26 Oct '05 03:38>1 edit
"The central thesis of this paper is that religious morality is infantile."
So begins an essay I read recently called Morality: Religious and Secular by Patrick Nowell-Smith. However, Nowell-Smith's arguments are not infantile and he goes on to raise some interesting points. Nowell-Smith makes use of some research conducted by Jean Piaget in the area of child psychology and moral development. In particular, Piaget conducted a study concerning how children of varying ages react to a game of marbles. Piaget found three distinct stages of development:
1. For very young children, the "game" of marbles invariably degenerates into the child tossing marbles around according only to his every whim. In this "premoral" stage, the child does not yet grasp the concept of a rule, and his game play is not in accord with any governing guidelines. Toward the end of the stage, the child's play may appear to be somewhat in accord with the rules of the game but only inasmuch as he begins to imitate older children who do play according to specified rules.
2. The second stage (ages around 5-9) is what Piaget calls the "heteronomous" stage and what Nowell-Smith also terms the "deontological" stage, although I think that may be misleading terminology. I like to call it the "Divine Command" stage. According to Piaget, in this stage "the rules are regarded as sacred and inviolable, emanating from adults and lasting for ever. Every suggested alteration in the rules strikes the child as a transgression." The child understands what a rule is, but he does not yet understand (or even inquire) what the rule is for. In the child's view, the rules are beyond question and have been essentially handed down as though on stone tablets. While the child may at times disobey the rules, he does not question the authority of the rules as written.
3. Finally, older more enlightened children understand not only what a rule is, but also what purpose the rules of the game serve. According to Piaget, "The rule is now looked upon as a law due to mutual consent, which you must respect if you want to be loyal, but which it is permissible to alter on condition of enlisting the general opinion on your side." This is the "autonomous" or "teleological" stage in which the children may view themselves as final authorities in the sense that "what tradition gave them they can change; from 'this is how we learnt to play' they no longer pass unquestioningly to 'this is how we ought to play'...the rules are no longer regarded as sacred, as worthy of obedience simply because they are what they are, but as serving a purpose, as rules for playing a game that they want to play. Rules there must certainly be; and in one sense they are sacred enough. Every player must abide by them; he cannot pick and choose. But in another sense there is nothing sacred about them; they are, and are known to be a mere device, to be molded and adapted in the light of the purpose which they are understood by all the players to serve."
Obviously, in Nowell-Smith's view, the religious moralists and Divine Command Theorists are like the childish younger players who just haven't quite figured out yet what the rules are really for; whereas those who take a more secular view toward morality are like the older more enlightened children. On that notion, I completely agree with Nowell-Smith -- Divine Command does seem rather infantile and silly.
However, if I am interpreting the essay correctly, Nowell-Smith goes on to basically reject any notion of deontological attitudes toward ethics. To me this seems to lead to some absurd conclusions. The tough question surrounding such a view seems to be in how we are to interpret the enlistment of "general opinion on your side" as Piaget says. For example, if during The Holocaust everyone excluding those who died (I have seen the figure at 11 million, but have also seen figures as high as 26 million) would have viewed the ensuing acts of genocide as permissible, would that have constituted the "general opinion?" If so, then according to Nowell-Smith's view it seems like there are circumstances under which the mass destruction of life during The Holocaust would have been morally permissible at the time. I think that is an absurd conclusion. So while I agree whole-heartedly with Nowell-Smith concerning the notion of Divine Command, I disagree with his rejection of all deontological principles. In particular, I think we need a way to avoid the absurd conclusion that moral permissibility may be determined solely by the largest, most powerful faction, if indeed the ideology of such a group constitutes "general opinion." The problem I think is that life, unlike marbles, is not a game that can be halted and abandoned if a group of chronic cheaters forms. But also, if everyone in a game of marbles collectively "gangs up" on a single player and systematically limits his playing privileges through rules adopted under "general opinion," then under Nowell-Smith's view, that would seem to be a suitably fair game; but this conclusion does not seem reasonable.
Has anyone else read this essay?
So begins an essay I read recently called Morality: Religious and Secular by Patrick Nowell-Smith. However, Nowell-Smith's arguments are not infantile and he goes on to raise some interesting points. Nowell-Smith makes use of some research conducted by Jean Piaget in the area of child psychology and moral development. In particular, Piaget conducted a study concerning how children of varying ages react to a game of marbles. Piaget found three distinct stages of development:
1. For very young children, the "game" of marbles invariably degenerates into the child tossing marbles around according only to his every whim. In this "premoral" stage, the child does not yet grasp the concept of a rule, and his game play is not in accord with any governing guidelines. Toward the end of the stage, the child's play may appear to be somewhat in accord with the rules of the game but only inasmuch as he begins to imitate older children who do play according to specified rules.
2. The second stage (ages around 5-9) is what Piaget calls the "heteronomous" stage and what Nowell-Smith also terms the "deontological" stage, although I think that may be misleading terminology. I like to call it the "Divine Command" stage. According to Piaget, in this stage "the rules are regarded as sacred and inviolable, emanating from adults and lasting for ever. Every suggested alteration in the rules strikes the child as a transgression." The child understands what a rule is, but he does not yet understand (or even inquire) what the rule is for. In the child's view, the rules are beyond question and have been essentially handed down as though on stone tablets. While the child may at times disobey the rules, he does not question the authority of the rules as written.
3. Finally, older more enlightened children understand not only what a rule is, but also what purpose the rules of the game serve. According to Piaget, "The rule is now looked upon as a law due to mutual consent, which you must respect if you want to be loyal, but which it is permissible to alter on condition of enlisting the general opinion on your side." This is the "autonomous" or "teleological" stage in which the children may view themselves as final authorities in the sense that "what tradition gave them they can change; from 'this is how we learnt to play' they no longer pass unquestioningly to 'this is how we ought to play'...the rules are no longer regarded as sacred, as worthy of obedience simply because they are what they are, but as serving a purpose, as rules for playing a game that they want to play. Rules there must certainly be; and in one sense they are sacred enough. Every player must abide by them; he cannot pick and choose. But in another sense there is nothing sacred about them; they are, and are known to be a mere device, to be molded and adapted in the light of the purpose which they are understood by all the players to serve."
Obviously, in Nowell-Smith's view, the religious moralists and Divine Command Theorists are like the childish younger players who just haven't quite figured out yet what the rules are really for; whereas those who take a more secular view toward morality are like the older more enlightened children. On that notion, I completely agree with Nowell-Smith -- Divine Command does seem rather infantile and silly.
However, if I am interpreting the essay correctly, Nowell-Smith goes on to basically reject any notion of deontological attitudes toward ethics. To me this seems to lead to some absurd conclusions. The tough question surrounding such a view seems to be in how we are to interpret the enlistment of "general opinion on your side" as Piaget says. For example, if during The Holocaust everyone excluding those who died (I have seen the figure at 11 million, but have also seen figures as high as 26 million) would have viewed the ensuing acts of genocide as permissible, would that have constituted the "general opinion?" If so, then according to Nowell-Smith's view it seems like there are circumstances under which the mass destruction of life during The Holocaust would have been morally permissible at the time. I think that is an absurd conclusion. So while I agree whole-heartedly with Nowell-Smith concerning the notion of Divine Command, I disagree with his rejection of all deontological principles. In particular, I think we need a way to avoid the absurd conclusion that moral permissibility may be determined solely by the largest, most powerful faction, if indeed the ideology of such a group constitutes "general opinion." The problem I think is that life, unlike marbles, is not a game that can be halted and abandoned if a group of chronic cheaters forms. But also, if everyone in a game of marbles collectively "gangs up" on a single player and systematically limits his playing privileges through rules adopted under "general opinion," then under Nowell-Smith's view, that would seem to be a suitably fair game; but this conclusion does not seem reasonable.
Has anyone else read this essay?