Our Identity

Originally posted by SwissGambit
Yeah, there's no way to prove conclusively that the 'you' right now is the same 'you' from even a minute ago.

Perhaps I actually came into existence one second ago, with memories implanted in my mind to make me think I've lived for many years.

Perhaps none of what we call the physical world is even real - but just a simulation in which our minds are trapped.

I was actually getting at a different aspect. The only things that relate the 'me' now and the 'me' one minute ago are:
1. The exact same atoms.
2. A strong similarity in the way that the atoms are configured.

However, over the course of my life the vast majority of the atoms have changed. The very fact that I have grown from a single cell to what I am today means that most of the atoms I contain could not possibly have been part of 'me' when I was a baby.
So in the long term it is really 2. that provides more of a connection.

It is really only my mind that matters. If I lost my arms and legs and major body organs and they were replaced with transplants or bionic versions I would still be 'me'. If I suffered a stroke, suffered amnesia and had a major character change you might see me as a different person. This too has been the subject of many movies including both character swaps (where someone finds himself/herself in someone elses body) or character change - amnesia etc.

suppose we go at the problem a different way.

Assume you wake up tomorrow morning and remember nothing about your life.

Everything, where you are, where you are supposed to be, what your name is, who the people in your past and present life are, all as though none of it happened or you never met them.

You don't know who you are -- then who are you?

Are you the same person, or a different person?

A carpenter and his assistant was working on a house. They had this conversation:
- Nice hammer you have!
- I've had it for a very long time. It was handed to me from my grandfather.
- Oh, it looks rather new, doesn't it?
- Perhaps, but it is old. I care for it a lot
- How do you mean?
- I've replaced the head twice and the handle three times.

Now, is this the same hammer he got from this grandfather or not?

Back to the human body: How many parts can you replace and stilll say it's the same person? Can you even replace the brain? No? What about cerebellum? What is the least part that you cannot replace in order to concerve the 'me' in a body. Is it in this part we have our 'me'?

Originally posted by FabianFnas
A carpenter and his assistant was working on a house. They had this conversation:
- Nice hammer you have!
- I've had it for a very long time. It was handed to me from my grandfather.
- Oh, it looks rather new, doesn't it?
- Perhaps, but it is old. I care for it a lot
- How do you mean?
- I've replaced the head twice and the handle three times.

No ...[text shortened]... ot replace in order to concerve the 'me' in a body. Is it in this part we have our 'me'?

Are you saying that if, as thoroughgoing naturalism entails, all of our thoughts are the effect of a physical cause, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground?

Knowledge is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if naturalism were true, would there be a way of knowing it—or anything else not the direct result of a physical cause?

Could we even suppose it, except by a fluke?

Originally posted by Scriabin
Let me pose a hypothetical problem:

Suppose a device existed that could allegedly transport you from one place to another instantaneously without your having actually to travel between the point from which you depart and the point to which you arrive.

The device would disassemble you, atom by atom, and commit to a computer's memory the pattern of your ...[text shortened]... rded a the departure point -- so it would make no difference.

Would there be a difference?

I use this exact thought experiment when I teach units on personal identity. The problem is that we want an account of personal identity that both identifies aspects of us putatively tied to our persistence through time that we take to be constitutive of who we ultimately are and that prevents the possibility of duplication. There are good reasons to think that these two goals are incompatible. If you tie personal identity too closely to our physical bodies, the unfortunate entailments include our being destroyed by slight modifications to our physical bodies. If you tie personal identity too closely to the content or functional organization of our psychology, the unfortunate entailments include the possibility that these properties could be instantiated in more than one person simultaneously (e.g., if your transporter/duplicator misfires and creates two copies of the original). I worry less about the second criterion than the first, for reasons I won't belabor here.

But, with regard to your thought experiment, suppose that the process of duplication is slowed down. Suppose that a philosophically inclined neuroscientist kidnaps you and begins to slot out your neurons, one by one, for functionally identical silicone replacements. Is there any reason to think that you would experience any cessation of consciousness, or experience any other psychological changes incompatible with persistence? If not, then you will presumably survive this "brain replacement" surgery. Suppose, further, that your original neurons are then reassembled into a fully functional brain and placed into another body. Somebody will awake in that body who will be both psychologically and, in an important sense, physically identical to you prior to your surgery. So, is this also you? If so, then personal identity does not require the the impossibility of duplication. If not, then you must think something is particularly important about continuity of consciousness. But why is this important, since you presumably also think that we survive other temporary unconscious states?

I don't know, this whole philosophical debate seems like a big muddle.

Originally posted by bbarr
I use this exact thought experiment when I teach units on personal identity. The problem is that we want an account of personal identity that both identifies aspects of us putatively tied to our persistence through time that we take to be constitutive of who we ultimately are and that prevents the possibility of duplication. There are good reasons to think t ...[text shortened]... nconscious states?

I don't know, this whole philosophical debate seems like a big muddle.

Wow, he's back. Where have you been?

Originally posted by bbarr
I don't know, this whole philosophical debate seems like a big muddle.

Why do you see it as a muddle? To me it is quite obvious that our consciousness can be copied and that there is no rational reason to think otherwise. Of course there are irrational reasons such as religious or psychological ones but nothing that can stand up to even basic scrutiny.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Wow, he's back. Where have you been?

I've been trying to bulk up the C.V. in preparation for the fall, when I go on the market. I see you're still fighting the good fight!

Originally posted by twhitehead
Why do you see it as a muddle? To me it is quite obvious that our consciousness can be copied and that there is no rational reason to think otherwise. Of course there are irrational reasons such as religious or psychological ones but nothing that can stand up to even basic scrutiny.

I don't know what it means to say that consciousness itself can be copied. If what you mean is that the content and structure of psychological states and processes and be copied, then I agree. I think the philosophical debate about personal identity is a muddle because philosophers want more than they can get. They want an account of personal identity wherein our persistence is grounded in features about us that we care about but that are not capable of duplication. If you jettison the second criterion the muddle disappears, but there are some bullets to bite. Suppose, for instance, that I commit a murder just prior to stepping onto the transporter/duplicator. The duplicator scans my body and sends the information but fails to take me apart. It then constructs a duplicate somewhere else. Now there are two people, functionally identical. Should I and my duplicate both be charged with murder? I think so, but many philosophers think I'm wrong about this.

Originally posted by bbarr
I use this exact thought experiment when I teach units on personal identity. The problem is that we want an account of personal identity that both identifies aspects of us putatively tied to our persistence through time that we take to be constitutive of who we ultimately are and that prevents the possibility of duplication. There are good reasons to think t ...[text shortened]... nconscious states?

I don't know, this whole philosophical debate seems like a big muddle.

Welcome back🙂

Hypotheses non fingo although that apple never fell on my head;

However, all this jazz has to do with rearrangement. I rearrange myself second by second on my own due to agents that they are related to the Worlds 3, 2 and 1. Also, I may end up with myself rearranged by others due to agents that they are related to the Worlds 3, 2 and 1. All in all, your idea seems to me just another form of rearrangement.

But what is the most interesting with Myself? In my opinion, it is its ever changing “exact position”. I am nothing but a Story, therefore I ‘m just a Position. This Position derived from a specific chessboard and specific chessmen from a specific tabiya, and it took this very formation that you monitor right now through constant evolution and changes move by move all the way down to the bitter end of the Game.

When the Game ends you have no chessboard and chessmen anymore -but the rest of us they remain with the footprints of this Position and of the Mind behind it. These footprints are solely the footprints of my existence.

Therefore, if I am still Myself and a Story/ Position through the rearrangement(s) I mentioned above, I will be still Myself if the rearrangement you proposed “respects” my Story and keeps the Position intact and ever ready to get its next shape according to “my” Dynamics. And I have the feeling that right by now you are aware of the fact that the term “Myself” can be clarified without contradictions at any level of understanding by means of the Mind-Only philosophy.


Of course it’s not strange at all that finally “Hypotheses fingo” -this is usual when I feel free to unleash my mind and look at it playing at its playground😵

Originally posted by bbarr
I've been trying to bulk up the C.V. in preparation for the fall, when I go on the market. I see you're still fighting the good fight!

Cool, good to see you back. Good luck with the search for a position. Any of them would be lucky to get you.

Originally posted by black beetle
Welcome back🙂

Hypotheses non fingo although that apple never fell on my head;

However, all this jazz has to do with rearrangement. I rearrange myself second by second on my own due to agents that they are related to the Worlds 3, 2 and 1. Also, I may end up with myself rearranged by others due to agents that they are related to the Worlds 3, 2 an ...[text shortened]... o” -this is usual when I feel free to unleash my mind and look at it playing at its playground😵

What is the idea that you are attributing to me?

Originally posted by bbarr
I don't know, this whole philosophical debate seems like a big muddle.

I think part of the apparent paradox (if I can call it that) is that we tend to view 'us' as a static, instead of a fully dynamic entity. And by static, I include a perspective that sees the self as a sequence of static selves.

For example, our brain is in constant activity, with neurons being fired all the time and electrical impulses flowing across it. I would imagine that at some point it would be impossible to perfectly replicate this, as the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle would apply.

Of course, this avoids the main thrust of the thought experiment (what exactly is the self) by pedantic practical considerations. However, for me, this is enough for not having to worry about the possibility of such exact properties being instantiated in more than one person as it almost surely will not happen (in a probabilistic sense, i.e. it happens with probability zero).

Originally posted by bbarr
What is the idea that you are attributing to me?

I consider as "idea" the whole string of your thoughts as you expressed them at your first post at this thread, to which I replied.

Originally posted by Palynka
I think part of the apparent paradox (if I can call it that) is that we tend to view 'us' as a static, instead of a fully dynamic entity. And by static, I include a perspective that sees the self as a sequence of static selves.

For example, our brain is in constant activity, with neurons being fired all the time and electrical impulses flowing across it. ...[text shortened]... most surely will not happen (in a probabilistic sense, i.e. it happens with probability zero).

Yeppers Palynka😵