Originally posted by PalynkaI agree that the use of these types of thought experiments invite your reasonable response. This is why, in the literature, other thought experiments are often also used. In particular, cases of monozygotic twins seem to threaten duplication if one endorses the following three claims: 1) Bodily identity suffices for personal identity, 2) Our bodies began at fertilization, and 3) Personal identity is transitive. Also, hypothetical cases of hemispherectomy and implantation threatens duplication if one endorses the following three claims: 1) Psychological continuity suffices for personal identity, 2) Psychological continuity is maintained even with the loss of either hemisphere of the brain, and 3) Personal identity is transitive. Derek Parfit suggests that we jettison the claim that personal identity is transitive, and I think there is quite a bit of merit in this suggestion. We can both be personally identical to some previous person without being personally identical to each other.
I think part of the apparent paradox (if I can call it that) is that we tend to view 'us' as a static, instead of a fully dynamic entity. And by static, I include a perspective that sees the self as a sequence of static selves.
For example, our brain is in constant activity, with neurons being fired all the time and electrical impulses flowing across it. ...[text shortened]... most surely will not happen (in a probabilistic sense, i.e. it happens with probability zero).
Originally posted by bbarrIt seems I agree with you that the only real problem is what philosophers want (but cant have).
Should I and my duplicate both be charged with murder? I think so, but many philosophers think I'm wrong about this.
Whether or not both should be charged with murder depends on why we 'charge with murder' in the first place. Too many people have the theistic view of justice whereby it is all about some book of sins held in the sky which needs tallying up and balancing. (an eye for an eye).
However if we analyze what punishment is really about then both copies would probably be charged with murder. Of course issues like that would have to be thought about and addressed when the situation arose. I guess the first question would be what we grant 'human rights' to. If the copy is in a computer, does it have human rights equivalent to the original?
These issues have of course been explored more often with the case of a human like consciousness developing in a computer - rather than being copied directly from a human. Of course once consciousness in a computer is demonstrated then copying it would be a relatively trivial exercise.
Originally posted by bbarrSorry, I don't see why what I said would not also be valid for the cases of monozygotic twins or hemispherectomy and implantation... The on-going effects of stimuli would also not be transferable, right?
I agree that the use of these types of thought experiments invite your reasonable response. This is why, in the literature, other thought experiments are often also used. In particular, cases of monozygotic twins seem to threaten duplication if one endorses the following three claims: 1) Bodily identity suffices for personal identity, 2) Our bodies began at ...[text shortened]... e personally identical to some previous person without being personally identical to each other.
Originally posted by bbarrWhatever I "think" is irrelevant, because my mind and my rest senses are deceiving. I am not my 6 senses the same way I am not my "Soul" or my "Body" or my "Body/ Soul".
Do you think that you are substantively the same person now that you were 10 minutes ago?
I think that I am not substantively the same person now that I were 10 minutes ago, although I may have or you may have the delussion that I am just the same. Also, I cannot claim that the BodySoul I use right now is not substantively the same.
Originally posted by PalynkaBut you still cannot avoid many of the questions that arise because even an imperfect copy may attain consciousness with memories and thought patterns very similar to your own which would raise many philosophical questions. In fact by deliberately damaging your brain after the copy operation the imperfect copy might actually be closer to the original than the future 'original'.
Of course, this avoids the main thrust of the thought experiment (what exactly is the self) by pedantic practical considerations. However, for me, this is enough for not having to worry about the possibility of such exact properties being instantiated in more than one person as it almost surely will not happen (in a probabilistic sense, i.e. it happens with probability zero).
Originally posted by black beetleHeraclitus versus ... ?
Whatever I "think" is irrelevant, because my mind and my rest senses are deceiving. I am not my 6 senses the same way I am not my "Soul" or my "Body" or my "Body/ Soul".
I think that I am not substantively the same person now that I were 10 minutes ago, although I may have or you may have the delussion that I am just the same. Also, I cannot claim that the BodySoul I use right now is not substantively the same.
Originally posted by twhiteheadI think that we can agree that for anything like a self existing in two different bodies at the same time, then the similarity must be exact. If it's imperfect, I don't see how I can say that the imperfect copy is me.
But you still cannot avoid many of the questions that arise because even an imperfect copy may attain consciousness with memories and thought patterns very similar to your own which would raise many philosophical questions. In fact by deliberately damaging your brain after the copy operation the imperfect copy might actually be closer to the original than the future 'original'.
To be clear, I think of the self as not being independent of its history. Not only because it is convenient to do so, but because of the argument I presented, I believe its history affects the present in a non-trivial way. Damaging my brain would be part of my history and my personality traits would evolve accordingly, but in the above definition of self, it would still be the same self.
Originally posted by bbarrYou summarize the issues very well. Just to add to the above point, if we look at plants that propagate vegetatively we quickly realize the futility of trying to assign identity to an organism based on sexual reproduction, or for that matter trying to assign indivisible identity to an organism.
In particular, cases of monozygotic twins seem to threaten duplication if one endorses the following three claims: 1) Bodily identity suffices for personal identity, 2) Our bodies began at fertilization, and 3) Personal identity is transitive.
Originally posted by PalynkaBut you are at all times essentially an imperfect copy of your past self. Even that physical atoms that make up your body are in a constant state of change and replacement.
I think that we can agree that for anything like a self existing in two different bodies at the same time, then the similarity must be exact. If it's imperfect, I don't see how I can say that the imperfect copy is me.
To be clear, I think of the self as not being independent of its history. Not only because it is convenient to do so, but because of ...[text shortened]... ould evolve accordingly, but in the above definition of self, it would still be the same self.
Why should changing the atoms all at once be sufficient cause to say it is not you any more? Why do you attach the history to the 'original' and not to the copy?
And just to throw another spanner in the works, what if we cut you down the middle and then replicated (even imperfectly) the missing halves to result in two new identities that still each retained 50% of the original you?
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Originally posted by twhiteheadBut you are at all times essentially an imperfect copy of your past self.
But you are at all times essentially an imperfect copy of your past self. Even that physical atoms that make up your body are in a constant state of change and replacement.
Why should changing the atoms all at once be sufficient cause to say it is not you any more? Why do you attach the history to the 'original' and not to the copy?
And just to thro ...[text shortened]... ssing halves to result in two new identities that still each retained 50% of the original you?
My self includes my history, so there is no past/present/future self in that sense. There is but one self with a past, present and future.
Why do you attach the history to the 'original' and not to the copy?
I already been through that. Please read my initial post and why past history cannot be perfectly copied. Since the present and the future history depend on my past history, then there is no point in time where I am identical to any copy.
And just to throw another spanner in the works, what if we cut you down the middle and then replicated (even imperfectly) the missing halves to result in two new identities that still each retained 50% of the original you?
This is an interesting one. I need to think about it. Now I see bbarr's point about hemispherectomy.
Originally posted by PalynkaTrue, but if personal identity is a transitive relation then these eventual differences are irrelevant. Suppose s1 is the cell before twinning. Suppose twinning results in s2 and s3. Had s2 not been created, most folks would say s1 and s3 are numerically identical (i.e., they are the same thing, in the same way that my desk is the same desk it was 10 minutes ago). Alternatively, had s3 not been created, s1 and s2 would be numerically identical. It seems arbitrary to claim that something essential happens to the relation between s1 and, say, s2 just because s3 also happened to be created. So, it seems arbitrary to deny that s1 bears a relation of numerical identity to s2 just because of s3. But the same can be said of the relation between s1 and s3. So, it seems s1 must bear a relation of numerical identity to both s2 and s3, or perhaps to their mereological sum. But, if numerical identity is transitive, then the fact that s1 bears this relation to both s2 and s3 entails that s2 and s3 bear this relation to each other (this just follows from the definition of 'transitivity'😉. Now, if s2 continues to be numerically identical to itself as it evolves, and if s3 continues to be numerically identical with itself as it evolves, then the relation of identity that obtained between s2 and s3 subsequent to twinning will be retained throughout their respective evolutions. The ridiculous implication is (if you think that personal identity tracks the numerical identity of the body) that monozygotic twins are the same person (or if you opt for the claim that s1 is identical to the mereological sum of s2 and s3, that monozygotic twins are each a half of one person). Similar comments apply to the hemispherectomy case.
Sorry, I don't see why what I said would not also be valid for the cases of monozygotic twins or hemispherectomy and implantation... The on-going effects of stimuli would also not be transferable, right?
Originally posted by Bosse de NageOh my obnoxious brother, it's been a long time to hear of yours🙂
Heraclitus versus ... ?
There is not such a think like "Heraclitus versus...". This is just a glance of Yourself in the Mirror.
The 6 senses are not real. You are transparent. And say not now that this is just dialectics for me😵
Originally posted by black beetleO.K., so you are a skeptic about personal identity. Fair enough.
Whatever I "think" is irrelevant, because my mind and my rest senses are deceiving. I am not my 6 senses the same way I am not my "Soul" or my "Body" or my "Body/ Soul".
I think that I am not substantively the same person now that I were 10 minutes ago, although I may have or you may have the delussion that I am just the same. Also, I cannot claim that the BodySoul I use right now is not substantively the same.