16 Nov 11
2 edits
COG (Callousness of God): Given two possible states of affairs, A and B, if A involves more suffering than B, and A and B are equivalent in regards to the goodness they instantiate and/or bring about, God does not take the extra suffering involved in A to weigh in favor of B.
I guess what I did not adopt here is "equivalent in regards to the goodness they instantiate and/or bring about".
What is there in the definition of God that insists that the degree of goodness accomplished by God has to be a static amount ?
If that is a commitment in the supplied definition of God someone please show me.
Dynamic good accomplished by God through more time makes it impossible for us to differentiate CALLOUSNESS of God from our limited or shortsightedness of the unfolding of His will.
16 Nov 11
1 edit
The killing of every man, woman, and child of the Amalekites, additional thoughts:
I showed how nasty the Amalekites were to the Hebrews.
Could it be that only combatants were singled out in the slaughtering ?
Some scholars say this could be the case.
The "city of Amalek" (1 Sam. 15:5) was probably a fortified military eencampment. Though the defeat was decisive such phrases indicating the destruction of "everything that breathes" have to be taken guardedly. This could have been the engagement of combatants only rather than non-combatants.
I showed that they were not totally exterminated though a story makes it sound as if only their king Agaq was the only one left alive. He wasn't the only one left as others lived to relentlessly oppose Israel on another day.
The Amalekites were still around 250 years latter during the time of King Hezekiah.
Can I believe every man, woman, and child had been literally exterminated by Saul at the instructions of the prophet Samuel ? Can I assume that for 250 years the survivors had no sheep, oxen or other cattle left after they were all utterly destroyed ?
Then we get to the book of Esther when the Jews are under the reign of Ahasuerus / Xerxes (486 - 465 BC). We read of at least one very evil Haman the Agagite (remember king Agag of Samuel 15:8) ?
The last remaining Amalekite, Agag, must have had a descendent. For Haman the Agagite was there in the book of Esther to carry out his nefarious plots against the Jews.
Herem - "ban" or "consecration to destruction" needs some context to understand in the Old Testament.
16 Nov 11
1 edit
Originally posted by jaywillI must annoy the dickens out of you.
[quote] Second, LJ points out that this whole thing depends on a “sufficiently literal” reading of the biblical texts. It has long been an annoyance to me how literalism is so predominantly asserted as the proper norm, and all others get marginalized as “spinning”, often for the purpose of making god “look better”. But this literalism-as-norm, by both theist old in MANY portions and in MANY ways to the fathers in the prophets, ..." (Heb. 1:1) [/b]
Well, mostly in a wonderful way! Good questions.
I would take a literalist to be anyone who takes a literal/factual reading as the [i]default as an apriori matter of hermeneutical principle[/i]. In other words, it’s all literal unless it can be demonstrably shown to be otherwise (as I hope the “stopping the sun” example illustrates). For example, a literalist might assume a priori that any particular recorded miracle (taking “miracle” here to be an event that violates known natural laws—and I don’t want to debate that, just using this as an example) actually occurred, as a matter of fact, unless somehow compelled to think otherwise. The naturalist would take the opposing view.
Under this definition, I think that such a literalist would concede any of the items on your list—insofar as each case can be demonstrated to be the proper alternative to a literalistic reading. For example, some people seem to concede a parable only where the text says that it is a parable. On the other hand, a literalist as so defined might also accept, say, a literary-critical approach that identifies a certain literary structure that defines parables, whether or not they are so-designated—but I would be surprised if someone accepted such a hermeneutic and still called themselves a “literalist”.
Maybe we could loosely distinguish between “strong literalism” and “weak literalism”.
A neutral hermeneutical approach would try to identify the literary form of the text without any a priori assumption. I myself, however, stand at the opposite end of the spectrum (not strictly as an a priori matter of principle, or even simply as an a priori naturalist, but based on my own reading): I think there are literal/historical elements in the texts; I think they can be demonstrated (e.g., by affirmation from extra-biblical sources, archeology, etc.); and their may be an identifiable literary form that a better literary critic than myself would recognize)—but I think they are not predominant. That is one reason that I tend to assume something other than a literal/factual reading to start; the other reason has to do with why I still read these texts—I read them contemplatively (or meditatively), and I apply midrashic/talmudic exegesis in the process.
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NOTE:
There are traditionally four levels in midrashic reading:
1. p’shat: the “plain meaning”, which may or may not be historical/factual—i.e., one could apply p’shat to Tolkein’s Lord of the Rings as well.
2. Remez: the “homiletical” meaning—e.g., my amalekite example; just drawing some lesson from the text itself.
3. D’rash: the “searched out” meaning; this sometimes might be described as using a form of contextualization on hallucinogens—it relies on relating often far-flung texts in the Tanach by a number of means. My “Elisha and the Bears” attempt is really just very simple; and does not leave the local text.
4. Sod: the mystical (sod means hidden or secret) meaning. For some this relates to the mystical theology of kabbalah formally; I take it to be a more broadly contemplative reading, hopefully pointing to the ineffable divine ground (ein sof in Hebrew).
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EDIT: Just in reply to your other two posts, I readily admitted that I only did, for my example, a close reading of those two verses—and I really wasn’t addressing the genocide issue there. I hope I have always acknowledged that you’re a very good scriptural exegete, jaywill, even when we have disagreed. With regard to your recognition of multiple (and not necessarily mutually exclusive, it seems, if I understand you right) alternatives for the “suffering servant”—I wholeheartedly agree, especially with such an approach that recognizes a certain “openness” where a single understanding does not have to be seen as foreclosing all others. I restrict myself to the OT—or, rather, the written and oral torahs (torot is the Hebrew plural); but that does not mean that I cannot appreciate your exegesis that includes the NT.
By now we both know that we will likely remain at impasse on a number of matters (e.g., you left the kind of non-dualism that I came to; I don’t expect that you will return, and I surely accept that your journey has been and is one of honesty and good faith). But we have also had many fruitful exchanges (at least for me); to the extent that I continue to participate here (I really am going to restrict myself for awhile), I suspect that we will in the future.
Be well.
16 Nov 11
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Originally posted by FreakyKBHIf you think this somehow solves the dilemma, then I think you do not understand the actual dilemma.
That's an easily solved dilemma. Very little since the recreation of the Earth has been called 'good' by God. Can you think of anything which could be construed as 'good' in His eyes which, in the normative sense of the word, would be bad?
Here is the actual dilemma for you, in a nutsthell. You made the following implication:
For whatever act A, if God calls A good, then A is good.
This statement is ambiguous, depending on the actual relationship between God's declaring A to be good and A's goodness. There are principally two interpretations for this. But here is the problem: either will be problematic for you, as I will outline below.
The first interpretation of this is that God declares A to be good in virtue of the fact that A is good. But this basically means that there are reasons that make A good, independent of God's declaring A to be good. In other words, it is not the case that God makes or somehow brings it about that A is good. Rather, on this interpretation, A's being good is explanatorily prior to God's declaring that A is good. But, then, you have to live with the upshot: morality is then not dependent on God; and you need to adopt some extra-God ethical treatment that explains the goodness of A.
The second interpretation is that it is in virtue of God's declaring A to be good, that A is good. In other words, God makes or somehow brings it about that A is good. On this interpretation, God's declaring that A is good is explanatorily prior to A's being good. But, then, you have to live with the upshot: morality is then an essentially arbitrary affair. It could not be here that God had good reasons for declaring that A is good; for, then, it would be in virtue of those good reasons that A is good (which contradicts the idea that God's declaring A to be good is explanatorily prior to A's being good). So, then you are simply left with the implication that God had no good reasons for his declaration, and may as well have simply not bothered to make such a declaration in the first place.
So, again, in summary: you made an implication which has two conceivable interpretations; but both interpretations have implications that will be problematic for you. In the first interpretation, morality is not dependent on God. On the second, morality is an arbitrary affair.
16 Nov 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloThe dilemma seems to be one of insistence: if there is a good by which God measures all things, then the good is the standard even above God. If God measures good by His good pleasure, then good is transient... or, at minimum, arbitrary. At your insistence, God cannot win this one!
If you think this somehow solves the dilemma, then I think you do not understand the actual dilemma.
Here is the actual dilemma for you, in a nutsthell. You made the following implication:
For whatever act A, if God calls A good, then A is good.
This statement is ambiguous, depending on the actual relationship between God's declaring A to be g ...[text shortened]... on, morality is not dependent on God. On the second, morality is an arbitrary affair.
But what if the case is that God measures good by something that doesn't change, that is not subject to whim or vacillating will? If, as the theist contends, God is the ultimate in integrity, full guarded on all sides by righteousness and justice, then He qualifies as the unchanging standard whose good pleasure is the measure by which all good is measured.
He looks around to find a straight line but can find none other than Himself; therefore He becomes the ruler.
16 Nov 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
The dilemma seems to be one of insistence: if there is a good by which God measures all things, then the good is the standard even above God. If God measures good by His good pleasure, then good is transient... or, at minimum, arbitrary. At your insistence, God cannot win this one!
But what if the case is that God measures good by something that doesn ...[text shortened]... d to find a straight line but can find none other than Himself; therefore He becomes the ruler.
The dilemma seems to be one of insistence: if there is a good by which God measures all things, then the good is the standard even above God. If God measures good by His good pleasure, then good is transient... or, at minimum, arbitrary. At your insistence, God cannot win this one!
But what if the case is that God measures good by something that doesn't change, that is not subject to whim or vacillating will? If, as the theist contends, God is the ultimate in integrity, full guarded on all sides by righteousness and justice, then He qualifies as the unchanging standard whose good pleasure is the measure by which all good is measured.
He looks around to find a straight line but can find none other than Himself; therefore He becomes the ruler.
That's pretty good. Could you refer me to further reading on that ?
16 Nov 11
Originally posted by jaywillUm, the Bible?
The dilemma seems to be one of insistence: if there is a good by which God measures all things, then the good is the standard even above God. If God measures good by His good pleasure, then good is transient... or, at minimum, arbitrary. At your insistence, God cannot win this one!
But what if the case is that God measures good by somethi ...[text shortened]... he ruler.
That's pretty good. Could you refer me to further reading on that ?
I don't know that I can point to any one source as that was pretty much an amalgamation of general principles, BUT, my all-time extra-biblical book is "The Integrity of God" by R.B. Thieme, Jr. Likely out of print, but if you can't get them to send you a copy, PM me and I'll send you one through the post.
It's the companion book to Christian Suffering and Christian Integrity. I'd rate it as the best, most concise and yet precise book on His character I've read.
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16 Nov 11
Originally posted by jaywillActually it's terrible, it does nothing to answer the basic problem, just rephrases it in pretty language.
The dilemma seems to be one of insistence: if there is a good by which God measures all things, then the good is the standard even above God. If God measures good by His good pleasure, then good is transient... or, at minimum, arbitrary. At your insistence, God cannot win this one!
But what if the case is that God measures good by somethi ...[text shortened]... he ruler.
That's pretty good. Could you refer me to further reading on that ?
As I am sure LJ will point out when he gets back.
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16 Nov 11
Originally posted by jaywillThis theistic rejoinder interprets "arbitrary" as "whim or vacillating will"and says basically God does not act on whim or vacillating will. Fair enough, but what then does God act on when declaring something good? Principles? Principles of which God is, or is not, the author? Which is it? The dilemma remains in either case.
The dilemma seems to be one of insistence: if there is a good by which God measures all things, then the good is the standard even above God. If God measures good by His good pleasure, then good is transient... or, at minimum, arbitrary. At your insistence, God cannot win this one!
But what if the case is that God measures good by somethi ...[text shortened]... he ruler.
That's pretty good. Could you refer me to further reading on that ?
16 Nov 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Um, the Bible?
I don't know that I can point to any one source as that was pretty much an amalgamation of general principles, BUT, my all-time extra-biblical book is "The Integrity of God" by R.B. Thieme, Jr. Likely out of print, but if you can't get them to send you a copy, PM me and I'll send you one through the post.
It's the companion book to Ch ...[text shortened]... I'd rate it as the best, most concise and yet precise book on His character I've read.
Um, the Bible?
lol !
Okay.
I don't know that I can point to any one source as that was pretty much an amalgamation of general principles, BUT, my all-time extra-biblical book is "The Integrity of God" by R.B. Thieme, Jr. Likely out of print, but if you can't get them to send you a copy, PM me and I'll send you one through the post.
It's the companion book to Christian Suffering and Christian Integrity. I'd rate it as the best, most concise and yet precise book on His character I've read.
Thanks. No need to mail it. But thanks.
16 Nov 11
2 edits
Originally posted by JS357
This theistic rejoinder interprets "arbitrary" as "whim or vacillating will"and says basically God does not act on whim or vacillating will. Fair enough, but what then does God act on when declaring something good? Principles? Principles of which God is, or is not, the author? Which is it? The dilemma remains in either case.
This theistic rejoinder interprets "arbitrary" as "whim or vacillating will"and says basically God does not act on whim or vacillating will. Fair enough, but what then does God act on when declaring something good? Principles? Principles of which God is, or is not, the author? Which is it? The dilemma remains in either case.
Its a thoughtful issue. I probably have no comment which you would find illuminating on the philosophical delimma of it.
I think what flows out of God as His very being is goodness. If the moral buck does not stop with God, the ground of all being, where else does it stop ?
But the way the revelation comes to us in Genesis good and evil are presented as something God alone is privy to absolutely know:
"And out of the ground Jehovah God caused to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food, as well as the tree of life in the middle of the garden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil." (Gen. 2:9)
"And Jehovah God said, Behold, the man has become like one of Us, knowing good and evil, and now lest he put forth his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat and live forever - " (3:22)
It almost sounds as if the knowledge of good and evil are something transcending even God.
We know a few places it says that God repented as, say, before the flood of Noah:
"And Jehovah saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.
And Jehovah repented that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him in His heart. ... for I repent that I have made them" (Gen 6:5,6,7b)
It could be that this kind of speaking is not for His sake but for ours.
Sorry, this probably doesn't help you. I felt to contribute something.
I can't see how proposing that no God exists does a whit to solve the problem.
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17 Nov 11
Originally posted by jaywillI find this intriguing as it implies that you can't see how morality can be arrived at without
I can't see how proposing that no God exists does a whit to solve the problem.
some external arbiter of right and wrong, which is particularly interesting as you said you
watched the video I posted which explains exactly how you can do just that.
I would be interested to know why you feel (assuming that is indeed how you do feel) that
morality needs an external arbiter to function or be useful/good?
17 Nov 11
Originally posted by jaywillwe only know the hebrew's side of the story.
[b]The killing of every man, woman, and child of the Amalekites, additional thoughts:
I showed how nasty the Amalekites were to the Hebrews.
Could it be that only combatants were singled out in the slaughtering ?
Some scholars say this could be the case.
you make an intriguing concept, but there are some flaws with it.
first, let's develop the context.
1 sa 15:2 - 3 the hebrew tribal deity is out for vengeance and he orders saul to exterminate the amalekites... to "utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass. "
that seems definite right there already: kill.everything.that.moves.
1 sa 15:4 so saul raises 210 000 troops (WOW!). did i say wow already? i mean wow. this is quiet a feat considering the average army of the area consisted of several thousand warriors, with a few thousand more in auxiliaries. even rome at the height of its power would have had difficulties raising that many troops on a whim to settle some petty tribal dispute.
1 sa 15:5 -- and saul does as ordered, but not quiet. he's a bit greedy and wants to keep the animals. after all, animals = wealth. and the king, probably to ransom him or use him as bait to capture the remnants of the amalekites who slipped through his fingers.
The "city of Amalek" (1 Sam. 15:5) was probably a fortified military eencampment.
no. the politics of the region consisted of 'city-states.' amalek would have been a typical walled city with outlying farmlands. when invaders approach, the farmers take their livestock and flee, either behind the protection of the city walls, or to another, friendly city.
in the case of amalek there seemed to be another tribe holed up in there but they were allowed to go free without harassment.
I showed that they were not totally exterminated though a story makes it sound as if only their king Agaq was the only one left alive. He wasn't the only one left as others lived to relentlessly oppose Israel on another day.
genocide is a tough gig. people get away in the confusion of the slaughter.
Can I believe every man, woman, and child had been literally exterminated by Saul at the instructions of the prophet Samuel ? Can I assume that for 250 years the survivors had no sheep, oxen or other cattle left after they were all utterly destroyed ?
according to what we have written in the bible, they did kill every man, woman and child in the city. or at least they tried. some would inevitably get away and some could have flown from the city before the invaders got there.
The last remaining Amalekite, Agag, must have had a descendent. For Haman the Agagite was there in the book of Esther to carry out his nefarious plots against the Jews.
hehe. "nefarious plots against the jews." hehe. nothing nefarious about the hebrew plot of committing genocide. once again, i point out that you only have the hebrew-biased version of the story.
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17 Nov 11
Originally posted by VoidSpirit
we only know the hebrew's side of the story.
Could it be that only [b]combatantswere singled out in the slaughtering ?
Some scholars say this could be the case.
you make an intriguing concept, but there are some flaws with it.
first, let's develop the context.
1 sa 15:2 - 3 the hebrew tribal deity is out for vengeance ...[text shortened]... once again, i point out that you only have the hebrew-biased version of the story.[/b]This is a very bold statement.... ;-)
17 Nov 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHOkay, your response is that God's good pleasure is the standard by which all good is measured; and, additionally, you hold that this standard is not subject to change. So, in effect you have chosen the second interpretation I outlined above (God's approval of A is explanatorily prior to A's being good), but you think you can get around the charge of arbitrariness by appealing to the fact that God's approval is not subject to change.
The dilemma seems to be one of insistence: if there is a good by which God measures all things, then the good is the standard even above God. If God measures good by His good pleasure, then good is transient... or, at minimum, arbitrary. At your insistence, God cannot win this one!
But what if the case is that God measures good by something that doesn ...[text shortened]... d to find a straight line but can find none other than Himself; therefore He becomes the ruler.
This response of yours does not work. Your error here is in thinking that just because God's approval is not subject to change, it follows that it is not arbitrary. But that is false. Arbitrariness has to do with whether or not there is divorce from reasons. Being not subject to change is neither necessary nor sufficient for being non-arbitrary (it seems not necessary since I would think one's reasons can change and hence so too can one's non-arbitrary judgments; and it is not sufficient since an unchanging judgment can still be divorced from reasons).
You will still have the threat of arbitrariness, regardless if God's good pleasure is unchanging or not. Either (1) God has reasons for unchangingly deeming A good or (2) God has no reasons for unchangingly deeming A good. But (1) is really not available to you, is it? After all, if there are reasons in virtue of which God calls A good, then it would be these reasons that ultimately explain the goodness of A, not the fact that God calls A good. So that leaves you with (2), which translates to arbitrariness. The fact that God's good pleasure is unchanging is neither here nor there.