Affirming Naturalism Presupposes God

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Plantinga’s argument (or at least this part of it) seems to take the form of a reducto something like the following:

(1) R;

(2) R entails recognizing that ~(R|N&E);

—or at least that P(R|N&E) is so low that it ought not to be accepted

(3) A sufficiently large, sufficiently intelligent and informed, population fails to recognize t ...[text shortened]... be generally reliable, admits that there may be lots of contrareity on many theoretical matters.

[/b]Thank you! (I know you tried to get something like that through my thick skull last time; thanks for trying again.) Hope you are well, old friend!

Does Plantinga offer any strong support for (i)? Absent that, I don’t see how (i) ought to be seen as a defeater for R… (And I think the argument from semantic epiphenomenalism seems absurd: there is no reason to assume, that I can see, that the “invisibility” of the cognitive function undermines conclusions from the behavioral function—e.g., natural selection. There is no reason, again, that I can see, to be committed to the notion that natural selection requires more than the behavioral function--even if that is the physical expression of the cognitive function.)

LATE EDIT: It's been a number of years since I read Warranted Christian Belief, and I don't own a copy. To argue that something is epistemically warranted, however, is not the same as arguing that it is true, let alone epistemically necessarily true; that is, absent a (logical or nomological) defeater, a belief might still be warranted. However, if one can show such a defeater, that belief becomes unwarranted. The argument here seems to be that the "naturalist" belief is defeated, and therefore unwarranted.

Originally posted by vistesd
Thank you! (I know you tried to get something like that through my thick skull last time; thanks for trying again.) Hope you are well, old friend!

Does Plantinga offer any strong support for (i)? Absent that, I don’t see how (i) ought to be seen as a defeater for R… (And I think the argument from semantic epiphenomenalism seems absurd: th ...[text shortened]... cognitive function undermines conclusions from the behavioral function—e.g., natural selection.)[/b]

I hope you are very well, too, and it is nice to see you around again.

Does Plantinga offer any strong support for (i)?

In my opinion, no he does not (but of course I would urge others to read his argument and see if they agree with me). This is precisely my main problem with his argument. In attempt to support (i) is where he breaks the discussion down into different categories of relationship between belief/behavior. He argues different lines, but two major things he tries to argue is that (1) N&E highly indicates semantic epiphenomenalism, and the combination of N&E and semantic epiphenomenalism undermines R and (2) even under assumption that beliefs semantically and syntactically causally influence behavior (let's call this proposition B), P(R|N&E&B) is not as high as one might think prima facie. I do not agree with these and do not think his arguments are that good in this area.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I hope you are very well, too, and it is nice to see you around again.

[b]Does Plantinga offer any strong support for (i)?

In my opinion, no he does not (but of course I would urge others to read his argument and see if they agree with me). This is precisely my main problem with his argument. In attempt to support (i) is where he breaks the di ...[text shortened]... a facie. I do not agree with either and do not think his arguments are that good in this area.[/b]

Thanks; I made a late edit that crossed--but it is really just some thinking out loud.

Originally posted by vistesd
Thanks; I made a late edit that crossed--but it is really just some thinking out loud.

Regarding your late edit, yes there are different types of defeaters. Plantinga thinks that the defeater that the probability thesis gives the devotee of N&E ultimately provides a particular type of undercutting defeater that would indicate that S's grounds for her beliefs (including the belief in N&E) are inadequate. Further, he thinks it is a particularly pernicious undefeatable type of defeater since if S tried to offer argument in support of in turn defeating this defeater, any such arguments would have the property of being question-begging.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Do you doubt that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes?

You seem to think that if one is committed to the idea that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes (or by solely physical events or by neural events that in turn cause muscular events or some such, etc), then he is further commi ...[text shortened]... neural events that are included in psychosemantic complexes and (ii) real-world properties.[/b]

Not to pick too petty a point, but I think it requires examination nonetheless.

You seem to think that if one is committed to the idea that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes (or by solely physical events or by neural events that in turn cause muscular events or some such, etc), then he is further committed to epiphenomenalism. That is not the case.
According to JSTOR:

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events.

Thus, the very definition of E requires that one hold the non-mental nature of human behavior. By considering mental events as nothing more/less than physical phenomena occurring within and around the brain, a person is necessarily beholden to E.

Your example of a monist falls short, in that he equated the mental with the physical, thereby removing his view from the realm of E, with his acknowledgement of the mental.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Not to pick too petty a point, but I think it requires examination nonetheless.
You seem to think that if one is committed to the idea that human behavior is determined entirely by electro-biochemical processes (or by solely physical events or by neural events that in turn cause muscular events or some such, etc), then he is further committed to epip physical, thereby removing his view from the realm of E, with his acknowledgement of the mental.

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. (...) By considering mental events as nothing more/less than physical phenomena occurring within and around the brain, a person is necessarily beholden to E.

I have told you before that I fear for your reading comprehesion. The material monist I mentioned before thinks that so-called mental events are identical to physical events, and he also thinks that physical events do have effects on other physical events. It is simply blatantly false that he is committed to E. Did you just not understand the part where it says E purports that "mental events...have no effects upon any physical events"? Not only is this monist not committed to the mental/physical distinction at play here (did you not understand that he thinks they are identical?); but, further, nothing I said about the monist would commit him to the idea that there exists events that have no effects upon other events.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. (...) By considering mental events as nothing more/less than physical phenomena occurring within and around the brain, a person is necessarily beholden to E.

I have told you before that I fear for your reading co ...[text shortened]... would commit him to the idea that there exists events that have no effects upon other events.[/b]

You're attempting to flesh out a distinction without a difference... or maybe even vice versa, but the result is the same, nonetheless. The monist in your example simply refuses to address the mental aspect of it, especially if he is equating the mental with the physical events. For him, there is no difference and he has done nothing more than avoid offering a definition/categorization of the term 'mental.'

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
You're attempting to flesh out a distinction without a difference... or maybe even vice versa, but the result is the same, nonetheless. The monist in your example simply refuses to address the mental aspect of it, especially if he is equating the mental with the physical events. For him, there is no difference and he has done nothing more than avoid offering a definition/categorization of the term 'mental.'

You're attempting to flesh out a distinction without a difference...

If you say so. 🙄

The monist in your example simply refuses to address the mental aspect of it, especially if he is equating the mental with the physical events. For him, there is no difference and he has done nothing more than avoid offering a definition/categorization of the term 'mental.'

No, he just thinks that mental events are identical with physical events. Say, he thinks mental events are identical with some neural events, which cause muscular events, which cause behavior, etc. Well, then, obviously enough he is not committed to the epiphenomenalist thesis that mental events are inefficacious. So, are you going to admit you were wrong and retract your earlier claim?

Originally posted by LemonJello
You're attempting to flesh out a distinction without a difference...

If you say so. 🙄

The monist in your example simply refuses to address the mental aspect of it, especially if he is equating the mental with the physical events. For him, there is no difference and he has done nothing more than avoid offering a definition/categorization are inefficacious. So, are you going to admit you were wrong and retract your earlier claim?

Even with your fleshed out example, he is simply equating the two events without addressing the nature of mental. The crux of the issue (from what I can perceive) is that 'mental' is inferring a hidden hand, which some parties find incompatible with their view that all can be explained via physical impetus.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Even with your fleshed out example, he is simply equating the two events without addressing the nature of mental. The crux of the issue (from what I can perceive) is that 'mental' is inferring a hidden hand, which some parties find incompatible with their view that all can be explained via physical impetus.

Even with your fleshed out example, he is simply equating the two events without addressing the nature of mental.

Bull. He has addressed it; you just do not agree with or care for his assessment.

The crux of the issue (from what I can perceive) is that 'mental' is inferring a hidden hand, which some parties find incompatible with their view that all can be explained via physical impetus.

Not sure how many ways I can explain this to you: he does not agree with your taxonomical distinction between mental and physical. Obviously he is not going to be committed to the same things you think on this issue since he thinks you are full of it on this issue. Just because you perceive something to be true does not mean that another is committed to it. If you claim that the person in my example is "necessarily beholden to (epiphenomenalism)", you basically need to show how epiphenomenalism follows from or is inseparable from his other commitments. That is not satisfied by your simply projecting your own perceptions and commitments onto him. And I have already shown that your earlier claim (that he is necessarily beholden to epiphenomenalism on the basis of his stance that mental events are identical with physical events) is just blatantly false.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Here is the reference:

William Robinson (2007). Evolution and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.

Thanks to Palynka for already providing a link to the manuscript. As far as I know Plantinga does not have a direct response. And Robinson's paper really only provides an outline or sketch of the criticism I mentioned aga either the case of epiphenomenalism or its denial, of which he of course considers both).

A quick question about Robinson's article:

Robinsion: "But he has not shown that a credible theory of content assignment will not have the consequence that continued acquisition of evidence and reflection upon it affect belief formation in self-correcting ways and that this relationship is itself a consequence of N&E."

Doesn't Robinson's statement rely in some way upon the deliverances of our cognitive faculties in order to establish the reliability of our cognitive faculties? But, Plantinga points out, "If the general reliability of our cognitive faculties is under question, we can't hope to answer the question whether they are reliable by pointing out that these faculties themselves deliver the belief that they are, in fact, reliable" (WCB, p. 226). Reflection and evidence assessment, it would seem, being adjuncts of the cognitive process, are inadmissible in establishing the reliability of our cognitive faculties. In which case, even if a "credible theory of content assignment" posited that our cognitive faculties are self-correcting, this could not serve as a defeater for the proposition P(N&E) is either low or inscrutable.

More questions later as I am still studying...

Originally posted by LemonJello
You're attempting to flesh out a distinction without a difference...

If you say so. 🙄

The monist in your example simply refuses to address the mental aspect of it, especially if he is equating the mental with the physical events. For him, there is no difference and he has done nothing more than avoid offering a definition/categorization are inefficacious. So, are you going to admit you were wrong and retract your earlier claim?

No, he just thinks that mental events are identical with physical events. Say, he thinks mental events are identical with some neural events, which cause muscular events, which cause behavior, etc. Well, then, obviously enough he is not committed to the epiphenomenalist thesis that mental events are inefficacious.

It doesn't really matter what a monist thinks, because, as Robinson points out, the claim that qualitative events are identical with neural events is unintelligible:

"If physicalists claim that qualitative events cause neural events, that is only because they have already accepted the claim that qualitative events are identical with neural events... physicalism can achieve consonance with evolutionary considerations only by adding a claim that neither it nor evolution can explain – namely, the claim that qualitative events are identical with neural events... physicalists are not entitled to claim that their view is acceptable on the ground that theirs is the only way to imagine that the world might be intelligible. One cannot parlay ignorance into sound metaphysics."

Originally posted by epiphinehas
A quick question about Robinson's article:

[b]Robinsion: "But he has not shown that a credible theory of content assignment will not have the consequence that continued acquisition of evidence and reflection upon it affect belief formation in self-correcting ways and that this relationship is itself a consequence of N&E."

Doesn't Robinson's sta ...[text shortened]... P(N&E) is either low or inscrutable.

More questions later as I am still studying...[/b]

It is rather refreshing to see someone who is eager to delve deeper into these types of discussions, so I thank you in advance for the engaging discussions.

Doesn't Robinson's statement rely in some way upon the deliverances of our cognitive faculties in order to establish the reliability of our cognitive faculties? But, Plantinga points out, "If the general reliability of our cognitive faculties is under question, we can't hope to answer the question whether they are reliable by pointing out that these faculties themselves deliver the belief that they are, in fact, reliable" (WCB, p. 226).

No. I think you are confusing two different things. What Plantinga asserts as having the property of being question-begging is argument (or just assertion or propositional attitude) sourced from cognitive faculties X in support of the conclusion that cognitive faculties X are generally reliable. What Plantinga is saying in your particular quote is basically that, supposing the question at issue is whether or not S's cognitive faculties are reliable, the fact that S's cognitive faculties have provided S with the belief that his own cognitive faculties are reliable is inadmissible. Regardless if Plantinga is right about this, it is not relevant to what Robinson is saying here. Please look at what precedes in the essay the quote you provided. Robinson is simply arguing that Plantinga has not shown that "N&E imply that our processes of belief formation cannot be selected to be self-correcting, even when extensive evidence is available and consideration of alternatives and review of reasoning is undertaken". He is not trying to make any claim whereby he assumes the denial of your Plantinga quote (that is, Robinson is not trying to say that the fact that persons believe they have reliable cognitive faculties is positive evidence for the proposition that indeed they do have reliable cognitive faculties). Robinson again is trying to make a statement that Plantinga has not properly thought through what sorts of things can be selected for under N&E that imply reliable belief formation or self-correcting belief formation processes that converge on cognitive reliability (even supposing the truth of semantic epiphenomenalism). Again, Plantinga argues that under semantic epiphenomenalism, evolution basically cannot bring about cognitive reliability because beliefs cannot be selected for in virtue of their content. But what Robinson is countering is that even under simple naturalistic accounts of content assignment it is likely that the conditions for content assignment (which can evolve and be selected for even under semantic epiphenomenalism) imply conditions for reliable belief formation.

Originally posted by LemonJello
It is rather refreshing to see someone who is eager to delve deeper into these types of discussions, so I thank you in advance for the engaging discussions.

Doesn't Robinson's statement rely in some way upon the deliverances of our cognitive faculties in order to establish the reliability of our cognitive faculties? But, Plantinga points out, "If t r even under semantic epiphenomenalism) imply conditions for reliable belief formation.

Thanks, I had that suspicion. More to come...

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]No, he just thinks that mental events are identical with physical events. Say, he thinks mental events are identical with some neural events, which cause muscular events, which cause behavior, etc. Well, then, obviously enough he is not committed to the epiphenomenalist thesis that mental events are inefficacious.

It doesn't really matter wha the world might be intelligible. One cannot parlay ignorance into sound metaphysics."[/quote][/b]

It doesn't really matter what a monist thinks, because, as Robinson points out, the claim that qualitative events are identical with neural events is unintelligible

You have really failed to understand what exactly Robinson was saying here. I think we need to back the truck up. Why does Robinson put forth the statements you quoted? He makes those particular statements in that section because he is trying to show that an adherent of epiphenomenalism in countering Popper & Eccles argument with the reply (AE1*) is left in an unsatisfactory position; BUT he thinks it is no more unsatisfactory in this respect than either physicalism or interactionalist dualism because he thinks both of these views suffer from a dialectically symmetric objection. Then enter your quote, which is basically Robinson's statement of what exactly he thinks that dialectically symmetric objection against physicalism is. Now, I would like to remind you of Robinson's upshot to all this: "I conclude that, unless all of these views are held to fail on parallel grounds, it cannot be an objection to epiphenomenalism that it achieves consonance with evolutionary considerations only by relying on a claim that neither it nor evolution can explain".

You simply cherry-picked throughout that section without any reference to Robinson's actual point. If Robinson actually thought that the objection you quoted showed that "it doesn't really matter what (physicalists) think" or that the physicalist viewpoint is unintelligible; then he would be forced by his very own admission to conclude that it also doesn't really matter what epiphenomenalists or interactionist dualists think either and that their viewpoints are unintelligible as well.

Personally I think that in defense of epiphenomenalism, Robinson's objection to the Poppler & Eccles argument is a very reasonable one. I think that epiphenomenalism is almost certainly false; but I think the strongest arguments against it are ones that Robinson does not even address in this paper (because they are not relevant to the purpose of this paper).