"God and the Meaning of Life"

Originally posted by sonship
[b] But this is where I think you get it backwards, and perhaps are missing my point. In order to judge whether or not any such person acted with consistent moral perfection, you would have to know what moral perfection looks like.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

By the way, I also am comfortable with sayi ...[text shortened]... lm he's wrong. But he really just will peacefully melt away into the dust of the planet. Right ?[/b]

But basically, Dr. Joseph Mengle got away with murder, literally. Right ? I mean in some abstract ethereal philosophic realm he's wrong. But he really just will peacefully melt away into the dust of the planet. Right ?

See my last post about the truth not needing to be satisfactory, just true. You yourself, have said before on here that you don't necessarily find certain explanations within your Christian understanding to be personally satisfactory, just true.. And in that sense we can both acknowledge the limits of our understanding.

No, my philosophy does not say that. My openness to the possibility allows for it.

EDIT: I don't know how much clearer I have to be about not following some abstract ethereal realm of morality--I explicitly denied that. My position is that no such moral abstractions relieve the "fraughtness" of our moral choices--in what Balthasar called the "infinite complexity of the particular". I grapple there. I am not the one appealing to some ethereal universal. [Whether or not there is such an ethereal universal--e.g., God, or some Kantian categorical imperative--I am not arguing that: only the illusion of evading the "fraughtness", ethical risk, by appeal to such.]

EDIT^2: I am not arguing--nor do I intend to--the existence of some entity that can be called God. My last declaration on that was agnostic theism.

Originally posted by vistesd

See my last post about the truth not needing to be satisfactory, just true. You yourself, have said before on here that you don't necessarily find certain explanations within your Christian understanding to be personally satisfactory, just true.. And in that sense we can both acknowledge the limits of our understanding.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am behind on reading your posts.

But from memory, I may have said something like this in the past: I am not yet fully conformed to the image of Christ and SEE everything absolutely through the eyes that the Son of God sees them. However, while I presently am perplexed or less than satisfied, it is inevitable that I will one day see ALL THINGS through the same eyes as the Son of God.

That is because God's purpose is that I be conformed to His image completely.
Now something like that I recall writing here on this Forum.


No, my philosophy does not say that. My openness to the possibility allows for it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Okay.
Now let me catch up with your posts I haven't read carefully yet.

Originally posted by sonship
[b] See my last post about the truth not needing to be satisfactory, just true. You yourself, have said before on here that you don't necessarily find certain explanations within your Christian understanding to be personally satisfactory, just true.. And in that sense we can both acknowledge the limits of our understanding.
---------------------------- ...[text shortened]... --------------------

Okay.
Now let me catch up with your posts I haven't read carefully yet.[/b]

I can't keep up with yours either. 🙂 I was speaking from memory. Maybe it was someone else.

EDIT: And my attempt to keep up has, unfortunately led to a lot of edits that you likely cannot keep up with. My bad.

Originally posted by vistesd
I can't keep up with yours either. 🙂 I was speaking from memory. Maybe it was someone else.

EDIT: And my attempt to keep up has, unfortunately led to a lot of edits that you likely cannot keep up with. My bad.

If you can put up with my many typos, I can live with your frequent edits.

Originally posted by sonship
If you can put up with my many typos, I can live with your frequent edits.

🙂

Jay, (at the risk of running ahead again) I think that you and I have different philosophical a prioris. Your Christian theology—while still a matter of diligent study on your part—has become your a priori truth when contemplating other things. At least in an informal sense, certain of your beliefs have taken on the role of axioms. And that is not a criticism.

My a prioris—also acquired through my life experiences and study—seem different from yours. I, for example, use the word “faith” to refer to an existential openness to possibility in the face of uncertainty—even fearful possibility. My a priori in that regard is that such uncertainty is inescapable, and that attempts to evade it end up being self-deceptive or illusory. And so my personal theological considerations are subject to that.

We likely disagree. I am comfortable with that. I feel far less need (if any) to convince others that I am right. But occasionally discussions such as this are helpful for me to revisit and question my own thinking. For me, personal integrity requires that I periodically question what I have come to believe.

Originally posted by vistesd

EDIT: I don't know how much clearer I have to be about not following some abstract ethereal realm of morality--I explicitly denied that. My position is that no such moral abstractions relieve the "fraughtness" of our moral choices--in what Balthasar called the "infinite complexity of the particular". I grapple there. I am not the one appealing to some ethereal universal. [Whether or not there is such an ethereal universal--e.g., God, or some Kantian categorical imperative--I am not arguing that: only the illusion of evading the "fraughtness", ethical risk, by appeal to such.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I guess I don't fully understand this "fraughtness" you speak of.

If One did not rise from the dead, then I would dismiss as ethereal any thought of resurrection and last judgement.

But the One who spoke of resurrection, demonstrated resurrection.

"Do not marvel at this, for an hour is coming in which all in the tombs will hear His voice And will come forth : those who have done good, to the resurrection of life; and those who have practiced evil, to the resurrection of judgment." (John 5:19)

Now anyone can SAY anything. But if one rises from the dead on the third day after execution - can you see why what THIS One says, I have to take more seriously ?

Sorry vistesd. This has become as real to me as eating a piece of toast. I can't muster the energy to be agnostic about this.

The One who holds every atomic particle in place in this vast universe - don't you think it might be child's play for Him to raise up from the dust Joseph Mengle and confront him with an infallible record of his deeds ?

You said you allow for wide possibilities.

Originally posted by vistesd

Jay, (at the risk of running ahead again) I think that you and I have different philosophical a prioris. Your Christian theology—while still a matter of diligent study on your part—has become your a priori truth when contemplating other things. At least in an informal sense, certain of your beliefs have taken on the role of axioms. And that is not a criticism.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Guilty as charged. You see I got saved. And I think you should get saved too.
Taking a break now.

Originally posted by sonship
[b] EDIT: I don't know how much clearer I have to be about not following some abstract ethereal realm of morality--I explicitly denied that. My position is that no such moral abstractions relieve the "fraughtness" of our moral choices--in what Balthasar called the "infinite complexity of the particular". I grapple there. I am not the one appealing to some et ...[text shortened]... ont him with an infallible record of his deeds ?

You said you allow for wide possibilities.

Sorry vistesd. This has become as real to me as eating a piece of toast. I can't muster the energy to be agnostic about this.

I know. And that’s what puts us (usually) at impasse.

“Fraughtness”: my coining a noun from “faught”—heavily laden, as in “fraught with danger”. I think that all our ethical situations are inescapably fraught with risk and uncertainty. If you ask me a general question, I can say with some certainty that I believe this or that act to be everywhere and always wrong. But that is what they call subjective certainty. And that certainty cannot become a pretense of any kind of moral omniscience—innate or given.

I almost take agnosticism as an ethical stance itself—but I need to think that out some more. I once rejected that very stance. I suppose it entails some epistemic skepticism, not sure.

My “agnostic theism” is very loose. Along the lines of Teihard de Chardin’s “Either there’s something afoot in the universe, or there’s not”. I am open to the possibility that there is, and choose to at least pursue that possibility—but I do not know, and hence am agnostic. (I no longer talk about “spiritual experiences” on here—and it’s been a long time since I did—because I do not assign them any strictly epistemic value. That is, I do not believe they do—or can—relieve that agnosticism. I think that is, again, illusory.) Suffice it to say that my own spiritual experiences support no more that faith (as I have defined it) in the face of that inescapable (from my understanding) agnosticism. I do not view that as a lack. (That last might be hard to understand, but there it is.)

I hope that nothing that I have said here came across as disrespect—only (where it is) disagreement.

Originally posted by sonship
[b] Jay, (at the risk of running ahead again) I think that you and I have different philosophical a prioris. Your Christian theology—while still a matter of diligent study on your part—has become your a priori truth when contemplating other things. At least in an informal sense, certain of your beliefs have taken on the role of axioms. And that is not a crit ...[text shortened]... lty as charged. You see I got saved. And I think you should get saved too.
Taking a break now.

I need a break too: I can't sustain these discussion the way I used to.

And I think you should get saved too.

I take that as a statement of your caring, concern and graciousness. (No sarcasm there.)

Originally posted by sonship
That's helpful. Let me ask. You speak of tending to or evading one's moral responsibility.

To whom is one responsible ?
Was Joseph Mengle responsible only to himself, in the ( hopeful ) intrinsic nobility of his own conscience ?

Secondly, concerning to whom or whatever we ARE responsible - Is there an ultimate accounting ? Are there real consequences for the attending or neglect of this responsibility?

To whom is one responsible ?

To the members of one’s normative community. That includes other moral agents, as well as moral patients. They are the ones who stand on the receiving end of one's morally relevant actions and intentions.

In another sense, it could be argued that one is responsible to appropriate or correct ethical principles, or some such.

Is there an ultimate accounting ? Are there real consequences for the attending or neglect of this responsibility?

I'm not sure exactly what is meant by "ultimate accounting". But of course there are real consequences that attend moral responsibility. Again, these responsibilities are owed to those who stand on the receiving end of our actions, and our actions have real consequences. (If our actions did not have real consequences, why would be motivated or demotivated to perform them? )

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
No offense, but I think his questions (and at least parts of his presentation) are poorly worded.

For instance, [b]1. The Meaning of "The meaning of Life" wherein Stringer concedes to two loose leaf definitions of the phrase.
Why is he unable to zero in on one?
Why is he ignoring the possibility of more than two?
What does he mean by "cosmic purp ...[text shortened]... arity.

I think his math's just too fuzzy to offer much of anything thoughtful.
My two cents.[/b]

Why is he unable to zero in on one?

He is able to do so but desists, since as he states in the paper he thinks both are relevant to the discussion at hand.

Why is he ignoring the possibility of more than two?

Where exactly does he ignore the possibility of more than two? He says that, as far as he knows, these are the two that are relevant. That’s perfectly consistent with the possibility that there are others that are irrelevant; or even the possibility that there are others that are relevant but of which he is unaware.

You should probably avoid these kinds of loaded questions. I imagine that Stringer might respond to the first by asking you in return why you are unable to stop beating your spouse.

What does he mean by "cosmic purpose or point of life" and specifically, "cosmic?"

It's clear enough in the text that he is taking 'cosmic' to qualify instances regarding the first sense of "the meaning of life" as opposed to the second. It's also clear enough that in Stringer's view, a "cosmic" purpose to life is something exogenously appointed by another agency, specifically a supernatural agency – although it is not clear to me if he is taking this as an analytic relation.

Regarding the rest of your post, I do not understand what you are trying to say.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
There's a mooring but one wonders where that boat is docked.

I'm not sure what you mean.

Originally posted by sonship
[b] To whom are we responsible? To anyone whose well-being is subject to our actions, including ourselves. And I tend to hold to a “neo-Stoical” principle of “all things considered” (insofar as our mental capacity allows).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The patients that Josep ...[text shortened]... nal Legislator to believe into this One, for this substitution to take place personally.[/b]

Him just being accountable to his poor victims really means there is NO injustice.
If there is no final justice for those poor victims then there really exists no INJUSTICE against them.

If someone is treated unjustly and there exists no retributive justice for the offender, then that is a case where injustice not only exists but is perhaps most acute. If on the other hand there is "final justice" for the victims, that would if anything alleviate the injustice (or perhaps injustice is a bell that cannot be unrung). So, at best, you seem to have things backwards. Cases where one acts unjustly and then gets away scot-free are cases where there is no retributive justice, not cases where there is no injustice. This view of yours seems a bit insulting, not just toward the intellect since your logic makes no sense, but also toward the victims of injustice. I suppose the victims of unsolved rape crimes, for example, can take comfort in knowing that if their offenders never receive any comeuppance, then there was no injustice to begin with?

Your argument does not make sense. It is like saying that if there are wrongs that do not ultimately get righted, then there are, or can be, no wrongs to begin with. First, that argument has a very challenged, contradictory structure because you start with the existence of wrongs having a certain property (the property of not being later righted) and work to the idea that there are, or can be, no wrongs. Second, the conclusion just would not follow anyway. All that should follow is that wrongs do exist, some of which never get righted (not that it is particularly clear what righting a wrong would consist in or entail, anyway) . You may not find such a proposition particularly palatable, but that is essentially irrelevant toward whether or not such a proposition holds true (at pain of committing some version of appeal to consequences).

You act like in the absence of "ultimate" justice or “"ultimate" accountability (again, not that these are particularly clear concepts), we have no plausible explanatory programs of justice and injustice. But I highly doubt that. As I already mentioned, we have responsibilities owed to other who stand as the direct receivers of our actions; and, of course, our actions have real consequences for those involved and are based on real motivations that move us and are made under various circumstances. It’s frankly much more plausible that we can cast justice and injustice in terms of the nature of those motivations and consequences along with contextual and circumstantial consideration; than the idea that we can cast justice and injustice in terms of relying substantially on your nebulous “ultimate” concepts that somehow, in some vague or mysterious way, restore cosmic moral balance at some unspecified point down the road.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm not sure what you mean.

In order for a boat to actually be moored, the dock must be stationary... otherwise, it's one floating craft dependent upon another.

Originally posted by LemonJello

Why is he unable to zero in on one?

He is able to do so but desists, since as he states in the paper he thinks both are relevant to the discussion at hand.

Why is he ignoring the possibility of more than two?

Where exactly does he ignore the possibility of more than two? He says that, as far as he knows, these ...[text shortened]... ic relation.

Regarding the rest of your post, I do not understand what you are trying to say.

He is able to do so but desists, since as he states in the paper he thinks both are relevant to the discussion at hand.
Not sure what you mean.
We're limited to his limitations?

That’s perfectly consistent with the possibility that there are others that are irrelevant; or even the possibility that there are others that are relevant but of which he is unaware.
My point, really.
He is unaware and seeks to affirm on that basis.

I imagine that Stringer might respond to the first by asking you in return why you are unable to stop beating your spouse.
He might make the required assumptions for such a question; he's clearly making assumptions here.

It's clear enough in the text that he is taking 'cosmic' to qualify instances regarding the first sense of "the meaning of life" as opposed to the second.
What is decidedly not clear is what is meant by the word "cosmic," protestations notwithstanding.

It's as though he is playing with a rover.