Atheism and logic

Theists try to monopolize truth(s). When they are questioned the "God did it" arguement often comes to the fore.
And yet, when other theists (from other religions) claim to know the ' truth' they are marginalized (at best) or downright belittled.

If this 'truth' is universal then surely it is available to all. And whatever forms "God" may take it is all still God by definition so understanding "him" will be coloured by one's background and culture.

The many thumbed down posts of atheists ,
(who are merely replying truthfully as possible) are unjustly treated and attacked personally.
How rude.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I've got a slight difference with you here. Classical logic is a language, and assigning the status true or false to it is as silly as asking if the moon is true - ignoring the meaning of true used in carpentry where it more or less means straight (which is where we get the word true from) - so far we agree. Classical logic is expected to preserve trut ...[text shortened]... ulness isn't a criterion for truth, something can be nonsense or trivial, but nevertheless true.

I overlooked you response until I just noticed it now.

To be fair I do not think you have a slight difference with me. Rather, I was suggesting that I thought there was a defect in the very notion that logic (as such) could be true, universally or otherwise, and expalined why I had that impression, and you know the answer to my question, for which much thanks.

"Classical logic is a language, and assigning the status true or false to it is as silly as asking if the moon is true"

Originally posted by DeepThought
No I mean true. Either it is true or false, there is no universality criterion.

So only true for you not true for everyone?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
So only true for you not true for everyone?

Just ask "why" every single time someone makes a statement. It works for children. It will work for you.

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
So only true for you not true for everyone?

A sentence either corresponds to actuality, when it is true, or it doesn't when it is false. There is no way something can be true for me but not true for everyone else. A statement like: "This person plays chess." may be true when applied to me but is not true when applied to everyone, but this is because of the word "this". If we replace the syntactic variable "this" with a constant "DeepThought", then "DeepThought plays chess" is true, but if "This person" is "DeepThought's sister" (who does not play chess) then the sentence wouldn't be true. What is the case is that "DeepThought plays chess" cannot be true for me but not true for someone else - since I do play chess it is true and the other party is mistaken, they simply have a belief that is false.

The only sense I can think of in which a statement could be true for one person, but not for another is a sentence such as "The flowers are beautiful.", but that is not a statement of fact. It means "I think the flowers are beautiful." so the statement isn't actually about the flowers, but the persons response to them.

If you think otherwise then please give an example of something which is true for one person but not another, and does not involve syntactic variables like "This".

Originally posted by DeepThought
A sentence either corresponds to actuality, when it is true, or it doesn't when it is false. There is no way something can be true for me but not true for everyone else. A statement like: "This person plays chess." may be true when applied to me but is not true when applied to everyone, but this is because of the word "this". If we replace the syntact ...[text shortened]... ch is true for one person but not another, and does not involve syntactic variables like "This".

I agree with what you are saying, I just want to know whether you think that the concept of truth is universal or relative?

Originally posted by finnegan
Just ask "why" every single time someone makes a statement. It works for children. It will work for you.

Just accept everything you hear blindly don't question anything. Is that your philosophy?

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
I agree with what you are saying, I just want to know whether you think that the concept of truth is universal or relative?

I'm sure there are theories of truth which are not universally held, but that is a property of the theory and not the thing it references. I do not think the adjective "universal" adds anything to the word "truth" that is not already there. It's not at all clear to me what you mean by "relative", what would "relatively true" mean?

When discussing counterfactuals one might use terms like that - consider the sentence: "Had the British electorate voted Remain then the financial markets would not be in turmoil.". Because the sentence refers to something that didn't happen (the Leave campaign won) the sentence cannot be true, however it is true that had the vote gone that way there would have been nothing for them to panic over quite this much. This is sometimes handled with possible world semantics - so in that language one could say: "There is a possible world, identical to the real world until last Thursday, when the Remain vote won, in that world the markets are not in turmoil.". The sentence is now true, because we are talking about an imaginary construct. In possible world semantics we could then meaningfully talk about universal truth as being something true in all possible worlds (or at least all accessible worlds), and relative truth as meaning true in one possible world, relative meaning in relation to the conditions in that world. However, I assumed that we were restricting the discussion of truth to the actual world.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I'm sure there are theories of truth which are not universally held, but that is a property of the theory and not the thing it references. I do not think the adjective "universal" adds anything to the word "truth" that is not already there. It's not at all clear to me what you mean by "relative", what would "relatively true" mean?

When discussing co ...[text shortened]... world. However, I assumed that we were restricting the discussion of truth to the actual world.

I'm sure there are theories of truth which are not universally held, but that is a property of the theory and not the thing it references. I do not think the adjective "universal" adds anything to the word "truth" that is not already there. It's not at all clear to me what you mean by "relative", what would "relatively true" mean?

I think you will get the gist of what I mean here: http://www.seekingtruth.co.uk/truth.htm

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
[b]I'm sure there are theories of truth which are not universally held, but that is a property of the theory and not the thing it references. I do not think the adjective "universal" adds anything to the word "truth" that is not already there. It's not at all clear to me what you mean by "relative", what would "relatively true" mean?

I think you will get the gist of what I mean here: http://www.seekingtruth.co.uk/truth.htm[/b]

I had a quick look. The page is arguing against notions of "relative" truth. They are using the word "absolute" to distinguish it. There is no point in the qualifier.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I had a quick look. The page is arguing against notions of "relative" truth. They are using the word "absolute" to distinguish it. There is no point in the qualifier.

Why does there have to be a point in the qualifier? (Please excuse my ignorance)

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
Why does there have to be a point in the qualifier? (Please excuse my ignorance)

Either one is trying to communicate something or one is not. The only point in the addition of the word "absolute" to the word "truth" would be emphasis.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Either one is trying to communicate something or one is not. The only point in the addition of the word "absolute" to the word "truth" would be emphasis.

I think the word "absolute" is added to communicate a difference in meaning to what relativists may understand by the meaning of the word "truth".

Originally posted by Fetchmyjunk
[b]I'm sure there are theories of truth which are not universally held, but that is a property of the theory and not the thing it references. I do not think the adjective "universal" adds anything to the word "truth" that is not already there. It's not at all clear to me what you mean by "relative", what would "relatively true" mean?

I think you will get the gist of what I mean here: http://www.seekingtruth.co.uk/truth.htm[/b]

One approaches material like your cited source with unavoidable trepidation and predictably enough, after several readings, it is dire. It is a real struggle to make sense of because, of course, it does not make sense. Rather than examine the entire text, let me comment on this one passage and assure you this is representative of the whole.

There are other examples of higher and lower truths (graded absolutism) in the Bible. Perhaps the simplest and clearest example is Jesus' comment "this is the greatest and foremost commandment" (Matthew 22.38). Here He was effectively saying that, "whatever else you do, the most important truth to follow is this":

What Jesus was "effectively" saying was not "the most important truth to follow is this" but rather "the most important commandment to follow is this."

The terms "commandment" and "truth" are quite simply and utterly different in every way. They are not synonyms and they do not imply each other. They are not even related to each other.

A commandment is an imperative and not capable of being true or false. For a statement to be true or false it has to be a statement. A command is not a statement. It is a command. FFS!!

And yet this is said to be the simplest and clearest example of "higher and lower truths." If that is the clearest and simplest example, then it is clearly and simply total nonsense on stilts laying fried eggs under a bush.

My “patchwork” thoughts on the matter—

A fact is whatever is the case. Something is either a fact or it is not. A true statement (a truth) is one that corresponds to the facts—e.g., “It is the case that A.” To add the qualifier of “absoluteness”—i.e., “It is absolutely the case that A”—adds nothing to the truth or falsity of the statement, though it may indicate the degree of subjective surety on the part of the speaker. As long as one understands that, there need not be confusion.

However, it seems to me that what Fetch might be after is (and I think that Deep Thought mentioned this) something that either (a) is the case in all possible worlds, or (b) is always the case in this world. As I see it, that comes down to a statement that “A is (always and everywhere) the case, nothing else considered”—and, yes, I recognize a redundancy there. That is, there are no considerations that could make A not the case—either (logically) in any possible world, or (nomologically) in this world.

If I am right, then the only real argument could be over whether there are any considerations under which this or that particular A might or might not be the case (logically or nomologically). I’m not sure I see the use of arguing over whether there can be any A that must be (always and everywhere) the case nothing else considered, without any specification as to what A we are talking about.

This seems to me to fall under what the Pyrrhonians mean by “non-evident” matters, for which there is no need (or use) for me to form any opinion at all—without knowing what A (that which is asserted as the case) is. It seems to me that, under such circumstances, there is no reasonable commitment I could make. I am, in a sense, not even agnostic—for I have no basis on which to form even a belief/disbelief/unbelief. I withhold all judgment as to whether there is or isn’t, might or might not be, some unspecified A that is (always and everywhere) the case nothing else considered.

Now, it is surely possible that one might come up with an A that I cannot imagine ever not being the case nothing else considered. Why would just that response—i.e., “I cannot imagine A never being the case (nothing else considered)”—not be seen as sufficient?