Originally posted by Zahlanzi
i was merely bringing myself closer to his position. he sets an arbitrary line that once you cross it you are a human being and before that you are a tumor, a parasite. i was admitting for a moment that the fetus is a potential human being and was set in proving that a newborn isn't much human either.
i do believe that once the zygot starts cell multipl ...[text shortened]... n the humanity status. so all that remains really is a matter of location, womb vs crib.
i was merely bringing myself closer to his position.
I see what you were doing now. Indeed, I realize I misread one of your replies on page 1, which got me confused. My apologies for that.
i do believe that once the zygot starts cell multiplication, that is a human being,...i also believe that accepting for that zygot to come into existance, the woman should enter a binding contract to carry it to term, even if the conception was done by accident. (except under the special circumstances).
You believe the woman should enter a binding contract with whom? Contracts are typically such that they are entered into between multiple parties. The woman would constitute one party. What are the other relevant parties involved here?
Also, why should the woman be obligated to do that? Remember, even if you were right that the zygote undergoing mitosis is a human being, that has nothing, per se, to do with showing that this zygote has rights or merits moral consideration.
are we denying the right to live, the most basic right, to another human being? didn't we already do that to slaves?
Again, as I have tried to outline, the question of rights is not vetted through considerations of human beinghood. The question of whether or not X is a human being is quite different from the question of whether or not X has rights or merits moral consideration. When you ask blatantly loaded questions like these, it signals that you fail to understand this distinction that I and others draw.
why should a fetus living in a woman's womb have any less rights than a newborn....all that remains really is a matter of location, womb vs crib
Please note that this question is no more apt than one that could be directed to you, such as "Why should the fetus have the same rights as a neonate?"
At any rate, to answer your question: depending on the gestational age of the fetus, I am not claiming that it should; on the other hand, during the early stages of gestation at least, your implication that there are no morally relevant differences between the fetus and the neonate is false. Let me explain below why.
The issue is one dealing with moral consideration. If, for example, one takes it to be the case that X is a moral patient, then she acknowledges that it matters how we treat X, and not just derivatively so. If, for another example, one takes it to be the case that X has rights, then she acknolwedges that this has prescriptive implications for our dealings with X. But, presumably, these kinds of judgments are not arrived at arbitrarily, so we should ask ourselves what sorts of considerations should inform such judgments. One that is central (I am not claiming it to be in any way exhaustive, just that it is central) to this should be the consideration of whether or not X stands to be harmed or benefitted. Don't you agree? After all, why should we care how we treat, non-derivatively, something that, say, cannot be harmed or benfitted? However, standing to be harmed or benefitted in the relevant sense here surely requires some mentality on the part of X. Minimally, it requires the capacity for consciousness; it probably requires the capacity to have interests which can be frustrated or upheld; or some mental point of view from which things can go worse or better. Your zygote undergoing mitosis lacks such mentality and cannot be harmed. You may want to ask yourself why you argue for rights for something that cannot be harmed. You may want to ask yourself why you endorse obligating the woman to enter a binding contract which has as its object the treatment of something that cannot be harmed or benefitted. Surely, this signals an important morally relevant difference between your zygote and the neonate.
I would also add that I understand this discussion is very complicated. Here are a just a few complications. For one, discussion of rights in no way exhausts the morally relevant considerations here. We can also have substantial moral obligations to non-persons as well, since we have prima facie general obligations to minimize pain, suffering, etc. For two, even if it were settled that your zygote has rights, that is nowhere near the end of the discussion. That would only lead into further complicated discussions regarding conflict of claims, in which multiple persons can have interests involved that are at odds in various ways. For three, through the zygote/embryo/fetus development, etc, the entity at issue here is acquiring along the way properties that are clearly morally relevant. So, this surely complicates the discussion tremendously. For example, I think it is very easy to draw morally relevant differences between your zygote and the neonate; on the other hand, it is much more difficult to do the same between, say, the fetus late in gestation and the neonate. For four, there are always important extenuating circumstances to consider as well, which is a point that you already seem to rightly acknowledge.
Is abortion really pro-choice?
22 Aug '12 01:181 edit
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