13 Aug 13
Originally posted by vistesdAgain, I just don't agree that the two collapse to the same thing. "? exists" is cognitively meaningless: it asserts nothing, and I can draw no statements from it. But "G exists" (where G is some thing of which we cannot conceive) expresses a proposition as far as I can tell. Again, you can tease out many other propositions from this, such as there exists something other than X (where X = your cat, or your wife, or you, etc). So I do not agree that TN applies to both of them; I think it only applies to the former.
ADDENDUM to the above post—
I know that I haven’t responded to your critique on a point-by-point, but think that I have covered it in the main.
With regard to G being defined as (a) that which cannot be conceived, or (b) a being whose essence we cannot conceive of or imagine, I agree that they come to the same thing (where “essence” is simply what a th ...[text shortened]... sts>. I argue that it really comes down to no more than a wordy way of saying <______ exists>.
Where I do agree with you, though, is that neither "G = ?" nor "G = some thing of which we cannot conceive" offers any real understanding of G.
But I don't think they are the same. In the first case, I think "G exists" does not express a proposition in the first place. In the second case, I think "G exists" expresses a proposition, but I don't see how belief in this proposition could be justified.
13 Aug 13
6 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloFirst, I see your point about G-10, and it’s not satisfying the criteria of TN. Question: if the series of “not-this, not that” is intended as an inexhaustible list of examples that eventually negates every positive attribute/descriptor—what is left? [And that does seem to me to be the way apophatic theology intends it, similarly to how contradiction is often deliberately used (e.g., in the Zohar) as a device to indicate the “ineffable”.] How would you describe that? It just seems to me that (although I concede that you’re right about the trail of negations keeping the thing in the cognitive realm, so to speak) you are left with a G that is empty of all conceivable content. We can conceive of (that there are) inconceivables, but we cannot, by definition, conceive of anything about any of them. I don’t think there’s anything left for indirect comprehension.
Again, I just don't agree that the two collapse to the same thing. "? exists" is cognitively meaningless: it asserts nothing, and I can draw no statements from it. But "G exists" (where G is some thing of which we cannot conceive) expresses a proposition as far as I can tell. Again, you can tease out many other propositions from this, such as there exi a proposition, but I don't see how belief in this proposition could be justified.
Maybe I’m the one being stubborn here, but if the series reduces to “God is not anything that we can conceive”—and I’m thinking this through as I write—then I think we have (1) There exist inconceivables (with which I do not argue), and (2) I name one of them God, without implying any possible conceivable content about G. “G exists”, taken as a proposition, says no more than that (at least) one singular inconceivable exists, and is not really different from (1), with “G” as simply a sign for “a singular inconceivable”. I concede that, as such, it is clearly cognitive. However, “G” (“God” ) is no more than a sign/name, and adds no more to the propositional content than “X” would.
To sum up on this point:
1. I concede that a series of propositions (here of the form: not-X1, not-X2, … , not-Xn, … ) means that such a negative theology is not noncognitive, even if such a series is infinite. Therefore, I agree that G-10 does not logically reduce to G-9.
2. Nevertheless, if such a G-10 series reduces to “nothing conceivable”—as, under a strict apophatism, I think it does—then one is left with the same (non-, or at least non-conceivable ) content as in G-9. Such a series might grant some indirect comprehension (by negative example) of the idea of the inconceivable (akin, perhaps, to Wittgenstein’s learning what “chess” means by learning the rules of the game, rather than by definition—only here indirectly by negation); but it does not (and cannot) give one any indirect comprehension of the inconceivable itself. It is indicative, not (even indirectly) descriptive. It leaves nothing, literally, to think about the inconceivable other than that it is inconceivable.
3. Following my second paragraph above, I concede that “X is inconceivable” is a meaningful proposition; we know what the word “inconceivable” means. X, however, has no other content that can be cognized about, directly or indirectly. Therefore, apophatic theology does not satisfy TN, although it is, in the end, empty.
Second, I don’t think your levitation example works. We can only observe or conceive of levitation (as an event that violates the natural order as we know it) within the frame of the natural order (which frame includes our consciousness, and how it functions, and how we can and do conceive of anything). We have no idea what supernatural observation would be, or what supernatural conceivability would be, or what levitation might look like (or mean) in some non-natural (supernatural) realm, or what a “supernatural cause” of such levitation might be--or even how to imagine any of that, without our imaging reverting to the natural realm. That is what I mean by a (conceivable if not actual—good point on that) analog that is not transferable willy-nilly to the supernatural category (as “wholly other” to all nature(s)). The same thing happens with things like “God is just” or “God is our heavenly father”.
Third, with regard to G-S generally, G is generally defined substantively, as a being (an exception would be process theology). I do not think that a being can be without nature (cannot be a “non-nomological” being). “Supernatural” (in the strict sense in which I am using it) is really just a name for “inconceivable nature”—and “God is a supernatural being” just says that God is “the being about which nothing can be conceived”, or “the ‘wholly-other’ from whatever can be conceived”. To say that S (and G-S) is inconceivable is then a tautology.
I do not say that this strict usage of G-S is universal in (sufficiently sophisticated) theology; but it is not uncommon either. There are certainly understandings of "God" that my arguments would not stand up to. As you noted, Conifer's approach is the right one.
That’s all for now. Cheers.
13 Aug 13
Originally posted by vistesdMeant to say hi how are you doing before, but I'm afraid I may have missed the opportunity.
[b]First, I see your point about G-10, and it’s not satisfying the criteria of TN. Question: if the series of “not-this, not that” is intended as an inexhaustible list of examples that eventually negates every positive attribute/descriptor—what is left? [And that does seem to me to be the way apophatic theology intends it, similarly to how contradict ...[text shortened]... nd up to. As you noted, Conifer's approach is the right one.
That’s all for now. Cheers.[/b]
I also wanted to reply to some of this but you get way to complicated for me. 😉
Things are much simpler to understand when viewed through the eyes of faith.
14 Aug 13
Originally posted by vistesd
[b]First, I see your point about G-10, and it’s not satisfying the criteria of TN. Question: if the series of “not-this, not that” is intended as an inexhaustible list of examples that eventually negates every positive attribute/descriptor—what is left? [And that does seem to me to be the way apophatic theology intends it, similarly to how contradict ...[text shortened]... nd up to. As you noted, Conifer's approach is the right one.
That’s all for now. Cheers.[/b]
Therefore, apophatic theology does not satisfy TN, although it is, in the end, empty.
Yeah, this I can agree with. 🙂
We can only observe or conceive of levitation (as an event that violates the natural order as we know it) within the frame of the natural order (which frame includes our consciousness, and how it functions, and how we can and do conceive of anything).
Yes, but the fact seems to be that many persons would take such putative instances of nomological violation to be 'supernatural' indicating. For instance, many would read putative miracles, such as walking on water or healing sickness merely at will or turning water into wine merely at will, etc, as supernatural indicating.
That doesn't seem to align with how you are intending 'supernatural', though. You clarify that you are intending it in the following way:
“Supernatural” (in the strict sense in which I am using it) is really just a name for “inconceivable nature”—and “God is a supernatural being” just says that God is “the being about which nothing can be conceived”, or “the ‘wholly-other’ from whatever can be conceived”.
In that case, "G-S exists" just says "A being about which nothing can be conceived exists". Then, about G-S I would reach the same conclusion as G-10: TN does not apply, but it "is, in the end, empty".
It's just that I am not sure to what extent this characterization of G-S captures common usage. I think I'll start a thread on this topic to survey what persons intend by the statement "God is a supernatural being". Would be worthwhile to get some ideas on that....
15 Aug 13
Originally posted by LemonJelloAgreed that G-S reaches the same conclusion as G-10.Therefore, apophatic theology does not satisfy TN, although it is, in the end, empty.
Yeah, this I can agree with. 🙂
[quote]We can only observe or conceive of levitation (as an event that violates the natural order as we know it) within the frame of the natural order (which frame includes our consciousness, and ...[text shortened]... "God is a supernatural being". Would be worthwhile to get some ideas on that....
I don't know what you mean by "common usage". I think G-S, or something very like it, is common (though not a majority view--I don't know) at more sophisticated levels of theological inquiry, but not at all "in the pews", so to speak. I am going by past reading in theology: Barth certainly, I think, and Barthians in mainstream Protestant theology. Such a view is prominent in theological kabbalah (e.g., Rav Israel Isaac Kook), and perhaps in Heschel (though I'd have to revisit that). Major figures in apophatic theology--which reaches the same result--would be Maimonides (Jewish) and Pseudo-Dionysus (Christian). Eastern Orthodoxy, following Gregory Palamas, holds that God can be known in his (revealed) "energies", but that God's essence cannot at all be known--this seems to be an attempt to accomodate natural revelation to the inconceivability of "the godhead" (although Orthodox theology does not use that concept much, because their trinitatrianism is different from the Western chruch; nor do they use the idea of "supernature", which one Orthodox theologian that I read--John D. Zizioulas--claimed entered theological discourse via Aquinas).
15 Aug 13
1 edit
By the way, I think what often happens in “common” discourse about "God" goes something like the following:
“God is just.”
“How do you define ‘justness’ such that we can tell if God’s (putatively revealed) actions are/have been ‘just’?”
“Well, you can’t judge God by human standards; that’s just human arrogance. ‘My ways are not your ways.’ The Bible (or the Torah, or the Qur’an) says that God is just, and that’s enough.”
“But what exactly would such justness permit and/or prohibit God from doing?”
“Whatever God does is just, because God is the standard.”
And on and on, with questions about humans obeying divine commands to do what, under most human constructions, would not be just at all. Etc., etc. You have participated here in such discussions, where the theist ends up in a position of giving no comprehensible—or even conceivable—content about God’s justness (or other attributes), based essentially on God’s “supernature” (whether that term is employed in the discourse or not) but nevertheless will veer away from any rigorous statement that might disallow applying natural concepts of justness (or love, or creativity, or parenthood) to God.
That is not just limited to theists, but—on a Wittgensteinian account—to transferring terms from a non-metaphysical to a metaphysical discourse, and assuming that they retain (any) meaning. And that’s really what I mean about transferring natural analogs to the supernatural category.
You are right in that “supernatural” is a term that carries alternative meanings. It could, as you note, just mean anything that appears to violate/transcend natural laws. But saying that such things as levitation are “supernatural indicating” invites the question: “What do you mean by ‘supernatural’?”. What positive content do you give that term, so that I can understand it? How is (or how can be) the supernatural comprehensible/conceivable content—or is it really essentially synonymous with incomprehensible and/or inconceivable?
15 Aug 13
2 edits
Originally posted by vistesdRedundant post.
Agreed that G-S reaches the same conclusion as G-10.
I don't know what you mean by "common usage". I think G-S, or something very like it, is common (though not a majority view--I don't know) at more sophisticated levels of theological inquiry, but not at all "in the pews", so to speak. I am going by past reading in theology: Barth certainly, I think at I read--John D. Zizioulas--claimed entered theological discourse via Aquinas).
16 Aug 13
Originally posted by vistesd“How do you define ‘justness’ such that we can tell if God’s (putatively revealed) actions are/have been ‘just’?”
By the way, I think what often happens in “common” discourse about "God" goes something like the following:
“God is just.”
“How do you define ‘justness’ such that we can tell if God’s (putatively revealed) actions are/have been ‘just’?”
“Well, you can’t judge God by human standards; that’s just human arrogance. ‘My ways are not your ways.’ The Bi ...[text shortened]... ble content—or is it really essentially synonymous with incomprehensible and/or inconceivable?
That's easy. We don't.
To define anything about God is simply an act of unbelief. God is to be trusted and relied upon with absolute faith no matter the cost.
We have ample explanation about everything we need to know about God from God Himself.
Why does this seem so simple and easy to understand to me? Why struggle so over what man can never know of and by himself?
16 Aug 13
2 edits
Originally posted by josephwBut you just defined God as trustworthy and reliable.
[b]“How do you define ‘justness’ such that we can tell if God’s (putatively revealed) actions are/have been ‘just’?”
That's easy. We don't.
To define anything about God is simply an act of unbelief. God is to be trusted and relied upon with absolute faith no matter the cost.
We have ample explanation about everything we need to know about God fr ...[text shortened]... and easy to understand to me? Why struggle so over what man can never know of and by himself?[/b]
If you can't define anything about God then you can't say anything meaningful about it (I would say 'him' but that would be defining it as male).
16 Aug 13
3 edits
Originally posted by vistesdYes, agreed that often happens in common discourse.
By the way, I think what often happens in “common” discourse about "God" goes something like the following:
“God is just.”
“How do you define ‘justness’ such that we can tell if God’s (putatively revealed) actions are/have been ‘just’?”
“Well, you can’t judge God by human standards; that’s just human arrogance. ‘My ways are not your ways.’ The Bi ...[text shortened]... ble content—or is it really essentially synonymous with incomprehensible and/or inconceivable?
Of course it is flat-out self-contradictory for one to purport to predicate a term like 'just' unto God and then to claim that God is somehow beyond predication of such terms. To avoid obvious incoherency, the theist who claims God transcends such predication would have to agree that a statement such as "God is just" does not function in a cognitively meanginful truth-functional way but rather satisfies some other type of functioning. As I recall, Conrau K deftly fleshed out a way that such statements could function noncognitively as a means to elicit a certain affective disposition or attitude toward 'God' in this past thread (a fabulous thread, imo):
Thread 126461.
What's interesting, though, is that although all such God-statements would be noncognitive, I'm still not sure "theological noncognivitism" necessarily applies. As I understand TN in its narrow sense, it hinges on the statement "God exists", and this is not a statement that purports to predicate anything unto 'God'. So, I still think "God exists" could be cognitively meaningful and assert a proposition (and hence be something toward which a person can hold a propositional attitude such as belief, thus consitituting his theism) even if all otherwise predicative statements of the form "God is X" are cognitively meaningless.
In that case, my main concern would be the justification of belief in "God exists". Not for lack of trying, I see no way that one could justify this belief while not being able to entertain any other cognitively meaningful statements about God. It seems almost certain to me that nothing internalist to the person would serve as a justifier here. Perhaps, then, the only approach this theist would have toward justifying his theistic belief may be something like the externalist warrant that Plantinga has tried to outline in his writings....I don't know.
Regarding 'supernature' though, I would rather start without any a priori assumption that it implies inconceivability or something like G-10 or apophatic theology, etc (since the correctness of that assumption is just not clear to me as of yet).
Regardless, yes, I agree it does seem to be a rather nebulous notion. In what follows, I am just sort of spitballing possible ways it could be intended.
If one holds it to be the notion of "beyond nature" or "wholly other" than nature as you have mentioned, etc, then I would agree with your analysis that this basically leads to something like G-10.
On the other hand, one could hold that it consists in the violation of (or of not being subject to) the nomological. But this seems to have many problems. For one, there is a diagnostic problem. If one were to observe something that appears, say, to violate a physical law, one may be justified in labeling it an unexplained phenomena, but it's not clear how one would be justified in labeling it supernatural in this sense. This is based on the idea that a sort of contingent naturalism is the proper, warranted default. Second, there is potentially a coherency problem here, in light of the fact that things like physical laws are supposed to represent exceptionless generalizations, whereas the 'supernatural' in this sense entails exceptions. This is maybe a semantic issue that could be resolved, however. Then there is a third problem that you raised earlier, that of the coherency of a "non-nomological" being. It may not make sense to say G is not bound to any nomological set of laws, since that would seem to imply that G's behavior is totally unregulated and random. This is related to twhitehead's concern that some theists claim that a supernatural being is not bound to any laws; but they are basically at least tacitly committed on the other hand to this supernatural being operating under certain laws. This seems like a valid concern to me.
I still think, however, that a theist may be able to supply a coherent notion of 'supernature' that is wrapped up with an attribute such as omnipotence. For example, supernature could be construed in terms of hypothetical (unlimited) powers that a being may have as opposed to limited power of natural beings. However, this seems fuzzy at best to me so far. Have to think about it more....
16 Aug 13
Originally posted by josephw
[b]“How do you define ‘justness’ such that we can tell if God’s (putatively revealed) actions are/have been ‘just’?”
That's easy. We don't.
To define anything about God is simply an act of unbelief. God is to be trusted and relied upon with absolute faith no matter the cost.
We have ample explanation about everything we need to know about God fr ...[text shortened]... and easy to understand to me? Why struggle so over what man can never know of and by himself?[/b]
That's easy. We don't.
Sure you do. You're always saying things like God is just; or loving; or reliable; or trustworhty; or compassionate; or merciful; or etc, etc, etc. Now you say that any such predication unto God is "simply an act of unbelief". Gotta make up your mind....
17 Aug 13
2 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloAs I recall, Conrau K deftly fleshed out a way that such statements could function noncognitively as a means to elicit a certain affective disposition or attitude toward 'God' in this past thread (a fabulous thread, imo):
Yes, agreed that often happens in common discourse.
Of course it is flat-out self-contradictory for one to purport to predicate a term like 'just' unto God and then to claim that God is somehow beyond predication of such terms. To avoid obvious incoherency, the theist who claims God transcends such predication would have to agree that a statement su fuzzy at best to me so far. Have to think about it more....
Yes, I recall that thread. The question is one identifying the language game. Zen koans are also an example of elicitive language (though not god-indicating).
Regarding 'supernature' though, I would rather start without any a priori assumption that it implies inconceivability or something like G-10 or apophatic theology, etc (since the correctness of that assumption is just not clear to me as of yet).
Well, I did not mean to imply that it necessarily does (and tried to be clear on that). I was targeting a particular usage that seems to occur in certain areas of theological discourse (that, historically at least, are not "fringe" theologies), and I think is sometimes pretty explicit—other times, I think that it, unintentionally, reduces to that. Of course, one does not need to use the word “supernatural” to talk about a what (putatively) exists “above or beyond the natural order”, or “transcends” it, or “is not explainable by natural laws or phenomena”, etc.—all of which are phrases used in various dictionary definitions of “supernatural”. [I haven’t quoted them precisely here, but particular reference is to [i]Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary[i], an edition of which (several years old, to be sure) is on my shelf.]
I think that it’s clear that “supernatural” can mean different things, and that any particular usage needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
I still think, however, that a theist may be able to supply a coherent notion of 'supernature' that is wrapped up with an attribute such as omnipotence. For example, supernature could be construed in terms of hypothetical (unlimited) powers that a being may have as opposed to limited power of natural beings. However, this seems fuzzy at best to me so far. Have to think about it more....
That may well be. But my interest is not so much in how the word might be “salvaged” according to alternative construals, but in how it is being used in any particular discourse. Some theologians likely would accept the kind of construal you suggest here (especially for the purposes of apologetics); others would surely not.
17 Aug 13
1 edit
Originally posted by vistesdIf you look at the OT, you'll see that it was the people who met God were
I thought that this might be an interesting topic for discussion, following on the “atheism is a belief system” thread.
The passages below are from the Wikipedia article here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theological_noncognitivism
“Theological noncognitivists claim that all alleged definitions for the term "God" amount to "God is that which caused e coherent/meaningful—and I thinkl would have to be udged on a case-by-case basis.
left to define Him as God revealed Himself to them. The point of much of
OT it was God revealing Himself to the people. They credit Him with actions
and specific relationships with people, so the whole point of all of that is
that when they worship and turn towards God they do it for the specific
God who has brought together children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob to
get to Jesus Christ. All again, to the specific God through the specific
covenants that God had with the people who are following Him.
Kelly
18 Aug 13
Originally posted by LemonJelloWhy is what I'm trying to say so difficult for others to understand?That's easy. We don't.
Sure you do. You're always saying things like God is just; or loving; or reliable; or trustworhty; or compassionate; or merciful; or etc, etc, etc. Now you say that any such predication unto God is "simply an act of unbelief". Gotta make up your mind....
When I say, "God is just", is "God just" because I said so, or is "God just" because He said so?
When I say "God is eternal", is "God eternal" because I said so, or is "God eternal" because He said so?
I choose to believe that God is eternal or just or infinite, or that God is love, not because I am somehow endowed with the ability to create a God with such qualities and characteristics, but because He exists and has revealed Himself to me, not only through nature, but by and through His Word.
Because it is said in God's Word that Jesus is the "...Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last", can I not say with absolute confidence that Jesus is eternal? Is not my saying so based on God's Word and not my own or any other's?
Does anyone out there in spirituality forum land understand what I'm saying?