Originally posted by The Chess Express
[/i][b]First off, whatever the nature of free will, God authored it. He is the designer. He was not constrained by any of it's current characteristics.
To the second part, free will does not necessitate a choice of good and evil actions. Here is a definition of free will.
If an agent chooses action A in the state of nature S, then the agen ...[text shortened]... , it just means that God created the universe in the best way to achieve the ultimate goal.[/b]
I will try a different approach to explaining free will. I was not trying to deliberately confuse you. I'm used to speaking in terms of sets and think it's a simple and concise language. That's why this method is also a common way in to approach the issue of free will in analytic philosophy. Essentially, my definition says that the state of nature does not determine an individuals decision. Let me try an example. Say a person is is faced with the problem of picking up one of three balls from a table. One ball is red; one is yellow; and one is blue. Without loss of generalization, let's say that we observe the individual pick up the yellow ball. A
determinist would claim that the combination of all events in nature up to the point of selection (i.e. the state of nature) caused the individuals choice. Really the individual never could choose any other ball than the yellow one.
An advocate of free will would disagree and claim that while the state of nature may have had some influence on the individual's choice, it did not determine the choice. The individual could have chosen the red or blue ball. This is a simplification of the whole issue, but that's the crux of the matter.
Yes, it is evident that we cannot make choose to do any sort of action. If we do have free will, then limiting our set of choices to a number (bigger than one) cannot remove it. Yes, God did not need, as many xian apologists contend, to allow choice of evil actions. Certainly, this doesn't make the remaining choices meaningless. The choice of a spouse or a lover. The choice to donate to a needy family. This choice to read to a child. How can you say these are unimportant?
The ice cream example was to show you one very simple, obvious way free will can exist even when evil is not an option. Personally, I prefer the description with sets, but that was clearly not effective.
You say ice cream is meaningless. Fine. Even if you do think these choices are "meaningless," that does not negate the fact that I have refuted the misconception that free will necessitates a choice over evil actions. A xian apologist cannot with honesty continue to claim that God decision to endow us with free will, even in its present design, constrained him to allow evil choices. Case closed.
You claim that evil must exist for good. Fine, but certainly the evil that exists could be limited to a choice not to do a good action. In mathematical terms we might call this the null. Take reading to a child. A good action. What would be the evil counteraction associated with this? Not reading to the child? This may not really be 'evil,' but rather "non-good." Now a definite evil action would be raping the child. In Creation, we all have such a choice. But why? As I've already shown, it is unnecessary even if you believe that the option to commit some "non-good" action is worthwhile so that we can distinguish good.
If you believe God created the universe in the best way possible (already this suffers from questions of higher ordering over even God, but given that you are uncomfortable with sets, I won't go into spaces), then you must believe that allowing adults to choose to rape a child is better than not allowing them to. God must have thought it wise not to allow us the ability to extinguish the sun, but just couldn't think of any better Creation than one where adults may rape children.