Originally posted by lemon limeNo, you would not be safe in saying that. In fact, you are guaranteed to be wrong. It is logically impossible for everything to have a cause, unless there is only one possible reality (which seems doubtful). There have to be brute facts (uncaused facts).
Something may appear to be random if no discernible or predictable pattern can be found, but I think I'm safe in saying that for every action there is always a cause, whether that cause can be identified or not.
But even in every day quantum mechanics, there appears to be plenty of randomness, and there is no good reason to think there are causes. It can't be ruled out, but neither can it be ruled in.
Originally posted by lemon limeI've spent most of this page arguing with myself, you're not the one getting confused!
I've been intrigued by this discussion, mostly because I don't know why it would present a problem for anyone. You said:
[b]Omniscience is an attribute which has been claimed as a property of God. If that is the case it is reasonable to ask what the implications are for free will.
Omniscience is as you say a property of God, but it's not a prope ...[text shortened]... elf:
Just because God knows what I will do does not mean he causes me to do it.[/b]
Knowledge concerns information. If someone knows something then they have the information about it and if someone has prescient information about it then it's as if it has already happened. So if God knows what your decision will be before it happens then it as if you have already made the decision.
Your action is the cause of God's knowledge about what you do, God's knowing it is an effect. Cause has to precede effect, if event A and event B are causally related then the one that comes first in time is the cause and the one that comes second is the effect, to the extent that it is possible to define what time is in terms of the ordering of causal events. This is the reductionist view of time and in this view cause has to precede effect pretty much by construction. In a Platonic view of time you can imagine drawing a line (time) and putting events onto the line, in that formulation an event's temporal location is defined by where it is on the line and so closed time-like loops aren't ruled out by construction.
With prescient omniscience, at the beginning of time God knows what you will do and may intervene to alter the world in the light of that knowledge but before you are born. That intervention can alter the circumstances you make the choice in, then when you do make the choice you cause God to know what you will do at the beginning of time. If you have free will that's an awfully unstable situation.
William of Ockham got round this problem by dividing facts rooted in the past into two types, one's with accidental necessity, which are what Plantinga calls hard facts about the past, and one's which do not have accidental necessity - Plantinga calls these soft facts. For example a history book written a year ago talking about the Battle of Hastings has hard facts about the past, a book of predictions about the future contains at most soft facts (and if we require the facts to be true they may even not be facts at all). The idea is that God's knowledge of the future does not have the necessity of the past because none of it is strictly about the past.
Ockham didn't define very clearly what he meant by something having the necessity of the past. Plantinga gave a formulation of necessity of the past that appears to work. What I was worrying about was this bit that allowed God to intervene in the world, based on his knowledge of the future, that prevented things which should have the necessity of the past not having it. Plantinga uses the example of some ants moving into someone's garden. The guy isn't going to mow his lawn the following Sunday, but if he does it'll kill the ants. God cares about the ants for some reason and if the guy were to mow his lawn the following Sunday then God would have made the ants move in to someone else's garden. So the ants moving in depends on something in the future. This appears to be a problem.
Plantinga takes care of this in a suspicious looking way, essentially because there are possible worlds where God doesn't care about the ants they guy mowing his lawn won't of necessity cause the ants not to move in. He preserves the necessity of the past by this trick. I wondered if Plantinga's formulation allowed things that shouldn't be accidentally necessary to become so, and initially thought it did, but I've changed my mind as predictions are about the future and so not strictly about the past.
Plantinga sort of assumes this in his formulation I gave in my previous post. I was getting confused as Plantinga words it as "P is true at time t". It dawned on me that what he meant was that something like a prediction doesn't have a truth value until the event the prediction refers to happens.
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Originally posted by DeepThoughtKnowing doesn't necessarily translate into causing... I can know something about a highly probable outcome without affecting that outcome, so I still maintain that an omniscient being can know about an outcome without necessarily needing to intervene in order to make that outcome happen.
I've spent most of this page arguing with myself, you're not the one getting confused!
Knowledge concerns information. If someone knows something then they have the information about it and if someone has prescient information about it then it's as if it has already happened. So if God knows what your decision will be before it happens then it as if ...[text shortened]... g like a prediction doesn't have a truth value until the event the prediction refers to happens.
This discussion has been confusing for me to follow because it's not clear if it's intended to specifically refer to the Judeo-Christian God or not...maybe it's simply meant to be an intellectual exercise including any other possible god or gods. The reason I'm wondering about this is because I couldn't help noticing how many of the ideas brought up here either don't mesh with or completely misrepresent the definition of the Judeo-Christian God, as can be found in the Biblical narrative. I don't believe understanding (specifically) the Judeo-Christian God is nearly as complicated as many of these messages seem to suggest...
And for some strange reason, this is starting to remind of that scene in Dark Star where someone is trying to reason with a bomb, and get it to change its mind about detonating. One of questions I have about this scene is why would anyone need to give a bomb the ability to reason? All any bomb needs to have for the purpose of blowing something up is a timer and mechanism for detonation... imbuing a bomb with something resembling higher brain function in humans isn't just overkill, it's insanely unnecessary.
Image trying to set an automatic coffee maker to start making coffee at a preset time. But in order to set the time you need to talk to your coffee maker, and get it to understand why you want it to start making coffee before you wake up in the morning:
"Why would you want me to make coffee if you are still asleep? You can't drink the coffee in your sleep, can you?"
"That's not the point. The point is I won't have to wait until the coffee is done brewing after I wake up, because you will have finished making the coffee before I wake up."
"But how do you know you will wake up when the coffee is done brewing?"
"I have another device that wakes me up at about the same time the coffee will be ready for me to drink."
"I am not aware of any other device that can do this. I have no mechanism designed to perform such a function... all I can do for you is make coffee."
a new generation of machines designed for our convenience... đ
Originally posted by DeepThoughtAha ... thanks for the explanation then - have never come across that notation before ... I'll take a look at those links
A square ⥠is the logical symbol for necessity so âĄP means necessarily P, in other words that P is true in all possible worlds. âP means possibly P, meaning there is a possible world where P is true. When unicode doesn't work you'll get a square with the unicode number in it. It's only if that happens that it hasn't rendered properly.
I'm using A - ...[text shortened]... ctuals isn't written yet. That site is a bit of a gold mine for people interested in this stuff.
Originally posted by lemon limeFor this part of the argument it doesn't even have to be a creator god, but they do need to be infallibly, even if not invariably, prescient. So omniscience, knowing everything, isn't a requirement for this, but if they know the future they know it with certainty. Returning to my earlier example of Alice the Pythia, a pythia was the priestess who did the prediction at the Oracle of Delphi [1] (I doubt any of them were called actually called Alice), she's not omniscient but when asked a question while sat on her stool breathing the pneuma and communing with Apollo she's infallible. She would be sufficient for this. Interestingly, and as an aside, all the predictions I've read are of the form "if you do X then Y will happen" they leave free will intact because of the way they are phrased, Y typically being something that only really makes any sense after it happened. She's not omniscient, but is infallible when asked a question. So yes, for the argument any God will do.
Knowing doesn't necessarily translate into causing... I can know something about a highly probable outcome without affecting that outcome, so I still maintain that an omniscient being can know about an outcome without necessarily needing to intervene in order to make that outcome happen.
This discussion has been confusing for me to follow because it's ...[text shortened]... u is make coffee."
a new generation of machines designed for our convenience... đ
The guy who wrote the paper, Alvin Plantinga, is a big name in Analytic Philosophy as well as being a Christian apologist, based on his Wikipedia page he's a Calvinist [1]. So the original paper has the Christian God in mind and the ideas looked at are due to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and several other less famous historical Christian figures. But the argument doesn't particularly depend on it being the Christian God.
The potential problem with infallible prescience, and it's the infallibility that matters, is that it can't be wrong. Suppose you have a dream you win the lottery on a certain date and can remember the numbers in the dream. You think what they heck - buy a ticket with those numbers and they come up. The justification's flakey it's certainly not knowledge and could obviously have been wrong, so there's no possible mechanism for your premonition to be said to have caused the numbers to come up.
In the case of infallible prescience there's a potential problem. The fact that something is going to happen is true and known before time. It has to happen. It is difficult to reconcile this with free will. Ockham's gets out of this by claiming that no prescient knowledge, even if infallible, has accidental necessity.
The best way I can explain accidental necessity is this: imagine a collection of possible worlds, with complete histories from the moment of creation to the end of time. All possible histories of the universe are represented in this collection. At the start of time nothing has accidental necessity and so accidental necessity is the same as logical necessity, logically necessary means it has to be true in all possible worlds. At time t to be accidentally necessary it only has to be true in all possible worlds which are identical to the actual world until time t. Logical necessity still has to span the entire ensemble. So at most only very short ranged predictions will have accidental necessity (the stone I just threw into the air will fall to the ground in all possible worlds with the exact same history up to now as the actual world). Ockham insisted that only facts strictly about the past were accidentally necessary, ruling out even my stone example. God's prescience is not strictly about the past and therefore does not have accidental necessity. This frees up the future.
To get an idea of the problem, God has known I will make this post from the beginning of time. He is infallible and therefore it is true that I will make this post and has been since the beginning of time. This in fact means that there is no possibility of me doing anything other than make this post. In this view I have no free will. The argument due to Aquinas stops this at the logical level, Ockham's argument stops it at the level of the accidental necessity, the necessity of the past, assuming one believes Ockham's argument. Plantinga's paper [3] seeks to tie up some loose ends in Ockham's argument.
Basically their claim is that knowledge of the future, even infallible knowledge of the future does not prevent the alternative possibilities being present.
Well if the bomb isn't smart it might blow up at the wrong time or in the wrong place without even thinking about it first!
I tend to agree with you about automatic coffee machines though, part of waking up is making the coffee.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pythia
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga
[3] http://www.andrewmbailey.com/ap/Ockhams_Way_Out.pdf
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Originally posted by DeepThoughtIn the case of infallible prescience there's a potential problem. The fact that something is going to happen is true and known before time. It has to happen. It is difficult to reconcile this with free will. Ockham's gets out of this by claiming that no prescient knowledge, even if infallible, has accidental necessity.
For this part of the argument it doesn't even have to be a creator god, but they do need to be infallibly, even if not invariably, prescient. So omniscience, knowing everything, isn't a requirement for this, but if they know the future they know it with certainty. Returning to my earlier example of Alice the Pythia, a pythia was the priestess who did t ...[text shortened]... //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga
[3] http://www.andrewmbailey.com/ap/Ockhams_Way_Out.pdf
I have a simpler explanation:
For one thing, and you can find plenty of examples of this in the Bible, God has intervened in the affairs of men at various times and places. Being a father myself, it didn't long for me to make the connection between Gods relationship to man as a Father and my relationship to my kids as a father. I would intervene when I felt it was necessary, not for the purpose of exercising control but to make sure they could safely reach adulthood, and hopefully with enough information to begin navigating their own way through life.
Having said that... and more to the point of this particular discussion, attributes of God such as omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience don't naturally exist anywhere in the physical universe. This tells me a different set of laws and/or rules are more likely to be found in a spiritual realm... so it seems clear to me that the rules governing causation (and anything else in this physical realm) aren't necessarily applicable to God in a spiritual realm.
Although both realms could have (and likely do have) analogous features, there's really no concrete reason for me to believe he created both realms to function in exactly the same way, especially in light of the impossibility of anyone or anything in this physical realm being everywhere at the same time, and having unlimited power and knowledge. The only mastery I have of time and space is that I can be in one place at a time... and that's it.
If God has unlimited mastery over time and space, this might explain how someone like Moses could have literally seen God (not his face, but from the back), even though Jesus clearly stated that no man has ever seen God at any time. So no man has ever seen God at any time, but Moses wanted to see God, so God allowed Moses to see him walking past him. I can think of only two ways this can be explained... Jesus either meant no one has seen Gods face at any time, or it was Jesus himself who Moses saw walking past him... Jesus as God in the flesh, and having mastery over time and space.
It doesn't make sense from a strictly enforced timeline perspective that someone could be seen walking by before he was born and took on human form. On the other hand, there's really no reason for me to believe God is limited by the same physical restrictions that apply to me.
Edit: Okay, after reading through this again I can see it's not so much a simpler explanation as it is a different explanation.
Originally posted by lemon limeI agree that there is no reason to believe that the laws of physics apply outside of the universe. The laws of physics have been determined empirically and we can't do experiments outside of the universe, so there's no experimental authority to make claims about such domains. We do, however, expect logic to be applicable.
[b]In the case of infallible prescience there's a potential problem. The fact that something is going to happen is true and known before time. It has to happen. It is difficult to reconcile this with free will. Ockham's gets out of this by claiming that no prescient knowledge, even if infallible, has accidental necessity.
I have a simpler explanati ...[text shortened]... I can see it's not so much a simpler explanation as it is a different explanation.[/b]
If an omniscient entity who lives outside the universe intervenes in the universe at time T1 on the basis of the action of some agent in the universe at a later time T2 then the agent at T2 has influenced the universe at T1. So there's backwards in time causation. Since the event at T1 happened because of the action at T2 the action at T2 is necessary for the event at T1 to have happened. But at T2 the event at T1 has already happened, so the action at T2 cannot not take place. So the agent at T2 would appear not to have free will about the action at T2.
As a one off one could take the view that it doesn't matter, the Pharoah in Exodus is portrayed as not having free will regarding the release of the Israelites, he is made to be intransigent, but no one seriously regards that as a challenge to free will globally. The potential problem is that even the possibility of backwards in time causation gives the future the same necessity as the past. It becomes difficult to avoid fatalist conclusions.
Ockham's way out is to deny that God's knowledge of the future has the necessity of the past. That way the action at T2 does not have the same necessity of the past at T1 as events chronologically before T1 do.
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Originally posted by AgergI'd not heard of modal logic until around Christmas. I'm not happy with the way I've tried to include time in my formula. It should be for any time t, ∀t means for all t, ∃t asserts the existence of a time t, neither of which properly capture "for any time t". So the condition should probably be:
Aha ... thanks for the explanation then - have never come across that notation before ... I'll take a look at those links
âĄªP(t) <-> P(t) & ¬â∃x∃y(S(x) & A(y) & B(x,y) & C(x,y,t) & âĄ(D(x,y,t) > ¬P(t))
S(x) x is an agent
A(y) y is an action
B(x,y) y is a basic action for x
C(x,y,t) x has the power to do y at some time after t
D(x,y,t) x does y at some time after t.
I think that Plantinga has propositions not having a truth value, or being false, before the thing they refer to has happened, so at times before t, P(t) is not true. This is what was causing me the confusion about predictions on the previous page.
Originally posted by lemon limeThought about you guys in church today when this scripture came up in
[b]In the case of infallible prescience there's a potential problem. The fact that something is going to happen is true and known before time. It has to happen. It is difficult to reconcile this with free will. Ockham's gets out of this by claiming that no prescient knowledge, even if infallible, has accidental necessity.
I have a simpler explanati ...[text shortened]... I can see it's not so much a simpler explanation as it is a different explanation.[/b]
the sermon.
Matthew 26:
47 While he was still speaking, Judas, one of the Twelve, arrived. With him was a large crowd armed with swords and clubs, sent from the chief priests and the elders of the people. 48 Now the betrayer had arranged a signal with them: “The one I kiss is the man; arrest him.” 49 Going at once to Jesus, Judas said, “Greetings, Rabbi!” and kissed him.
50 Jesus replied, “Do what you came for, friend.”
Then the men stepped forward, seized Jesus and arrested him. 51 With that, one of Jesus’ companions reached for his sword, drew it out and struck the servant of the high priest, cutting off his ear.
52 “Put your sword back in its place,” Jesus said to him, “for all who draw the sword will die by the sword. 53 Do you think I cannot call on my Father, and he will at once put at my disposal more than twelve legions of angels? 54 But how then would the Scriptures be fulfilled that say it must happen in this way?”
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Originally posted by KellyJayYes, I see the relevance, although I know the story it never occurred to me before to wonder exactly what scriptures Jesus is referring to. The Jewish conception of the Messiah was, roughly speaking, a military leader who would restore the ancient Kingdom of Judea. I haven't read the later prophets, so I don't know, but it doesn't make sense to me that they would have a messiah betrayed, so I'm wondering what the scriptures Jesus is referring to are. Is he speaking metaphorically, the scripture in question being God's plan rather than a part of the Bible or other worldly document?
Thought about you guys in church today when this scripture came up in
the sermon.
Matthew 26:
47 While he was still speaking, Judas, one of the Twelve, arrived. With him was a large crowd armed with swords and clubs, sent from the chief priests and the elders of the people. 48 Now the betrayer had arranged a signal with them: “The one I kiss is the ...[text shortened]... angels? 54 But how then would the Scriptures be fulfilled that say it must happen in this way?”
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Originally posted by DeepThoughtThere are so many scriptures Jesus is referring to, it would take some
Yes, I see the relevance, although I know the story it never occurred to me before to wonder exactly what scriptures Jesus is referring to. The Jewish conception of the Messiah was, roughly speaking, a military leader who would restore the ancient Kingdom of Judea. I haven't read the later prophets, so I don't know, but it doesn't make sense to me that ...[text shortened]... cripture in question being God's plan rather than a part of the Bible or other worldly document?
effort to refer to them all, but off the top of my head this was the first one
that came to mind.
Psalm 22:
1 My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?
Why are you so far from saving me,
so far from my cries of anguish?
2 My God, I cry out by day, but you do not answer,
by night, but I find no rest.
3 Yet you are enthroned as the Holy One;
you are the one Israel praises.
4 In you our ancestors put their trust;
they trusted and you delivered them.
5 To you they cried out and were saved;
in you they trusted and were not put to shame.
6 But I am a worm and not a man,
scorned by everyone, despised by the people.
7 All who see me mock me;
they hurl insults, shaking their heads.
8 “He trusts in the Lord,” they say,
“let the Lord rescue him.
Let him deliver him,
since he delights in him.”
9 Yet you brought me out of the womb;
you made me trust in you, even at my mother’s breast.
10 From birth I was cast on you;
from my mother’s womb you have been my God.
11 Do not be far from me,
for trouble is near
and there is no one to help.
12 Many bulls surround me;
strong bulls of Bashan encircle me.
13 Roaring lions that tear their prey
open their mouths wide against me.
14 I am poured out like water,
and all my bones are out of joint.
My heart has turned to wax;
it has melted within me.
15 My mouth is dried up like a potsherd,
and my tongue sticks to the roof of my mouth;
you lay me in the dust of death.
16 Dogs surround me,
a pack of villains encircles me;
they pierce my hands and my feet.
17 All my bones are on display;
people stare and gloat over me.
18 They divide my clothes among them
and cast lots for my garment.
19 But you, Lord, do not be far from me.
You are my strength; come quickly to help me.
20 Deliver me from the sword,
my precious life from the power of the dogs.
21 Rescue me from the mouth of the lions;
save me from the horns of the wild oxen.
22 I will declare your name to my people;
in the assembly I will praise you.
23 You who fear the Lord, praise him!
All you descendants of Jacob, honor him!
Revere him, all you descendants of Israel!
24 For he has not despised or scorned
the suffering of the afflicted one;
he has not hidden his face from him
but has listened to his cry for help.
25 From you comes the theme of my praise in the great assembly;
before those who fear you I will fulfill my vows.
26 The poor will eat and be satisfied;
those who seek the Lord will praise him—
may your hearts live forever!
27 All the ends of the earth
will remember and turn to the Lord,
and all the families of the nations
will bow down before him,
28 for dominion belongs to the Lord
and he rules over the nations.
29 All the rich of the earth will feast and worship;
all who go down to the dust will kneel before him—
those who cannot keep themselves alive.
30 Posterity will serve him;
future generations will be told about the Lord.
31 They will proclaim his righteousness,
declaring to a people yet unborn:
He has done it!
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Originally posted by DeepThoughtprescient: having or showing knowledge of events before they take place.
For this part of the argument it doesn't even have to be a creator god, but they do need to be infallibly, even if not invariably, prescient. So omniscience, knowing everything, isn't a requirement for this, but if they know the future they know it with certainty. Returning to my earlier example of Alice the Pythia, a pythia was the priestess who did t ...[text shortened]... //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga
[3] http://www.andrewmbailey.com/ap/Ockhams_Way_Out.pdf
For this part of the argument it doesn't even have to be a creator god, but they do need to be infallibly, even if not invariably, prescient. So omniscience, knowing everything, isn't a requirement for this
I'm a little surprised by this, because it seems to me prescience would necessarily fit within the definition of omniscience. In other words, knowing everything could just as easily mean knowing the future as it does knowing everything now. God knowing the past is obviously a no brainer, because it would only mean knowing everything that had occurred in the past. And although I'm willing the entertain the very strange idea of some past events coming about due to future causes, I think that idea might be too strange to work in any kind of logically structured argument.
as an aside, all the predictions I've read are of the form "if you do X then Y will happen" they leave free will intact because of the way they are phrased, Y typically being something that only really makes any sense after it happened.
This isn't a criticism of anyones reasoning from the past or present (or future) but it seems odd to me that something happening after it was foreknown to happen could in any way prove foreknowledge necessitating it happening... this sounds like someone wanting foreknowledge to be the cause of an action in preference to leaving no clear path to follow (from knowing to happening).
The potential problem with infallible prescience, and it's the infallibility that matters, is that it can't be wrong.
But by definition, it wouldn't be wrong because foreknowledge (prescience) isn't the same thing as prediction. Prescience (again, by definition) isn't the same as working out the most probable outcome according to known facts and conditions. It carries with it the same certainty as anything being presently observed.
Suppose you have a dream you win the lottery on a certain date and can remember the numbers in the dream. You think what they heck - buy a ticket with those numbers and they come up. The justification's flakey it's certainly not knowledge and could obviously have been wrong, so there's no possible mechanism for your premonition to be said to have caused the numbers to come up.
And yet it could happen. Even so, if everything in a dream came true it wouldn't necessarily be (or have to be) attributable to prescience.
In the case of infallible prescience there's a potential problem. The fact that something is going to happen is true and known before time. It has to happen. It is difficult to reconcile this with free will. Ockham's gets out of this by claiming that no prescient knowledge, even if infallible, has accidental necessity.
If by "accidental necessity" he means it didn't have to happen because it was foreknown to happen, then I would have to agree with Ockham. As I said before, I can see no real connection between knowing an action (before it happens) and the action itself. To my way of thinking, this would be like saying foreknowledge of your last message to me negates your free will because it caused you to write everything you wrote in your last message.
I can clearly see an implication of negation of free will, but nothing that actually connects or necessitates a connection between those two ideas. And I don't believe that occasional interventions would be enough to account for any (theoretical) foreknowledge of everything happening.
There is too much here for me to look at and respond to all at once, so I'll look at the rest of this later on tonight, or tomorrow morning. Or, maybe I could hop into my time machine next week, zip back to now and finish it then so that it will appear to have all been dealt with at once... and then I'll erase this last paragraph, so that no one will suspect what actually happened here.
to infinity, and beyond!
Originally posted by lemon limeIf omniscience is knowing all things past, present, and future then omniscience implies prescience. On the other hand if it is knowing all propositions and whether they are true or not then if propositions about the future do not have truth values then omniscience would only be about the past.
prescient: having or showing knowledge of events before they take place.
[b]For this part of the argument it doesn't even have to be a creator god, but they do need to be infallibly, even if not invariably, prescient. So omniscience, knowing everything, isn't a requirement for this
I'm a little surprised by this, because it seems to me p ...[text shortened]... h, so that no one will suspect what actually happened here.
to infinity, and beyond![/b]
Alternatively, if we thing of the universe as a collection of all possible worlds which have the same histories up until the present (universes are excluded as time marches forwards) then an omniscient entity could know what all possible futures are without necessarily knowing which one will come to be in the actual world. It depends on how one understands omniscience.
Just a point about what accidental necessity means. Logical necessity means true in all possible worlds. So 1+2=3 is true in all possible worlds. Accidental necessity means that something that was contingent, didn't have to happen, nevertheless did happen and has gained a level of necessity. The "accidental" part is to do with the contingency, something that is not inevitable is accidental. Had William of Normandy decided not to invade the Battle of Hastings wouldn't have happened, there are possible worlds where it didn't happen. So it's not absolutely necessary in the way logical necessity is, but having happened it can't unhappen so it's got a sort of necessity that is weaker than logical necessity. They call this accidental necessity.
Originally posted by DeepThoughtThanks for explaining accidental necessity, because I knew I was going out on a limb by trying to guess what it might have meant in this possible world...
If omniscience is knowing all things past, present, and future then omniscience implies prescience. On the other hand if it is knowing all propositions and whether they are true or not then if propositions about the future do not have truth values then omniscience would only be about the past.
Alternatively, if we thing of the universe as a collectio ...[text shortened]... a sort of necessity that is weaker than logical necessity. They call this accidental necessity.
Oh good grief, the confusion is setting in early this time... I need to go have a talk with my coffee maker.
This discussion is starting to crack me up, and I wish I knew about all of this when I was a wee lad attempting to talk my way out of trouble:
"The breaking of the vase wasn't intentional, it was contingent and therefore had a level of necessity. So it was accidentally necessary for the vase to have become accidentally broken...
... it was an accident!
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Originally posted by DeepThoughtSorry I have not responded in a while, since I have been busy outside of RHP.
I think I've got what he's saying, but I don't believe him.
In some possible world w, we have:
D(x,y,t) > ¬P(T)
if x were to do y at time t then P(T) would not be true. D(x,y,t) is false in the actual world, that is the agent won't take the action (otherwise P(T) would not be true). Then in the nearest possible world where D(x,y,t) is true we h ...[text shortened]... at step is justified.
Do you agree with how I'm interpreting his necessitated counterfactual?
I took another look at Plantinga's arguments concerning condition (3). His condition (3) has the form of necessity operating on a counterfactual claim, so it is a bit of a strange animal. Typically, to first order, a counterfactual claim itself such as D –c> ~P is assessed in the following way. Roughly, one looks to the set of nearest or most similar world(s) wherein the antecedent, D, holds; and then one interrogates those worlds to assess if the consequent, ~P, also holds there (or not). So, to first order, to say that D –c> ~P holds is to say that the nearest D-world is not a P-world. The condition (3), however, adds another layer of possible worlds semantics on top of that because it has necessity operating on this. So, to first order, to say that Necessarily (D –c> ~P) holds is to say that for all worlds satisfying some accessibility relation with the actual world (this would typically be noted by R(w*, w) or some such), the nearest D-world is not a P-world. And, generally, to say that R is satisfied between some world w and the actual world, w*, is to say that w* is possible given the relevant facts of w. So, this is basically how I understand and breakdown the propositional content of (3).
In his paper, Plantinga starts with a weaker version (W3) of (3) and argues that it needs to be supplanted with a stronger version (S3) :
(W3): D –c> ~P
(S3): Necessarily, D –c> ~P.
Again, as I understand the difference here, W3 is only asserting of the actual world that the nearest D-world is not a P-world; whereas S3 is asserting this of all worlds accessible from the actual world.
Let us look first at Plantinga's argument that W3 is too weak because even something like his (34) will turn out not accidentally necessary on a formulation like his (31). Here is the heart of his argument there:
The facts of the matter, therefore, are these: if Paul were
to mow his lawn this afternoon, then God would have foreknown that Paul would
mow his lawn this afternoon; and if God had foreknown that Paul would mow
this afternoon, then God would have prevented the ants from moving in. So if
Paul were to mow his lawn this afternoon, then the ants would not have moved
in last Saturday. But it is within Paul's power to mow this afternoon. There is
therefore an action he can perform such that if he were to perform it, then the
proposition
(34) That colony of carpenter ants moved into Paul's yard last Saturday
would have been false. But what I have called "the facts of the matter" certainly
seem to be possible; it is therefore possible that there be an agent who has the
power to perform an action which is such that if he were to perform it, then
(34) would have been false-in which case it is not accidentally necessary…in the sense of (31).
One thing to note is that his inference pattern here has this form (the bold above is my emphasis that highlights this):
(a)Q –c> R
(b)R –c> V
Therefore:
(c)Q –c> V
On any quasi-standard possible worlds construal of counterfactuals, this inference pattern is invalid. Unlike the material conditional, counterfactuals are not transitive. The reason for this is straightforward: (a) requires that the nearest Q-world be an R-world; and (b) requires that the nearest R-world be a V-world; but those together do not guarantee that the nearest Q-world is a V-world, since the nearest R-world could be closer than the nearest Q-world. So we could easily construct some counterexamples that show that counterfactuals are not transitive and thus that this inference pattern is not valid for counterfactuals. Be that as it may, Plantinga's argument does not hinge on whether or not this inference pattern is generally valid. If you look at the specifics of his argument, his Q & R happen to be related in such a way that they basically always go together, such that this inference should go through in this particular instance. Also, he is not actually claiming that this (a)-(c) argument flies in the actual world (which is good, since (b) seems highly implausible). He is merely claiming that there is some possible world, accessible from the actual world, wherein this argument flies. He does not need (b) to be plausible, just possible – here meaning true in some world broadly accessible from the actual world. So, Plantinga's argument here seems fine to me: (31) needs revised, if we want something like (34) to be accidentally necessary.
As to whether or not his strengthening (3) to S3 accomplishes this, Plantinga does not really give much actual argument for this. He just sort of states that it is obvious now that it does provide something like (34) with accidental necessity:
While it may be within Paul's power to do something - namely, mow his lawn - such
that if he were to do so, then that colony of ants would not have moved
in, his performing that action does not entail the falsehood of the proposition
that the ants did move in; and it looks as if there is nothing he or anyone can
do that does entail its falsehood.
Again, the italics above is Plantinga's own emphasis. Not exactly a satisfying argument, but upon scrutinizing it, I think Plantinga is correct. With the weaker W3, to show that (34) fails to be accidentally necessary, we just needed to show that there is some possible world, accessible from the actual world, for which the nearest D-world is not a P-world. That could be a world, for example, wherein God cares sufficiently for the ants. Whereas, with the stronger S3, now to show that (34) fails to be accidentally necessary, we would need to show that for all possible worlds, accessible from the actual world, the nearest D-world is not a P-world. That will fail to hold in this scenario, since it seems clear that there are worlds, accessible from the actual world, for which that will not be the case (say, worlds wherein God does not care for the ants). And I do not think Plantinga would need to justify this point any beyond just saying that there are such accessible worlds. So this seems to work.
One concern you have is that perhaps in fixing this problem, S3 creates other problems for Plantinga. That could be. However, so far I am not at all following your prediction examples in understanding what the problem would be. Plantinga does not need to deny that propositions indexed to the future have truth values (and the supposition that they do is basically implicit throughout since the Ockhamite project takes foreknowledge to be a viable thing). The main point is that instances of prediction made in the past, like instance of foreknowledge, need not be "strictly" about the past. And, regardless, conceptually I would think instances of prediction could only be less problematic than instances of foreknowledge, since unlike with foreknowledge, there is no analytic relation that guarantees that an instance of prediction is factually correct. I do not see any obvious problems for Plantinga's formulation here.