Affirming Naturalism Presupposes God

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]So although you stated it as if it followed from your argument, in reality it doesn't follow from your argument and you just take the word of Plantinga?

The pages I refer you to contain the probability calculus that you're looking for, which you are more than welcome to assign your own values to. On the contrary, I'm taking Hume's word for it ld-view. Therefore, in order to affirm naturalism one must presuppose God's existence.[/b]

On the contrary, I'm taking Hume's word for it

Huh? Twhitehead asked you about the probability under consideration in P's argument (the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable conditioned on the conjunction of naturalism and contemporary evolutionary explanation). What could Hume have to say on the probability of something conditioned on contemporary evolutionary explanation?

Originally posted by LemonJello
According to mainstream biology, behavior is governed entirely by biochemistry—conscious belief being little more than a shadow cast by the inner workings of that biochemistry. Of what import is it to our biology whether or not the content of our beliefs are on the whole true or not? Any beliefs would have to be accidental as far as evolution bility is not as high as one might think, but his argument in that respect is not convincing.

That is just BS. Please provide some credible references that demonstrate that "mainstream biology" is committed to semantic epiphenomenalism.

Do you doubt that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes? If so, provide some credible references that demonstrate otherwise.

At any rate, Plantinga's argument is not restricted to epiphenomenalism...

Definitely not, but Plantinga does say, "it is exceedingly hard to see... how epiphenomenalism—semantic or simpliciter—can be avoided, given N [naturalism]" (Warranted Christian Belief, p. 236).

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]On the contrary, I'm taking Hume's word for it

Huh? Twhitehead asked you about the probability under consideration in P's argument (the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable conditioned on the conjunction of naturalism and contemporary evolutionary explanation). What could Hume have to say on the probability of something conditioned on contemporary evolutionary explanation?[/b]

I concede the point.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
That is just BS. Please provide some credible references that demonstrate that "mainstream biology" is committed to semantic epiphenomenalism.

Do you doubt that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes? If so, provide some credible references that demonstrate otherwise.

At any rate, Plantinga's argument is pliciter—can be avoided, given N [naturalism]" (Warranted Christian Belief, p. 236).

Do you doubt that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes?

You seem to think that if one is committed to the idea that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes (or by solely physical events or by neural events that in turn cause muscular events or some such, etc), then he is further committed to epiphenomenalism. That is not the case. As a simple example, a monist can very well hold that mental events are identical with physical events, and he can avoid any threat of epiphenomenalism within such a framework. Perhaps you are too wrapped up in dualistic mindset. Your particular argument here seems to be something like: (1) there are mental events and there are physical events, and they are distinct (2) S is committed to the claim that behavior is governed entirely by physical events (3) Hence, S is also committed to the claim that mental events are inefficacious with respect to behavior (i.e., S is committed to some version of epiphenomenalism). That is a bad argument because, regardless of the truth value of (2), S need not be committed to the dualistic premise (1).

If so, provide some credible references that demonstrate otherwise.

You were the one who tried to imply that the average mainstream biologist is committed to some version of epiphenomenalism. I think you should retract since the implication is, I think, ridiculous. A good chunk of biologists are presumably materialists; and a good chunk subscribe to some version of contemporary evolutionary theory. Both of these commitments, prima facie, should if anything tend to assuage the threat of epiphenomenalism. For instance, there are well-known arguments by William James and later by Popper & Eccles as well as others that basically argue that having commitment to evolutionary principles is not really even compatible with epiphenomenalism.

Plantinga does say, "it is exceedingly hard to see... how epiphenomenalism—semantic or simpliciter—can be avoided, given N [naturalism]"

Again (revisit considerations above), I disagree with Plantinga here. But, even if I were to grant him that the threat of semantic epiphenomenalism is high for the average naturalist, I think his argument has deeper problems. Plantinga doubts that a satisfactory account of belief content assignment can be provided under naturalism, but he assumes for the sake of discussion that it can (although in his view the belief content would be inefficacious or causally irrelevant with respect to behavior). Then, he goes on to argue that, given this semantic epiphenomenalism, the probability that evolution would lead to reliable cognition is low or inscrutable. But this conclusion does not follow from the supposition of semantic epiphenomenalism. Plantinga does not adequately address or consider the likely interdependence between conditions for belief content assignment and conditions for reliable belief formation. An upshot is that Plantinga's combination of blanketly granting the success of some naturalistic content assignment account while denying that it would conduce to reliable cognition is too hasty. If you are interested I have a paper by William Robinson that outlines this criticism toward Plantinga's argument through presentation and consideration of simple models that appeal to covariance between (i) neural events that are included in psychosemantic complexes and (ii) real-world properties.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
No.

Example:

The formation of the complex geometric shape of a snowflake is not totally random for the outcome (the shape) has symmetry and some order.
And yet there is no purpose behind its formation nor outcome for it can be demonstrated that a snowflake is formed by mindless natural forces such as changes in temperature, humidity etc.

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No.

Example:

The formation of the complex geometric shape of a snowflake is not totally random for the outcome (the shape) has symmetry and some order.
And yet there is no purpose behind its formation nor outcome for it can be demonstrated that a snowflake is formed by mindless natural forces such as changes in temperature, humidity etc.
======================================

One down (perhaps). And about 10 million biological examples to go.

Why would you pick a snowflake example, when you should be able to easily select one of millions of biological examples ?

Wouldn't a biological example be more related to the subject of discussion - Naturalism and Evolution ? I mean you would be the first to protest if I spoke about orgins of life in, ie., snowflakes or some other non-living entity.

You'd be the first to protest that non-living origins of life have nothing to do with evolution. Right ?

Originally posted by jaywill
[b]====================================
No.

Example:

The formation of the complex geometric shape of a snowflake is not totally random for the outcome (the shape) has symmetry and some order.
And yet there is no purpose behind its formation nor outcome for it can be demonstrated that a snowflake is formed by mindless natural forces such as c t to protest that non-living origins of life have [b]nothing to do with evolution. Right ?[/b]

[/b]“...One down (perhaps). And about 10 million biological examples to go. ...”

only one example is needed to contradict a logic to debunk that logic.
(remember, your 'logic' was that a "far from purely random" outcome necessarily implies purposeful outcome )

“...Why would you pick a snowflake example, when you should be able to easily select one of millions of biological examples ? ...”

-this is very simple; it is because you would deny that the biological examples can be created without a god but I assume you would not deny that the snowflake could be created without a god.

“..Wouldn't a biological example be more related to the subject of discussion - Naturalism and Evolution ? ...”

yes; but still need to use the snowflake example to disprove your logic.

“...You'd be the first to protest that non-living origins of life have nothing to do with evolution. Right ? ...”

No.
Using your same logic to non-living things would result in conclusions that I think even you would find absurd. If that logic is valid, then it must be valid universally unless there is some aspect to that logic that logically indicates otherwise (how can any valid logic in a totally ARBITRARY way not apply to a particular context? ) and that implies it should apply to non-living as well as living things.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
“...One down (perhaps). And about 10 million biological examples to go. ...”

only one example is needed to contradict a logic to debunk that logic.

“...Why would you pick a snowflake example, when you should be able to easily select one of millions of biological examples ? ...”

-this is very simple; it is because you would deny that the a specific context? ) and that implies it should apply to non-living as well as living things.[/b]

I don't think "mindlessness" is revealed in the outcome of what I see, even when I look outside my room window at the trees and birds.

And I think the snowflake example was used because it was non-living. Though the shape does speak of symmetry and design, it is an easier example then explaining away biological functions.

I agree that crystals and snowflakes reveal some mathematical symmetry that could smack of design.

Theists who argue for intelligent design, I don't think, usually do so by appealing to snowflakes. But this reproducing living thing called a living organism is the much harder case to believe arose by chance.

Originally posted by jaywill
I don't think "mindlessness" is revealed in the outcome of what I see, even when I look outside my room window at the trees and birds.

And I think the snowflake example was used because it was non-living. Though the shape does speak of symmetry and design, it is an easier example then explaining away biological functions.

I agree that crystals ...[text shortened]... ng living thing called a living organism is the much harder case to believe arose by chance.

“...Theists who argue for intelligent design, I don't think, usually do so by appealing to snowflakes. ...”

-and yet, if they use the same logic as you, they should else they would be logically inconsistent.
Why should the logic that a ' "far from purely random" outcome necessarily implies purposeful outcome ' , if valid, NOT apply to snowflakes nor other non-living things? If that logic is valid for living things then why not non-living?

“...But this reproducing living thing called a living organism is the much harder case to believe arose by chance. ...”

are you now talking about abiogenesis here or evolution? -either way, it didn't occur by pure chance for both need certain conditions to work and also have some degree of predictability -just like with the formation of snowflakes.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
“...Theists who argue for intelligent design, I don't think, usually do so by appealing to snowflakes. ...”

-and yet, if they use the same logic as you, they should else they would be logically inconsistent.
Why should the logic that a ' "far from purely random" outcome necessarily implies purposeful outcome ' , if valid, NOT apply to snowflakes ...[text shortened]... k and also have some degree of predictability -just like with the formation of snowflakes.

=====================================
-and yet, if they use the same logic as you, they should else they would be logically inconsistent.
Why should the logic that a ' "far from purely random" outcome necessarily implies purposeful outcome ' , if valid, NOT apply to snowflakes nor other non-living things? If that logic is valid for living things then why not non-living?
=========================================

Possibly. But if your case is that strong it should be easy for you to have jumped right into a bioligical example.

You should be confident that you are so obviously in the right, the snowflake could be the lesser example.

Why not put up your far stronger examples that will nip the intelligent design in life philosophy right in the bud ? Save your weaker examples of defeaters for latter rather than up front, at first.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Do you doubt that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes?

You seem to think that if one is committed to the idea that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes (or by solely physical events or by neural events that in turn cause muscular events or some such, etc), then he is further co ...[text shortened]... neural events that are included in psychosemantic complexes and (ii) real-world properties.[/b]

I'd definitely like to read Robinson's paper. Does Plantinga have a response?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
I'd definitely like to read Robinson's paper.

http://www.public.iastate.edu/~wsrob/EvoEpi.pdf

Originally posted by jaywill
[b]=====================================
-and yet, if they use the same logic as you, they should else they would be logically inconsistent.
Why should the logic that a ' "far from purely random" outcome necessarily implies purposeful outcome ' , if valid, NOT apply to snowflakes nor other non-living things? If that logic is valid for living things ...[text shortened]... he bud ? Save your weaker examples of defeaters for latter rather than up front, at first.

[/b]What is “weak” or “lesser” about the snowflake example? If it totally debunks that logic (which it does) then whether you arbitrarily label it as “weak” or “strong” or whatever is purely academic and irrelevant because, the fact remains, it STILL debunks that logic.

I only use the snowflake example BECAUSE you would be unlikely to deny that a snowflake is created with order ( "far from purely random" outcome implies "order" ) but WITHOUT purpose.
Therefore, if you like, I could argue that, in that narrow sense, that makes the snowflake example a “stronger” example and arbitrarily label it as being the “greater” example and the biological ones as the “lesser” ones -now, does that help?

I could point to a vast number of different examples of kinds of things that are created with order without purpose -sand dunes, different categories of snow flakes (and there are different categories and they form different kinds of snow) , different categories of weather systems, different categories of lightening, sunspots and solar flares, the great many of different categories of crustal formations etc etc.
These different examples of non-living examples probably outnumber or at least have a number comparable to the number of living species.

So, what criteria are you using to determine which example would be the so-called “lesser” one here?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
I'd definitely like to read Robinson's paper. Does Plantinga have a response?

Here is the reference:

William Robinson (2007). Evolution and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.

Thanks to Palynka for already providing a link to the manuscript. As far as I know Plantinga does not have a direct response. And Robinson's paper really only provides an outline or sketch of the criticism I mentioned against Plantinga. But I think the criticism is on the right track: basic idea being that Plantinga does not properly consider the fact that even simple naturalistic accounts of conditions for belief content assignment are likely to imply conditions for reliable belief formation over a wide cognitive terrain.

I also invite you to read the main thrust of Robinson's paper just to make another related point. The point being, it is rather bizarre how Plantinga wants to claim it is "exceedingly hard" for him to see how the naturalist is going to avoid epiphenomenalism. What a crazy claim. It is Plantinga himself who also thinks the naturalist in a practical sense will be handcuffed to some version of contemporary evolutionary explanation (which is basically the subject of ConrauK's earlier objection); and it is not at all that difficult to see why there is prima facie a lot of tension between such explanation and epiphenomenalism...to the point that Robinson (far from thinking that it is exceedingly hard to see how the two can be separated) actually feels compelled to write a whole paper about how he thinks the two may even be reconciled to the contrary of what he sees as popular thought!

I like studying Plantinga's argument quite a bit. But I think he really fails in the section of his argument that argues for the probability thesis (the claim that P(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable). For one, he overstates the degree to which naturalism indicates semantic epiphenomenalism. And, regardless, his arguments for the probability thesis are lacking (for either the case of epiphenomenalism or its denial, of which he of course considers both).

I always seem to think that Plantinga’s argument is worse than even his (better informed) critics think.

It seems to me that Plantinga’s argument contains a hidden assumption, that the failure of our cognitive faculties to accurately identify the error of (R|N&E)—at least among a large sample of thinkers—bears heavily on the likelihood of such faculties to be sufficiently reliable generally.* I do not see how Plantinga (who does not argue for perfect cognition, but only sufficient general reliability) shows that an error just at this conjunction defeats R, such that—

“Therefore, to assert that naturalistic evolution is true also asserts that one has a low or unknown probability of being right. This, Plantinga argued, epistemically defeats the belief that naturalistic evolution is true and that ascribing truth to naturalism and evolution is internally dubious or inconsistent.” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism]

I simply do not see that the first assertion at all implies the second. That is, I do not see how failure of cognitive reliability at that particular entails a general failure sufficient to render P(R|N&E) low, or ascribing truth to N&E “internally dubious or inconsistent”. And I do not see how Plantinga otherwise shows that P(RǀN&E) ought to be considered low, or inscrutable, or dubious. (He might have a further argument for that that I don’t really see.)

Plantinga’s argument (or at least this part of it) seems to take the form of a reducto something like the following:

(1) R;

(2) R entails recognizing that ~(R|N&E);

—or at least that P(R|N&E) is so low that it ought not to be accepted

(3) A sufficiently large, sufficiently intelligent and informed, population fails to recognize that ~(R|N&E);

(4) Therefore, ~R.

I reject (2). If P’s argument does not (implicitly) rest on something like (2), then I am wrong.

_____________________________________

* I don’t see that, under naturalism, our cognitive faculties have to be reliable in a majority of cases per se, but simply need to be sufficiently reliable in cases bearing on the survival of the species, via the behaviors that result from that cognition (the fact that the external environment is not “aware” of the invisible process of belief-formation seems to me irrelevant; that is, I see no reason to assume that sufficiently reliable cognition—even where belief-formation is affected by desires—leading to sufficiently reliable behavior ought to be a mystery in need of a theistic explanation). It also seems to me that P confuses a priori with a posteriori probabilities in this regard?

Originally posted by vistesd
I always seem to think that Plantinga’s argument is worse than even his (better informed) critics think.

It seems to me that Plantinga’s argument contains a hidden assumption, that the failure of our cognitive faculties to accurately identify the error of (R|N&E)—at least among a large sample of thinkers—bears heavily on the likelihood of such faculties t ...[text shortened]... ems to me that P confuses a priori with a posteriori probabilities in this regard?

Plantinga’s argument (or at least this part of it) seems to take the form of a reducto something like the following:

(1) R;

(2) R entails recognizing that ~(R|N&E);

—or at least that P(R|N&E) is so low that it ought not to be accepted

(3) A sufficiently large, sufficiently intelligent and informed, population fails to recognize that ~(R|N&E);

(4) Therefore, ~R.

I reject (2). If P’s argument does not (implicitly) rest on something like (2), then I am wrong.

Plantinga definitely does not hold (2). If he did, it would completely undermine the rest of his position, since the rest of his position is definitely committed to both (a) R and (b) lots of people do not recognize or endorse the idea that P(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.

I think there must be some confusion here over what Plantinga means when he argues that the probability thesis defeats R for a naturalist. He is not saying that failing to recognize his contention about P(R|N&E) means ~R. To see that he is not making any claim like this, I will try to present his basic argument below.

R = our cognitive faculties are Reliable.
N = Naturalism
E = contemporary Evolutionary account
S = a devotee of N&E

(i) P(R|N&E) is low or inscrutable.
(ii) For S, (i) is a defeater for R. (In other words, the conjunction of N&E&(i) defeats R.)
(iii) If S has a defeater for R, then she has an undercutting defeater for every belief she holds, including the belief in N&E itself.
(iv) Therefore N&E is basically self-defeating.

Nothing in there will translate to your (2). He cannot hold (2) because he is personally committed to (1) and (3). Plantinga does not think the fact that many people do not agree with his contention about P(R|N&E) means that ~R. His belief that R, along with his ideas of what it means for cognitive faculties to be generally reliable, admits that there may be lots of contrareity on many theoretical matters.