Nonexistent Justice

Originally posted by vistesd
I’m wondering if it makes any sense to talk about nature (the universe, the Tao) being just or unjust. We might define (according to some criteria) certain outcomes as just or fair (e.g., lightning strikes a person dead whom we consider to be sufficiently bad to deserve death), but that would not mean that the universe was acting “justly”—or [ ...[text shortened]... to be so”, it then must be so—there must be some mechanism, or gods, to make it so? No.

We might define (according to some criteria) certain outcomes as just or fair (e.g., lightning strikes a person dead whom we consider to be sufficiently bad to deserve death), but that would not mean that the universe was acting “justly”—or acting “unjustly” in the counter-case.
Isn't that just like you, vistesd: boiling things down to their essence. God, my friend, I've missed our grappling.

More to the point, is the point. The universe cannot act, justly or otherwise. As has been stated, it just is, wholly incapable of mindful action. Justice requires mindful activity.

Because we might decide that “it ought to be so”, it then must be so—there must be some mechanism, or gods, to make it so? No.
So the issue comes down to this: from whence cometh our desired oughts?

Originally posted by finnegan
I assume you know you are just rehashing a typical Socratic dialogue as presented by Plato and playing around with the problem of "universals." Justice is a universal. Another easy example of a universal is the word "dog" and the problem arises because there are many individual dogs but it is not clear that "dogs" exist apart from those countless individua ...[text shortened]... to the values of democracy and sympathetic to dictatorship, like his philosophical heirs.

That is a pretty harsh condemnation of Socrates. If, as historians and classicists suppose, Plato's early Dialogues probably most accurately represent the views of Socrates, does your assessment stand? Crito is probably a better representation of Socrates' political views than The Republic, and here Socrates' views on democracy seem mixed.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]Well, I don't think it says anything about justice, really.
You're right: the suffering infant doesn't say anything about justice. Why? Because there is no justice in life, in the universe: it just is (ha-ha). We consider some situations fortunate and others unfortunate, and place no blame on any one or thing for the seemingly uncaused unfortuna ...[text shortened]... he realm of anything outside of an ideal in man's head: we do not have a template in nature.[/b]

Must just be me, but I still really do not have a good idea of what exactly you are arguing. It doesn't help that your reasoning seems a bit inconsistent in my opinion. Before, you seemed to be suggesting an inference from an instance like the suffering infant to the idea that justice does not really exist (at the very least, you implied that there is some inference about justice, whatever it may be, to be drawn from the infant example). Now, you seem to be saying that there is no inference from an instance like the suffering infant to anything about justice "because there is no justice in life, in the universe". It seems you just want to have it that there is no justice regardless of whether or not there is any inference about justice to be drawn from the example of the suffering infant -- in which case, I am not sure why you brought up the subject of the infant in the first place. I'm not really sure what to make of any of this.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b] We might define (according to some criteria) certain outcomes as just or fair (e.g., lightning strikes a person dead whom we consider to be sufficiently bad to deserve death), but that would not mean that the universe was acting “justly”—or acting “unjustly” in the counter-case.
Isn't that just like you, vistesd: boiling thing ...[text shortened]... make it so? No.[/b]
So the issue comes down to this: from whence cometh our desired oughts?[/b]

The universe cannot act, justly or otherwise.

Right, the universe itself is not something to which I would ascribe agency. Is this, at bottom, your point with all this? If so, then I agree.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b] We might define (according to some criteria) certain outcomes as just or fair (e.g., lightning strikes a person dead whom we consider to be sufficiently bad to deserve death), but that would not mean that the universe was acting “justly”—or acting “unjustly” in the counter-case.
Isn't that just like you, vistesd: boiling thing ...[text shortened]... make it so? No.[/b]
So the issue comes down to this: from whence cometh our desired oughts?[/b]

I’m not sure we’re actually grappling on this one, my friend—yet.

We come at your question, however, from two wholly different perspectives. I could offer a predictable Taoist-esque spin to the story of eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and bad—but I won’t, because it is predictable (at least to you and others who know me so well).

I do not entertain the notion that the universe ought to be different than it is. I do think that people’s behavior is sometimes other than it ought to be (or I would never think in ethical terms at all). The difference between the western/theistic tradition and such as the Taoist/Zen traditions is—to over-simplify—that the former regards immoral behavior as a rebellion against God’s divine standards, while the latter views it as a deviation from a kind of natural harmony due to illusive thinking/attitudes/conditioning. Since we are, to a large extent, communal beings, individual well-being cannot be divorced from communal well-being.

Norms of ethical behavior could well derive (and evolve) from our natural endeavors to survive and to thrive as natural beings, along with others, in our natural environment—sure, we have the capability to modify our natural environment, but if our modifications become destructive that is likely to lead to net ill-being rather than net well-being. Personally, I just try to balance things as well as I am able.

From a Taoist perspective—and this, I think, is an issue that we have grappled over—conceptual perfectionism has little place. (There are many variations and interpretations of Taoism; I am following Ellen Chen* here.) I cannot claim, for example, that nature is flawed because I am going to die (if I were to view that as an “imperfection” ), or that our norms of ethical behavior (whatever they may be) are deficient simply because some people violate them, nor that “well-being” is a goal doomed to absolute failure because I am sometimes plagued with “ill-being” (e.g., the flu, or ill-treatment by others). I tend not to deal in absolutes, nor to condemn the “imperfect” by reference to—and insistence upon—some standard of “perfection”.

As you once put it to me, I sometimes may lose my “inner Buddha” (or my inner Tao). Usually, that happens when I start taking myself—and my thoughts!—too seriously.

The Tao goes round and round.
Sometimes I fear
that I might fall off.
But then—
to where could I possibly fall?

___________________________________________________


* Ellen Chen, The Tao Te Ching: A New Translation With Commentary.

Originally posted by bbarr
That is a pretty harsh condemnation of Socrates. If, as historians and classicists suppose, Plato's early Dialogues probably most accurately represent the views of Socrates, does your assessment stand? Crito is probably a better representation of Socrates' political views than The Republic, and here Socrates' views on democracy seem mixed.

Let's disagree about Socrates for while - he will not go very far in the meanwhile - and concentrate on the point I thought important - which is that a debate about universals is doomed to enter a quagmire and I wanted to question the motivation in that. Like Socrates, it can be terribly attractive to appear wise (of course with loud disclaimers) and expose the alleged lack of wisdom in others (who lack training for the unfair debate) while performing tricks with words. It is a very short step from that to believe that we are indeed wise because it is a fun and clever trick so we must be fun and clever to use it.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]I assume you know you are just rehashing a typical Socratic dialogue as presented by Plato and playing around with the problem of "universals."
Only informed by SpongeBob Squarepants.

Justice is a universal.
I think so, too. Only I come to the conclusion based on something other than dogs.

It can only sow confusion.
That's ...[text shortened]... I see him as desirous of finding first things, even at the expense of social underpinnings.[/b]

Sophistry. I think you need to pin your flag a bit more honestly to the mast.

Originally posted by finnegan
Let's disagree about Socrates for while - he will not go very far in the meanwhile - and concentrate on the point I thought important - which is that a debate about universals is doomed to enter a quagmire and I wanted to question the motivation in that. Like Socrates, it can be terribly attractive to appear wise (of course with loud disclaimers) and expos ...[text shortened]... we are indeed wise because it is a fun and clever trick so we must be fun and clever to use it.

A question about universals from one who lacks philosophical training (though I read a bit). It seems to me that a universal concept—such as, say, “redness” or “justness”—might be useful, but that that is a far cry from talking about—again, say, “redness” or “justness”—as some kind of universal substance (or essence—if I have my philosophical lingo right)?

I have the feeling that Freaky is using “justice” in the latter sense. I would not use the “Tao” in that sense (though some Taoists might).

Take that all as a question.

Originally posted by finnegan
Sophistry. I think you need to pin your flag a bit more honestly to the mast.

The flag that I bear can be seen from miles away.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Must just be me, but I still really do not have a good idea of what exactly you are arguing. It doesn't help that your reasoning seems a bit inconsistent in my opinion. Before, you seemed to be suggesting an inference from an instance like the suffering infant to the idea that justice does not really exist (at the very least, you implied that there is s ...[text shortened]... subject of the infant in the first place. I'm not really sure what to make of any of this.

As stated from the onset, the suffering infant has long been cast as the supposed fly in the ointment of an omnipotent, benevolent God: since He both has the power and is compassionately informed enough to ease or eliminate the suffering, how can He justly not do so?

The conclusion (from the argument) is that either God is not in possession of any one or all of the characteristics described, or He simply doesn't exist.

So, from the assumption that God does not exist, the question then is put out: from where do we get a sense of justice? It certainly is not demonstrated in the natural world. It has no template, and appears out of man's imaginations, apparently.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
As stated from the onset, the suffering infant has long been cast as the supposed fly in the ointment of an omnipotent, benevolent God: since He both has the power and is compassionately informed enough to ease or eliminate the suffering, how can He justly not do so?

The conclusion (from the argument) is that either God is not in possession of any one o ...[text shortened]... in the natural world. It has no template, and appears out of man's imaginations, apparently.

So, from the assumption that God does not exist, the question then is put out: from where do we get a sense of justice?

So your question is simply: if God does not exist, then from where do we get a sense of justice?

Gee, it would have been nice if you would have just asked this question initially. If you recall, your question that prompted this thread was something seemingly completely different: "If justice is not universally realized, does it exist?"

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
As stated from the onset, the suffering infant has long been cast as the supposed fly in the ointment of an omnipotent, benevolent God: since He both has the power and is compassionately informed enough to ease or eliminate the suffering, how can He justly not do so?

The conclusion (from the argument) is that either God is not in possession of any one o ...[text shortened]... in the natural world. It has no template, and appears out of man's imaginations, apparently.

I see no problem with the concept of Justice appearing out of man's imagination.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]So, from the assumption that God does not exist, the question then is put out: from where do we get a sense of justice?

So your question is simply: if God does not exist, then from where do we get a sense of justice?

Gee, it would have been nice if you would have just asked this question initially. If you recall, your question that prompted ...[text shortened]... thing seemingly completely different: "If justice is not universally realized, does it exist?"[/b]

Precisely because the same argument (undeserved suffering infant) is used as an argument against God's characteristics.

Originally posted by finnegan
I see no problem with the concept of Justice appearing out of man's imagination.

Just as God did, correct?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Precisely because the same argument (undeserved suffering infant) is used as an argument against God's characteristics.

Not sure what you mean.

If you have something to say against the use of the suffering neonate as an example used in the problem of evil, perhaps you should just address that argument directly.