Originally posted by black beetleGreat post, bb.
Edit: "To call morality an invention as opposed to calling it, say, a discovery about how to get along together, is already to have opted for a horn of the Euthyphro dilemma."
I doubt that. "Discovery" of what exactly? Is really morality a discovery (of something "objective" out there that exists in separation from our own mind) about "how to get alo ...[text shortened]... ir convenience. Words are Empty.
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Originally posted by bbarrSo, my good man, can you answer the eternal question: If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?
To call morality an invention as opposed to calling it, say, a discovery about how to get along together, is already to have opted for a horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. Again, the worries here (as applied to social contract accounts of morality), are: (1) that if our agreement regarding some set of norms is based upon reasons (e.g., that we will have some desi ...[text shortened]... ., but that's banal, and not the notion of objectivity epistemologists care about.
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Originally posted by bbarrA little birdie told me I missed this post...
O.K., it seems like you want to analyze normative expressions like “Behavior X is good” as composed of two parts: (1) The expression of a preference that X be done, and (2) the expression of a preference that others prefer that X be done. It is not that these preferences make the claim “Behavior X is good” true, since on your view normative claims can ...[text shortened]... then you don’t take moral claims seriously, except inasmuch as they express strong preferences.
I think your (1) and (2) are not descriptions that are accurate enough. Expressing my preferences can be done in a descriptive way (statement of fact "I prefer X" ) or in a non-cognitive way ("Hooray for X!" ). These latter expressions of preferences are non-cognitive, but they reveal them indirectly, nonetheless. This revealing property is the second dimension that I mentioned. So it's different to say "I prefer X and I prefer X to be preferred by others" and say "Hooray for X!" or "X is good", although the first meaning is indirectly embedded in the second (but not vice-versa). This may seem like knit-picking, but I feel the line between cognitive subjectivism and a non-cognitivism is one that the non-cognitivist cannot avoid stressing enough if he's serious about his non-cognitivism. It's perhaps a trivial difference for others, but not to me.
I'm not sure how the chess example is related. "Should" statements are not always moral utterances. "The chicken should cross the street to get to the other side" is not a moral utterance...is it? I see it as "if X is the objective, Y is an efficient way to achieve it". I certainly don't see any non-cognitive element there, a chess program could have said it. So I don't think theories of morality are called for here. How would a virtue ethicist interpret the statement that he should take my rook? Perhaps I'm missing your point here, but it seems to me a fallacy of equivocation to imply statements with "should" or "good" are always about morality. (e.g. "He is in good health" has a clear meaning and can be translated without recourse to the word "good" or other words typically associated with moral utterances)
Of course, as a non-cognitivist, pinning down what a moral utterance is hard. But if another commits to a definition, then the non-cognitivist is able to address it. In a way, most atheists have the same conundrum when discussing God with a theist. It's hardly meaningful unless the theist commits to a definition. The position I find it hardest to deal with is cognitive subjectivism because I am left arguing how frequent and how important is the emotional support in moral utterances. But despite that, the real beef I have is with moral realists. This is why I first addressed moral realism. It is those who claim something exists who need to justify their position before I can address it. Or else I'm left chasing shadows.
Smith case: Many people do exactly that and there are plenty of cases where "Smiths" have been demonized and used as scapegoats by the use of moral and emotional argumentation for personal advantage. "He's a bad person, therefore he must have done it". "He beats his wife, so he must also be a thief" and what not. Do I think it's appropriate? What do you mean by that? The case states my preferences from the start, so you already tied my hands. That it somehow now clashes with mine is a problem of the starting assumptions! To be clear, I'm not sure I see the difficulty, the only one that arises is because you tie me down to a set of preferences that is not mine.
The final remark is a bit out of the blue. I don't take moral claims seriously but I like to engage with those that do. Same as I am an atheist and yet I like to talk with theists about God. In both cases, I hope to learn something, either about my own positions or about competing alternatives.
Originally posted by PalynkaThe following is not intended as an argumentative question:
A little birdie told me I missed this post...
I think your (1) and (2) are not descriptions that are accurate enough. Expressing my preferences can be done in a descriptive way (statement of fact "I prefer X" ) or in a non-cognitive way ("Hooray for X!" ). These latter expressions of preferences are non-cognitive, but they reveal them indirectly, nonethe ...[text shortened]... out my own positions or about competing alternatives.
How do you, as a non-cognitivist, deal with the proposition: “It is always and everywhere ethically/morally wrong to commit child rape”?
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Originally posted by vistesdEquivalent to ("Boo to child rape anywhere and everywhere!" )^10000.
The following is not intended as an argumentative question:
How do you, as a non-cognitivist, deal with the proposition: “It is always and everywhere ethically/morally wrong to commit child rape”?
(not exactly, but this is the clearest immediate translation I can find. Basically, the main function of that statement is intended to express your feelings about child rape and also puts emotional pressure for others to feel the same way/gives emotional support to others who feel the same way. Under this view, there is no truth value to that statement, it is neither true nor false, although it also reveals some of your preferences)
How do you view it?
Originally posted by PalynkaI am frankly torn. On the one hand I have trouble philosophically with the kind of moral objectivism that it seems the statement implies. On the other hand, I don’t see how the proposition cannot not be true (to put it in a cumbersome negative way)—or that I can simply say it is my preference based on my emotional response. For one thing, it is a case where I am quite prepared to enforce (violently) prohibition on child rape without question—where as there are other “boo/yuck” types of behavior where I would not be (i.e., absent the ^10000), and likely many where circumstantial context would be deciding.
Equivalent to ("Boo to child rape anywhere and everywhere!" )^10000.
(not exactly, but this is the clearest immediate translation I can find. Basically, the main function of that statement is intended to express your feelings about child rape and also puts emotional pressure for others to feel the same way/gives emotional support to others who feel the s ...[text shortened]... ther true nor false, although it also reveals some of your preferences)
How do you view it?
Bbarr once told me on here that intuition can be a part of virtue ethics, in which behavior flows from our character without needing the intermediation of reasoning (say, the application of deductive inference to the issue at hand). That is my recall, so I won’t hold him to my understanding—and I hope he comes back to respond to all this. I may never figure out a rational argument for my stance—but having none does not mean that (1) I feel inhibited in responding to actual situations [as neither would you], or (2) that I think I need to accept any propositional foundations that otherwise seem unreasonable to me (e.g., any kind of “theistic imperative” ).
I am following this conversation, in part, in hopes of coming to a firmer foundation myself….
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Originally posted by vistesdWhy "simply"? I think it's a mistake to think that it being a preference means that you can't impose it on others who disagree. I've seen this implied many times. Preferences can be very, very, very strong if you think about it. If you try pinning down what a preference is (for example, a mapping of the ordinal ranking of possible choices) you can have certain preferences that are extremely dominant over even your other preferences regarding imposing behaviour on others through force.
or that I can simply say it is my preference based on my emotional response. For one thing, it is a case where I am quite prepared to enforce (violently) prohibition on child rape without question
To say they are preferences, is NOT the same as saying it's a "matter of taste" so up to the individual or even to accept submission to majority voting.
Edit - Seems to me you're closer to non-cognitivism than virtue ethics, but I guess each of us sees a bit with the perspective of one's corner.
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Originally posted by PalynkaYou are right about the "simply"--I stand corrected. But I still think their needs ("ought"? 😉 ) to be some clear justification for imposing one's preferences on others, no matter how much weight they carry in terms of one's own preference ordering. (It just struck me that I don't recall the notion of relative weight ever being addressed in terms of ordinal preference-ranking, as opposed to cardinal utility...?) And I'm afraid that such justification ends up being "turtles all the way down"--but that might mean that I haven't read bbarr clearly enough.
Why "simply"? I think it's a mistake to think that it being a preference means that you can't impose it on others who disagree. I've seen this implied many times. Preferences can be very, very, very strong if you think about it. If you try pinning down what a preference is (for example, a mapping of the ordinal ranking of possible choices) you can have certa virtue ethics, but I guess each of us sees a bit with the perspective of one's corner.
As for being closer to one or the other, I'll stick with "torn" for now.
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Originally posted by vistesdThat's similar to my view, any particular turtle where you decide to stop will require a choice so I'd rather remove the smoke screen and accept that the irreducible part of picking any cognitive moral theory will be based on preferences. There is no escaping that preferences (in any form) will be the primitives. What you build on top of it may help you in terms of consistency but it seems self-deception to believe they are not ultimately anchored on preferences (and biological explanations for any statistical patterns regarding the distribution of those preferences change nothing).
You are right about the "simply"--I stand corrected. But I still think their needs ("ought"? 😉 ) to be some clear justification for imposing one's preferences on others, no matter how much weight they carry in terms of one's own preference ordering. (It just struck me that I don't recall the notion of relative weight ever being addressed in terms o nough.
As for being closer to one or the other, I'll stick with "torn" for now.
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Originally posted by PalynkaI seem to recall an earlier post where Bennett asserted that we need to start with at least one premise (foundationalist epistemology) to get anywhere. However, that premise is not proved by the remaining terms of the inference, or by the conclusion (affirming the consequent?). Basically, epistemologically, there has to be a first turtle. (Wittgenstein said much the same thing in his On Certainty, with emphasis on the idea that there are some things that, if we cannot claim them with certainty, but without further justification, then the whole epistemic game collapses—e.g., “My name is V”.)
That's similar to my view, any particular turtle where you decide to stop will require a choice so I'd rather remove the smoke screen and accept that the irreducible part of picking any cognitive moral theory will be based on preferences. There is no escaping that preferences (in any form) will be the primitives. What you build on top of it may help you in t ...[text shortened]... for any statistical patterns regarding the distribution of those preferences change nothing).
Note: I have to go re-read bbarr’s posts to see what was his foundational premise re virtue ethics.
Ah yes! That “flourishing” (eudaimonia) just has to be taken as intrinsically good (my personal translation of eudaimonia—a bit redundant perhaps—is “flourishing well-being”, since some just translate it as well-being, and some as happiness). Now I have to say that I can accept that as a foundational premise—and would like to see a logical argument demonstrating that flourishing well-being is, at least in some cases, not intrinsically good (especially since it seems to include survival of the organism—since the opposite of well-being is ill-being, which is, in extremis, a threat to the organism’s survival).
Now, the question is: Is survival of the organism with flourishing well-being (to compound redundancies?) a matter of—perhaps evolutionarily encoded—preference? At that level, I’m not sure there is any real argument at all between the two positions—except that a noncognitivist might deny the necessity (but surely not the acceptability) of such an analysis? [Very much a “?” there!]
EDIT: By "good" in the above, I do not mean Morally good, but of (absolute?) value. I believe that Aristoltle held eudaimonia to be the highest good, or excellence, which did not serve any higher ariston.
EDIT 2: You know, I’m wondering how much of your position is related to economic utility theory (possibly one could substitute eudaimonia for utility, without wrenching the concept really), subsequently (via Samuelson) “occamed” into ordinal preference ranking? I mean utility (preference) maximization (or some variant thereof—e.g., Simons’ “satisficing” ) seems to be the foundational premise for all of neoclassical consumer theory. Again, this would seem to imply that there is not so much difference between what you’re saying and what Bennett is saying…
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Man, put this together with my ventures into Aquinas today, and my brain is really cracked! In a flourishing sort of way, though... 🙂