God and Random Events

Originally posted by vistesd
Although there is no causal link between knowing that X (even infallibly* knowing that X) and X actually happening, I think the logic works something like this:

1. G knows that X;
2. G’s knowledge is infallible;
3. it is possible that ~X.

But 3. contradicts 1. and 2., and results in a reductio ad absurdum. Thus, it is illogical to suggest accepted epistemic view, it is not compatible with the omniscience normally predicated of god.

I had a very nice discussion on this with Lord Shark, bbarr, Conrau K, etc: Thread 133337. I think we all left the disussion in agreement that the fatalist argument is a big fat failure. In short, the theist can hold to an account of infallibility which basically holds that necessarily, P --> G knows P; the theist gets everything he wants, and it is false that your 3 contradicts your 1 & 2.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Hmm, I thought from previous discussions here that a compatibilist would reject 3) in the 2nd argument. If so, a theist who is a compatibilist is not troubled by the argument.

Good point. But even for a compatibilist, doesn't the conjunction of (a) G infallibly knows that X and (b) ~X (whether by agency or not) still entail a logical contradiction? That is what I think that compatibilism does not overcome, though you are right that it would overcome my "effective choice" specification.

I think that fallibilism would directly overcome my argument. I wonder if compatibilism is compatable with infallibilism?

BTW, I think that libertarian free will is incoherent.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I had a very nice discussion on this with Lord Shark, bbarr, Conrau K, etc: Thread 133337. I think we all left the disussion in agreement that the fatalist argument is a big fat failure. In short, the theist can hold to an account of infallibility which basically holds that necessarily, P --> G knows P; the theist gets everything he wants, and it is false that your 3 contradicts your 1 & 2.

I will take a look, and prepare to stand corrected! 🙂 Thanks.

EDIT: Wow! Clicking the links took me back to a 2008 discussion with you and me and No.1 and twhitehead and KM! Memories... 🙂

EDIT^2: In the meantime, some of the discussion in the other threads seems related to the technical understanding of fallibilism and infallibilism (and a good deal is focused on libertarian free will). As I read, how about if I re-word my first inference (without reference to agency) in plain as follows:

1. God knows that X;
2. God cannot be wrong;
3. ~X.

How can this not be a reductio? And if I similarly re-word the the inference that includes agency?

Perhaps I erred in using the term "logical contradiction", in the sense that that would be the case in all possible worlds?

Originally posted by vistesd
I will take a look, and prepare to stand corrected! 🙂 Thanks.

EDIT: Wow! Clicking the links took me back to a 2008 discussion with you and me and No.1 and twhitehead and KM! Memories... 🙂

EDIT^2: In the meantime, some of the discussion in the other threads seems related to the technical understanding of fallibilism and infallibilism (and a goo ...[text shortened]... term "logical contradiction", in the sense that that would be the case in all possible worlds?

The following is Bennett’s summary of his argument (which I do not see defeated in the thread):

BBarr to LordShark: “Right, but my argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then whatever you do in this world, you do necessarily. In fact, the argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then there are no contingent truths. The theist should hate this result. I like the argument, but I'm willing to be persuaded that it has gone wrong somewhere. But it's valid, so if this conclusion is false, then we have to get rid of one of the premises. Which premise would that be?”

______________________________________________________

Here is your formulation in response to luciferhammer:

Consider the following (and I do not think the argument is affected regardless of whether we include your addition of in this world):

(1) Necessarily, G knows that you will A (in this world).

This is bbarr's Premise 4.

(2) Necessarily, if G knows that you will A (in this world), then you will A (in this world).

Expresses that the consequent follows with necessity from the antecedent.

(3) If necessarily P; and if necessarily (P -> Q); then necessarily Q.

A transfer of necessity principle.

(4) Necessarily, you will A (in this world).

Follows from conjuction of (1), (2), and (3).

(5) So ~L.

A main point of L is that it is a feature (of this world) that there are live options that one do otherwise than one in fact does. So no proponent of L can admit of my (4).

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For disclosure, I think the libertarian would be justified in denying bbarr's premise 4 (and here my premise (1)) because (as this thread has helped clarify my thinking on it) I do not think the theist is committed to it on the basis of G's infallibility.

[Where L is libertarian free will.]

_________________________________________________________

Granted yours and bbarr’s arguments are more precise and proper than mine (e.g., the language of "necessity" ); and I understand that, I'm not being sarcastic or anything. But they do not seem to admit of god’s infallibly (in the common sense of that term) knowing that I A, and that I actually ~A. What am I missing?

EDIT: If I add the word "necessarily" in 1. and 2.?


EDIT^2: …the theist can hold to an account of infallibility which basically holds that necessarily, P --> G knows P…

I am still trying to work through this part in my own head, but “Necessarily, if P, then G knows P” seems to give the theist just G’s universal awareness of events as they happen—i.e., G is the universal observer. If so, I may be hoisted on the petard of my own removing temporal consideration (e.g., foreknowledge) from the argument?

Sorry for the late edit…

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Compatibilism is the position that free will is compatible with determinism.

Once we throw out the idea that choices are only free if there was a possibility of choosing otherwise, there is no problem with this view. In fact, it makes more sense than the idea that there is some random element affecting my choices.

Yes but I am never going to throw out the idea that choices are only free if their was a possibility of choosing otherwise.

So you lose me at 'once we throw out...'

Originally posted by vistesd
I will take a look, and prepare to stand corrected! 🙂 Thanks.

EDIT: Wow! Clicking the links took me back to a 2008 discussion with you and me and No.1 and twhitehead and KM! Memories... 🙂

EDIT^2: In the meantime, some of the discussion in the other threads seems related to the technical understanding of fallibilism and infallibilism (and a goo ...[text shortened]... term "logical contradiction", in the sense that that would be the case in all possible worlds?

1. God knows that X;
2. God cannot be wrong;
3. ~X.

This is not a rewording of your first formulation. Your first formulation included the premise that "it is possible that ~X", whereas this formulation includes the premise that ~X, which is quite a difference. In this formulation, 1 & 3 are directly contradictory, totally regardless of premise 2. This formulation is not relevant to the subject of the fatalist argument. However, your first formulation was.

Your first formulation was:

1. G knows that X;
2. G’s knowledge is infallible;
3. it is possible that ~X.

But, we have to ask ourselves, what does the infallibility condition on G's knowledge actually mean? If we unpack it, what does premise 2 mean? Let's suppose that the theist's infallibility condition translates to the following:

Infallibility condition in reference to G's cognition: Necessarily (P --> G knows P).

This after all, would seem to get the theist everything he could want. It gives him that in any world where ~P, G knows ~P; and in any world where P, G knows P. So, there are no possible worlds where G is mistaken or ignorant about the status of P.

So, then your formulation is basically

1. G knows X.
2. Necessarily, (X --> G knows X).
3. Possibly ~X.

This triad is NOT inconsistent. Do you agree?

Originally posted by vistesd
The following is Bennett’s summary of his argument (which I do not see defeated in the thread):

BBarr to LordShark: “Right, but my argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then whatever you do in this world, you do necessarily. In fact, the argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then there are no contingent truths. The t al consideration (e.g., foreknowledge) from the argument?

Sorry for the late edit…

Bennett's argument was not defeated in the initial thread in which he presented it (I think this earlier thread is linked to within the thread to which I linked). But the whole point of Lord Shark's follow up thread is that we came to realize that bbarr's argument was not sound. In particular, his premise 4 was not justified on the basis of the theist's committment to G's infallibility.

The formulation of mine that you have quoted here fails for the exact same reason: my premise (1) (which is in fact just a restatement of bbarr's premise 4) is NOT justified on the basis of the infallibility condition.

Please refer back to this formulation I presented in the previous post:

1. G knows X.
2. Necessarily, (X --> G knows X).
3. Possibly ~X.

Now, IF 1 and 2 here entailed "Necessarily, G knows X", then bbarr's argument would go through with full force and it would be quite devastating for the libertarian theist. But, that is just not the case. The conjunction of (a) X and (b) necessarily, X --> G knows X does NOT entail necessarily, G knows X.

Bottom line, bbarr's fatalistic argument failed because his premise 4 is not justified in virtue of the theist's infallibility condition.

EDIT: Also, this reply of mind to lucifershammer was predicated on the fact that LH was not ready to accept that IF bbarr's premise 4 was justified that would have disastrous consequence for the libertarian theist. LH denied this, but I still strongly disagree: if premise 4 is allowed, then I think the libertarian theist can kiss his position goodbye. But, that was a separate issue from whether or not premise 4 was actually justified. And it was not.

Originally posted by vistesd
I will take a look, and prepare to stand corrected! 🙂 Thanks.

EDIT: Wow! Clicking the links took me back to a 2008 discussion with you and me and No.1 and twhitehead and KM! Memories... 🙂

EDIT^2: In the meantime, some of the discussion in the other threads seems related to the technical understanding of fallibilism and infallibilism (and a goo ...[text shortened]... term "logical contradiction", in the sense that that would be the case in all possible worlds?

Wow! Clicking the links took me back to a 2008 discussion with you and me and No.1 and twhitehead and KM! Memories... 🙂

The good ol' days!

Originally posted by vistesd
The following is Bennett’s summary of his argument (which I do not see defeated in the thread):

BBarr to LordShark: “Right, but my argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then whatever you do in this world, you do necessarily. In fact, the argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then there are no contingent truths. The t ...[text shortened]... al consideration (e.g., foreknowledge) from the argument?

Sorry for the late edit…

I am still trying to work through this part in my own head, but “Necessarily, if P, then G knows P” seems to give the theist just G’s universal awareness of events as they happen—i.e., G is the universal observer. If so, I may be hoisted on the petard of my own removing temporal consideration (e.g., foreknowledge) from the argument?

Sorry I missed this. I don't think so because, for example, P could be temporally indexed. What if, for example, P = "S will do A".

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]1. God knows that X;
2. God cannot be wrong;
3. ~X.

This is not a rewording of your first formulation. Your first formulation included the premise that "it is possible that ~X", whereas this formulation includes the premise that ~X, which is quite a difference. In this formulation, 1 & 3 are directly contradictory, totally regardless of p ily, (X --> G knows X).
3. Possibly ~X.

This triad is NOT inconsistent. Do you agree?[/b]

This is not a rewording of your first formulation. Your first formulation included the premise that "it is possible that ~X", whereas this formulation includes the premise that ~X, which is quite a difference. In this formulation, 1 & 3 are directly contradictory, totally regardless of premise 2. This formulation is not relevant to the subject of the fatalist argument. However, your first formulation was.

Ooops! But, just so I might get it straight, can you explain why, if I kept the original wording for 3. in the formulation with “G cannot be wrong”, the reductio still fails as it is construed, i.e. keeping "3. it is possible that ~X" (nevertheless, see below).

Sorry for this mess, LJ—but at least you can see how stubbornly (if obtusely) I’m grappling with this… (:

This triad is NOT inconsistent. Do you agree?

Yes. But it seems to me that there are two different construals in play:

I.

Necessarily,
if P
then G knows P.

II.

Necessarily,
if G knows P (and G cannot be wrong)
then P.

The first one seems to me to be indefeasible simply because it is analogous to saying that “By definition of G, if P, then G knows P.” I might be wrong, but I don’t see how else to treat it; the theist can just say, “Well, that is the definition of an omniscient G.” This construal might be masked as if it were a logical inference, but it really is not.

The second construal seems different: here ~P would result in a contradiction similar to the one that I proffered. II. really can be put in terms of a logical inference, one that leads to reductio if one removes the “necessarily” to allow for the possibility of ~P, including ~P as a result of effective agency. If a theist presents an argument in terms of II., one could correct him by pointing out that he cannot have that construal and "effective (free) choice"", and offer I. instead.

By replacing “2. God cannot be wrong” (which I really just changed in order to avoid any technical errors about “infailibility conditions”, which I thought I might be guilty of), with your translation “Necessarily (P --> G knows P)”—well, as I note, that seems to be, not a translation but a different construal.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]I am still trying to work through this part in my own head, but “Necessarily, if P, then G knows P” seems to give the theist just G’s universal awareness of events as they happen—i.e., G is the universal observer. If so, I may be hoisted on the petard of my own removing temporal consideration (e.g., foreknowledge) from the argument?

Sorry I mi ...[text shortened]... ecause, for example, P could be temporally indexed. What if, for example, P = "S will do A".[/b]

Yeah, I thought of that after I posted it. Still, see the above.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Wow! Clicking the links took me back to a 2008 discussion with you and me and No.1 and twhitehead and KM! Memories... 🙂

The good ol' days![/b]

The good ol' days!

I wonder if my brain felt as wrecked back then…

Originally posted by googlefudge
Yes but I am never going to throw out the idea that choices are only free if their was a possibility of choosing otherwise.

So you lose me at 'once we throw out...'

If you are never going to throw out the idea, would it be fair to say that there is no possibility of choosing otherwise - and thus your refusal to throw it out is not a free choice?

Originally posted by SwissGambit
If you are never going to throw out the idea, would it be fair to say that there is no possibility of choosing otherwise - and thus your refusal to throw it out is not a free choice?

I think that that implication of libertarian free will is pretty clearly deconstructed--but LJ is cracking my brain sufficiently for the moment, on another logical argument that I thought was pretty clear...

Basically, though, the question is: if the situation, S, is exactly the same--including my knowledge, my ability to reason, whatever conditioning or biases, etc. and external circumstances--how (other than randomly) could I come to a different decision? If, for example, I go back to 10 years old, but with my current information base and reasoning ability, etc., even if the external circumstances are the same, the total situation is not. What basis can there be for thinking that I could perceive differently, think differently, decide differently...then, as I was, then?

Originally posted by vistesd
I think that that implication of libertarian free will is pretty clearly deconstructed--but LJ is cracking my brain sufficiently for the moment, on another logical argument that I thought was pretty clear...

Basically, though, the question is: if the situation, S, is exactly the same--including my knowledge, my ability to reason, whatever c ...[text shortened]... erceive differently, think differently, decide differently...then, as I was, then?

Heh, I'm letting the pros do battle while I carry on a layman-to-layman conversation.

Yeah, I agree - if the situation S is exactly the same, there is no basis for coming to a different decision.