The NT Application of the Canaanite Conquest

LemonJello,

How would that address the incoherence of the view you put forth before? If God acts in time, say simultaneously with the big bang, then it is not the case that God's existence is outside time, right? So, if you commit to this simultaneous creation event, you are thereby disavailed of holding that God somehow transcends time, right?

No, I do not agree with your "Right?" I think you're wrong.

Believing at the moment of creation of time and space an time transcendent God touched or, if you will, entered that realm simultaneously I don't see negates His eternal being.

You have reinforced that you do not believe the universe is eternal.
Let me ask you then if you believe the beginning of the universe can be found out by science alone?

If, for instance, you agree with Carl Sagan "The Cosmos is all that is [edited] or ever was or ever will be" do you think science has a method to discover how the universe began ?

Robert Jastrow said astronomers have proved with their own methods that the universe began by forces that we could never hope to discover and which were for all intents and purposes "supernatural." The gist of atheistic naturalism is that the space-time universe - which can be studied by physical sciences, is all the reality there is.

I don't think there is a way natural sciences can discover by scientific methods how purely natural forces came into existence in the first place. I have heard your objection. What is your alternative answer for a non-eternal universe coming into existence?

Again, let me be clear on what my objection is. You basically claimed before that God is somehow outside time and yet acts in time through creative events (I think you are also committed to the idea that He subsequently interacts with His creation too, but correct me if I am wrong). That is what I am claiming is incoherent. Either God is outside of time; or it is not the case that God it outside time. You cannot have it both ways.

So the question is - If time therefore began to exist, how is God's relation to the beginning of time to be construed?


Leibniz’s preferred relational view of time, there are no instants of time in the absence of changing things. He disagreed with Newton in a beginningless duration of time in which nothing existed except God. I think I have to go with the view that given God’s immutability, time begins at creation and God’s eternal existence is to be thought of in terms of timelessness. That means to me He transcends time.

You think that puts a straight jacket on God so that He cannot begin time and space with creation. I don't see it that way.
Leibniz's challenge "Why, if He has endured through an infinite time prior to creation, did not God create the world sooner?" This was the philosopher's way of objecting to Newton's idea of God having only endless time within which to act and before He did, nothing existed in beginningless time. Newton was a theist but I think your objection is similar to his philosophy about God having no other way to bring about the universe without being a being wholly captive IN time, albeit a beginningless time with no changing physical objects, actually no physical objects of any sort.

You have not proposed an eternal universe. But you have not given the cause for its beginning either.
If you want beginningless TIME in which the universe popped into existence, if there was nothing else, I'd like to know why one moment and not another was that TIME in which the universe popped into existence.


The astrophysical evidence today points to the origination of the material universe at a point in the finite past before which it did not exist. Stephen Hawking agreed that time had been demonstrated to have had a beginning - "Today almost everyone believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the big bang."

I don't believe God came into existence in the same moment as the universe because that would defy the definition of God.
"God HAS to be subject to time entirely" I don't believe. So God began time, Himself being eternal and transcendent to His creation, is what I believe.

I am unwilling to believe that the universe came into being uncaused out of nothing. I elect then for a supernatural cause. Sir Arthur Eddington agrees, - "The beginning seems to present insuperable difficulties unless we agree to look on it as frankly supernatural." I also don't feel to go against the current scientific findings that time had a beginning along with space, matter and energy.

What is logically untenable to me is that God would choose one moment in time rather than another to create the universe of time and space. Though I admit this presents some difficult paradoxes. I don't think they are insurmountable.

An eternal God could -

1.) refrain from creating time and space.
2.) create from an infinite past unverseless time.

Choice #1 is negated by the existence of the universe.
Choice #2 is negated by consensus of scientific evidence that time and space had a beginning.

Or one could argue -

God somehow came into existence the moment the universe also came into existence.

This choice goes against what we should understand by God. Forcing the conclusion of #3 seems question begging in favor of eleminating the possibility of the existence of a Supreme Being. It is suspiciously too friendly to an atheist viewpoint. Then again I suppose one could argue that my view is too theism friendly as well. But I think it involves less "faith" than to muster up belief in an uncaused time and space universe.

I have to go with the finitute of the past, the beginning of time, and some anthropomorphic belief about a Beginner.
I haven't seen your alternative. I see your aversion to the thought of God. I see you agreeing with the universe not being eternal yet objecting that its beginner or cause HAS itself to be imprisoned within it.

Your bafflement is noted and not really criticized. I am baffled somewhat too. I am not baffled to the point of Atheism.
We have a supernatural miracle before us in the beginning of the universe caused by a transcendent Agent.

I'm not finished but will stop here for this morning.

Originally posted by LemonJello
If you're claiming that there is no a priori reason to think modus ponens holds everywhere, then I would disagree. It seems like there is such reason, since it is a demonstrably truth-preserving schema. Further, if your claim reduces to the assertion that there are counterfactual circumstances under which something like the inference repre ...[text shortened]... trably false, for a similar reason. A combined truth table for A, A->B, and B should show this.

Vann McGee (1985) presented an interesting argument aiming to show that MP inferences may not be necessarily truth-preserving. Consider the 1980 US Presidential election. Reagan was running way out in front of Carter with Anderson a distant third.

1) If a Republican will win, then if Reagan does not win, Anderson will win.

2) A Republican will win.

3) Therefore, if Reagan does not win, Anderson will win.

But, of course, we have very good reason to believe that even if (1) and (2) are true, (3) is false. The polls clearly indicate that if Reagan does not win, Carter will win. MP gets tricky with counterfactuals and embedded conditionals.

Originally posted by LemonJello

Why is logic different from them?

I would say because logical possibility is a boundary on coherent thought, whereas nomological possibility is not. This is partly what I meant before when I said that logical possibility is broader. I think they also require different treatment in modal logic. For logical possibility, S5 seems very natural. However, it may not be appropriate for physical possibility.

Give me a bit of time to read up on S3, S4, and S5 - I skimmed the Wikipedia page before reading the threads about omniscience and free will, so I know what you are talking about, but need to read it all carefully and follow the other links and so on to hope to make an intelligent response.

Please realise that this isn't a strong point, I'm just asking why not.

Originally posted by sonship
Space and time ( no pun intended) will allow me to address probably only a portion of your post.

[quote] All acts are subject to such characteristics. Like I said: acts are events, and events are subject to temporal relations. Again, my objection is that your view is incoherent because it entails a contradiction. Your view amounts to claiming that God is ...[text shortened]... od created the heavens and the earth."

I need time to digest your comments below these.[/b]

When we speak of time, space, matter, energy coming into existence from nothing prior, I think we have to go with a personal / volitional cause of Someone, shall I say "bigger than you and I." The explanation can only be explained in terms of an agent and volition, not to mention tremendous even unlimited power, knowledge, ability and wisdom.

I do not have a problem if you want to provide account in terms of "personal explanation". Please go ahead. But we will have a problem if that account seems incoherent. Let's revisit the example of "personal explanation" that you provided – that of explaining why there is a pot on the stovetop. The explanation is basically that your wife formed the intent to put the pot on the stovetop to satisfy a desire for tea; and then she acted on that; and a pot on the stovetop resulted. Please note how this is all subject to temporal relations. As an agent, your wife existed prior to the pot's being on the stovetop, and she acted in time to bring that about. Like I have already said, acts are events, and they occur in time. This all seems reasonable.

You make it sound like such an example should transfer naturally to your account of God's bringing "time, space, matter, energy into existence from nothing prior". But you failed to clarify some major, glaring differences. On your account above, God (or anything else for that matter) does not even exist prior to this event that you are claiming He is responsible for bringing about through His own volition. Don't you think that's a big difference that requires some addressing? It's not coherent as far as I can tell. Perhaps you can persuade me otherwise with more clarification.

You already tried once to clarify this, claiming that God's existence is timeless and eternal and somehow forms a boundary on time while still being causally connected. I do not find this coherent, either, since it amounts to your claiming both that God's existence is outside time and yet that He is causally active within time. I do not think you can have it both ways.

So I hold that a finite time ago a Creator endowed with free will is the eternal Cause of the temporal effect of the universe. His choosing to do so was an eternal choosing rather than a change of mind within the time which He had not yet created. By exercising His causal powers God created time, space, matter and energy - the whole universe with a beginning. The cause is eternal but the effect is not.

An "eternal choosing"? Again, I do not find your account coherent. The volitional process you ascribe to God is a process which includes forming an intention to bring something about, and that is a process whereby the agent undergoes change. If God were eternal and timeless, He would also be changeless and therefore impotent as any sort of causal agent in this sense.

Originally posted by sonship
Space and time ( no pun intended) will allow me to address probably only a portion of your post.

[quote] All acts are subject to such characteristics. Like I said: acts are events, and events are subject to temporal relations. Again, my objection is that your view is incoherent because it entails a contradiction. Your view amounts to claiming that God is ...[text shortened]... od created the heavens and the earth."

I need time to digest your comments below these.[/b]

To adopt your objection I have to believe, perhaps a transcendent all powerful God exists but it would be impossible for this God to create time and space. Or I would have to believe no such Creator exists and the physical universe is an actual infinite series of events. Or I would have to believe that the universe came into existence by nothing. Or possibly I would have to believe that some timeless abstract entity that perform no actions brought about the universe.

Actually, you don’t "have to believe" anything on this. I realize that withholding judgment and saying "I do not know" is unsatisfactory in some sense, but sometimes that is all the evidence warrants. Frankly, I do not profess to know the answers to a lot of these questions.

I will try to respond to the rest of your points when I have more time.

Originally posted by bbarr
Vann McGee (1985) presented an interesting argument aiming to show that MP inferences may not be necessarily truth-preserving. Consider the 1980 US Presidential election. Reagan was running way out in front of Carter with Anderson a distant third.

1) If a Republican will win, then if Reagan does not win, Anderson will win.

2) A Republican will win.
...[text shortened]... n does not win, Carter will win. MP gets tricky with counterfactuals and embedded conditionals.

Thanks for this. I will try to get a copy of the paper.

At first glance, it is not clear to me if this is supposed to be a counterexample to the idea that MP is truth-preserving or if it is supposed to be a counterexample to the idea that MP is ground-for-belief-preserving. In other words, is this supposed to be a case where (1) & (2) are both true and (3) is false; or is this supposed to be a case where we have reason to believe (1) & (2) but not (3). Do you know which was McGee's intention?

Also, do you know what account of conditional interpretation McGee uses in the paper? If the conditionals are interpreted materially, for example, this is not a counterexample to the idea that MP is truth-preserving, since (3) is true on that interpretation.

Anyway, thanks. I will try to get a copy. I do agree that things can get weird with nested conditionals. Also, it can seem difficult how to give proper account of conditional interpretation. For example, this instance of modus tollens seems problematic if the conditionals are interpreted materially (I think this example is from Michael Jubien):

(a) If God does not exist, then it is not the case that if I am evil, I will be punished after I die.
(b) I am not evil.
(c) Therefore, God exists.

– that of explaining why there is a pot on the stovetop. The explanation is basically that your wife formed the intent to put the pot on the stovetop to satisfy a desire for tea; and then she acted on that; and a pot on the stovetop resulted. Please note how this is all subject to temporal relations. As an agent, your wife existed prior to the pot's being on the stovetop, and she acted in time to bring that about. Like I have already said, acts are events, and they occur in time. This all seems reasonable.

There must be "acts" that do not conform to your criteria.
There must be an agent who is causally prior to the time and space, matter and energy if not temporally prior.

If that agent is not volitional WHY with nothing else in existence, did the world pop into existence?
Something has to give in our logical structure of explanations.
I believe what has to give is our set limitation what a human will and mind can do.
The cumulative case for how the universe works, evidences to me a "Person" - mind and volition, on a higher level indeed.

You make it sound like such an example should transfer naturally to your account of God's bringing "time, space, matter, energy into existence from nothing prior". But you failed to clarify some major, glaring differences. On your account above, God (or anything else for that matter) does not even exist prior to this event that you are claiming He is responsible for bringing about through His own volition. Don't you think that's a big difference that requires some addressing? It's not coherent as far as I can tell. Perhaps you can persuade me otherwise with more clarification.

The objection is something like the request - "Define God. Give three examples."

The analogy, like many to facilitate communication is, less than perfect. It is still helpful in spite of "glaring differences" I think.
No, the lady deciding to have a cup of tea is not exactly like the creation of the universe. The transfer analogy is helpful to show that one "volitional" explanation is more appropriate than an explanation requiring elements of the universe to exist.

If the universe is not and then is, it is no easier explanation that it existed before it existed and something in it caused it to exist.
God causally "prior" to its existence is the better explanation.

If that causes us some concern because we as humans cannot do that, I think we have to live with that.
I don't think it diminishes our dignity, self worth or significance.
If it calls for something of awe in us or even a sense of worship, I don't see why that cannot be an appropriate response.

How about we just let God be God?
You see, LJ, with me a red flashing DANGER, DANGER light doesn't go off in me when I think of a Creator God whose life and ability is beyond my human limitations.

"How did God do it?" I don't really know. My analogies are imperfect too.
I don't fully understand my own human life. I don't think you fully understand yours.
I, for sure, don't fully understand an Uncreated and Eternal maximal Life.

You already tried once to clarify this, claiming that God's existence is timeless and eternal and somehow forms a boundary on time while still being causally connected. I do not find this coherent, either, since it amounts to your claiming both that God's existence is outside time and yet that He is causally active within time.

Transcendence and Immanence has been a claim of theists for a long time.
A pantheist [edited] would only support Immanence.

I'll be looking for your long awaited alternative explanation.

I do not think you can have it both ways.

Another imperfect analogy was given as to how the play writer could also enter into his or her own play.
Shakespeare could have it both ways - to be transcendent to his Hamlet and involved in it too.

An "eternal choosing"? Again, I do not find your account coherent. The volitional process you ascribe to God is a process which includes forming an intention to bring something about, and that is a process whereby the agent undergoes change. If God were eternal and timeless, He would also be changeless and therefore impotent as any sort of causal agent in this sense.

The cumulative case for God being the Creator of the universe is, I believed confirmed by one huge elephant under the carpet of human history - Christ. The cumulative case of Christ in history arguably shows a Man who chose to be born where he wanted to - Bethlehem, in fulfillment of prophecy about His incarnation. And He predicted His death and resurrection. And He apparently orchestrated His own timing of death to perfectly coincide with prophecy and certain centuries old sacred rituals.

If He can do that I think I can expect that He can, without time, bring about time. Don't press me too much on how that is done.
But objections to it being done by God, I don't think are insurmountable.

This Life is related to time in such a way that it is believable to me that before Time God could causally create time.
Additional evidence of Christ's transcendence and involvement with time makes me think I am on the right track .

Actually, you don’t "have to believe" anything on this.

A life long apathetic agnosticism just didn't happen to me. Maybe it will happen to someone else.

I realize that withholding judgment and saying "I do not know" is unsatisfactory in some sense, but sometimes that is all the evidence warrants. Frankly, I do not profess to know the answers to a lot of these questions.

I think that's honest of you.

I really don't KNOW how without time God called into being time and space and all the universe.
But I did not know how my earthly father did some of the things he did. I trusted him when he told me they were done.
I trust my heavenly Father - "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Millennia of minds as smart as yours have heard this. Some believed. Some did not believe. For you to announce its " incoherence" I think presumes a lot.

I mean I know they didn't have modern science and modern technology. But for a few thousand years Genesis 1:1 was a cohesive and communicative utterance as to how it all got here. Now to the generations of foregoing minds you announce the incoherence of the idea? I don't mean an argument ad populum. But are you that much more gifted intellectually than the minds of generations which have found the sentence coherent?

I think space and time God has created for OUR existence. He created these because WE need them to exist. I don't think God needs them to exist. And I don't think He is necessarily shut out of His own creation so that He cannot also act within it.

Originally posted by LemonJello

Why is logic different from them?

I would say because logical possibility is a boundary on coherent thought, whereas nomological possibility is not. This is partly what I meant before when I said that logical possibility is broader. I think they also require different treatment in modal logic. For logical possibility, S5 seems very natural. However, it may not be appropriate for physical possibility.

With physical possibility, where we are talking about a parallel universe, rather than a copy of this one where there is just one thing different which is what modal semantics seems to me to do, there is an automatic problem for physics. Assuming we aren't talking about another brane in a bulk or some such speculative theory where the universes are connected somehow - but a genuinely separate entity - then there is no way of empirically probing it. This means that there is no a priori reason to think a parallel universe is in any way related to this or any other disconnected universe in any "laws of physics" kind of way. Based on the list on the Wikipedia page on modal logic I'd say one could expect them to be reflexive (w R w for all w in the set of universes, where R means physically related or similar in some way) which the Wikipedia page gives as T. For S5 we need statements that relate universes which there just isn't any empirical justification for. Unless of course the laws of physics at a fundamental level aren't inevitable in some way.

Originally posted by bbarr
Vann McGee (1985) presented an interesting argument aiming to show that MP inferences may not be necessarily truth-preserving. Consider the 1980 US Presidential election. Reagan was running way out in front of Carter with Anderson a distant third.

1) If a Republican will win, then if Reagan does not win, Anderson will win.

2) A Republican will win.
...[text shortened]... n does not win, Carter will win. MP gets tricky with counterfactuals and embedded conditionals.

I was able to get a copy of the McGee paper. Outstanding little paper and quite thought-provoking.

As I see it, there are 3 related but distinct arguments in the paper:

(i) M presents examples, like the Reagan example, which he claims show that MP is "not strictly valid" as a rule of inference (not as a law of semantics) by which he means to show that MP is not grounds-for-belief-preserving (not that it is not truth-preserving). Basically, M is claiming that such examples show that one can have good grounds for accepting the premises of an application of MP while not having good grounds for accepting the conclusion.

(ii) He presents an argument by way of the lungfish example, where he tries to show that even if MP is truth-preserving we will be stuck with an "unexpected disparity between believing a proposition and believing that that proposition is true".

(iii) He presents the argument that there is a tension between the law of exportation and MP. Basically, the idea is that for the indicative conditional we need something intermediate in strength between the material and strict implication. But then we have to choose between exportation and MP, since only the material conditional will satisfy both.

To me, the weakest part in the paper is clearly the lungfish argument designed to show that a commitment to MP's truth-preservation will leave one stuck with the belief disparity problem. This argument is a head-scratcher, since in no way does it follow from M's suppositions that the future linguist actually believes "It is true that, if that animal has lungs, it is a lungfish." It only follows from the suppositions that the future linguist can derive this through application of the truth-preserving (we suppose) schema MP from beliefs that he does believe. We already know there are potentially many cases where application of truth-preserving schema on propositions one properly believes results in something one does not, in fact, believe. Consider, for example, a simple argument like this for a roll of an n-sided die (n>>1):

(1) It is true that the die will not turn up n.
(2) It is true that the die will not turn up (n-1).
.
.
.
(n-1) It is true that the die will not turn up 2.
(n) So it is true that the die will turn up 1.

Even if the future linguist believes all of premises (1) – (n-1) on good grounds, he will not believe (n), even though it follows validly. It's absurd to claim that we have to give up truth-preservation in this case or we are stuck with a belief disparity like M described. From M's own suppositions in this hypothetical lungfish case, it does not follow that the future linguist believes "It is true that, if that animal has lungs, it is a lungfish" so we are not stuck with a belief disparity.

Regarding the examples, like the Reagan example, the way M puts the point seems prone to confusion for two reasons. First, it's potentially confusing to say MP is "not strictly valid" because there are occasions where it does not preserve grounds for belief, since validity is often taken to deal with preservation of truth. I suppose, though, M makes it explicit enough that he is taking MP as a rule of inference, not as a law of semantics. Second, the way he puts it seems ambiguous: "…there are occasions on which one has good grounds for believing the premises of an application of modus ponens but yet one is not justified in accepting the conclusion" seems ambiguous between (a) one has good grounds for believing each premise but not the conclusion and (b) one has good grounds for believing the conjunction of the premises but not the conclusion. The former reading is not a problem for validity, as the die example above should show; or, say, as a Kyburg-like lottery example should show. The latter reading presumably is a problem, though. To me, in this paper M does not properly clarify this distinction. I have to think, however, that what he is claiming is that his examples show there are occasions where one has good grounds for believing the conjunction of the premises but not the conclusion. This is what he is claiming is problematic. (He could also counter here that my die example misses this distinction in response to his lungfish example; but, even so, it still would not follow from his own suppositions that the future linguist believes in the way M tries to saddle us with).

However, I am not entirely sure why M thinks these examples like the Reagan example show this problem. These are basically intuitive offerings of counterexamples, but there is no actual direct comparative assessment of the epistemic probabilities of the conjunction of the premises versus that of the conclusion by M; nor does he offer any interpretation of the conditional or nested conditional. I think he owes the reader some account of conditional interpretation such that the relevant epistemic probabilities are shown to be quite different. For example, if we interpret them materially, there is no problem here. Of course M already acknowledges that. If we interpret them according to, for example, a Stalnaker interpretation, there is still no problem: since the actual world is a world in which a Republican wins, both the first premise of the Reagan argument (the nested conditional) and the conclusion conditional have the same Stalnaker valuation, both false. Of course, M already thinks the Stalnaker account is not right. If we evaluate the epistemic probability of a conditional as the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent and relevant background knowledge, then, yes, the conclusion of the Reagan argument does have a low order of probability. However, I'm not entirely sure how to apply the same interpretation in calculating the probability of the conjunction of premises, and specifically, in how to apply it to a nested conditional. I would guess, in applying it to a nested conditional like A -> (B -> C) , I would import in and take it as the conditional probability of C given A & B & relevant background knowledge. But I am not sure; and don't we already have reasons from the literature (e.g., the work of Lewis) to doubt that the probability of a conditional is the same as the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent? So, I am not entirely sure what to make of this section of M's paper.

In the last part of the paper, M's arguments designed to show that no conditional other than the material conditional will be consistent with both exportation and MP seems sound to me. I also agree with him that we probably need an indicative conditional intermediate in strength between the material and strict implication. M argues that we should jettison MP. But I am not entirely sure why he thinks we need exportation. He argues that we need exportation on the basis of some examples of natural instances that he claims gives "good inductive evidence that the subjunctive conditional satisfies the law of exportation". This does not seem too satisfying, and if anything to me it seems like we need importation, not exportation. If we are just banking on inductive evidence from natural instances, it seems to me that when one utters a statement like the nested conditional in the Reagan argument of the form A -> (B -> C), one is saying (A & B) -> C. Actually, M touches on exactly this point when he says "Another approach we might use would be to continue to use a formal system in which MP has unrestricted validity, and to take account of the invalidity of MP in English by modifying our informal rules for translating English sentences into the formal language." I would think this deserves more exploration, even given M's cautionary points on this approach.

Hope some of that makes sense. Cool paper, but not immediately convincing. But I am still trying to sort out my thoughts on it. Nested conditionals seem like a tough nut.

Originally posted by DeepThought
With physical possibility, where we are talking about a parallel universe, rather than a copy of this one where there is just one thing different which is what modal semantics seems to me to do, there is an automatic problem for physics. Assuming we aren't talking about another brane in a bulk or some such speculative theory where the universes are conn ...[text shortened]... for. Unless of course the laws of physics at a fundamental level aren't inevitable in some way.

Under S5, based on the way the axioms deal with iterated modal operators, necessity will "cut across" all worlds. In other words, under S5, there is no such thing as a proposition being necessary in one world but not other worlds. This seems quite appropriate for, say, logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. However, it does not seem appropriate for physical necessity. Unlike with logical necessity, it seems right to say that something could be physically necessary in some world but not another.

For example, suppose there is some world w that has all our physical laws and then some more. Then, plausibly, there will be events ruled out by the laws of w but not ruled out by our world. Even though w is physically possible relative to our laws, we could think of propositions physically necessary in w that fail to be true in our world. Then, the upshot is that S5 will not be appropriate: specifically, one of the axioms regarding iterated modal operators will not be appropriate.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Under S5, based on the way the axioms deal with iterated modal operators, necessity will "cut across" all worlds. In other words, under S5, there is no such thing as a proposition being necessary in one world but not other worlds. This seems quite appropriate for, say, logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. However, it does not seem appropriate ...[text shortened]... ate: specifically, one of the axioms regarding iterated modal operators will not be appropriate.

I'm wondering what you mean by physical "necessity" I'm translating this into a conservation law - which is the most obvious interpretation. Conservation laws depend on symmetries and the presence of fields. If the symmetry isn't present then the corresponding charge isn't conserved - if the field isn't present then there isn't anything to be conserved. Although then we have the question as to whether Noether's theorem is necessarily valid in physically disjoint universes. At which point there are two levels of necessity, one to do with whether a symmetry is present or not - which is within range of physics, and one to do with whether the underlying principle is necessary or not which strikes me as being within the domain of metaphysics.

Originally posted by sonship
[quote]
– that of explaining why there is a pot on the stovetop. The explanation is basically that your wife formed the intent to put the pot on the stovetop to satisfy a desire for tea; and then she acted on that; and a pot on the stovetop resulted. Please note how this is all subject to temporal relations. As an agent, your wife existed prior to the pot' ...[text shortened]... don't think He is necessarily shut out of His own creation so that He cannot also act within it.

There must be "acts" that do not conform to your criteria.
There must be an agent who is causally prior to the time and space, matter and energy if not temporally prior.

Why, exactly?

If that agent is not volitional WHY with nothing else in existence, did the world pop into existence?
Something has to give in our logical structure of explanations.
I believe what has to give is our set limitation what a human will and mind can do.

Or perhaps what has to give is some versions of the principle of sufficient reason. It seems that many versions of the Cosmological argument hinge on considerations of the PSR.

If that causes us some concern because we as humans cannot do that, I think we have to live with that.
I don't think it diminishes our dignity, self worth or significance.
If it calls for something of awe in us or even a sense of worship, I don't see why that cannot be an appropriate response.

How about we just let God be God?

My objection to your view is NOT that it is problematic because it affords that God can do things that humans cannot do. My objection -- again for the umpteenth time -- is that your view is problematic because it seems to entail a contradiction. As far as I can tell, you are dodging the issue with this same old song and dance we've seen in the past in the form of "just let God be God" special pleading. Even if we fully respect that your view provides for God's being omnipotent and hence able to do lots of stuff humans cannot do, that does not extend to the ability to do logically impossible stuff, at pain of just introducing more incoherence.

I'll be looking for your long awaited alternative explanation.

My "alternative explanation" for what?

Another imperfect analogy was given as to how the play writer could also enter into his or her own play.
Shakespeare could have it both ways - to be transcendent to his Hamlet and involved in it too.

Right, but Shakespeare was a temporal being, constrained to temporal relations the same as any rendition of his play. What I am actually looking for are clarifications on your underlying views regarding causality, such that it makes sense for you to hold on one hand that God is causally responsible as a creator and for interactions with that creation; and on the other hand that God exists in an eternal, timeless state. Again, what I am looking for is some actual clarification that reconciles these, not just special pleading for the case of God.

Originally posted by DeepThought
I'm wondering what you mean by physical "necessity" I'm translating this into a conservation law - which is the most obvious interpretation. Conservation laws depend on symmetries and the presence of fields. If the symmetry isn't present then the corresponding charge isn't conserved - if the field isn't present then there isn't anything to be conserved ...[text shortened]... rlying principle is necessary or not which strikes me as being within the domain of metaphysics.

Physical, or nomological, necessity will refer to being necessitated by the natural laws. Those laws will represent exceptionless generalizations in our world, but one key point is that we will also need some account of counterfactual robustness to ensure that they are not just accidentally exceptionless, or some such. In other words, "all As are B" may in fact be an exceptionless generalization that holds. But this generalization may not be counterfactually robust, such that it would fail to hold if, say, there had been more or different As than what there actually are, or if some subset of the As that exist had been in different circumstances that what actually is. Presumably, nomological necessity needs to be immune from this sort of counterfactual attack. However, requiring this does not seem to help settle the question of whether or not there is a difference between metaphysical necessity and nomological necessity, since it will plausibly be consistent with either view. In general, the counterfactual claim that "if it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q" translates to something like the claim that Q is the case in those metaphysically possible worlds (wherein P is the case) that are nearest to the actual world. So then something like our exceptionless "all As are B" will have counterfactual robustness if it remains exceptionless in the nearest-by metaphysically possible worlds wherein there are more As than what there actually are or wherein some As are in different circumstances that what actually is, etc. The person who thinks natural laws are metaphysically necessary will say this holds trivially, since it remains exceptionless in all metaphysically possible worlds. But the person who thinks nomological necessity is different (weaker) than metaphysical necessity will also plausibly say this holds, on the grounds that metaphysically possible worlds wherein the law remains exceptionless are closer to the actual world than those metaphysically possible worlds wherein the law is violated.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I was able to get a copy of the McGee paper. Outstanding little paper and quite thought-provoking.

As I see it, there are 3 related but distinct arguments in the paper:

(i) M presents examples, like the Reagan example, which he claims show that MP is "not strictly valid" as a rule of inference (not as a law of semantics) by which he means to show t ...[text shortened]... But I am still trying to sort out my thoughts on it. Nested conditionals seem like a tough nut.

Nice post.

From P > Q it follows that (P & R) > Q. So, apparently, the following is a valid inference:

1) If I had a cup of tea right now, then I would enjoy it very much.

2) Therefore, If I had a cup of tea right now and somebody put broken glass in it, then I would enjoy it very much.

Of course, we're not inclined to agree. This example of 'strengthening the antecedent' comes from David Lewis and highlights the importance of context in the interpretation of indicative conditionals. The nearest possible worlds to us where P is true are ones where A is false. We assess the conditional P>Q for nearby P-worlds and, in those worlds, the conditional is true if Q is true.

I think McGee's purported counterexamples to MP rely on an illicit contextual shift. MP arguments are necessarily truth-preserving. This means they're necessarily probability-preserving as well.

So, suppose the probability of 'If a republican wins the election, then if Reagan doesn't win, Anderson will win' is P=1 (since Anderson is the only other republican on the ballot). Suppose the probability of 'A republican will win the election' is P=.9 (because Reagan is that far ahead in the polls). Then the probability of the conclusion 'If Reagan doesn't win, Anderson will win' can't be lower than p=.9. But the conclusion strikes us as much less probable because when we assess it, we mistakenly assess the conditional probability of 'Anderson will win' on the assumption 'Reagan doesn't win', rather than assessing the conditional probability of the entire conclusion 'If Reagan doesn't win, Anderson will win' in light the premises supporting it.

To put the point another way: If, when we assess 'If Reagan doesn't win, Anderson will win' we merely look to the nearest possible worlds where Reagan doesn't win, then we'll be inclined to reject this conclusion. In the vast majority of those worlds, after all, Carter will win. But this ignores the contextual constraint of the premise 'A republican will win'. We should be assessing 'If Reagan doesn't win, Anderson will win' by looking to the set nearest possible worlds where our premises are true. That is, to the set of worlds where a republican will win. Among that set of worlds is a subset of worlds where Reagan does not win. In that subset, Anderson wins.

Originally posted by bbarr
Nice post.

From P > Q it follows that (P & R) > Q. So, apparently, the following is a valid inference:

1) If I had a cup of tea right now, then I would enjoy it very much.

2) Therefore, If I had a cup of tea right now and somebody put broken glass in it, then I would enjoy it very much.

Of course, we're not inclined to agree. This example of 'str ...[text shortened]... t set of worlds is a subset of worlds where Reagan does not win. In that subset, Anderson wins.

I see what you're saying about probabilistic logic although I had to read it three or four times before I got what you were saying. But I'm wondering about the symbolic stuff at the top and it's translation into normal language.

You can replace (P & R) with (P v R), and then assert ¬P to draw the odd conclusion that if you didn't have a cup of tea and someone put some glass in it then you would enjoy it very much. Possibly there's a problem with the back reference "it", is this what you mean by strengthening the antecedent?