Originally posted by LemonJelloWe must not forget that twhitehead claims to be a computer programmer. I suppose absurd logic is common place in his programs. 😏What do we mean when we say A caused B?
I think we mean: if A didn't happen, then B wouldn't have happened.
That is related to one possible take on it, which is related to so-called counterfactual theories of causation. But it is by no means the only take on it, and this line has several challenges and problems that go with it, requiri ...[text shortened]... able to say that the sprinkler system engaging caused the fire to start. But isn't this absurd?
Originally posted by DeepThoughtFree will is simply you pick which way you go!
An observer outside the universe (if that's a meaningful statement) observing the universe would see it all at once. They would be outside of time. So yes, that particular interpretation is consistent with God not being limited by time. But be a bit wary of it, I got that from a Wikipedia page and the writer didn't necessarily understand the theory. ...[text shortened]... so the interpretation they were using may be completely inconsistent with libertarian free will.
Now if our lives are like people in a book where the reader is looking at the
pages of a story, those lives in the book are set in place! The story will be
told but the reality will be none of the people in the story gets a real
choice, they will always only do what was is written for them to do. The
author not the person in the story are really making all of the choices.
If that is true there is no free will in that except for the author who always
gets what they want.
If an observer does not make the choices for anyone, instead each person
does make all of them than freewill is there, even if someone one knows
the outcome.
I don't have to know the future to know that if there are two people and
one is honest and caring the other is selfish and greedy that when both of
them find a wallet with money and ID in it to know what the outcomes are
going to be. They will act according to what they are, their choices will
show everyone who and what they are.
As long as our choices are the driving force around us we are to blame!
We can setup a world where our kids are cared for, or we can setup a
world where they are just there and our selfish desires rule over all. The
issue in this discussion boils down to one and only one point in my
opinion, who makes your choices, not who knows!?
For us it is always if A than B not C, for God it is always A than X we do
not grasp it, God does if we have the ability to make the choice it is always
on us what it is we do. If God forces B than there is no "if" statement it
is always A than B not C.
Originally posted by KellyJayIf someone is selfish and greedy it does not, of itself, mean that they are not also scrupulously honest. The difficulty with your point about free will is that it is rather coarse grained. I don't think any of us disregard the idea that we make our own decisions, but do we make them in the manner of clockwork, or in some less deterministic way? The nature of free will is what is at question.
Free will is simply you pick which way you go!
Now if our lives are like people in a book where the reader is looking at the
pages of a story, those lives in the book are set in place! The story will be
told but the reality will be none of the people in the story gets a real
choice, they will always only do what was is written for them to do. The
au ...[text shortened]... what it is we do. If God forces B than there is no "if" statement it
is always A than B not C.
Omniscience is an attribute which has been claimed as a property of God. If that is the case it is reasonable to ask what the implications are for free will. Later we may ask the question, should we find that there is a contradiction with free will whether there is such a thing as free will and that will bring us to discussions about responsibility. However, we are not yet there. We are still trying to work out what the necessity of the past means.
Originally posted by DeepThoughtWhat if God is approaching being omnicient, but hasn't quite attained it yet?
If someone is selfish and greedy it does not, of itself, mean that they are not also scrupulously honest. The difficulty with your point about free will is that it is rather coarse grained. I don't think any of us disregard the idea that we make our own decisions, but do we make them in the manner of clockwork, or in some less deterministic way? The n ...[text shortened]... er, we are not yet there. We are still trying to work out what the necessity of the past means.
Originally posted by LemonJelloIf whenever fire breaks out then the sprinkler engages, and the sprinkler engaging only happens when fire breaks out, then we cannot know whether or not fire breaking out or the sprinkler engaging is the primary cause.
Further, this seems to lead to all sorts of absurdities. Suppose that an appliance shorts out and a fire ensues. A sprinkler system overhead engages and puts out the fire. Now, aren't the following both true: (a) if the short didn't happen, then the sprinkler system would not have engaged and (b) if the short didn't happen, then the fire would not have ...[text shortened]... able to say that the sprinkler system engaging caused the fire to start. But isn't this absurd?
So no, it isn't absurd.
You only believe it is absurd because:
1. You have been brought up to believe the causal process only proceeds in the direction of the flow of time.
2. You know some facts about fires and sprinklers that violate our propositions.
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Originally posted by twhiteheadGee that's rather presumptuous telling me what I believe and why.
If whenever fire breaks out then the sprinkler engages, and the sprinkler engaging only happens when fire breaks out, then we cannot know whether or not fire breaking out or the sprinkler engaging is the primary cause.
So no, it isn't absurd.
You only believe it is absurd because:
1. You have been brought up to believe the causal process only proceeds ...[text shortened]... flow of time.
2. You know some facts about fires and sprinklers that violate our propositions.
Sorry I bothered. I would recommend you take a good look at the works of Lewis on counterfactual theory regarding causation -- summaries of his theories, defenses and criticisms thereof, etc.
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Originally posted by DeepThoughtThe point I was making and I'm still making is that unless we say we were
If someone is selfish and greedy it does not, of itself, mean that they are not also scrupulously honest. The difficulty with your point about free will is that it is rather coarse grained. I don't think any of us disregard the idea that we make our own decisions, but do we make them in the manner of clockwork, or in some less deterministic way? The n ...[text shortened]... er, we are not yet there. We are still trying to work out what the necessity of the past means.
without control, unless we were forced to make all of our choices we have
a freewill, or better said, we are free moral agents. I say free moral
agents due to we have a sin nature that binds us to it. Personally I think
we only have free will when we are free of our sin nature.
You wish to debate if God who is omniscience has the ability to give
someone a will of their own, that even Himself would not violate, I'm
not at all sure any formula you could come up with will give you insight
into God's ability, or God's desires for such person, or race of them.
Originally posted by twhiteheadThere's a rule in physics that for event A to be said to have caused event B it has to have happened before event B (technically in the backwards light cone). So backwards in time causation is ruled out in physics more or less by assumption. While it's not entirely clear that it should be, that is the normal rule. In fundamental physics there is no difference between an elementary particle collision run forwards in time and backwards - they look the same (but see [1] below). What seems to happen is that causation has something to do with statistics and entropy.
If whenever fire breaks out then the sprinkler engages, and the sprinkler engaging only happens when fire breaks out, then we cannot know whether or not fire breaking out or the sprinkler engaging is the primary cause.
So no, it isn't absurd.
You only believe it is absurd because:
1. You have been brought up to believe the causal process only proceeds ...[text shortened]... flow of time.
2. You know some facts about fires and sprinklers that violate our propositions.
I have to ask what you mean by time. In General Relativity it is not a well defined quantity. Given one set of coordinates (x,y,z,t) we can always reparameterize and use some other set of coordinates in which the time coordinate is different. In fact for some rather technical reasons it is not wrong to say that there is no time in General Relativity. Time as we know it is an emergent phenomenon [2].
One approach to this is to start with events. Imagine a causal chain, event A causes B causes C etc.. Then if A causes B we say A came before B, and time emerges as an ordering of events. In that kind of model backwards in time causation is ruled out simply because if one event causes another it's defined to have happened before it, that is what before means. This requires that there are no causal loops, A causes B causes C causes A.
I'd tread a little lightly in discussions with the philosophers here. LJ gave a good example. Talking to you in this thread it feels as if you are trying to invent objections for the sake of it. Maybe you are not and I'm being unjust. But if you are you'll find that some posters have more and some less tolerance to that kind of behaviour. If not I suggest you try reading LJ's reference, it will give you some understanding of what the discussion's about.
[1] What I said isn't true. Time reversal invariance is not a symmetry of nature. It is broken by the weak nuclear force. Having said that it is a symmetry of electro-magnetism which is by far the most important force on every day distance scales. So to a first approximation what I was saying above is true.
[2] See e.g. the Wikipedia page on "The Problem of Time"
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Originally posted by DeepThoughtI agree with your summary, and I believe that because of this, predicting the future beyond a given accuracy is therefore impossible. If we are going to give God his omniscience, then we have to develop new physics. I am saying that in you argument that logic does not rule out omniscience coexisting with free will, you may inadvertently be assuming physics is unchanged, but physics already rules out omniscience.
What seems to happen is that causation has something to do with statistics and entropy.
Talking to you in this thread it feels as if you are trying to invent objections for the sake of it.
I am testing objections. I fully admit that I am not as well read as the other participants and am new to many of the ideas. But I am not testing them to be rude or to start a fight or to troll, I genuinely think there may be some problems with the claims being made and I would like to know what the solutions to my objections might be. It would probably be best for me to go and read the philosophers referenced. I'll consider it.
Originally posted by twhiteheadSomething can be logically possible but ruled out by physics. So there's no logical reason that going faster than light should be impossible. In the possible world of Star Trek it is, in the actual world (the one we live in) it is not because the laws of physics rule it out as it's tantamount to time travel. So yes, at the level of the discussion we aren't worrying about the laws of physics. If we find that there is no logical problem then we may start looking at physics and trying to see if a physics based objection can be found. Although there are instant problems with that as we have to worry about whether God is an external observer and whether external observers are possible or not, as well as developing a consistent theory of time, which is one of those questions that is difficult to approach empirically.
I agree with your summary, and I believe that because of this, predicting the future beyond a given accuracy is therefore impossible. If we are going to give God his omniscience, then we have to develop new physics. I am saying that in you argument that logic does not rule out omniscience coexisting with free will, you may inadvertently be assuming physic ...[text shortened]... . It would probably be best for me to go and read the philosophers referenced. I'll consider it.
Ok., that's fine, I believe your motives. When you're disagreeing with someone on internet forums to test ideas it's important to explain that that's what you're doing as LJ can't tell where you're coming from. It's in the nature of the medium.
That philosophy site is good. In the time between making my last post and this one I was able to read the article on time. At a guess you're looking at half an hour to an hour per article, based on a sample of one. I found it a fairly easy to read and it formed a good introduction to the subject. It also told me that the model of time (A causes B so A is before B) is called a reductionist theory of time. There's pages on modal logic (listed under logic) and possible worlds which all look good to read. There's a table of contents so you can look for things to read about.
http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html
Originally posted by sonhouseSo you agree that the Bible teaches that God is omniscient?
Really? Maybe not that term directly but read this:
http://www.openbible.info/topics/omniscience
like this:
Jeremiah 1:5 ESV / 51 helpful votes
“Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations.”
Get that part? The writers of the bible screwed that one up big time ...[text shortened]... ed you in the womb I knew you.
I guess you don't know your own bible as well as you thought..
Originally posted by twhiteheadIs that a fact?
If you had been following the thread you would know that if a God who isn't limited by time exists, then the future exists and there can be no free will.
If you were to ask me I think that anyone following this thread wouldn't know a thing about God, the future or free will!
But God knows, and in the end that's all one really needs to know. If God doesn't know it, it doesn't exist.
Originally posted by LemonJelloHi L.J., here's a second attempt at writing down Plantinga's condition symbolically. I'm not sure if I have it right. The top condition is the one I'm happier with, but it has a consequence I'm not happy with.In symbols statement 42 is:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬∃x ∃y ∀t [(t ≥ T) & S(x) & A(y) & B(x,y) & C(x,y,t) & □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T))]
To me this does not seem accurate.
Here again is Plantinga's statement (42):
[i]"(42) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if p is true at t and [b]it
is not possible both that p is true at t a ...[text shortened]... e-written to accommodate), which is something I think Plantinga does touch on at times, briefly.
P(T) - the proposition at time T is true.
S(x) - x is an agent.
A(y) - y is an action.
B(x, y) - y is a basic action for x.
C(x,y,t) - x can do y at time t.
D(x,y,t) - x does y at time t.
□ª = accidental necessity
□ = logically necessary
◇ = logically possible
∀t (t ≥ T) = for all times t such that t is at or after T
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬◇(P(T) & ∃x ∃y ∀t [(t ≥ T) & S(x) & A(y) & B(x,y) & C(x,y,t) & □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T))])
I really don't understand the condition □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T)), in Plantinga's colony of ants example, the ants move in at T. At T1 > T Paul could mow his lawn, but God knows he won't, if he does then because God cares about the ants for ineffable reasons then he would have prevented them from moving in. So since the ants have moved in Paul is an agent who can change the past. But there is a possible world where God doesn't care about the ants and in that possible world Paul mowing the lawn does not entail that the ants didn't move in. So the accidental necessity of the ants moving in seems to depend on God not necessarily caring about them, which strikes me as odd. The ants apparently don't have free will in this - so what if there's a human (Peter say) involved who puts the ants there at time T - in possible worlds where God cares about the ants does Peter not have free will (to avoid the ants being there in the first place)?
Let:
Q(x) = ∃y ∀t [(t ≥ T) & S(x) & A(y) & B(x,y) & C(x,y,t) & □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T))]
I'll use the word Q-agent for an agent x for which Q(x) is true.
Then we have:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬◇(P(T) & ∃x Q(x))
So, using the duality relation and ¬(A&B) ⊢ ¬A v ¬B we get:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & □ (¬P(T) v ¬∃x Q(x))
The next step makes me wonder if I've translated Plantinga's condition correctly:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & □ (P(T) -> ¬∃xQ(x))
and
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & □ (∃x Q(x) -> ¬P(T))
I'm not worried about the first line, P(T) is accidentally necessary iff P(T) is true in the actual world and in all possible worlds if P(T) is true then there is no Q agent that can do anything about it. The second line seems wrong somehow. P(T) is accidentally necessary if and only if P(T) is true in the actual world and in all possible worlds if there is a Q-agent then P(T) is not true. It shouldn't be necessary requirement that the agent should actually stop it if they exist, just that they could stop it.
So did Plantinga intend:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬◇∃xQ(x)
P(T) is accidentally necessary if and only if P(T) is true in the actual world and there is no possible world with a Q-agent who can stop P(T).
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Originally posted by DeepThought
Hi L.J., here's a second attempt at writing down Plantinga's condition symbolically. I'm not sure if I have it right. The top condition is the one I'm happier with, but it has a consequence I'm not happy with.
P(T) - the proposition at time T is true.
S(x) - x is an agent.
A(y) - y is an action.
B(x, y) - y is a basic action for x.
C(x,y,t) - x ...[text shortened]... (T) is true in the actual world and there is no possible world with a Q-agent who can stop P(T).
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬◇(P(T) & ∃x ∃y ∀t [(t ≥ T) & S(x) & A(y) & B(x,y) & C(x,y,t) & □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T))])
One preliminary point is that you are using universal quantification over times at T or later. Although the way Plantinga words (42) is somewhat ambiguous, I highly doubt that the universal quantification is what he intends. He is intending that S have the power to perform A at some t such that t ≥ T, not for all t such that t ≥ T. If you think about it, the idea that an agent possesses the power to perform A at all times t ≥ T is not reasonable in context, seemingly ruling out any agent whose existence is nonpermanent.
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬◇(P(T) & ∃x Q(x))
So, using the duality relation and ¬(A&B) ⊢ ¬A v ¬B we get:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & □ (¬P(T) v ¬∃x Q(x))
The next step makes me wonder if I've translated Plantinga's condition correctly:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & □ (P(T) -> ¬∃xQ(x))
and
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & □ (∃x Q(x) -> ¬P(T))
I'm not sure why at the end you have split it up into two criteria for accidental necessity of P at T. But I would generally agree that we should be able to say that
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬◇(P(T) & ∃xQ(x))
is equivalent to:
□ªP(T) <-> {P(T) & □(P(T) -> ¬∃xQ(x)) & □(∃xQ(x) -> ¬P(T))}.
This should work since, as you point out, ¬◇(P & Q) is equivalent to □(¬P v ¬Q); and since we can also show through truth tables that (¬P v ¬Q) is equivalent to ((P -> ¬Q) & (Q -> ¬P)); and finally since □((P -> ¬Q) & (Q -> ¬P)) iff □(P -> ¬Q) & □(Q -> ¬P).
I'm not worried about the first line, P(T) is accidentally necessary iff P(T) is true in the actual world and in all possible worlds if P(T) is true then there is no Q agent that can do anything about it. The second line seems wrong somehow. P(T) is accidentally necessary if and only if P(T) is true in the actual world and in all possible worlds if there is a Q-agent then P(T) is not true. It shouldn't be necessary requirement that the agent should actually stop it if they exist, just that they could stop it.
I agree that □(∃xQ(x) -> ¬P(T)) looks problematic. It has the form of a strict implication; whereas, as you point out, we know it is not the case that the existence of a Q-agent entails the falsity of P.
So, I would agree that this is probably not capturing what Plantinga intends.
Maybe part of the problem here lies in Plantinga's "(3) necessarily if S were to perform A at t or later, then p would have been false." This is necessity operating on a counterfactual conditional. In your symbolic rendering, you are taking it that the scope of worlds under consideration include all possible worlds (consistent with logical necessity); but for counterfactual conditionals, there should generally be some accessibility relation, or some such, that limits the scope of worlds. I would tend to argue that the scope of worlds under consideration in (3) are only P-worlds (i.e., worlds wherein P is true). Worlds wherein P is false do not apply; for in such worlds "p would have been false" is not counter to the facts. So my take is that (3) is asserting that the counterfactual conditional therein is true in all possible P-worlds. And I suppose this amounts to saying that for all possible P-worlds, the nearest possible world wherein S performs A at t or later is not a P-world.
So this is why I had mentioned the following earlier: "So, what Plantinga is basically saying is that P is accidentally necessary at t just in case both of the following hold: the actual world is a member of W & Q is false in all members of W." (Again, W here represents the set of all P-worlds). He is not, in my opinion, intending to say anything about the truth value of Q in non-P-worlds because non-P-worlds are not relevant to (3).
So, if I had to put it into your symbols, I would guess Plantinga intends the following:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & □(P(T) -> ¬∃xQ(x)).
This helps restrict our attention to P-worlds when it comes to non-vacuous truth (in non-P-worlds, the conditional P(T) -> ¬∃xQ(x) is vacuously true since P(T) is false).
So did Plantinga intend:
□ªP(T) <-> P(T) & ¬◇∃xQ(x)
Perhaps. This would have a similar effect to what I suggested since ¬◇∃xQ(x) means □¬∃xQ(x), and that entails □(P(T) -> ¬∃xQ(x)). However, this formulation additionally seems to carry non-vacuous implications about the truth value of Q in non-P-worlds, and it is not my impression that Plantinga intends to go there.
I really don't understand the condition □(D(x,y,t) -> ¬P(T)), in Plantinga's colony of ants example, the ants move in at T. At T1 > T Paul could mow his lawn, but God knows he won't, if he does then because God cares about the ants for ineffable reasons then he would have prevented them from moving in. So since the ants have moved in Paul is an agent who can change the past. But there is a possible world where God doesn't care about the ants and in that possible world Paul mowing the lawn does not entail that the ants didn't move in. So the accidental necessity of the ants moving in seems to depend on God not necessarily caring about them, which strikes me as odd. The ants apparently don't have free will in this - so what if there's a human (Peter say) involved who puts the ants there at time T - in possible worlds where God cares about the ants does Peter not have free will (to avoid the ants being there in the first place)?
Again, with respect to my comments above, I think there is perhaps some danger here in how we interpret the counterfactual conditional, and in applying logical necessity to capture it in symbols. Unless you have a different interpretation, let's say that the counterfactual conditional "If S were to perform A at T or later, then P would have been false" is true for a P-world, W, iff the nearest possible world to W where S performs A at T or later is not a P-world. And the necessity that Plantinga is applying here is limited in scope to P-worlds. Again, that's just my take on it.
Plantinga's concern here is the following. On an Ockhamite formulation of accidental necessity, things that are "strictly about the past" ought to be accidentally necessary. And it seems that a fact like "The ants moved in at T" is , at t > T, strictly about the past if anything is. So, it ought to be the case that this fact is accidentally necessary on a successful Ockhamite formulation. However, it seems that not even a fact like this is accidentally necessary on a formulation that is exactly like (42) except without the necessity operator in (3). The reason is because of the possibility of divine fore-cooperation. Plantinga reasons that if it is possible that God cares intensely enough about the ants, then there is some possible P-world such that the nearest possible world to it wherein Paul mows at T is a world wherein the ants do not march in (a non-P-world). Then the upshot is that P is NOT accidentally necessary.
So, to get around this, Plantinga sees the need to add the necessity operator into (3). Now for P to NOT be accidentally necessary, it would have to be the case for ALL P-worlds that the nearest possible world wherein Paul mows at T is not a P-world. This solves the problem, provided that God's relevant concern for the ants is not necessary with respect to the same scope of worlds. So, yes, I think you are right when you state "So the accidental necessity of the ants moving in seems to depend on God not necessarily caring about them". Seems like a good point. I'm not sure Plantinga successfully addresses/justifies this point. He basically says that in virtue of the necessity operator being there, a fact like "The ants moved in at T" on his formulation will be accidentally necessary because regardless of the possibility of divine fore-cooperation, "[Paul's] performing that action does not entail the falsehood of the proposition that the ants did move in", where the emphasis in italics is Plantinga's own. So, it appears that Plantinga is taking (3) to have the form of strict implication.
I may have to give this point more thought....