belief

Originally posted by vistesd
Wittgenstein in On Certainty? “I know that my name is N.” It seems strange to say “I know that” in, say the context of casual conversation—e.g., are you trying to reassure yourself? Nevertheless, if I cannot properly say—given, e.g., the context of philosophical discussion—“I know that my name is N”, then what can I properly say that ...[text shortened]... roof, generally expected? (E.g., "I know the solution to Fermat's last theorem." )

Well, yes, Wittgenstein thought of many philosophical disputes, including epistemological ones, as needing diagnosis and remedy rather than solution. We start with the use of a concept, like knowledge and attempt an explication. Analysis of that concept leads to apparently intractable problems, and we find ourselves wishing for, but unable to provide, necessary and sufficient conditions for that concept. We are lead to say incredible things; things that strike right-thinking people as nonsensical, or minimally as too complex to be an accurate characterization of the concept at issue. We end up dealing with “language on holiday”. If only Wittgenstein had given us a theory! But he didn’t deal in theories, alas.

Let’s take the claim “I know my name is N”… Just as with the famous claim, Moore’s “Here is one hand…”, with which Wittgenstein starts, of course it can be said that one knows these claims. But are they certain? No, and Wittgenstein is explicit about this. But are they incorrigible? Again, no. One can be properly corrected about this (and in, e.g., OC 91, citing Russell, Wittgenstein is explicit about the requirement for justification or “grounds” for a belief to count as knowledge). But are they subject to unmotivated doubt; doubt even when uttered in normal contexts? Here, in ‘On Certainty’, things get tricky. What counts as a ‘normal context’ is internal to a language game. But language is normative; it is entailed by one using a term that it is possible for that term to be used incorrectly (this is why, as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, there can be no private languages; language is normative, and we can’t really be bound by rules of usage we just give ourselves as we go). So claims to know can be challenged. Perhaps one has misused ‘know’. And if ‘know’ has proper and improper usages, then maybe it’s not such a bad idea to attempt an analysis after all (though this may be more curve-fitting or tracing contours than giving necessary and sufficient conditions). Further, questions about evidence and possible verification are also parts of language games. Empirical propositions are subject to testing, as Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledges in ‘On Certainty’. So it is not sufficient that a claim be common that it be indubitable.

But, the Wittgenstein stuff aside, what you seem to be raising are issues of usage. Epistemic pluralists and contexualists do the same. There may be fundamentally different notions, all going by ‘knowledge’. My cat knows that there is milk on the floor. I know there is milk on the floor. But does ‘know’ mean the same thing in both cases? Probably not (this is one motivation for Reliabilism). Maybe there is a difference between dispositional and reflective knowing. Or suppose you ask “Do you know how deep the water is?”. I say “20 feet”, based on the testimony of my friend who has been to this bridge before. If you are asking because you are curious about fishing, my evidence may be sufficient for you to grant that I know. If you are asking because you want to jump, my evidence may be insufficient for you to grant that I know. When things get important, our standards of evidence and corresponding knowledge attributions get more rigid.

Originally posted by bbarr
Well, yes, Wittgenstein thought of many philosophical disputes, including epistemological ones, as needing diagnosis and remedy rather than solution. We start with the use of a concept, like knowledge and attempt an explication. Analysis of that concept leads to apparently intractable problems, and we find ourselves wishing for, but unable to provide, ...[text shortened]... et important, our standards of evidence and corresponding knowledge attributions get more rigid.

Thank you. The worry that I had not mentioned the distinction between psychological certainty and epistemic certainty, or that I had somehow muddled them, also kept me from sleeping well last night—so I mention it now as a kind of late edit that may or may not be necessary.

I also may be a bit musty this morning as a result of thoughts about W that plagued my sleep. I am on my second mug of coffee, and have started re-reading On Certainty—backwards, as I sometimes do; interesting that his very last paragraph relates to the OP. (I really was going from recall last night.) I hope in my selection below, I do not wrench the context.

In para. 596, W says: “If someone tells me his name is N.N., it is meaningful for me to ask him ‘Can you be mistaken?” That is an allowable question in the language game. And the answer to it, yes or no, makes sense. —Now of course this answer is not infallible either, i.e., there might be a time when it proved to be wrong, but that does not deprive the question ‘Can you be…’ and the answer ‘No’ of their meaning.”

So, W (in what I take here as the “second voice” in his dialogic approach) affirms epistemic fallibilism here (and elsewhere, I think; I’m not sure I would make that as a bald claim on just this quote; nevertheless&hellip😉. In 601, he writes: “There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression’s meaning by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in which one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice….” [My italics] An example of his dictum to look at the” use” rather than the” meaning”. It may also be an example of W eschewing theory for—practice.

In 606, he addresses what I would take to be the distinction between what I’ll call sureness (instead of psychological certainty) and epistemic certainty: “That to my mind someone else has been wrong is no ground for assuming that I am wrong now. —But isn’t it a ground for assuming that I might be wrong? It is no ground for any unsureness in my judgment, or my actions.” [Italics in original] This also, I think, goes to your point about commonality—here applied to a ground for doubt, that even a certain commonality of error is not sufficient for a claim to be dubitable. He also, in 609, refers to cases where, in calling something “wrong”, we may be “using our language game as a base from which to combat theirs?”. [Italics in original]*

—This all also goes to your point in a prior post that fallibilism does not require that no propositions can claim epistemic certainty, only that it is not necessary for one to be able to claim knowledge (and, if we want to be really careful, and speaking in English, we perhaps should qualify that we are using the word “know” in an epistemic sense—and not, say, to refer to recognition or intimate familiarity, etc.).

Finally, for the moment, in 613, he says, with regard to the name of a person he has known for years: “Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos.” This is what I had in mind when I wrote: “My understanding of W’s point in OC is that there are certain statements—such as “My name is N” or “I did not lunch yesterday in Peking”—such that, stated with the explicit or implicit “I know”, they either properly count as knowledge (JTB), or [at least any practical?] epistemology is just undermined (in the face of, e.g., a Pyrrhonian skepticism). And yet, such statements do not meet the criteria of infallibility. (It is not impossible that I had lunch in Peking yesterday, perhaps under some weird "Manchurian Candidate" scenario.)” But just here is where I think I may have been conflating practical sureness with epistemological discourse.

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* For example, I think that twhitehead generally comes from a more mathematical view toward such things as “certainty” (given his background), and so naturally wonders how it is that one could know a proposition, but only fallibly. That is, I suspect that he is coming from a different “game”—one that has different “rules” for what it means to “know” something. You and LJ are operating from another game, that also has its rules. Somehow, if the specific games are not acknowledged, then we can get just the noise of combat between competing language games (one of my gripes when poetic discourse is taken literally).

I also think there was another confusion in the thread—that caused by taking terms that normally are used within the context of a certain game (formal epistemology), and using them without that supporting context. I try more and more to avoid using such terms as fallibilism/infallibilism, foundationalism/coherentism, etc., because of my lack of background—that avoidance being a kind of hedge against using them wrongly. That made me think of something that I had read in Bernard Willams, which I then looked up this morning:

“What distinguishes analytical philosophy from other contemporary philosophy (though not from much philosophy of other times) is a certain way of going on, which involves argument, distinctions, and, so far as it remembers to try to achieve it and succeeds, moderately plain speech. As an alternative to plain speech, it distinguishes sharply between obscurity and technicality. It always rejects the first, but the second it sometimes finds a necessity.” [Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. vii.]

Necessary technical speech may enhance clarity in the technical language game to which it applies, but can cause confusion when removed from that context (perhaps even from a theoretical to a practical context)—this is likely to be especially the case when one word (or set of words) is used in more than one language game, within each of which the usage is somewhat different. (For example, in economics, a change in “demand” is not the same thing as a change in “quantity demanded”; but when I read the financial news, for example, I have to realize that when they use the former term, they most often mean the latter without realizing it.) Some technical terms originate within a given language game, but some are quite ordinary terms—like “know”—that take on different technical meanings in different games. And in the latter case especially, the very distinction that Williams mentions is not necessarily clear.

“Clearing away the brush” (to use your phrase) also entails being clear about what language games are in play.

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All this is, of course, only my attempt to think clearly (if long-windedly) about your question as to the cause of confusion. I springboard from Wittgenstein without any pretense of knowing what Wittgenstein “really meant”—I don’t think that Wittgenstein (at least the “later” Wittgenstein) would have objected to being used that way.

I will now continue with my backwards reading—and then revisit the PI as well I think…

EDIT, for something I forgot to say. I don’t think that I am disagreeing with any of the following from your post, which I really found helpful—

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Let’s take the claim “I know my name is N”… Just as with the famous claim, Moore’s “Here is one hand…”, with which Wittgenstein starts, of course it can be said that one knows these claims. But are they certain? No, and Wittgenstein is explicit about this. But are they incorrigible? Again, no. One can be properly corrected about this (and in, e.g., OC 91, citing Russell, Wittgenstein is explicit about the requirement for justification or “grounds” for a belief to count as knowledge). But are they subject to unmotivated doubt; doubt even when uttered in normal contexts? Here, in ‘On Certainty’, things get tricky. What counts as a ‘normal context’ is internal to a language game. But language is normative; it is entailed by one using a term that it is possible for that term to be used incorrectly (this is why, as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, there can be no private languages; language is normative, and we can’t really be bound by rules of usage we just give ourselves as we go). So claims to know can be challenged. Perhaps one has misused ‘know’. And if ‘know’ has proper and improper usages, then maybe it’s not such a bad idea to attempt an analysis after all (though this may be more curve-fitting or tracing contours than giving necessary and sufficient conditions). Further, questions about evidence and possible verification are also parts of language games. Empirical propositions are subject to testing, as Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledges in ‘On Certainty’. So it is not sufficient that a claim be common that it be indubitable.

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I have to go find it, but I recall that W distinguished also between mistakes made within a given game, and mistaking the game itself (my words). I’ll search that out.

BTW, can you give me a recommendation for any specific works by Koethe, both poetic and philosophical, that you think I might best start with? Thanks.

Originally posted by vistesd
EDIT, for something I forgot to say. I don’t think that I am disagreeing with any of the following from your post, which I really found helpful—

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Let’s take the claim “I know my name is N”… Just as with the famous claim, Moore’s “Here is one hand…”, with which Wittgenstein starts, of course it ...[text shortened]... works by Koethe, both poetic and philosophical, that you think I might best start with? Thanks.

Vistesd, thank you for the wonderful post. It is always a pleasure to follow the trail of your thoughts.

I am not sure that the distinction between epistemic and psychological certainty is particularly important in the OC. See S144, for instance. The claims that function as certain do not do so because they “drag you by the hair to assent” (as Descartes characterized the results of clear and distinct perception). Neither, seemingly, is certainty an epistemic matter, as though propositions are certain when the evidence renders them sure. What evidence? What process of verification could we subject the claim ‘here is a hand’ to, without being inconsistent? Rather, they are grammatically certain. They are the claims that stand fast against the backdrop of our practices of questioning and enquiry. And in S152 this notion is clarified. It is not, as Kant would have it, that some propositions (like the rules of logic) must be treated as certain in order to engage in thought at all. It is that there is a practice we learn, not the application of single propositions. It is a system we come to believe, not particular claims in isolation. And this practice holds fast particular “hinge propositions”, or propositions our practices presuppose are inured from doubt. These propositions are not foundational, or axiomatic, as though the edifice of practice rested upon their truth; they are not the epistemic preconditions for knowledge. They are not even, strictly speaking, propositions we can know (they are literally supposed to “go without saying”, as beliefs that are non-epistemically bedrock); they are propositions that stand fast for us, held in place as indubitable against the backdrop of our practices of knowing. Of course, for all this, these propositions may turn out false.

Regarding fallibilism, what would Wittgenstein say? I think this is pretty clear. We have practices of investigation, enquiry, and providing evidence. These can cause us to revise our claims to knowledge. That doesn’t mean it wasn’t appropriate to have made the claim “I know…”, or that it was a misuse of the expression.

I do not think that S613 should be understood as claiming that hinge propositions must properly count as knowledge, lest practical epistemology be undermined. After all, they don’t function as knowledge claims in the language game. That is why is sounds so strange to W’s ears when Moore says “I know that here is a hand”. The point is simply that they are indubitable. What would it take for a doubt about such a claim to be raised? Well, it may be that whatever doubt could be raised would be itself more dubitable than the claim in question. But, if not, then we may find ourselves dislodged from the game (“bucked by facts from the saddle&rdquo😉, and thereby without the grounds to make judgments. We may go mad. Or, of course, madness may be the only explanation when one entertains doubts about hinge propositions.

Regarding your edit: In the interest of clarity I will try to be less clear (i.e., technical).

Start with Koethe’s Falling Water. It is gorgeous poetry.

Originally posted by LemonJello
twhitehead, I believe we are probably still talking past each other. I have read through the thread pretty carefully, starting from where you first objected to bbarr's lottery argument. I think the confusion lies in one or two (or both) things. Maybe if I attempt to clarify those points, it will help the discussion.

First, it seems clear to me that hope this helps or clarifies our discussion somewhat. 😕

Having re-read through a number of posts, and now this one.
I am fairly happy I agree with you about the justification side and understand what you ware talking about.

For your first point it is obviously the closure principle that doesn't work as formulated.

And I get your arguments for the second point.


My problem is not how you match the justification condition up with the truth condition.

It is the truth condition itself.

I don't see the point or value of it.


Instead of JTB + fourth condition whatever you choose.

T is irrelevant. and unhelpful.

so JB+third condition whatever you choose.


The reason being that the justification is your basis for deciding it is true, as much as is possible for the proposition at hand.
If J doesn't show P to be true then you fail the justification and you can't claim to know P.
If J does show P to be true, to the required standard (whatever you define that to be), then you can claim to know P.
While P=true is suitably highly probable, but currently indistinguishable from not-P=true, It is practically impossible to know if
P is true.

The truth condition is external, unknown, and rendered redundant by the justification condition for all practical purposes.


In the case of the lottery.
Before the lottery is run, the 'truth' doesn't actually exist. No ticket has won or lost, they just have probabilities as to their outcomes.
Thus claiming knowledge before the lottery is run according to you is impossible as no ticket can possibly meet the truth condition.
The truth is not only not known but doesn't exist yet.

After the lottery is run, I would contend that as it is possible to look up the result and thus know with certainty (barring hallucination,
evil demons, news vendor screw up ect. of course) whether the ticket has or has not won, you can't justifiably claim P as knowledge without doing this.



What I would like to here is how you justify the truth condition.

Because as far as I can see it's useless.

If I had any reason to think any of my knowledge claims were false then my justification would fail.
If I don't have any reason to think my knowledge claims are false, then it makes no practical difference to me whether they are true or not.
I can't tell.

What use is a definition that includes a condition I can never meet?

Originally posted by bbarr
Vistesd, thank you for the wonderful post. It is always a pleasure to follow the trail of your thoughts.

I am not sure that the distinction between epistemic and psychological certainty is particularly important in the OC. See S144, for instance. The claims that function as certain do not do so because they “drag you by the hair to assent” (as Descartes ...[text shortened]... s clear (i.e., technical).

Start with Koethe’s Falling Water. It is gorgeous poetry.

Thank you. Wittgenstein has intrigued me (as a playful layperson) at least since Dottewell was on here (you may remember him); he did his MA on Wittgenstein—at Cambridge. And I found myself arguing somewhat stubbornly with him about W and Zen without realizing his background; but it was a congenial argument, and he was a gracious soul.

Rather, they are grammatically certain. They are the claims that stand fast against the backdrop of our practices of questioning and enquiry.

That is very helpful. Thanks. I will keep that (with your other comments) in my head as I continue my re-read. (Same for your comment on S613.) I’d like to at least get through OC again, and maybe the PI as well (I’ve read a good chunk of the latter, but suspect that I really need to start again.)

Thanks also for the Koethe recommendation; I will order it forthwith.

In the interest of clarity I will try to be less clear (i.e., technical).

Now that gave me a good belly-laugh! 🙂 I did recall that Williams was a particular favorite of yours, and I happened to recall those comments from the only work of his that I have.

Be well.

How do you guys keep up with this? There is so much food for thought here. I only got down to halfway through the third post on this page this morning.
Or do you guys enjoy doing people's heads in? 😀

Originally posted by karoly aczel
How do you guys keep up with this? There is so much food for thought here. I only got down to halfway through the third post on this page this morning.
Or do you guys enjoy doing people's heads in? 😀

Mainly we do our own heads in, and ask others to try to put them back together.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Mainly we do our own heads in, and ask others to try to put them back together.

Funny ... as long as you know you're doing my head in too ...AAAARRGH 🙂

Originally posted by googlefudge
Having re-read through a number of posts, and now this one.
I am fairly happy I agree with you about the justification side and understand what you ware talking about.

For your first point it is obviously the closure principle that doesn't work as formulated.

And I get your arguments for the second point.


My problem is not how you match the can't tell.

What use is a definition that includes a condition I can never meet?

Thank you for your clarifications. I am glad we agree, excepting the issue of the truth condition. But, on that particular issue of the truth condition, I have to disagree strongly with what you have said. That P is true is a necessary condition for S's knowing that P is true; and without this condition, you do not have an acceptable analysis of knowledge; at best, you would have an analysis of justified belief.

I would like to first point out that portions of your arguments here seem just blatantly contradictory. For instance, you say that, in your view, J/B/Gettier is an acceptable analysis of knowledge. Okay, then under your view, if S believes P and S's belief in P is justified and [whatever we need here to satisfy Gettier condition]; then S knows that P is true. Now, you go on to clearly state that in such cases, "the truth condition is external, unknown, and rendered redundant by the justification condition for all practical purposes". So, now you are saying the truth condition is, among other things, unknown. But the truth condition here is simply that P is true. So, now you are implying that it is not the case that S knows that P is true. Please compare those two bolded phrases above. So as far as I can tell, this view of yours is just contradictory. Am I missing something here?

Your view seems blatantly incoherent from other angles as well. For instance, on page 14 you stated "I can't ever know if any of the things I think are true about the world are actually true". But then you go on later to say that you think J/B/Gettier is an acceptable analysis of knowledge. But that J/B/Gettier is an acceptable analysis of knowledge implies that J/B/Gettier being collectively met is sufficient for S's knowing that P is true. And whatever is true is actually true, so under your view J/B/Gettier being collectively met is sufficient for S's knowing that P is actually true. And, of course you do think J/B/Gettier can be met. So, which is it? You do or do not think one can know that the things one thinks about the world are actually true? Your view is contradictory on this matter.

Further, you contend that the truth condition is pointless/irrelevant to analysis of knowledge because it is external and has no practical implications for S from within his epistemic situation and because, you claim, "there is no detectable difference between those things I claim to know but are actually wrong, and those things I claim to know and are true". First, as bbarr already stated, you are conflating the point of the justification condition with the point of the truth condition. The practical issues you bring up are enveloped by the justification condition, and is not the job of the truth condition to do the same. Relatedly, you are conflating the conditions under which something is known with some practical procedure for verifying that something is known. The analysis of knowledge concerns the former, not the latter, and as such, the issues of practicality that you raise carry no real force against it. I would also add that just because the truth condition does not raise the practicality differences you mention, that would not mean that the truth condition does not raise differences that are epistemologically relevant. Regardless of whether you can detect some difference between your justified belief that happens to be true or the same justified belief that happens to be false, there is surely still a relevant difference here, which concerns the relation between the proposition you believe and the world. In one case, the proposition you believe picks out something actual and has correspondence to facts about the world; whereas in the other case, not.

What use is a definition that includes a condition I can never meet?

I would draw your attention to two points of notional confusion here. One is that, again, you are conflating the conditions under which you know something with some practical test. Secondly, the truth condition is not something you meet per se, but rather it concerns the proposition that you believe. So it is more like something the proposition you believe must meet, in its relation to the world.

Lastly, I would submit that rejecting the truth condition in the manner you have just does not seem to make any sense. So you think S can know that P is true when in fact P is false?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Thank you for your clarifications. I am glad we agree, excepting the issue of the truth condition. But, on that particular issue of the truth condition, I have to disagree strongly with what you have said. That P is true is a necessary condition for S's knowing that P is true; and without this condition, you do not have an acceptable analysis of knowle ...[text shortened]... m to make any sense. So you think S can know that P is true when in fact P is false?

Sounds like he is pretty confused to me.