The Virtue of Submission?

Originally posted by vistesd
Can one make that as an assumption? I don’t think so. I think one must reach that as a conclusion.

(I’ve been trying to be very careful not to specify a particular god, or assume his/her/its nature.)

To say, “[b]If such-and-such a god is morally perfect in every sense... does not seem logically different from saying, “If one’s parents are ...[text shortened]... .”

All of this requires being able to specify what kind of behavior entails moral perfection.[/b]

Are humans capable of specifying accurately what constitutes moral or ethical behaviour? If we do are these specifications timeless or do they have an expiry date? Seems to me that what was moral and ethical perfection one generation ago no longer applies. If then our morals and ethics are fluid and constantly being revised, maybe we cant do anything but submit to a higher moral authority?

Originally posted by vistesd
We’re just using the words differently, that’s all. In our household, we just don’t use those words at all, because they mean something different to us.

In the context of that main topic of the thread, No.1 gave the definition of submission as the act of submitting to the power of another, and I agreed that is how I am using it. We have also been ...[text shortened]... t to the power/authority of another.

So the questions (mine and No.1 Marauder’s) still stand.

I see. So the real question is should we submitt to a higher authority if we are unwilling? This higher authority can take the image of God, government, society, etc. In general, I think it fool hearty to say that there is NEVER any virtue in doing so. Otherwise we would have anarchy. Then again, some feel as though we would be better off with anarchy. Come to think of it, there are probably those who feel that this world is in a state of anarchy presently. However, I am of the opinion that anarchy in general is not desirable.

Having said that, if we then can conclude that submission can be virtuous, the question then becomes when? I say this assuming that you are not an anarchist of coarse. When do you view it as desirable or not desirable?

Originally posted by whodey
I see. So the real question is should we submitt to a higher authority if we are unwilling? This higher authority can take the image of God, government, society, etc. In general, I think it fool hearty to say that there is NEVER any virtue in doing so. Otherwise we would have anarchy. Then again, some feel as though we would be better off with anarchy. ...[text shortened]... ing that you are not an anarchist of coarse. When do you view it as desirable or not desirable?

This goes to both your and Rajk’s posts:

No.1 asked the following question, which I think gets to the heart of it—

If "virtue" means moral excellence or righteousness, how can one abandon his judgment on moral matters to someone else?

If I choose to submit to another power or authority in moral/ethical matters, then I am responsible for that moral choice. I think that the self-authority and the self-responsibility are inescapable at bottom. If I think that the agent to which I submit is morally perfect, then I am responsible for making that judgment, based on whatever evidence I admit.

Therefore, I contend that abandoning one’s moral judgment to someone else is not only not virtuous—it is at bottom illusory.

If one seeks the counsel of others, one chooses to do that on one’s own recognizance. If one chooses to follow that counsel or not, one does so on one’s own recognizance.

Either you are choosing or someone else is choosing for you, and you simply follow along like a marionette. But even in such a case, who chose to follow that someone? You did—for good reasons or bad.

Therefore, I don’t think that one can make a blanket statement about whether “submitting to authority”, or refusing to, is always wrong or always right. I think, however, that any tendency to submit to authority without question or reason is wrong. And any attempt to abrogate one’s own moral responsibility by submitting to the authority of another—any other—is illusory.

One rabbi, commenting on the Abraham-Isaac story, said that had Abraham truly trusted that god was holy and just, he would have refused such an outlandish and atrocious command: to kill his son, or anyone’s child, on an altar. And would have trusted that such a refusal is, in fact, the response a just god would have wanted and commended. (The wording of that story in the Hebrew is complex, and there are actually two sources of the voice(s) that Abraham heard. It can be read in a number of ways, and I am not asserting this one as the only “right” reading; I am only giving it as an example. If someone wants to read it in other ways, that’s fine.)

Originally posted by vistesd
This goes to both your and Rajk’s posts:

No.1 asked the following question, which I think gets to the heart of it—

[b]If "virtue" means moral excellence or righteousness, how can one abandon his judgment on moral matters to someone else?

If I choose to submit to another power or authority in moral/ethical matters, then I am responsible for [i]th ...[text shortened]... I am only giving it as an example. If someone wants to read it in other ways, that’s fine.)[/b]

Could you say a little more about the sources of the voice from the Hebrew tradition?

Originally posted by kirksey957
Could you say a little more about the sources of the voice from the Hebrew tradition?

The first voice that Abraham hears is that of ha elohim—the god or gods (it’s a plural form that is used for both). The second voice that he hears (telling him to spare Isaac) is that of YHVH (or an angel of YHVH). That has allowed the rabbis to offer a whole variety of interpretations.

Originally posted by vistesd
..........had Abraham truly trusted that god was holy and just, he would have refused such an outlandish and atrocious command: to kill his son, or anyone’s child, on an altar.

I think it was because Abraham trusted that God was holy and just, that he decided to obey since he knew that Issac was the chosen heir and God would have resurrrected Issac ....

Heb 11 17 By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac: and he that had received the promises offered up his only begotten son.
18 Of whom it was said, That in Isaac shall thy seed be called:
19 Accounting that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead; from whence also he received him in a figure.

I think the question that needs to be answered first is whether or not people are capable of establishing moral or ethical codes of conduct.

Originally posted by Rajk999
I think it was because Abraham trusted that God was holy and just, that he decided to obey since he knew that Issac was the chosen heir and God would have resurrrected Issac ....

[i]Heb 11 17 By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac: and he that had received the promises offered up his only begotten son.
18 Of whom it was said, That ...[text shortened]... ed first is whether or not people are capable of establishing moral or ethical codes of conduct.

[/i]That’s a possible alternative reading. Your “since he knew that” seems to reflect my statement on the last post of page 3: “All of these ‘ifs’ could be recast as, ‘If one knows that . . . .’”

I think the question that needs to be answered first is whether or not people are capable of establishing moral or ethical codes of conduct.

I agree; and I think that goes right to the dilemma. I continued in the page 3 post : “All of this requires being able to specify what kind of behavior entails moral perfection.”

If people are not able to establish moral or ethical codes of conduct, then I would say they are certainly unable to specify what conduct entails moral perfection. In that case, can anyone say that they know what the word “moral” really means? Can they say that they know what words such as “holy” or “just” mean? That is, to say something like, “Being moral means to act morally (or justly, or lovingly, or whatever)” seems to be an empty sentence unless one is able specify what actually are moral (or just or loving) acts.

I would argue that without that ability, one wouldn’t really know what he was talking about in ascribing moral perfection to God or anyone else.* Therefore, one could not say whether or not it is morally virtuous to submit to God or any other authority. If that is the case, then one could not say whether asking a father to kill his son on the altar—even knowing that Isaac would be resurrected—is morally virtuous or not.

Now, I think that people clearly are capable of establishing moral and ethical codes of conduct, across cultures and religions. Those codes of conduct reflect what various groups of people specify as moral behavior, and that specification constitutes what they mean by the words “moral” or “morally virtuous”—and from which they extrapolate to imagine what “moral perfection” might mean.

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* This goes to what Wittgenstein thought was the philosophical predicament: Being bewitched by our own language into thinking we know what we’re talking about. The way out of any such bewitchment is to look at how given words are used, because that is where the real meaning lies—not just in definitions stringing together more words.

That is what I am getting at when I say that, unless we are able to specify what kind of behavior is entailed by the word “moral”, we cannot specify what kind of behavior entails “moral perfection.” And if we can’t specify the kind of behavior we’re talking about, we cannot establish moral codes of conduct—because we can’t even specify what we mean by moral. And without that ability, we can’t say that God is moral (or just or holy, if that latter term means behaving in a certain way).

If I say: “George is iplitsch,” you have no idea what I mean if you don’t know what it is to be iplitsch, if you don’t know the use of that word. If I say that one is iplitsch if one acts iplitsch, then you will ask me what kinds of acts constitute iplitschness. If I can’t tell you that, then you can’t have any idea whether George is iplitsch or not.

Suppose I say: “Well, in your language, you might say that George is kind.”

You say: “Ah, I think I get it, then.”

But then I say: “I don’t know your language very well, though; so that might not be correct. Can you tell me what exactly ‘kind’ means?”

At that point, since I don’t know your language well (so that simply giving me other definitional words is unlikely to help me much), you will likely begin to give examples of kindly behavior—that is, you will tell how the word is used. If I then say: “Yes, yes. That’s what iplitsch means", then—and only then—will we have understood one another.

Now: Substitute “God” for “George,” and “moral” for “iplitsch.”

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EDIT: It seems that one either submits to God as sheer power, or one submits to God based on God’s perceived moral authority (or, alternatively, refuses to submit to sheer power in the absence of perceived moral authority). If the latter, then one has to have some sense of what kind of behavior is moral.

There are certainly gods (or notions of god) that you find lacking in moral authority: therefore it seems that you are quite capable of deciding what kind of conduct is moral—i.e., “establishing a moral or ethical code of conduct”—beforehand.

Originally posted by vistesd
This goes to both your and Rajk’s posts:

No.1 asked the following question, which I think gets to the heart of it—

[b]If "virtue" means moral excellence or righteousness, how can one abandon his judgment on moral matters to someone else?

If I choose to submit to another power or authority in moral/ethical matters, then I am responsible for [i]th ...[text shortened]... abandoning one’s moral judgment to someone else is not only not virtuous—it is at bottom illusory.

If ones moral compus is taken in the context of a parent/child relationship, however, we can see that the child's judgment is illusory in comparison to the parent. For example, lets say you tell your child that he needs to go to the doctor for some shots. The child naturally rebels as such a notion. In fact, the parent helps hold the child and pin him or her to the table so that the shot can be given while all the while the child screams in protest at such an unjust verdict. Now whose perspective is illusory?

Originally posted by whodey
If ones moral compus is taken in the context of a parent/child relationship, however, we can see that the child's judgment is illusory in comparison to the parent. For example, lets say you tell your child that he needs to go to the doctor for some shots. The child naturally rebels as such a notion. In fact, the parent helps hold the child and pin him or h ...[text shortened]... ile the child screams in protest at such an unjust verdict. Now whose perspective is illusory?

Yes, and in your example the parent acts for the ultimate welfare of the child in spite of the child’s illusion—he acts to ensure the child’s healing. The parent does not punish the child for the illusion, nor leave the child on his own to suffer the consequences of the illusion, nor insist that the child submit before he will care for him. In fact, the parent understands that the illusion is natural (as you say, he naturally rebels), based on the child’s limited capacity, and does not think that the child’s refusal to submit is any kind of fault.

The child’s behavior is neither virtuous nor non-virtuous; it has no moral/ethical status whatsoever.

Originally posted by vistesd
Yes, and in your example the parent acts for the ultimate welfare of the child in spite of the child’s illusion—he acts to ensure the child’s healing. The parent does not punish the child for the illusion, nor leave the child on his own to suffer the consequences of the illusion, nor insist that the child submit before he will care for him. In fact, the pa ...[text shortened]... ild’s behavior is neither virtuous nor non-virtuous; it has no moral/ethical status whatsoever.

Of coarse this example is used in the context of a child who does is not given the right to choose not to recieve the shot. However, God gives his children the right to defy him and choose not to recieve the shot. If the child then decides to not recieve the shot and then becomes sick because of his refusal then the child dies.

You may say that God is an unfit parent, however, I would say that we know enough to make the "right" choice. Granted, not everyone has the ability to make the "right" choice such as those who are not intellectually able to or mature enough to make such choices. It really comes down to accountability. At some point your child will be accountable for his own actions and you must set them free. At that point you will not have the luxuary of forcing him or her to "do the right thing".

Originally posted by whodey
Of coarse this example is used in the context of a child who does is not given the right to choose not to recieve the shot. However, God gives his children the right to defy him and choose not to recieve the shot. If the child then decides to not recieve the shot and then becomes sick because of his refusal then the child dies.

You may say that God is an At that point you will not have the luxuary of forcing him or her to "do the right thing".

Of coarse this example is used in the context of a child who does is not given the right to choose not to recieve the shot.

Do you think, then, that you gave an irrelevant example? I think not. The child is not given the right to choose because the child is not capable of making a non-illusory choice.

Now, you say that God gives us the right to choose, and that we (everyone) know enough to make the right choice: that is, the veils of illusion are lifted. We stand, not as children of God, but as adults of God. Good (seriously).

That means, for one thing, that when I say that I do not believe that your God (that is God as you understand the word) does not exist—I am perforce lying. There is no other option. All the Buddhists are lying, all the Taoists are lying, all the Hindus are lying, etc., etc. . . .

And yet: I don’t think I’m lying. Or am I lying about that? Am I lying to myself? But, then, I’m just under another kind of illusion. . .

Further: You have to have some criteria for believing that you’re not under an illusion of some sort. What are your criteria for someone (anyone) to know they’re not under an illusion (any illusion)—that they know what they think they know, that they have sufficient information?

Now, I don’t think I am under an illusion; just as I do not think that I am lying. But then, I do not attempt to abrogate my own responsibility by submitting to some other authority—which is the whole point of this thread. (I do, however, think that others are under the veils of illusion—with regard to the topic of this thread—and I may well be in regard to certain other issues.)

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Of coarse this example is used in the context of a child who does is not given the right to choose not to recieve the shot.

Do you think, then, that you gave an irrelevant example? I think not. The child is not given the right to choose because the child is not capable of making a non-illusory choice.

Now, you say that God gives us the right ...[text shortened]... on—with regard to the topic of this thread—and I may well be in regard to certain other issues.)[/b]

Wow, after reading this I feel like I have been trying to say exactly that for months. I actually feel satisfied...

Rec'd!

Originally posted by whodey
...however, I would say that we know enough to make the "right" choice.

I don't know enough to make the same choice you have. How do you explain this?

Originally posted by TheSkipper
Wow, after reading this I feel like I have been trying to say exactly that for months. I actually feel satisfied...

Rec'd!

The dilemma is: We are reasoning beings (as adults) who create maya in our own minds by bewitching ourselves with our own thoughts, with our own reasoning.

This is not only because we fail to see contradictions in our reasoning (and then track down all our premises—ala Dr. Scribbles, ala Ayn Rand); but also because we fail to realize the nature of our own thinking-mind, and hence confuse thoughts, conceptions, imaginations with the pre-conceptual real.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Of coarse this example is used in the context of a child who does is not given the right to choose not to recieve the shot.

Do you think, then, that you gave an irrelevant example? I think not. The child is not given the right to choose because the child is not capable of making a non-illusory choice.

Now, you say that God gives us the right ...[text shortened]... on—with regard to the topic of this thread—and I may well be in regard to certain other issues.)[/b]

Who is under an illusion in terms of the existence of a God who is a personality? I say he exists as where you say he does not. Can both of us be correct? Must not one of us be under an illusion and the other not? Who then can we say is delusional?

As for the adult bit, I would say that those who are accountable to God for their actions have reached adulthood. For example, a child is not held accountable due to maturation issues etc. However, in comparison to God these adults are still children in that he understands all as where we do not.

Now in terms of making a non-illusory choice, the Bible refers to coming to God as coming to the light verses being in darkness. In John chapter 3 we are told that some prefer the darkness rather than the light so as not to shed light on their sinful activities that they love. We are all given an innate sense of right/wrong and we have all gone against this inner voice at some point. What then are we to do with this "sin"? Do we prefer it or do we flee from it and run to the cross for deliverance?

Now as far as you running from your sins and prefering not to sin that is all well and good, however, Christ said that only through him are can the chains of sin be truly broken.