07 May '14 22:30>1 edit
Since the theists here have been oh so gracious and responsive to discussion regarding my recent original argument submission ( Thread 158639 ) as well as a submission from the literature ( Thread 158939 )...ahem...here is another offering for debate from the literature. It is an argument by John Schellenberg. I think it ought to encourage interesting and fruitful debate. This topic is related to Drange's argument from nonbelief, discussion on which has already been initiation by JS357 earlier in this forum, if I recall correctly.
The basic idea is that if it is the design intention of a loving creator that his/her creatures at least be in a position to freely choose to relate (or not) with him/her; and in light of the fact that a creature's being in such a position requires that the creature hold the belief that the creator exists; then the fact that some creatures do not hold this belief, and on intellectually honest grounds no less, would present a problem for the idea that such a creator exists. Here is a formulation of the argument by Schellenberg:
The argument is clearly logically valid. So if you do not agree with the the conclusion, then which premise(s) do you reject and why?
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Explanation and abbreviated defense of the argument by Schellenberg can be found here:
http://infidels.org/library/modern/john_schellenberg/hidden.html
Interestingly, if you read through the page and then click on "Continue the Debate" toward the end, then it will take you on to considered counter-arguments; and then counter-counter-arguments, etc. So, it is a good way to get background perspectives from both sides of the argument.
The basic idea is that if it is the design intention of a loving creator that his/her creatures at least be in a position to freely choose to relate (or not) with him/her; and in light of the fact that a creature's being in such a position requires that the creature hold the belief that the creator exists; then the fact that some creatures do not hold this belief, and on intellectually honest grounds no less, would present a problem for the idea that such a creator exists. Here is a formulation of the argument by Schellenberg:
1. If there is a perfectly loving God, all creatures capable of explicit and positively meaningful relationship with God who have not freely shut themselves off from God are in a position to participate in such relationships--i.e., able to do so just by trying to.
2. No one can be in a position to participate in such relationships without believing that God exists.
3. If there is a perfectly loving God, all creatures capable of explicit and positively meaningful relationship with God who have not freely shut themselves off from God believe that God exists (from 1 and 2).
4. It is not the case that all creatures capable of explicit and positively meaningful relationship with God who have not freely shut themselves off from God believe that God exists: there is nonresistant nonbelief.
5. It is not the case that there is a perfectly loving God (from 3 and 4).
The argument is clearly logically valid. So if you do not agree with the the conclusion, then which premise(s) do you reject and why?
----------------------
Explanation and abbreviated defense of the argument by Schellenberg can be found here:
http://infidels.org/library/modern/john_schellenberg/hidden.html
Interestingly, if you read through the page and then click on "Continue the Debate" toward the end, then it will take you on to considered counter-arguments; and then counter-counter-arguments, etc. So, it is a good way to get background perspectives from both sides of the argument.