06 Mar '14 01:53>
One thing I have often seen in this forum is the claim that God's existence is required for there to be "objective" morality. Of course, this is typically issued by a theist who is intent on undermining secular ethical accounts that claim objective foundations. And, of course, this theist typically operates under the assumption that his own account of morality provides for an objective foundation. The really curious thing about this is that, more often than not, if one actually scrutinizes this theist's moral account, it turns out not to be objective. For instance, many of the theists in this forum hold to some type of view that entails that morals depend constitutively on some aspect(s) of God; that His commands, or His essential character, or the content of His will, etc, determine moral status. I think only in bizarro world could this be construed as an "objective" account of morals. On the contrary, it ties morality constitutively to an agent and hence makes morals mind-dependent, or subjective. It is therefore a thoroughly subjectivist view, where essentially only one subject, God, matters. The point of objectivity is that the determination of moral status, the truth values of moral claims, etc, should be constitutively indpendent from any observer attitudes. The theistic account just described obviously does not fit the bill then, since it entails that such things depend on one particular agent. Again, it is a form of subjectivism, and the story of this theist with his objective account is like the story of the emperor with his new clothes.
But, now, if this theist's motivation were just to have some account that is properly objective; well, they could just claim that moral determination and status are not tied to any persons at all, God included. But, this never seems to satisfy. So my question, then, is what is the actual motivation here? We could say, well, they do not actually require morals to be objective, properly construed; they just require that morals be independent from what any humans think. Okay. But I have thought more about this, and this cannot be all that they require here. For, again, simply saying that moral matters are settled by independent objective facts and do not depend on what anyone at all (including God) thinks get this done nicely; but yet still would not satisfy. So, what more is at issue?
It seems to me that often what is additionally at issue is some cosmic sense of retributive justice. Morals are tied constitutively to God because in addition to getting that morals are independent of human attitudes, we are also availed, albeit vaguely, of the notion that ultimately our feet can be held to the fire for wrongdoings, irrespective of fallible human justice systems that cannot ensure this. Somehow, if one has a notion of morality, thoroughly objective as it may in fact be, it is not adequate if there is no all-encompassing comeuppance clause.
Of course, one could object here that I am being very cynical and that perhaps this theist just thinks, on the basis of evidential considerations, that in order to have a moral law there must be some moral law giver. Granted, but that has really nothing to do with the claim that a moral law giver is necessary for there to be "objective" morality. My focus here is more on the intent regarding the term 'objective' here and in what it is supposed in context to require. It seems to me that in many of these discussions it is being used as proxy for something like "binding" in a practical sense, and the claim reduces to the idea that morals fail to bind if there is no eschatological comeuppance clause. This makes God less a souce of objective morality (which literally makes no sense anyway, to say that the source of mind-independent morals is a divine mind) and more an ultimate moral balance restorer, in terms of delivering ultimate retributive justice that would otherwise go unchecked. If so, this plays nicely into my other thread, Thread 157928, which discusses how such theistic ethical views are essentially childish, in part because they are fixated on punishment and retribution.
I am looking for alternative viewpoints or interpretations....
But, now, if this theist's motivation were just to have some account that is properly objective; well, they could just claim that moral determination and status are not tied to any persons at all, God included. But, this never seems to satisfy. So my question, then, is what is the actual motivation here? We could say, well, they do not actually require morals to be objective, properly construed; they just require that morals be independent from what any humans think. Okay. But I have thought more about this, and this cannot be all that they require here. For, again, simply saying that moral matters are settled by independent objective facts and do not depend on what anyone at all (including God) thinks get this done nicely; but yet still would not satisfy. So, what more is at issue?
It seems to me that often what is additionally at issue is some cosmic sense of retributive justice. Morals are tied constitutively to God because in addition to getting that morals are independent of human attitudes, we are also availed, albeit vaguely, of the notion that ultimately our feet can be held to the fire for wrongdoings, irrespective of fallible human justice systems that cannot ensure this. Somehow, if one has a notion of morality, thoroughly objective as it may in fact be, it is not adequate if there is no all-encompassing comeuppance clause.
Of course, one could object here that I am being very cynical and that perhaps this theist just thinks, on the basis of evidential considerations, that in order to have a moral law there must be some moral law giver. Granted, but that has really nothing to do with the claim that a moral law giver is necessary for there to be "objective" morality. My focus here is more on the intent regarding the term 'objective' here and in what it is supposed in context to require. It seems to me that in many of these discussions it is being used as proxy for something like "binding" in a practical sense, and the claim reduces to the idea that morals fail to bind if there is no eschatological comeuppance clause. This makes God less a souce of objective morality (which literally makes no sense anyway, to say that the source of mind-independent morals is a divine mind) and more an ultimate moral balance restorer, in terms of delivering ultimate retributive justice that would otherwise go unchecked. If so, this plays nicely into my other thread, Thread 157928, which discusses how such theistic ethical views are essentially childish, in part because they are fixated on punishment and retribution.
I am looking for alternative viewpoints or interpretations....