Originally posted by Agerg
Thankyou for the topic - it's a good question and will hopefully coax out some interesting discussion from others.
I suppose the main question that has to be asked is: What do we mean by divine? If it is it some fundamental property of Jesus's "construct" that is able to manifest in some perceptible sense in the universe, then surely it would be required th and in the second - hinged upon the third ... I'll put it down to a late night).[/hidden]
What do we mean by divine? If it is it some fundamental property of Jesus's "construct" that is able to manifest in some perceptible sense in the universe, then surely it would be required that these features are present in any copy of Jesus (else that copy is deficient); but then if that is the case, this copy would be at least divine to the extent that Jesus's divinity has any impact on this universe would it not!?
I pretty much agree with you: to me, it only makes sense that if the original Jesus has the property of being divine, then we should expect than an exact duplicate of Jesus would also have the same property. However, I have thought a bit about this, and below are some conceivable reasons why one may hold otherwise. I would be interested to know your ideas on this.
First, as SwissGambit already pointed out, one may hold that the person is, at bottom, constituted by a disembodied soul. If that's the case, then they do not have reason to think that exact physical duplication of the body would translate to duplication of the person or soul. Of course, if you're like me, then you find this sort of soul talk to be pretty implausible.
Second, although the duplication at issue here would exactly replicate the "arrangement" or "construct", it would fail to replicate some other features and relational properties. The original Jesus and the duplicate are not exactly the same in all respects. For example, their origins are different: Jesus came about from virgin birth orchestrated by God and subsequent development whereas the duplicate came about through duplication in some way largely unspecified in the hypothetical. If one holds that the property of being divine is not divorceable from the way in which one came about, then they do not have reason here to think the duplicate is divine, even if they have reason to think the original Jesus is divine.
Third, this one is rather funny to me. It's related to the second one above. The duplicate Jesus should have all the same beliefs that the original Jesus has. But, hilariously, it would seem that many of these beliefs the duplicate has are false (even if the associated corresponding beliefs in the original Jesus are true). For example, suppose the duplicate is created sometime after the water walking episode. Suppose the original Jesus has beliefs related to episodic memory of this walking on water. The duplicate will also have these memories of walking on water. But did the duplicate ever actually walk on water? No. So it would seem that the duplicate has a bunch of false beliefs, particularly as it relates to episodic memory. Perhaps one would deny that having so many false beliefs is consistent with being divine.