The Kalam Cosmological Argument

Originally posted by menace71
I'll throw in my 2 cents

We know this universe is actually finite and currently expanding. Finite meaning it had a beginning. Objects we see in all directions are red-shifted moving away from us.
Our universe is not eternal in another words. It had a start. We can argue about how it started but there is no doubt it started.


Manny

It had a start in this part of the universe. There could be other celstial bodies eons away that we will never know ,which are totally unaffected by the big bang
and its subsequent expansion

Originally posted by vistesd
I have also before argued that the universe is not a “thing” (an effect, per se) but the whole collective complex of things, forces and their relationships. The universe is not like a jar containing bugs, such that—once one has explained the collection of bugs and their relationships, one is still left with the jar to explain.

If one of the relationshi ...[text shortened]... ther subject to infinite regress (soluble only by fiat), or it devolves to begging the question.

It basically ends up saying that the principle of cause-and-effect needs a cause—but then, that cause would need a cause, and so on…

This misconstrues premise (1) as a physical principle.

In essence, “God” as a “first cause” is declared by fiat in order to escape infinite regress; I can, as I noted above, simply stop by fiat at the singularity, without the need to invoke one more (unnecessary) step.

Yes, but not without asserting a metaphysical absurdity.

If the universe came into being without a cause, why doesn't anything else come into being without a cause? What's to stop a raging tiger from suddenly appearing in my room? There may be no logical inconsistency in positing that the universe came into being without a cause, but that has no bearing whatsoever on its metaphysical possibility. I find it ridiculous in the extreme that anyone could rationally assert that it is more probable that the universe came into being without a cause than with a cause (yet, here we are).

But, since it is a deductive argument, the simplest counter seems to be that it fails to establish the kind of logical necessity that it proposes...

All that is necessary to establish, in the case of premise (1), is that premise (1) more probable than its denial. Absolute certainty is not necessary in order to rationally accept premise (1).

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]It basically ends up saying that the principle of cause-and-effect needs a cause—but then, that cause would need a cause, and so on…

This misconstrues premise (1) as a physical principle.

In essence, “God” as a “first cause” is declared by fiat in order to escape infinite regress; I can, as I noted above, simply stop by fiat at the sing an its denial. Absolute certainty is not necessary in order to rationally accept premise (1).

[/b]With regard to the current state of scientific cosmology (and its variants), I still think you are making a leap from (1) a particular variant (or variants) of current theory—as if it is settled—to (2) generatio ex nihilo, and then offering creatio ex nihilo by a “pre-existing being to explain that generatio. The “big bounce” theory is, according to a Scientific American article that I read about a year or so ago, also getting consideration these days; so the cosmology is far from settled.

With regard to the “metaphysical absurdity” of premise (1), you keep saying that, but you haven’t shown it. Since cause-and-effect can be taken as an aspect of the universe, and since the universe—or, if you prefer, being (as opposed to “something” called “non-being” ) can be assumed to have always been, in some form, without absurdity—then it is hardly absurd to suggest that the being-itself needs no cause, having never “begun” to exist. If any being needs to have (a) a beginning, and thus [granting the assumption only for argument] (b) a cause—then the same has to be said of the being called god.

It seems that you are mixing the state of scientific knowledge with metaphysics (or other Kalam-ists are)—and that I, in my ranging response, fell into the trap at points. Science not deal with metaphysics (ontology). And if premise (1) is metaphysical, then it necessarily applies to any/all being—not just the manifestation that we recognize. Otherwise it moves into the nomological realm.

I am pretty sure that science does not say that being-itself ever “began to be”—just the particular manifestation that we observe as the universe. And before that singularity, physics does not describe what was… And I do not see creatio ex nihilo by some “magical” being as less problematic that generatio ex nihilo; and I see no reason to accept either one. [I only use the word “magical” there to put a sharp point on bringing in an incommensurability to explain another incommensurability.]

As for your comments about us all becoming theists—and yes, I know you were being tongue-in-cheek—I see no reason for a theist to accept, let alone to rely upon, any version of the cosmological argument…or other so-called “proofs of god”; to draw upon your Plantinga (despite the issues I have with his thought), I think it is better to follow his notion that theistic belief can be shown to be warranted, rather than the stronger claim that it is—logically or nomologically—necessary (or metaphysically necessary, whatever that means).

In an effort at better clarity (since I don’t think I’ve been clear enough), let’s stick with metaphysics for the moment, before mixing in physics.

First, I want to note that the phrase “metaphysically absurd” means to me just a metaphysical proposition that is logically absurd. So, it would have to be shown that [re premise (1)] rejection of the principle of sufficient reason leads to a logical contradiction/incoherency. It is not enough to make it as a “common sense” assertion—even if I accept that “common sense”.

Second, metaphysical language deals with being, not just this or that form of being—e.g., the physical universe as it is. Therefore, for premise (1) to be a metaphysical proposition (as opposed to just a "physical", that is, nomological proposition), it must refer to being per se.

This is not to say that such metaphysics must be non-dualistic (though I am a metaphysical non-dualist): there might be, for example, contingent being on the one hand, and non-contingent (“necessary” ) being on the other. The latter is asserted by conventional Christianity (and other dualistic theisms) to be “God”. Being that can be said to have begun to exist can only be contingent being—if the principle of sufficient reason is held. I think we agree that the idea of generatio ex nihilo of contingent being is absurd, since an actual nihil would be absent any conditions at all (e.g., information, energy) that might give rise to anything at all.

However, there is nothing absurd about the proposition that being per se is completely non-contingent (though its forms/expressions/manifestations are contingent). This entails the rejection of any “such thing” as non-being; and can be coupled with the proposition that such non-being is in fact unimaginable to the human consciousness (such that people generally end up imagining it as something like dark, empty space of infinite extension). Nevertheless, I take such a proposition as axiomatic; and I do not pretend that I can show that this axiom is logically necessary. (Which is why I cannot argue that metaphysical non-dualism is logically necessary.)

This assumption of the non-contingency of being-itself, however, does satisfy Okham’s Razor. It does not require the additional distinction of contingent and non-contingent being, or that dualist-theist postulate of a prior non-contingent being separate from the universe of contingent being, and serving as an external causal agent of that universe of contingent being. Nor does it require the troublesome notion of actual “non-being”, or why the putative non-contingent being (god) escapes the principle of sufficient reason—that is, exactly how is that being, in contra-distinction to all other being, non-contingent; and how is it that being-itself cannot simply be non-contigent (and beginningless). [Again, that is not to say that any forms/expressions/manifestations of being-itself are not contingent, only that the causal agency of such contingent existents is contained within non-contingent being-itself.]

In sum, premise (1) only becomes relevant in conjunction with the prior assumption that some actual being is contingent. (Whether one calls this complex or body of contingent being “the universe” or something else.) That is, premise (1) actually depends on premise (2), which only states (here in “physical language” ) that there is contingent being-itself (“the universe” ) which therefore stands in need of a cause. That is where the (metaphysical) argument devolves into a question-begging tautology: (a) there is contingent being; (b) contingent being—by definition—needs a cause; therefore, (c) there is a cause; and (d) that cause is necessarily [a] non-contingent being. In other words, (c) is really contained in (a) by definition .

Further, the versions proffered by conventional dualistic theism also require that such non-contingent being-itself somehow create all contingent being-itself ex nihilo!? A “magical” power of creatio ex nihilo that is hardly more comprehensible than the “magic” of generatio ex nihilo. The non-dualist (perhaps panentheistic) view that all contigent forms-of-being are generated in and from and of non-contingent being-itself—and that only the forms are contingent—is metaphysically much cleaner, even if the “how” equally remains inaccessible to our intellect.

_____________________________________________

So much for the metaphysics. I have yet to be convinced that the physics requires either an actual pre-universe actual nihil, or ontological dualism. Some theories might. But absent final refutation of valid possible counter-theories, I would be very—very!—careful about making my metaphysics dependent on a particular variant of physics. After all, that is precisely how all the “god of the gap” problems come about… Remember that one of the requirements of a logical truth is that it be true “in all possible worlds” (real or imagined); and a “metaphysical truth” that is not a logical truth would itself be simply—contingent.

Originally posted by vistesd
With regard to the current state of scientific cosmology (and its variants), I still think you are making a leap from (1) a particular variant (or variants) of current theory—as if it is settled—to (2) generatio ex nihilo, and then offering creatio ex nihilo by a “pre-existing being to explain that generatio. The “big bounce” theor ...[text shortened]... t it is—logically or nomologically—necessary (or metaphysically necessary, whatever that means).[/b]

The “big bounce” theory is, according to a Scientific American article that I read about a year or so ago, also getting consideration these days; so the cosmology is far from settled.

Not true.

Alternative theories propounded by scientists result directly from the attempt at falsifying the prevailing Big Bang Model, they are not competing theories having equal theoretical and evidential support. Further, each alternative theory has failed in some fashion to overthrow the Big Bang Model, and with each successive failure the Big Bang Model has been corroborated (now through almost a century of attempted falsification). The Big Bang Model is so clearly the orthodox view that Alexander Vilenkin has said, "the proof now in place, cosmologists can no longer hide behind the possibility of a past-eternal universe. There is no escape, they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning" (Vilenkin, Many Worlds In One, 176). Far from the state of cosmology being in constant flux, it is quite settled.

BTW, if you'd like we can discuss the merits of the Oscillating Model.

With regard to the “metaphysical absurdity” of premise (1), you keep saying that, but you haven’t shown it.

What is metaphysically absurd is asserting that something can begin to exist without a cause. Again, if a whole universe can pop into existence uncaused, why not a rabid baboon in the corner of your room? What reason is there to think only universes can come into being uncaused and nothing else? Inversely, what good reason is there to think that the principle of cause-effect cannot be extrapolated to include the universe itself? Premise (1), again, is more probable than its denial; therefore, it is reasonable to accept premise (1) rather than its denial. Until you provide a legitimate defeater for premise (1) it will be rational to accept it (i.e., absolute certainty isn't necessary).

Since cause-and-effect can be taken as an aspect of the universe, and since the universe—or, if you prefer, being (as opposed to “something” called “non-being” ) can be assumed to have always been, in some form, without absurdity—then it is hardly absurd to suggest that the being-itself needs no cause, having never “begun” to exist.

The problem is, of course, that the Big Bang Model does in fact predict that universe 'began' to exist (unless you are positing a past-eternal universe here).

If any being needs to have (a) a beginning, and thus [granting the assumption only for argument] (b) a cause—then the same has to be said of the being called god.

For the record, I am not arguing that every being has a beginning.

Rather, whatever begins to exist has a cause. The universe had a beginning, so it has a cause. Since God has no beginning, God does not require a cause.

I am pretty sure that science does not say that being-itself ever “began to be”—just the particular manifestation that we observe as the universe.

In fact, it does. Everything points to a cosmic beginning. Unless you wish to posit a past-eternal universe, you must accept a beginning to space-time. Unfortunately, the implications of a past-eternal universe (wherein the universe "always was" and never "began to be" ) don't jive with what we know about our universe.

And I do not see creatio ex nihilo by some “magical” being as less problematic that generatio ex nihilo

What is "magical" is something coming into being uncaused. Whereas positing God as the cause of the universe is at least intelligible. It is not reasonable to reject premise (1) simply in order to avoid its theistic implications.

As for your comments about us all becoming theists—and yes, I know you were being tongue-in-cheek—I see no reason for a theist to accept, let alone to rely upon, any version of the cosmological argument…or other so-called “proofs of god”

I agree to a certain extent. IMO, none of these arguments are necessary for Christianity, in particular, to have warrant. But even though arguments for God's existence can't prove anything, they do serve to show how the proposition, "God exists," is more reasonable than its negation. And perhaps making it intellectually permissible for some people to believe in God, on the occasion their hearts are stirred by the Holy Spirit to believe, who otherwise would not.

Originally posted by karoly aczel
It had a start in this part of the universe. There could be other celstial bodies eons away that we will never know ,which are totally unaffected by the big bang
and its subsequent expansion

The problem is that everything we see and know started with this universe. Time/space/Matter/Energy

I think we should start with what we can see and observe and know. Anything beyond is mere speculation. Of course the theist/creationist does not have to wrestle with anything beyond what we know happened and can say God did it.


Manny

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]The “big bounce” theory is, according to a Scientific American article that I read about a year or so ago, also getting consideration these days; so the cosmology is far from settled.

Not true.

Alternative theories propounded by scientists result directly from the attempt at falsifying the prevailing Big Bang Model, they are not compe heir hearts are stirred by the Holy Spirit to believe, who otherwise would not.[/b]

Like old times, eh Epi!! 🙂 By the way, I meant to say earlier that I know quite well that these arguments are for you done in the spirit of inquiry, and not dogmatism. I sometimes get so caught up in the arguments themselves that it might seem as if I fail to realize that. (And I’m a bit rusty since I take part here so little these days.)

I’ll keep this brief as we lost power and phone (w/ internet connection) last night in storms. I’m out briefly where I can connect.

I still think we’re mixing metaphysics and physics rather glibly (see my post after the one you responded to). I am likely not as up on the current physics as you are, however I think you put too much “faith” in the notion of scientific “orthodoxy”—recent discussions in the Science thread can be found here:

http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=101961&page=1

The reference to the Scientific American article is here: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=big-bang-or-big-bounce

Here are two more references:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1007.1750

http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/astronomy/bigbang.html

I am not qualified to debate the merits of various theories of physics; but clearly the interpretations are less settled than you imply. Your comment about not saying that all being stands in need of a cause goes to my discussion of contingent being versus non-contingent being. I think that we likely also have some differences of definition, viz:

I understand “universe” to mean “all that is”, the “whole of being”. (I can adjust the language for manifold-universes theory quite easily.) You seem to take “universe” to mean “all contingent being”; non-contingent being is “god”. Once again we are at the dualist/non-dualist divide. I do not dismiss physics certainly, but I am less willing than you seem to be to play the “god of the gaps” game—in my case, a “non-dualism of the gaps”. I think my post restricting itself to metaphysical (philosophical) language shows that, logically, the Kalam argument devolves into a tautology—since contingent being by definition would be caused being.

EDIT:

Unless you wish to posit a past-eternal universe, you must accept a beginning to space-time.

Space-time is not a necessary manifestation of being-itself; it is a contingent manifestation. That is not to say that there is such a thing as contingent being-itself—as opposed to either nihil or non-contingent being-itself. This is where the language of physics and that of metaphysics get all mixed and muddied. Physics does not make a claim about contingent versus non-contingent being-itself; it does make claims about how being-as-such (if it makes any sense to talk that way; I’m not sure it does) is manifest, but studies the manifestation (including process).

In gestaltic terms: physics studies the figures/forms/manifestations as they are related against the ground. Physics has to acknowledge the reality of ground, but the ground is always implicate, never explicate. Figure and ground are logically nonseparable. The notion of the whole gestalt being contingent begs the question: contingent vis-à-vis what? (See below; this is just another angle on the question, and I know that I have a tendency to provide too many angles&hellip😉

What is "magical" is something coming into being uncaused.

No, what is “magical” is any generatio ex nihilo; to think that is somehow “solved” by positing a non-contingent being as cause shows that you are not grasping the radicality of the idea of nihil as absolute non-being (think: even the concept of “emptiness” requires the concept of “space”—the nihil is not just emptiness-of-infinite-extension).

Similarly, one cannot talk sensibly of "cause" without assuming time already. So the notion of a pre-time causal agent is technically senseless.

To start with nihil is to start with what I suggest cannot be conceptualized at all by the human intellect, and to pretend otherwise is self-deception. I am entertaining the notion—emphasis on “entertaining”, as opposed to (yet) asserting—that to speak of metaphysical nihil is itself an absurdity.

A final word: in all this, I seem to have forgotten both my Wittgenstein and my twhitehead—

If “contingent being”—the natural universe—includes time/space, as you say (and I agree), then to speak of a “cause” of that contingent universe (and a “cause” of space/time) is strictly senseless. The concept “cause”, as I noted above, entails the concept of time.

Therefore the whole notion of a “first cause” of the time/space universe is one of those “bewitchments by language” that Wittgenstein talked about: it gives us the impression that we are speaking sensibly, when—upon analysis—we find that we are not. Before the contingent universe of time/space—well, there it is: cannot speak of “before” or “prior” or “past” or “beyond” or . . . . It is, technically, senseless speech, period. One cannot even use terms like “it happened”, let alone “generated” or “created”—in any tense! Wittgenstein recognized how seductive metaphysics can be in that regard; I forgot . . . .

To paraphrase Wittgenstein a bit (albeit the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus): Whereof one cannot sensibly speak, thereof one ought to remain silent.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Regardless, premise (1) is more probable than its denial. Unless you can provide a defeater from premise (1) which makes it less likely than its denial, it is perfectly rational to accept it.

“...Regardless, premise (1) is more probable than its denial. ...”

why is that? I have just explained why we cannot rationally assume that (1) is more probable to be true than false.
Where is the error in my argument?
And what is your explanation/counterargument for rationally assuming that (1) is more probable to be true than false?

“...Unless you can provide a defeater from premise (1) which makes it less likely than its denial, . ...”

my “defeater” would be may argument that I have already given and which concludes that you cannot rationally assume (1) to be probable. My analogy that I gave should help make you see why.

Originally posted by vistesd
Like old times, eh Epi!! 🙂 By the way, I meant to say earlier that I know quite well that these arguments are for you done in the spirit of inquiry, and not dogmatism. I sometimes get so caught up in the arguments themselves that it might seem as if I fail to realize that. (And I’m a bit rusty since I take part here so little these days.)

I’ll keep t ...[text shortened]... pposed to (yet) asserting—that to speak of metaphysical nihil is itself an absurdity.

No, what is “magical” is any generatio ex nihilo; to think that is somehow “solved” by positing a non-contingent being as cause shows that you are not grasping the radicality of the idea of nihil as absolute non-being...

But, how do we define non-being? Aren't we limited in that respect? By that I mean, we can only conceptualize non-being as the lack of everything we understand our universe to be—i.e., a space-time continuum. It could very well be that an immaterial being exists. Thus, it is not necessarily unintelligible to posit a non-contingent being based on our limited concept of non-being.

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
“...Regardless, premise (1) is more probable than its denial. ...”

why is that? I have just explained why we cannot rationally assume that (1) is more probable to be true than false.
Where is the error in my argument?
And what is your explanation/counterargument for rationally assuming that (1) is more probable to be true than false?

“...Unle ...[text shortened]... i]rationally[/i] assume (1) to be probable. My analogy that I gave should help make you see why.

But even in your analogy it is more probable that any given animal had a male parent, and so more rational to assume that any given animal had a male parent. For the argument to be sound, absolute certainty is not required. It is perpetually confirmed in our experience that whatever begins to exist has a cause, and regardless of the remote possibility of something being an exception to the rule it is rational to think the universe, if it had a beginning, had a cause as well.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
But even in your analogy it is more probable that any given animal had a male parent, and so more rational to assume that any given animal had a male parent. For the argument to be sound, absolute certainty is not required. It is perpetually confirmed in our experience that whatever begins to exist has a cause, and regardless of the remote possibility ...[text shortened]... on to the rule it is rational to think the universe, if it had a beginning, had a cause as well.

“...But even in your analogy it is more probable that ANY GIVEN animal had a male parent, and so more rational to assume that ANY GIVEN animal had a male parent. ...” (my emphases)

in either case above, is “ANY GIVEN animal” only “ANY GIVEN animal” contained entirely WITHIN the classes of animals within the observed sample group having that characteristic?
If yes, then that tells us nothing reliable about the probability of a class of animal existing outside this sample group having no males (if you claim otherwise, then just TRY and mathematically show how, using an arbitrary hypothetical example, exactly what that probability is in percentage terms taking full account of classes of animals outside that sample group and then I think you would see what the problem is)
If no, then somehow you have jump from “ANY GIVEN animal” within the sample group has males to “ANY GIVEN animal” INCLUDING those classes of animals outside the sample group has males and I would like to know how you made this jump.

“...For the argument to be sound, absolute certainty is not required. ….”

I was talking about probability and not “absolute certainty”. “absolute certainty” is not a requirement for my argument to be sound and I would like to know why you think it is.

“....It is perpetually confirmed in our experience that whatever begins to exist has a cause,...”

this is simply false; haven't you heard of random quantum events? A random quantum event my do X or Y and yet to “cause” has ever been “confirmed in our experience” for determining whether it did, X or Y (don't get me wrong, I am NOT saying that apparently “random quantum events” have no cause. I am merely pointing out that any assumption that they have a cause or even merely “probably” have a cause would, with our currently knowledge, be impossible to logically justify. Perhaps one day that will change with new scientific discoveries)

“...and regardless of the REMOTE possibility of something being an exception to the rule ...” (my emphasis)

how do you mathematically work out that something can, in this case, be a “ REMOTE possibility” of being an exception to the 'rule' that everything has a cause when, for certain classes of events (such as quantum events) we cannot currently apparently observe such causes even if they exist?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
If the universe came into being without a cause, why doesn't anything else come into being without a cause?

I admit I haven't read the whole thread, but I really don't think you have in any way justified your claim that everything needs a cause and that that is backed up by observation.
As far as I am aware, the vast majority of events in the universe are not known to have a cause. They appear to be random. Whether they are truly random or whether they have a cause is unknown at this time, but it is certain that they are not known to have a cause.

What's to stop a raging tiger from suddenly appearing in my room?
The laws of physics, that's what. There are rules about what is or is not allowed to spontaneously appear, and raging tigers, though possible, are highly improbable.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]No, what is “magical” is any generatio ex nihilo; to think that is somehow “solved” by positing a non-contingent being as cause shows that you are not grasping the radicality of the idea of nihil as absolute non-being...

But, how do we define non-being? Aren't we limited in that respect? By that I mean, we can only conceptualize non-being as ...[text shortened]... arily unintelligible to posit a non-contingent being based on our limited concept of non-being.[/b]

And where the "grammar of our consciousness" stops, we should—stop. At least with regard to propositional truth claims—and even, I think, with speculation that takes that form. The speculation becomes doctrine, the doctrine can become dogma—and people are told that they must believe (in the conventional sense of that word) what they cannot intellectually accept, and what is often contradictory.

And “immaterial being” is not the same as “nothing”—that is Moore’s critique: we end up thinking of “nothing” as a “queer kind of ‘something’”, and think that we have avoided a categorical contradiction—or worse, that the contradiction can just be ignored. To posit a non-contingent being may not itself be unitelligible; to think that you have thereby removed the problem of ex nihilo is as erroneous as saying that one has "solved the problem" of squaring a circle by positing a being who can "magically" (or "supernaturally", if you prefer) do it.

It is analogous to Goedel’s theorem: any sufficiently complex system of thought will be either incomplete or inconsistent. So many Christians (for purposes of this context; certainly they are neither alone, nor better or worse, than others-, including non-theist philosophers) seem to want to prove their case so zealously, that they reject incompleteness at the cost of running into the quagmire of inconsistency. And then we have these arguments (which, as you well know, I too have enjoyed over the years). You know that I said a long time ago in one of our discussions that I think that a (logically) consistent Christian theology is possible—but the consistency comes with the price-tag of accepting incompleteness in the face of the mystery (which I define as just that syntax of reality that lies outside the grammar of our consciousness—and that is itself a changing thing, I think).

And this is where I failed in this discussion: Wittgenstein is right. Whereof one cannot speak (without inconsistency), thereof one must remain silent. Wittgenstein said that we need to stop at the boundary of what we can actually describe—and I think he had a point (though I might not draw the boundary so sharply). I now refuse to speculate about the possibility and nature of “non-being”; I refuse to speculate about what it “might mean” (if it can mean anything, which I doubt) for the universe-itself to be an effect in need of some cause; etc., etc. Where the grammar of our consciousness ends, I accept the (analogy to) “incompleteness”.

That is where poetry, and the kind of elicitive language that bbarr and ConrauK have also talked about, properly comes into play—and should not be treated, as it so often seems to be in written scriptures, as if it were propositional language. “Faith”, unfortunately, has come to mean acceptance of the proper propositions—while there are all these intra-mural debates about who is, or is not, a “True Christian™” (or a “True Vedantist™”, or a “True Kabbalist™”, or a . . .).

I did, however, enjoy the argument with you. Like I said, it was like “old times”, and you do force me to examine and try to up-level my own thinking. Be well.


EDIT: Do I need to add that strict non-dualists and panentheists do not have these issues? They may have others, and should also be aware of the incompleteness/inconsistency trade-off. That is partly why I have never said that I can "prove" metaphysical non-dualism; I don't think that recognition puts me in a weaker position than dualists who keep trying to "prove" dualistic theism. I happen to think that non-dualism is a position with greater warrant; metaphysically, it entails nothing more than positing an ultimate Gestalt in which and of which we are...

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Not true.

Alternative theories propounded by scientists result directly from the attempt at falsifying the prevailing Big Bang Model, they are not competing theories having equal theoretical and evidential support. Further, each alternative theory has failed in some fashion to overthrow the Big Bang Model, and with each successive failure the ...[text shortened]... i], 176). Far from the state of cosmology being in constant flux, it is quite settled.

Not true.

The Big Bang Model only deals with the universe after a possible singularity. It does not say anything about the singularity, and the singularity itself is little more than a statement of lack of knowledge. All hypothesis about the singularity and whether or not it was the beginning of time, are just that, hypothesis. They do not compete with the Big Bang Model because the Big Bang Model does not cover that stage of the universes development, or if it is taken as doing so, all the hypothesis are part of the Big Bang Model and are competing hypothesis trying to explain a particular part of the Model.
Most importantly though there is no real evidence to date for any of the various hypothesis.