Originally posted by lucifershammer
No - what you're describing is the Cartesian notion of soul.
The Thomistic relation between soul and human being is that between essence and being. I presume the Augustinian conception was that of form (idea) and object. The soul is simply the essence/form of a living being.
It follows, then, that all living beings have a soul. The only q ...[text shortened]... ersonality plus his/her physical attributes. In other words, the essence of the person.
The ideas that I was trying to express were the following: (a) the sharp division between "soul" on the one hand, and "mind" on the other, often articulated today, is artificial and bogus, and the result of a sort of hyper-Cartesianism, which permits the postulation of entities like souls, that are not only conceptually divorced from the body, but also apparently conceptually divorced from the mind; and (b) that when Aquinas and Augustine referred to the soul, they weren't just referring to an entity separate from the mind, but to one that encompassed it and its characteristics. You went on to point out that the Thomist soul in fact encompassed the whole person, body and soul, and not just the mind; and as you rightly point out, this is, in a strong sense, a non-Cartesian view. So I am now thinking that the formal Thomist notion of the soul, as the essence or form of the person, may also be the cause of what I regard as the illegitimate splitting of the folk notions of soul and mind. I seem to recall Swinburne asserting that his view of the soul, essentially the mind, was more in line with classical Christian thinking; but if you are correct, then this is perhaps not so.