Theological Noncognitivism

Originally posted by Conrau K
I am hard put to see much distinction between this formulation of non-cognitivism and verificationism. Non-cognitivism just seems to be a subset of verificationism: if an entity is defined negatively, then a reference cannot obtain and hence cannot be verified. It is therefore meaningless.

The verificationist would say that since supernatural properties meaningless (and I think, even as an atheist, there are a lot of arguments in favour of this).

Hi, Conrau! Good to hear from you. How are you? Well, I hope.

Now that I started this ball rolling, I find that I have to play catch-up. But how does what you wrote change under a falsificationist regime, i.e., for something that is in-principle non-falsifiable? I would hold, for example, that the supernatural (to the extent that we mean by that "not of the natural order" ) is neither verifiable nor falsifiable, in-principle. I'm not sure that renders the category cognitively meaningless, but I am entertaining that position.

I've been otherwise occupied, and haven't had a chance to finish even the Conifer article, but he didn't appear--at least as far as I got--to include the supernatural in his G-x formulations (though some other terms might skirt it).

I'll get back after some further study. I had a resource on the shelf where a noncognitive argument was made for the more "transcendent" attributes assigned to God, but not terms like father, love, sovereign, etc.--his argument, as i recall, was that once you remove such terms from the natural category, their meaning disappears since we have no way of knowing what they might mean applied to a "supernatural" being. [We have moved to a small apartment, and, unfortunately I had to purge a ton of books from my shelves--had to purge the shelves as well. 🙁 ] I agree with Wittgenstein (as I repeat perhaps ad nauseum) that one cannot simply transfer terms from the natural category (language game) to the supernatural (he would have said "metaphysical" ) category (language game), and assume that they retain either (a) their original meaning, or (b) any meaning at all--and that we simply "bewitch" [his term] ourselves into thinking that we still know what we're talking about when we do so.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'm sure there are some definitions that collapse to saying that "god is that which caused everything but god". However, to say that theological noncognitivists claim that all alleged definitions of god collapse to this is totally absurd. Maybe some noncognivitists claim that (for some bizarre reason, since the claim is obviously false); but, to be hone ...[text shortened]... aim is itself sufficient for being a theological noncognitivist. That's not obvious to me.

I accept your criticism of the wiki article. Surely one need not be a universal theological noncognitivist, in the same way that one need not be a universal skeptic.

I have come to the (at least provisional) conclusion that some well-known theological positions--such as god as the "wholly other"--are really absent any meaningful content, and we really don't know what such a thing means. (See my post above to Conrau).

By the way, a theological noncognitivist need not be an atheist. The stream of apophatic theology is essentially noncognitivist. I stumbled upon the following quote from Augustine—who is hardly a marginal figure in Christian thought:

“What then, brethren, shall we say of God? For if thou hast been able to understand what thou wouldest say, it is not God. If thou hast been able to comprehend it, thou hast comprehended something else instead of God. If thou hast been able to comprehend him as thou thinkest, by so thinking thou hast deceived thyself. This then is not God, if thou hast comprehended it; but if this be God, thou has not comprehended it.”
—St. Augustine

EDIT: Maimonides could also be added as well, a major figure in Jewish thought.

Here is a partial rejoinder to Conifer that I found: http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/conifers_refutation_of_noncognitivism/

I haven't read it all yet; I am pulling together what materials I can to attempt to make a defense of theological noncognitivism, assuming that position for the purpose of argument. Please be patient, as I prepare (if I can). Thanks.

EDIT: The above small essay seems to assume supernaturalist theism, and implies that that is where the meaning of some terms used by Conifer break down; but there is a lot that is not specified. I will direct what arguments I make to god as a supernatural being, and specifically the god of the Abrahamic traditions.

EDIT 2: On a quick read, I would dispute that "an invisible pink unicorn" is "imaginable": we can imagine the separate parts but not the whole. The fact that a grammatical sentence can be constructed using individually understandable terms does not mean that the sentence defines or describes anything that is "imaginable", or has any sense.

Originally posted by vistesd
The fact that a grammatical sentence can be constructed using individually understandable terms does not mean that the sentence defines or describes anything that is "imaginable", or has any sense.

The reigning King of France is bald.

Originally posted by DeepThought
The reigning King of France is bald.

That is certainly imaginable, in a way the invisible pink unicorn is, I propose, not.

EDIT: By saying that the parts are imaginable, but not the whole, I do not mean to say that we can't imagine a unicorn that has the attributes of being pink in color and sometimes invisible. I was not clear on that, so I'll make up a definition to get at what I mean: "A punicorn is a unicorn that that is pink and perfectly transparent." Sorry for being sloppy.

Preface

The following post is my “first pass”, so to speak. I’m sure that it needs to be fleshed out a lot more—and hopefully that will happen as the discussion continues. I may have to modify my position in the face of valid counter-arguments; that is not “moving the goal-posts”. It is, in any event, a work in progress; I just wanted to get my initial thoughts out there.

Obviously, I agree with LemonJello that Conifer’s approach—designating what kind of G-X you’re talking about, and then analyzing that—is the way to go. My G-X, I’ll designate as G-S: god as a supernatural being. I am not going to deconstruct each of Conifer’s G-Xs, as that is not my purpose. I will note that Conifer does not address the question of supernaturality, and seems to leave himself sufficient wiggle room to “naturalize” any of his definitional terms—I suspect that is disingenuous, but perhaps Confer doesn’t believe in a supernatural God, which would set his theology (whatever it is) outside the mainstream.

With regard to Conifer’s G-9, however, I disagree that it expresses a proposition, as it has no propositional content at all. How can a proposition be a proposition absent any definable content? As a definition used in the expression of a proposition (such as <G-9 exists> ), it renders that proposition empty of any cognitive content as well, in the sense that I discuss in the following post. One might say that <There exist indefinable _______> . . . Well, if you put a word like “things” in there, it seems problematic, as “things” certainly is definable, and it really expresses that there are things of which we know nothing, which I would not dispute (or dispute that that is a proposition; I do dispute that <X is a things that is undefined is a proper proposition). For the rest, see my remarks on inconceivability below—if Conifer has a point about what is “indefinable”, I don’t think it extends to what is “inconceivable” (to the extent that there is any substantive difference between the two).

With regard to his G-10, unless the list of “nots” is truncated somewhere, I suggest that it really reduces to the same thing as G-9, with the same problems.

LemonJello: I think, in general, typical or common usage regarding god-talk is cognitively meaningful, by which I mean that I think it characteristically serves to express propositions.

Does the following definition serve to express a proposition?

>> God is that which we cannot conceive of. Or: God is a being whose essence we cannot we cannot conceive of or imagine. [The redundancy is deliberate]. Or: God is a being whose definition is beyond our ability to conceive.

Now, the fact that we cannot conceive of X does mean that X cannot exist. I have never assumed that, to put it metaphorically, the grammar of our consciousness must be exhaustive of the syntax of the universe. One conventional definition of “proposition” is—

2a : an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false
b : the objective meaning of a proposition

[From http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/proposition]*

I can believe or doubt that there are existents beyond my ability to conceive, but how can I either believe or doubt the existence of a particular X whose definition includes inconceivability? How can I justify either belief or doubt—whether you call that X “Ipsomil” or “God”? I cannot cognize that of which I cannot conceive, though I can cognize about the possibility that there are things of which I cannot conceive—I just can’t cognize about them, whatever they might be.

I suggest that “God is the wholly-other” (not an uncommon theological statement, by any means) says no more than the above.

I further suggest that “God is a supernatural* being” says no more than the above.

Supernaturality is either that which is “wholly other” from nature, or it just means something that is natural but unusual, or perhaps that which is natural but inconceivable. Sophisticated theologies (at least, and on my reading) pretty much embrace the first “strong version”, and it is the one that I intend here.

The fact that we have no way of conceiving what is not of the natural order is why we fall back on natural analogs—e.g., “God is a loving father”. Well, does God procreate? Or is God an adoptive father? I know what father might mean in the natural order, just as I know various understandings of “love”. But I do not even know what analogs—if any—might be validly transferrable to the non-natural domain. That such analogs are transferrable seems nothing more than an assertion without justification.

Putative revelation from the supernatural realm does not solve the problem, as we only have such putative revelation in the natural domain, where we read and interpret it using our natural cognitive abilities. (What would supernatural cognition be like? What is God’s supernatural cognition like? What warrant is there for assuming that it is like ours? ).

Some people propose that “faith”, aside from its more conventional usages, refers to some sort of “mystical” or “spiritual” or “supernatural” means of cognition of the supernatural. And by this, they seem to mean something more than intuition, or direct apprehension (prior to conceptualization). Well, I could claim that sort of thing for, say, fear. NOTE: Of course, not all Christians employ such a specialized usage of the word faith.]

I suggest that “God exists”, where God refers to a supernatural being, is not a proposition at all, since it “proposes” (for the reasons mentioned above) no cognitive content . I suggest (for the reasons mentioned above) that is applies to propositions that assign natural (often anthropomorphic) analogs to the supernatural, as well as well as those that use more abstract terms.
____________________________________________________

*I am using “supernatural” strictly to mean not of the natural order (and not of an alternative natural order for which such analogs as “father” are similar enough to be valid; and I will use “universe” or “cosmos”, as well as nature, as shorthand for all that is of the natural order.

** This is the broad definition from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

“The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.”

I realize that my argument here likely implicitly rejects the “Metaphysical 101” approach to propositions in the SEP article. I will quote the closing line on propositions from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: “So a satisfactory doctrine of propositions remains elusive.”

ADDENDUM to the above two posts: I am using "proposition" in the sense of the definition offered in the second post. One could, I suppose, define a proposition as any string of words, thoughts or symbols put into propositional form, such as <X is Y>, just as one could define a sentence in terms of grammatical structure. I am not well-enough versed in various views on what constitutes a proposition (and perhaps Quine is right, in that talk of propositions adds more problems than it solves, vis-a-vis simple declarative statements.

Nevertheless, if one wants to (perhaps more correctly) add the qualifier "meaningful", or "having decipherable cognitive content", or such, that is fine.

Originally posted by vistesd
By the way, a theological noncognitivist need not be an atheist. The stream of apophatic theology is essentially noncognitivist. I stumbled upon the following quote from Augustine—who is hardly a marginal figure in Christian thought:

“What then, brethren, shall we say of God? For if thou hast been able to understand what thou wouldest say, it is not God ...[text shortened]... t. Augustine

EDIT: Maimonides could also be added as well, a major figure in Jewish thought.

I tend to doubt that any of this is "essentially noncognivist". All of St. Augustine's God-talk here seems cognitively meaningful and expresses propositions that I can understand. Just based on what we can glean from his God-talk here, "God exists" surely seems cognitively meaningful. It would enter into logical relations, and I could use it to infer an infinitude of other propositions, such as the proposition that there exists at least something other than my brother (since I can comprehend my brother).

I don't think the right charge against this stream of theology would be one of TN, since it seems to me that this type of God-talk serves to express propositions. It seems to me that the problem here is that one could not speak directly about God (in a way that would purport to comprehend directly God) without contradicting oneself. My understanding is that it would be a cognitive affair that serves to express propositions; but one cannot speak directly about God without expressing propositions that contradict each other. I would like to think this is what St. Augustine is lamenting when he says "What then, brethren, shall we say of God?"

One could counter-argue that if one cannot speak in statements directly about God (say, statements that positively ascribe properties unto God) without expressing contradictions, then such statements cannot express "thinkable" propositions and this would indicate TN. However, I do not strictly agree, even supposing that such statements express unthinkable propositions, that this would indicate TN. If you look at, for example, Conifer's definition of TN it hinges on whether or not the statement "God exists" expresses a (thinkable) proposition or not; and "God exists" is not a statement that purports to ascribe a property (since existence is not a predicate). On my understanding, "God exists" here expresses a proposition and it is not unthinkable; like I said, I could use it to infer lots of other propositions, too, which could not be true if it had no propositional content.

So, I don't think TN strictly applies to this stream, although I think I would agree that the cognitively meaningful God-talk here is rather limited to a robustly indirect sort. I would think the problem with this stream is that one will presumably have a very difficult task justifying belief in the proposition "God exists" if he cannot even entertain direct thoughts about God without descending into incoherency.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Preface

The following post is my “first pass”, so to speak. I’m sure that it needs to be fleshed out a lot more—and hopefully that will happen as the discussion continues. I may have to modify my position in the face of valid counter-arguments; that is not “moving the goal-posts”. It is, in any event, a work in progress; I just wanted to get m ...[text shortened]... ed somewhere, I suggest that it really reduces to the same thing as G-9, with the same problems.[/b]

Conifer, as far as I know, is an atheist and just a college student when he wrote the paper. I agree he is talking out his arse in many places; but it's just that I think his paper is a better starting point for this discussion than the wikipedia article that cites his paper.

At any rate, I agree with you about G-9. This would be one of those places I think Conifer is confused. "G-9 exists" does not express a proposition. And if you really look at Conifer's argument, it doesn't seem at all to show that "G-9 exists" expresses a necessarily false proposition as he claims; rather, it just seems to suggest, if anything, that most people who claim to be committed to the G-9 definition are not really committed to that in actuality.

However, I do not agree that G-10 reduces to G-9. It seems to me that "G-10 exists" does express a thinkable proposition. I can use it to infer other propositions. For example, since I can ascribe positive properties to my brother, I can use "G-10 exists" to infer that there exists something other than my brother. Again, pace my post above, I do not think TN is strictly the right charge to level against this stream; but I think the cognitively meaningful God-talk would be limited to indirect sorts, and I also fail to see how belief in "G-10 exists" could be justified.

Originally posted by vistesd
LemonJello: [b] I think, in general, typical or common usage regarding god-talk is cognitively meaningful, by which I mean that I think it characteristically serves to express propositions.

Does the following definition serve to express a proposition?

>> God is that which we cannot conceive of. Or: God is a being whose essence we cannot we canno ...[text shortened]... mbridge Dictionary of Philosophy: “So a satisfactory doctrine of propositions remains elusive.”[/b]

Does the following definition serve to express a proposition?

>> God is that which we cannot conceive of. Or: God is a being whose essence we cannot we cannot conceive of or imagine. [The redundancy is deliberate]. Or: God is a being whose definition is beyond our ability to conceive.

You've listed a few here, and I would think the first 2 may reduce to about the same thing. Yes, as I described with G-10 and also in response to the St. Augustine quote, I do think "G exists" is cognitively meaningful in reference to these sorts of definitions of G and I do not think TN strictly applies. Again, though, I would have the same disclaimer that it seems to me with these that the cognitively meaningful G-talk would likely be limited to indirect sorts.

The third one you list here seems different to the first two and would seem to collapse to something like G-9, unless I am misreading it. Again as I mentioned, I think "G-9 exists" does not express a proposition and TN applies to it.

I just can’t cognize about them, whatever they might be.

Yes, that's likely true with those sorts of G definitions. However, I still disagree that this implies TN. I think it would probably imply that cognitively meaningful talk will be limited; and it probably implies that one cannot speak in a cognitively meaningful way that ascribes properties or comprehension directly unto G. But, the question of TN is narrower in the sense that it asks whether or not "G exists" is cognitively meaningful, and this is not a statement that purports to ascribe direct property or comprehension unto the concept G; it just purports to claim that this G concept is instantiated.

So, again, I guess I would say that I do not agree that TN strictly applies; but yes I do agree that the cognitively meaningful G-talk may be quite limited in some ways.

The fact that we have no way of conceiving what is not of the natural order is why we fall back on natural analogs

I plan to return to your argument regarding G-S when I have more time to respond. On first glance though, it seems like your argument rests to some extent on this assumption that "...we have no way of conceiving what is not of the natural order...." But why should we assume that? That seems false to me. The natural order is basically delimited by what is nomologically possible. But nomological possibility is narrower than logical possibility, by which I mean that everything that is nomologically possible is logically possible but not everything that is logically possible is nomologically possible. And since, generally, we can conceive of things that are logically possible (since they do not entail contradiction), then it should follow that we can conceive of things that are logically possible but not nomologically possible. So, we can conceive of things that are nomologically impossible, or outside the natural order.

Again, I'll return to your G-S arguments when I have more time to consider them. Cheers,

Originally posted by LemonJello

Does the following definition serve to express a proposition?

>> God is that which we cannot conceive of. Or: God is a being whose essence we cannot we cannot conceive of or imagine. [The redundancy is deliberate]. Or: God is a being whose definition is beyond our ability to conceive.

You've listed a few here, and I would think t n, I'll return to your G-S arguments when I have more time to consider them. Cheers,

I, too, have limited time at the moment, but maybe we can work through this (or play through it) in a more casual way. 🙂

While it’s perhaps correct that my examples to not constitute TN, at least as narrowly construed, G-9 at least leaves you with no propositional content about which you can think, and I’m not sure what indirect comprehension is possible for G-10 if it’s carried “all the way down”. One might say, “Okay, not X—but what is left? Y perhaps?” No, not that either. I do know how to think about “something” from which all attributes are removed. And I would like to be shown that my examples do not work.

I have, admittedly, given perhaps a strong definition of “supernatural” for G-S. Yes, I understand the difference between the logical and the nomological—but S would (at least in the strong sense that I believe most theologians would take it) not apply to any other “nomological” world, nor would such theolgians be satisfied to leave it at a logical construct. I don’t think that to call G a “non-nomological” being would be helpful at all. What we need here is a definition that logically, but not nomologically (in any world), describes “a supernatural being”. If you want to redefine simply S as an alternative “nomological” world, with alternative natural laws, and say that TN fails in the face of such a view, I have no argument. But you are not then, I assert, talking about the same S as mainstream Christian theology. [I do not suggest that TN would hold against any naturalized theology.]

The "scare-quotes", where they occur, attached to "nomological" above are intentional. I do not think that (most) supernaturalist theologians would consider G-S to be of any order (universe) that could be termed "nomological"; again, I think the term is generally used in a much more radical (and ultimately illusory) way. I think that apophatic (negative) theology is an attempt to (not- ) speak about such a radically "wholly other" G-S, and I think that it fails. [In sum, I think that such a radical G-S is (a) a common, though not universal, theological "construct", (b) that such a G-S is akin to G-9, and (c) that G-10, unless truncated, does essentially reduce to G-9 (or something close enough to it), lacking any definable content to consider.

Does “G-exists” constitute a proposition without some meaningful definition of G? Am I using meaningful in too broad a way here (for example, I have not made any distinction between meaningfulness, sense, and/or coherency)? I am re-reading some arguments by atheist philosopher Kai Nielsen, who does seem to distinguish between meaningful and coherency, but I’m damned if I can see it. (Nielsen seems to follow the stream of analytic philosophy that sees ordinary language as sufficient for such discourse.)

Basically my argument might reduce to:

1. G-9 satisfies the conditions of TN.

2. G-10 does also, unless the negating series is truncated somewhere (otherwise, indirect comprehension of—what?). I do not know if Augustine (or, from memory, Maimonides) intended to carry it all the way down, or not. I do understand the thinkability of "not-this" (identifable thing or concept) vis-a-vis other (identifiable) "thats"; but if there are no "thats" left? I might also imagine that there are unthinkables, but have no idea what to think (or how to begin to think) about something that is declared both unthinkable, and a particular "something" (see below; I don't think my statements along these lines contradict what I am saying here.)

—Perhaps G.E. Moore’s comments about treating nothing as “a queer kind of something” (called “nothingness”, or “absolute nihil”?) is suggestible here? We think that we know what such a nihil is (or might be), but that is essentially a grammatical error caused by transferring a term from ordinary language games to a metaphysical language game (rather similar to speaking of the universe as a “thing”, and hence an effect in need of a cause). I would argue such a putative “nothingness” has no propositional content.

3. I have linked indefinability, inconceivability (with respect to any particular indefinable that is proffered, but not with respect to the ability to conceive of indefinables as a whole, which seems to be what you are talking about), the theological concept of G as “wholly other”*, and the supernatural (the latter two radically understood, to be sure—but that is what, at least sophisticated, mainstream theological metaphysics embraces). Similarly, I can imagine that there are unimaginables, but I cannot imagine this or that unimaginable; I would take the statement "X is unimaginable" straightforwardly.

If those links are faulty, I would ask you to say explain how.

4. I do not think that analogs from the (any) natural order are simply transferable to S, as I radically construe it. I do not think that such analogs add anything to imaginability or indirect comprehension, and are illusory.

5. And related to the above, I argue that simply substituting terms that sound as if they have a positive conceptual content does not alter their essential negativity/emptiness.

6. I have not considered directly fideism(s), but it seems that some expressions at least are noncognitive in nature.

Finally, if I am misconstruing/conflating technically distinct terms, I will happily stand corrected. If TN stands on such distinctions, I will stand corrected there as well. There really does seem to be little in the literature out there on TN, especially if it is fairly narrowly defined as a position. A search leads one often to references of fideism, for example.) That is part of what has led me to assume warrant for the kind of conflation that I might be guilty of.

As always—

Cheers, and thanks for engaging me on this topic.

_________________________________________________________

* I think I earlier attributed that, at least by way of an example, to Tillich; but I think it may have actually been Barth.

ADDENDUM to the above post—

I know that I haven’t responded to your critique on a point-by-point, but think that I have covered it in the main.

With regard to G being defined as (a) that which cannot be conceived, or (b) a being whose essence we cannot conceive of or imagine, I agree that they come to the same thing (where “essence” is simply what a thing is). But I do not see how those definitions can be plugged into meaningful proposition.

(1) There are things (beings, entities) of which we cannot conceive or imagine;

—So far, so good; I have not intimated otherwise, and in fact have explicitly accepted this.

(2) If X exists, X is such a thing; [definition]

(3) X exists.

I would say that the propositional form is there, but that you cannot conceive of, imagine or cognize about X; you have no idea what X might or might not be, or possibly be; you cannot believe or doubt, or assign any truth value to <X exists>. I argue that it really comes down to no more than a wordy way of saying <______ exists>.

Originally posted by vistesd
I, too, have limited time at the moment, but maybe we can work through this (or play through it) in a more casual way. 🙂

While it’s perhaps correct that my examples to not constitute TN, at least as narrowly construed, G-9 at least leaves you with no propositional content about which you can think, and I’m not sure what indirect comprehension is possibl ...[text shortened]... ay of an example, to Tillich; but I think it may have actually been Barth.

and I’m not sure what indirect comprehension is possible for G-10 if it’s carried “all the way down”. One might say, “Okay, not X—but what is left? Y perhaps?” No, not that either. I do know how to think about “something” from which all attributes are removed.

Your claim, as I understand it, is that G-10 reduces to G-9; and G-9 (as I have already agreed) has no propositional content. So, your claim as I understand it is basically that G-10, like G-9, has no propositional content. But if G-10 has no propositional content, then how is it that you are drawing all these statements from it? "X does not apply." "Y does not apply." "Z does not apply." Etc (where X,Y,Z are all things to which you can ascribe positive properties). These are all statements that you claim are true, based on your understanding of G-10. How can these propositions follow from G-10 if G-10 has no propositional content? If propositions logically follow from G-10, it can only be in virtue of the fact that G-10 has propositional content. Again, I do not think the problem here is that G-10 lacks propositional content. Rather, the problem seems to be that its propositional content can give you no non-ersatz understanding of G. So I would not say "G-10 exists" is cognitively meaningless, since it expresses a proposition as far as I can tell. But I would say that I have absolutely no idea how one would go about justifying belief in that proposition.

What we need here is a definition that logically, but not nomologically (in any world), describes “a supernatural being”.

The theist can simply claim that G is bound by logical possibility, not nomological possibility. This seems to be what many theists claim, as an extension and implication of the attribute 'omnipotence'. By that attribute they often intend that God has the capacity to do whatever is logically possible; and since nomological laws are not logically necessary, this implies the capacity to suspend or contravene whatever is nomological; and that means G is not subject to any set of nomological laws. Then the question with respect to TN would be whether or not "G-S exists" under this understanding of G-S expresses a proposition, and it seems clear to me that it does.

Basically my argument might reduce to:

1. G-9 satisfies the conditions of TN.

Again, this I agree with.

2. G-10 does also

Again, this I disagree with this. To me, your arguments do not show that G-10 is cognitively meaningless; if anything, they seem to show just the opposite since you draw many statements from it that we can understand. It's just that these statements are apophatic in nature and do not provide any positive understanding of G. I take that to be in principle a separate issue from TN. To be sure, though, I take this as a major failing, since although I think "G-10 exists" expresses a proposition, I see no way that belief in that proposition could be justified.

3. I have linked indefinability, inconceivability (with respect to any particular indefinable that is proffered, but not with respect to the ability to conceive of indefinables as a whole, which seems to be what you are talking about), the theological concept of G as “wholly other”*, and the supernatural (the latter two radically understood, to be sure—but that is what, at least sophisticated, mainstream theological metaphysics embraces).

Again, I do not see why G-S should be linked with inconceivability. We can conceive of instances of the suspension or contravention of nomological laws because such laws are not logically necessary and hence suspension or contravention of those laws does not entail a contradiction. But even if I thought G-S were linked with inconceivability, it would not immediately follow that TN applies to it. After all, G-10 is linked with inconceivability by definition and I still do not agree that TN applies to it. I guess I am being stubborn on that point.

4. I do not think that analogs from the (any) natural order are simply transferable to S, as I radically construe it. I do not think that such analogs add anything to imaginability or indirect comprehension, and are illusory.

I'm not quite sure I understand. But, again, I think even instances of contravention of the natural order are conceivable, so I don't see why one would have to rely only on analogs of the natural order in order to understand G-S. It's part of the natural order that one cannot levitate at will. But can I conceive of some being's levitating at will? Yes.

I suppose that whatever is in contravention of the natural order in some possible world would be (supposing that it is not logically impossible) in keeping with the natural order in some other possible world (for example, there is some possible world where levitating at will is part of the natural order). But, I do not see why that is relevant. The relevant point would be that instances of contravention of the natural order are conceivable. They are conceivable in virtue of the fact that nomological laws are not logically necessary.