Atheist Holiday

Originally posted by SwissGambit
1. God\'s attributes and character merit man\'s praise [Rom 1:21]
2. God afflicted the family of Job, killed scores of Israelites due to the sins of their brethren, ordered genocide of certain non-Israelite races, etc. [OT stories]
3. Killing innocent people/genocide is morally heinous.
4. Beings who commit morally heinous acts do not deserve praise f ...[text shortened]... n is to take a hypothetical set of beliefs and show that they entail absurd conclusion(s).

Your argument contains more presuppositions (and imported definitions with various implications) than you are probably aware of:
1. You make a statement about the innocence of people, and what they deserve or do not deserve. This shows that you have an ethic--a moral system--which you believe to be capable of assessing people to be innocent or not innocent, and assessing what judgment they deserve, if any.
2. Your ethic supplies you with the means to describe things as "morally heinous."
3. You have some ideas about what character qualities in a God (even if hypothetical to you) merit or do not merit praise.

How did your ethic--your system of moral judgments--bring you to these ideas about morality? How can you know that it is a valid system of judging moral things? How do you know that your reasoning within your ethical system is sound?

So you can see, all different flavors of presuppositions are in play here!

Originally posted by HolyT
Your argument contains more presuppositions (and imported definitions with various implications) than you are probably aware of:
1. You make a statement about the innocence of people, and what they deserve or do not deserve. This shows that you have an ethic--a moral system--which you believe to be capable of assessing people to be innocent or not innocent, ...[text shortened]... system is sound?

So you can see, all different flavors of presuppositions are in play here!

If you think one of my presuppositions is invalid, then feel free to reject the premise that stems from it.

What is morally heinous? How can you know that something is morally heinous? That presupposes that you have some system for assessing that something is morally heinous. Same thing for other terms and descriptions that your statements depend on. One could agree or disagree with a premise, or attempt to argue that it is wrong or right, but that would be grasping at air without understanding what those terms mean to you. They may mean something completely different to someone you're discussing this with from what they mean to you. But if you state what your ethic is (or other presuppositions), then someone might begin to understand what terms such as "morally heinous" mean, and then could discuss your premises and conclusion.

Originally posted by HolyT
What is morally heinous? How can you know that something is morally heinous? That presupposes that you have some system for assessing that something is morally heinous. Same thing for other terms and descriptions that your statements depend on. One could agree or disagree with a premise, or attempt to argue that it is wrong or right, but that would be grasping ...[text shortened]... at terms such as "morally heinous" mean, and then could discuss your premises and conclusion.

I'm not going to define my entire moral code for you. All I'm interested in knowing is whether you agree or disagree that genocide is morally heinous.

I'm not asking you to define your ENTIRE moral code. I'm just pointing out that you appear to have one. It would be interesting (and relevant) to explore what its basis is, how it works, and how it operates in conjunction with your other presuppositions. And I would be foolish to attempt to discuss intelligibly your arguments when you use labels (which themselves carry implications and depend on conclusions that are related to the argument at hand) that are not defined in order to use premises and make arguments that depend heavily on their definitions.

The form of your argument remains the same:
Premise #1: God should be a certain way in terms of behavior (morality, inter alia). (This premise is based on your moral code which informs you about right and wrong, but also on other presuppositions that tell you what God should be like, if indeed God exists. Also, your worldview informs you about how concepts like justice, goodness, and mercy should operate together.)
Premise #2: You observe things in the Bible that don't fit your moral code as you understand your moral code and as you understand the Bible.
(Side notes: [1] examining your moral code is relevant, because you may not really understand it, and this premise depends on it, [2] you may not have a very thorough understanding of the parts of the Bible you use for your argument, and how they relate to each other and the whole of the Bible.)
Conclusion: Therefore, you conclude that the Bible is inconsistent.
But all you have really concluded is that the Bible is inconsistent with your worldview (based on your understanding of the Bible), which is what your worldview would have told you in the first place!

Originally posted by HolyT
I'm not asking you to define your ENTIRE moral code. I'm just pointing out that you appear to have one. It would be interesting (and relevant) to explore what its basis is, how it works, and how it operates in conjunction with your other presuppositions. And I would be foolish to attempt to discuss intelligibly your arguments when you use labels (which them ...[text shortened]... rstanding of the Bible), which is what your worldview would have told you in the first place!

You keep using the word “presupposition.” Just for clarity, in what sense are you using it? For example—

1 : to suppose beforehand
2 : to require as an antecedent in logic or fact

(Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary)

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Diverse cultures have developed moral concepts; as a statistical phenomenon, one can observe varying distributions of particular moral concerns. It might be a social phenomenon; it might be “hard-wired” into our brains as social animals (the disgust-response, for example)—ye olde nature versus nurture stuff. C.S. Lewis, for instance, argued from the observation of moral concepts across cultures—and a broad, though not perfect, “fit” in terms of certain moral notions such as honesty, proscriptions against such things as rape and murder, etc.—to the existence of a divine moral agent/influence: God.

A question is whether certain moral theories developed, first, as description or prescription—divine command theory, virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, intuitionism, social utilitarianism, etc.

From a descriptive point-of-view, it seems obvious that the plethora of moral theories point to multiple possibilities for grounding one’s moral thought (different antecedent assumptions). Nevertheless, there seems to be a common feature (at least on the “negative” side): one needs a justifying reason to harm; the justifying reasons may differ, as may the specific list of harms, but causing random and unreasoning harm is considered a rejection of moral consideration per se. People who have no sense of morality at all are more likely to be judged insane than simply immoral in terms of this or that behavior.

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At bottom, then, I think the question is if genocide can ever have a sufficiently “justifying reason to harm”—and, if one asserts the positive, what would such a justifying reason look like, what would it entail. The same for torture. The same for rape. The same for any harming act.

By stating that genocide is everywhere and always “morally heinous,” I think that SwissGambit is saying that there can be no such justifying reason (or at least that he can imagine none). At least that’s what I would be saying. And having said that, the burden falls to anyone who wishes to claim that there is, or can be, such a justifying reason—i.e., that genocide can be morally justified.

Again, that requirement for a justifying reason to harm seems common to all moral theories. At a strictly personal level, I am quite willing to take it as (presuppositionally? intuitively?) given.

However, if one asks: “Whence the requirement for a justifying reason to commit harm?”, the question is not strictly one of this or that moral or immoral act—but whence morality at all? The question moves to the meta-level. And there I can only speculate (can anyone else do any more?). I am sure that such speculation will turn up antecedent assumptions. I can find such discussion interesting, and educational, but not personally compelling—unless someone wants to take the position that the notion of a justifying reason to harm is itself unjustified under any moral theory. Until then, offering competing moral theories would just amount to disagreeing about why we agree... Again, interesting, but not particularly compelling: if someone convinces me that some aspect of my own moral-theoretical structure* does not hold up, or needs modified (e.g., Occam’s Razor needs to be applied to a number of antecedent assumptions)—fine.

* Basically, at this point, a general version of virtue ethics plus what I call “recognition of the other” (somewhat ala Levinas), with some underpinning speculations vis-à-vis the evolution of consciousness—bit of a patchwork...

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SwissGambit, telerion, vistesd, twitehead, and others: I knew there would be a flood of responses, so I hope you can understand if I can only reply to a small fraction of them! Thanks for your reading and responding. I'll try to respond to some more of your thoughts here and there.

No problem. 🙂 I’ve been popping in here more and more infrequently myself. Thank you for offering stimulative points and questions.

Originally posted by HolyT
I\\\'m not asking you to define your ENTIRE moral code. I\\\'m just pointing out that you appear to have one. It would be interesting (and relevant) to explore what its basis is, how it works, and how it operates in conjunction with your other presuppositions. And I would be foolish to attempt to discuss intelligibly your arguments when you use labels (whic ...[text shortened]... ding of the Bible), which is what your worldview would have told you in the first place!

I\\\'m not asking you to define your ENTIRE moral code. I\\\'m just pointing out that you appear to have one.

Umm, yeah, I\\\'m not a nihilist or moral skeptic. Few people are.

It would be interesting (and relevant) to explore what its basis is, how it works, and how it operates in conjunction with your other presuppositions.

No, the argument does not require this at all. Everyone is free to apply their own definition of \\\'morally heinous\\\'.

And I would be foolish to attempt to discuss intelligibly your arguments when you use labels (which themselves carry implications and depend on conclusions that are related to the argument at hand) that are not defined in order to use premises and make arguments that depend heavily on their definitions.

I did define my labels [genocide = morally heinous]. If you need a reminder what the words \\\"moral\\\" and \\\"heinous\\\" mean, consult a dictionary. If you feel that the acts I described in premise 3 are in fact not heinous, please say so.

The form of your argument remains the same:

Please stop trying to paraphrase the argument, because you keep getting it wrong. The argument isn\\\'t concerned with how God should behave, but only whether his character is praiseworthy.

[1] examining your moral code is relevant, because you may not really understand it, and this premise depends on it, [2] you may not have a very thorough understanding of the parts of the Bible you use for your argument.

OK, so show my alleged ignorance, if you can. Reject one of the premises.

Conclusion: Therefore, you conclude that the Bible is inconsistent.
But all you have really concluded is that the Bible is inconsistent with your worldview (based on your understanding of the Bible), which is what your worldview would have told you in the first place!

You just don\\\'t get it. The argument is not dependent on my worldview. My worldview is certainly not the only one that claims genocide is evil. Worldview only changes one\\\'s response to the argument - it decides what premises they will reject.

Perhaps it\\\'s time for you to move on and start responding to the posts of others in the thread. I hold out little hope of a meaningful response to my argument.

Originally posted by vistesd
You keep using the word “presupposition.” Just for clarity, in what sense are you using it? For example—

1 : to suppose beforehand
2 : to require as an antecedent in logic or fact

(Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary)

vistesd,
There's so much good stuff in your posts to discuss that I regret that I'll scarcely be able to discuss a small portion of it. When I use "presupposition," definition #2 is closest to what I mean. But it's more than that definition, which could also define a premise loosely. It's something that helps describe your overall worldview, like the examples I gave in an earlier post. So, definition #1 is also applicable.
You did a good job of fleshing out some of the issues in SwissGambit's posts. Of everything you mentioned, probably many of your thoughts will be touched on in this overall discussion. More later....

Originally posted by SwissGambit

[b]I\\\'m not asking you to define your ENTIRE moral code. I\\\'m just pointing out that you appear to have one.

Umm, yeah, I\\\'m not a nihilist or moral skeptic. Few people are.

[quote]It would be interesting (and relevant) to explore what its basis is, how it works, and how it operates in conjunction with your other presuppo ope of a meaningful response to my argument.

[/b]Everyone is free to apply their own definition of \\\'morally heinous\\\'.

Good point. Your (4), indeed, seems to allow for any (non-absurd) definition of morally heinous. By “non-absurd,” I have in mind any definition under which the individual would not consider behavior, defined by that individual to be morally heinous, as praiseworthy.

Your (3) asserts that acts such as those listed are morally heinous, presumably under any such non-absurd definition. This would seem to be the only premise that a Biblically-committed Christian could really challenge. At least, in past discussions on here, that is the only one I recall being challenged—usually (again, as I recall) along one of the following lines:

(a) God is exempt from following the same moral commands issued to humans (perhaps because of God’s omniscience).

(b) Humans have no standing to even question the morality of God’s actions at all. Either (i) because questions of morality do not apply to God’s actions vis-à-vis God’s own creation (a kind of “God’s dominion” argument), or (ii) because our knowledge of such affairs is limited, whereas that of an omniscient God is not (God’s response to Job?).

(c) The texts in question actually contain clues as to why such actions by God are moral—or ought to be considered moral, even according to human standards—if we just understand the texts correctly (a “proper exegesis” argument).

(d) Human beings are simply not able to make proper moral determinations (perhaps because of inherited “original sin” ), and therefore should simply trust God and follow God’s commands.

You have implicitly rejected (d) (and (b), I guess) in the presentation of your inference.

I’ll just follow along now, and see how you guys go at this. (Forgive me if I’ve misrepresented your position in any way.)

Originally posted by HolyT
vistesd,
There's so much good stuff in your posts to discuss that I regret that I'll scarcely be able to discuss a small portion of it. When I use "presupposition," definition #2 is closest to what I mean. But it's more than that definition, which could also define a premise loosely. It's something that helps describe your overall worldview, like the examp ably many of your thoughts will be touched on in this overall discussion. More later....

When I use "presupposition," definition #2 is closest to what I mean. But it's more than that definition, which could also define a premise loosely. It's something that helps describe your overall worldview, like the examples I gave in an earlier post. So, definition #1 is also applicable.

Thanks. I think I understand. I wasn’t sure if you were using it pejoratively or not—and “not” seems to be the answer. It’s really a question of epistemological foundations, realized or unrealized. And that’s a big question. One I’m still working on for myself... On the one hand, I’m fairly empiricist; on the other hand, I am interested in the limits and applicability of “the grammar of our consciousness” as we try to interpret the world and our own existential condition in it. (A "hermeneutical empiricist", perhaps?) I think that what we tend to call “meaning” is not given, but derives from that engagement.

There's so much good stuff in your posts to discuss that I regret that I'll scarcely be able to discuss a small portion of it.

Thanks, and again, no problem. I seldom take part in morality discussions on here (though I follow them). You guys have just stimulated my own thinking, and sometimes I think best when I try to write it down. You can consider my posts just my “thinking out loud”, and then opening that up for any critiques.

Be well.

It seems that at some point there must be mutual agreement as to the definition of the most fundamental concepts. Without this, we will talk past one another. For just as HolyT has made explicit, in the absence of consensus, one can always appeal to a different presupposition.

While the exercise of identifying our assumptions and contemplating alternative ones is valuable, we must actively search for some agreement lest we fail to enter any meaningful discussion at all.

So in the interest of moving past this problem (which I believe has been well and sufficiently demonstrated by HolyT), can we agree upon some foundational assumptions? By this I mean that even recognizing that alternative assumptions exist and considering the implications of these alternatives, we nevertheless agree to specific assumptions that we mutually believe lead to the most relevant lines of discussion.

For example, perhaps we should assume that things external to our minds exist, that is you all are not just a figment of my imaginition (i.e. not solipsism). Now we could discuss (briefly) the implications of that assumption not being true (i.e. solipsism is true), but I think we are all more interested in the problems that arise from it not being true. Therefore we would agree upon the assumption that things external to our minds exist and continue from there.

Seem reasonable?

Originally posted by telerion
It seems that at some point there must be mutual agreement as to the definition of the most fundamental concepts. Without this, we will talk past one another. For just as HolyT has made explicit, in the absence of consensus, one can always appeal to a different presupposition.

While the exercise of identifying our assumptions and contemplating altern ...[text shortened]... ssumption that things external to our minds exist and continue from there.

Seem reasonable?

Okay, I’ll give it a go—

_______________________________________

Axioms and Corollaries.

A1: A world exists external to our minds.

—I do not take existence as a property/attribute. In other words, it is not “Ex Ex”—“There is some x such that x exists”—but rather, either Ex or ~Ex. x is either instantiated in the world, or not.

[Note: I have not figured out how to type a proper upside-down E for the existential quantifier.]

A2: “The world is everything that is the case.” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 1)

—Alternative formulation: “The universe is the totality that has no edge.” (scottishinnz)

Corollary: There is no supernatural [extra-natural] category that warrants consideration.

—I view the introduction of a supernatural category as an unnecessary and unwarranted metaphysical leap. If there is such a supernatural category, whatever knowledge we can have of it is only as , and insofar as, it might be expressed within, and subject to the rules of, the natural world. To paraphrase from Wittgenstein again (the “later” Wittgenstein), when one reaches that metaphysical boundary-line, the trick is—to stop. Not to leap.

A3: “The world is the totality of facts, not of things.” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 1.1)

—I intend this simply to obviate the need to address such questions as substance ontology versus process ontology, etc.

A4: The world is coherent.

—As opposed to chaotic; i.e., the world is characterized by having a “syntax.” Else we have no epistemic access at all.

A5: We perceive/experience the world representationally. (Representational realism.)

—For example, visual sense-data is transferred from our eye, via the optical neurological apparatus, to the visual cortex, which forms, as it were, a picture. The picture—the visual representation—is what we see. If that picture is exhaustively accurate, then this version of representational realism would seem to reduce to direct realism.

A6: What we can know of the world, we can know through empiricism (experience/observation) and reason.

Corollary: Rejection of metaphysical idealism.

Caveat: See Corollary A7(iii) below.

A7: Knowledge is derived from the application of reason to empirical data.

Corollary (i): Such things as faith have no epistemic value.

Corollary (ii): Knowledge (episteme) is not given. The world (universe) discloses facts, patterns, relationships. Interpretation and explanation derives from the application of reason to such.

—Or, as I like to put it, knowledge (and meaning) is obtained by application of the “grammar of our consciousness” to the “syntax of the world.” What lies outside the grammar of our consciousness, we cannot know.

Corollary (iii): It seems difficult to know how much of our perception itself is imposed by the grammar of our consciousness versus simply disclosed to it. For example, is time-space dimensionality a feature of the universe, or a pattern imposed by our consciousness (Kant, I believe)? I opt for the former, but am not wedded to it.

—Here, the whole thing may become fraught with issues of self-reference, since the grammar of our consciousness is itself part of the syntax of the world.


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These axioms are intended in the sense that, as Dr. Scribbles put it, “An axiom is any proposition serving as a standard of truth within some universe of discourse.”

See: http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=65825 (“Calling Out the Logical Lion (Dr.S.)” ) for the Good Doktor’s exposition.

This seems to be in line with what you are getting at.

EDIT: I include under empiricism (empirical/experiential data) the conscious but pre-conceptual existential experience (e.g., Zen).

EDIT: I did a rearrangement as an after-thought; apologies if anyone was reading this while I did so.