02 Apr '09 15:02>
Let me pose a hypothetical problem:
Suppose a device existed that could allegedly transport you from one place to another instantaneously without your having actually to travel between the point from which you depart and the point to which you arrive.
The device would disassemble you, atom by atom, and commit to a computer's memory the pattern of your entire body up to and including your brain's electrical field. Assume nothing whatsoever that physically exists in your body is left out -- it is all recorded while you are being disassembled.
The device then would transmit, not the atoms disassembled, but rather the pattern recorded, to another computer at whatever distance the range of the device could reach -- assume for the sake of the problem it was a very great distance indeed.
The device at the destination end would then, using the pattern received, reassemble you, everything that was recorded, which was everything physically in or about your body, from other, available atoms.
You step off the device having the subjective experience of the lights dimming slightly when you were transported and then coming back up almost instantly as you arrive at your destination.
The question is: since the atoms you were made from are not the atoms you are made from at the destination, how is it you are the same person?
isn't it reasonable to assume that the device kills you at one end, makes a perfect copy of you at the other end? The copy of you would subjectively have all your parts and memories, etc. So, to the copy, it would make no difference. Those who know you would be unable to distinguish the person who arrived at the destination from the person who was taken apart and recorded a the departure point -- so it would make no difference.
Would there be a difference?
Suppose a device existed that could allegedly transport you from one place to another instantaneously without your having actually to travel between the point from which you depart and the point to which you arrive.
The device would disassemble you, atom by atom, and commit to a computer's memory the pattern of your entire body up to and including your brain's electrical field. Assume nothing whatsoever that physically exists in your body is left out -- it is all recorded while you are being disassembled.
The device then would transmit, not the atoms disassembled, but rather the pattern recorded, to another computer at whatever distance the range of the device could reach -- assume for the sake of the problem it was a very great distance indeed.
The device at the destination end would then, using the pattern received, reassemble you, everything that was recorded, which was everything physically in or about your body, from other, available atoms.
You step off the device having the subjective experience of the lights dimming slightly when you were transported and then coming back up almost instantly as you arrive at your destination.
The question is: since the atoms you were made from are not the atoms you are made from at the destination, how is it you are the same person?
isn't it reasonable to assume that the device kills you at one end, makes a perfect copy of you at the other end? The copy of you would subjectively have all your parts and memories, etc. So, to the copy, it would make no difference. Those who know you would be unable to distinguish the person who arrived at the destination from the person who was taken apart and recorded a the departure point -- so it would make no difference.
Would there be a difference?