Originally posted by CalJust
Here is a very crude example.
I see a tree in front of me.
Is there really a tree in front of me?
Could it not be:
(a) a hologram
(b) a hallucination
(c) a reflection from a nearby mirror or window
(d) etc
How can [b] I be absolutely sure? Just because you say so??
All I can positively say is that to the best of my knowledge and experience, I think that what I see before me is a tree.[/b]
I see a tree in front of me.
So in this example, CJ believes that P (P = "there is a tree in front of me" , or some such). Then, pursuant to what I already described, whether or not this belief is true is an objective matter. It only hinges on whether P picks out an actual fact about the world. If it does, then P is true; if not, then not. This is an objective relation, just having to do with how P relates to the world. So truth is an objective matter: it is an
objective relational property, even if the truthbearer happens to be a subjective thing, such a perceptual belief belonging to CJ.
Is there really a tree in front of me?
Could it not be:
(a) a hologram
(b) a hallucination
(c) a reflection from a nearby mirror or window
(d) etc
How can I be absolutely sure? Just because you say so??
Agreed, you cannot be absolutely sure. That is, you cannot have epistemic certainty for such a perceptual belief, or virtually any other belief. No matter the strength or nature of your evidence, there will always be some live epistemic possibility that the belief is mistaken. After all, you could be a brain in a vat. Your (a)-(c) are generally valid possibilities too, etc.
But what does this have to do with anything? Per the discussion above, truth is still an objective matter, regardless of whether your evidence can be such that it guarantees truth.
All I can positively say is that to the best of my knowledge and experience, I think that what I see before me is a tree.
I disagree. Unless you have some nontrivial reasons to mistrust your sight in this particular instance (like you're distance challenged or it's foggy or crappy lighting or etc), you can positively say a whole bunch of things. To wit:
"What I see before me is a tree."
"I see a tree before me."
"There is a tree before me."
"I know there is a tree before me."
etc, etc, etc.
Knowledge does not require epistemic certainty. Neither does justifiable assertion regarding these types of statements.
By the way, as an aside, what exactly does "to the best of my knowledge and experience" add here? I would think that something like "I think that what I see before me is a tree" is already particularly insulated from error. After all, if you are genuinely thinking you see a tree, then it is hard to understand how such a statement could be false when uttered concurrently, even if there is, in fact, no such tree. In the literature, I have seen such statements referred to as "incorrigible" for this reason. Adding "to the best of my knowledge and experience" would add no further insulation from error, as far as I can tell. Of course, you're still needlessly jumping through hoops. You're justified in simply asserting that there is a tree before you, even if that turns out to be false. And, whether it turns out true or false is still an objective matter.