think your example will fly. And the problem you will have from here is this: if you try some ad hoc further stipulation to your example in order to get around these sorts of objections (like stipulating that these other hypothetical problematic circumstances do not obtain because the actor is of sound mind and of genuine intentions, yada yada yada) then the less and less your example will have anything to do with describing an action irrespective of conceivable circumstance.