Originally posted by knightmeister
I keep hearing this argument that somehow free will can't exist because God is omnipotent and nothing happens without him initiating it.
According to this argument the universe/existence is entirely deterministic ruling out any chance of true free will. Therefore we cannot have free will because everything can be traced back to God's initiation or So I guess it shouldn't suprise me if you also have funny ideas about omnipotence as well
I keep hearing this argument that somehow free will can't exist because God is omnipotent and nothing happens without him initiating it.
I don't. One contention that is common, however, is that the existence of an omniscient god precludes free will of a libertarian sort. Since the focus here is on omnipotence, the following should be relevant: omnipotence implies the capacity for omniscience; so, omnipotence together with some claim that propositions regarding future states have definite truth values should collectively be enough to preclude libertarian free will.
1) If God is truely ominpotent then he must be the Uncaused Cause , the foundation of everything that exists for whom no initiation is necessary.
You're saying that being the "Uncaused Cause" (a necessary being who gives rise to all other existence) is a necessary condition for being omnipotent. Why should I accept this? What's the logical contradiction in saying that some omnipotent being also happens to be a being whose existence is contingent?
It follows logically from 1) that there is at least one thing in existence that has real free will because God is not subject to determinism being omnipotent and Uncaused.
Whether a being's existence is contingent or necessary; whether that being can do anything that is logically possible or not; I don't see why these considerations would have implications concerning freedom of the being's will. Presumably, an omnipotent being could bring about a state of affairs in which he possesses libertarian free will, but such a state is not necessary. Also, if you're suggesting that any omnipotent being has libertarian free will since he could "always have done otherwise" in light of his omnipotence, then you're just begging the question.
to have an infinite regress of caused causes that never ends which is mind boggling
Why is this so mind boggling relative to, say, the necessary existence of some eternal being? I don't see any reason why there must be some beginning. Besides, if we're going to conclude that some necessary entity must exist, it may as well just be the universe itself. The Cosmological Argument is not compelling in any way relative to the subject of your God.
3) If God has free will and is all powerful , why is it so impossible or hard for him to share that very free will with us?
It's seemingly impossible because of the properties you ascribe to your God. Many Christians want to say that God is eternal and timeless and yet that he is active in time and responsible for certain temporal changes (e.g., for miracles or acts of creation, etc.). This is sometimes called the problem of action: that if God is eternal and timeless, then it is not possible for him to change at any one point in time, which is something deemed necessary for his being causally active and responsible for temporal changes. Simply saying that he is omnipotent and therefore can do such things is not good enough since the claim here is that it is logically impossible for some thing to be both eternal/timeless and active in time. There may be ways for you to clarify your position and to attempt to get around the problem of action, but you should at least consider this argument which attempts to expose a contradiction in Christian theology.
I know some of you Atheists think that God should be able to create real free will and also prevent any of us from going astray at the same time , which to me is logically absurd.
Some of us atheists are compatibilists and think your notion of "real free will" is ridiculous and unintelligible to begin with. Sure, maybe under a libertarian account it would not be possible for god to provide for both an absence of willful misconduct and the existence of 'free will' -- after all, it is not logically possible to causally determine the content of willings if such content is metaphysically random, or perhaps if such content is brought about by some incredibly bizarre sort of agent causation. But who cares? Libertarian free will, such as your notion, is not even a coherent concept, let alone something to be valued if it did exist. Compatibilist free will is "real" free will in which *I* am a genuine source of the content of my willings, and under a compatibilist account it is possible for an omnipotent god to provide for both free will and an absence of willful misconduct. At the very least, the existence of free will does not entail the amount of pain and suffering that is present in the world (and I mean this also in regards to the pain and suffering that is commonly identified to be proximately caused by acts of 'free will' -- not merely in regards to the numerous forms of natural evils).