Originally posted by vistesdIn fact, the more uncertain you are, the more faith you can have.
Okay, I didn’t want to leave on such a negative note, so—
Read the last paragraph of my post (before the “trashy novel” comment), and ask yourself this question: “Am I trying to substitute certainty for faith?” KellyJay, for example, does not. Faith always and inescapably involves risk—that’s why it’s called the risk of faith, and a “leap of faith” (Ki ...[text shortened]... r your own decision of faith: “May it be for you and others a path of blessing.”
Good night.
Hence, those inclined to atheism have more capacity for faith in God than those inclined to belief.
One might even argue that, if faith is a good thing, and the more you have the better, then belief should be discouraged, and uncertainty encouraged.
Thus, to do God's work, evangelists should attempt to incline others to atheism, not belief.
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Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI don’t know, Pawney... That seems to be a bit analogous to saying that deliberate ignorance is better than incomplete knowledge. Or that it is better to have no information for making a decision, than to have information that is less than certain. Or that to draw no conclusions about anything is better than to draw conclusions based on incomplete or imperfect information. (You might be arguing something close to the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus here...)
In fact, the more uncertain you are, the more faith you can have.
Hence, those inclined to atheism have more capacity for faith in God than those inclined to belief.
One might even argue that, if faith is a good thing, and the more you have the better, then belief should be discouraged, and uncertainty encouraged.
Thus, to do God's work, evangelists should attempt to incline others to atheism, not belief.
Where there is certainty, faith* is not necessary. But I’m not sure that relative faith and relative certainty (whatever that might mean: relative probability?) run on some kind of inverse sliding scale of more and less, as you are suggesting. Those religions that are faith-based simply admit uncertainty, and urge a decision anyway.
My point is that when you are talking about the possibility of aspects of our existence that are outside our cognitive abilities (whether that implies the supernatural or not), we have no means to assign probabilities at all. (I’m taking a position of theological noncognitivism here, I think.) The theist may reason from certain evidence that s/he finds relevant, but, in the end, must admit uncertainty and make a “leap of faith.” Certainty here is not a possibility.
* I realize that I’m using the word faith very broadly here, and that religious faith may carry connotations that an everyday use of the word might not.
EDIT: My thinking cap's just not on too tight today... I think I see a glimmer of what you're getting at, but it's not clear. Try another run at it? 🙂
Originally posted by vistesdI am arguing that, if you think faith in God is a good thing, and faith is inversely correlated with certainty, then it might be good to reduce people's certainty that there is a God, so as to maximize their potential faith. Of course, this strategy may minimize their actual faith. However, striking the right balance should give gung-ho evangelists pause for thought.
I don’t know, Pawney... That seems to be a bit analogous to saying that deliberate ignorance is better than incomplete knowledge. Or that it is better to have no information for making a decision, than to have information that is less than certain. Or that to draw no conclusions about anything is better than to draw conclusions based on incomplete or impe ...[text shortened]... nk I see a glimmer of what you're getting at, but it's not clear. Try another run at it? 🙂
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeDo you think faith is limited to just God?
I am arguing that, if you think faith in God is a good thing, and faith is inversely correlated with certainty, then it might be good to reduce people's certainty that there is a God, so as to maximize their potential faith. Of course, this strategy may minimize their actual faith. However, striking the right balance should give gung-ho evangelists pause for thought.
Kelly
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Originally posted by PawnokeyholeA proposition, X, is certain iff the probability of X, P(X) = 1.0. If X is “God exists” (G), as per the original post, then:
I am arguing that, if you think faith in God is a good thing, and faith is inversely correlated with certainty, then it might be good to reduce people's certainty that there is a God, so as to maximize their potential faith. Of course, this strategy may minimize their actual faith. However, striking the right balance should give gung-ho evangelists pause for thought.
P(G) = 1.0 means that God exists (with certainty).
P(G) = 0.0 means that God does not exist (with certainty).
0.0 < P(G) < 1.0 means that we can only say that there is a given probability that God exists; there is no certainty.
Certainty itself does not admit of degrees (though we often speak that way, loosely).
Now, Christianity treats faith as a virtue—in fact, generally as a necessary salvific virtue. If P(G) = 1, then one does not have faith that G; one is certain that G. Suppose that one could be certain that G (God exists); for subsequent propositions about G (e.g., the conditions under which God will invite one into eternal communion), each such proposition is either certain or not, and the same argument applies.
My original argument was that one cannot assign such probabilities to the supernatural (extra-natural) category at all, because we are talking about something that transcends our existentially conditioned cognitive abilities. Therefore, reliance on a supernatural theos requires a radical kind of faith, ala Kierkegaard. My original argument might be wrong (and there are counter-arguments that I am familiar with, such as revelation). If that is the case, then “faith” takes on more the mundane characteristics of any decision we make, based on assigned probabilities, under the condition of uncertainty.
In either case, it seems to me that Christianity (and other religions as well) explicitly recognizes that uncertainty with regard to God in its commendation of faith, whether of the radical kind or the more mundane kind. One may attempt to gather evidence that increases the value of P(G); but if one seeks to gather sufficient evidence to show that P(G) = 1.0, then one is seeking to escape the necessity of faith. (Again, the same would hold for other propositions about G.)
I haven’t really worked out in my own mind the further implications of this, so can’t really say anything further until I do...
EDIT: Actually, people like Kierkegarrd and (I think) the Protestant theologian Karl Barth have argued against seeking the kind of evidence that assigns probabilties to G, and I think might agree that no probabilities can be assigned; that is, they argue for radical faith.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesI can't even figure out the probability that you exist! And I don't know who you are so the question is moot. Without a proper understanding of who you are, I can not give any reasonable estimate you exist.
Evaluate the probability that God exists.
Show your work by citing what bits of evidence and information you have considered and how they correspond to factors in your calcualtion.
Originally posted by ColettiHave you read his profile? It was written by two people attesting to his existence.
I can't even figure out the probability that you exist! And I don't know who you are so the question is moot. Without a proper understanding of who you are, I can not give any reasonable estimate you exist.
Originally posted by kirksey957🙂
Have you read his profile? It was written by two people attesting to his existence.
Well that's a start. But I've read more testimonies on Mickey Mouse. Still, I can't say I really know who either are yet. But I suppose based on the testimonies, and the existence of some of his posts, it might be reasonable to believe Dr Scrib exists. At least, the opinion he exists is not unreasonable.