09 Oct 08
Originally posted by NemesioMostly, my reason for thinking that the modal construal is not always straightforward is that it typically involves considerations of epistemic possibility (as well as perhaps contextualism), which I find to be an intricate subject.
Wow. Pwned.
By your thinking that modal construal is not always straightforward, do
you mean that people make statements that superficially seem to
rooted in infallibilism, but tacitly have concessions?
As in, 'I know that my wife is home right now because I called her a few
minutes ago.' It's possible that ~P (she went to the store), but I reason ...[text shortened]... she'd be home all night.
If not, what do you mean by 'not straightforward?'
Nemesio
But, your example is certainly along the lines of what I had in mind. If someone were to say "I know my wife is at home, but it is possible that she is at the store", that is probably not, despite what veritas says, a "self-defeating" statement (unless maybe we force upon it some harebrained infallibilist account of knowledge). Rather, it is typically meant as a fallibilist statement concerning the nature of our evidence or basis for belief. For instance, I know that I just spoke to my wife on the phone a short while ago; I know that she was speaking on our home phone because I called her there; I know that she told me that she would be home all night, and I know that her word is generally reliable; etc., etc. But, still, it is conceivable that after our call ended my wife promptly noted that our child is falling ill and thus rushed off to the store for medication. The mere fact that such situations are broadly consistent with my basis for belief would not preclude my knowing that my wife is at home (of course, if she did in fact rush off to the store, then I do not know she is at home because one cannot know a false proposition).
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by NemesioDo you believe that you can know anything with 100% certainty?
You do realize that the magnitude of your conviction has no bearing on the truth value of your belief, right?
I'd hate to list the things that I 'knew' with 100% certainty and was wrong about.
Nemesio
09 Oct 08
3 edits
Originally posted by LemonJelloHmm?
...because one cannot know a false proposition.
This seems equivocal, no? That is, I can know that my wife is home (but it is possible though
unlikely that she's at the store) unless she really is at the store, in which case I don't know that
she's home?
In the first usage, I'm using 'know' as synonymous with 'believe with great certainty but could be
mistaken.' I don't see how that wouldn't apply in the second usage.
It seems that if we acknowledge a fallibilist model of knowledge, in which some elements of the
known are actually just strongly justified beliefs, things that have false truth values can be 'known'
(as in believed with great certainty but could be mistaken).
Or am I just confused (and I apologize if I am)?
Nemesio
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by NemesioNo reasonable model of knowledge (whether fallibilist or infallibilist) can admit that one can know a false proposition. One simply cannot know a false proposition. And concessive knowledge attributions are not meant in any way to imply otherwise.
Hmm?
This seems equivocal, no? That is, I can know that my wife is home (but it is possible though
unlikely that she's at the store) unless she really is at the store, in which case I don't know that
she's home?
In the first usage, I'm using 'know' as synonymous with 'believe with great certainty but could be
mistaken.' I don't see how that would ...[text shortened]... t could be mistaken).
Or am I just confused (and I apologize if I am)?
Nemesio
Consider the example again: "I know my wife is at home, but it is possible that she is at the store". Again, this is typically a statement concerning the nature of evidence or basis for belief. It is NOT saying that it is a possible state of affairs that both (1) I know my wife is at home and (2) my wife is at the store. That is a logically impossible state of affairs because it leads to contradiction: (1) implies that my wife is at home, whereas (2) implies just the opposite. Rather, it is saying something like I know my wife is at home, but I know it on a fallible basis (say, on the basis of evidence that is insufficient to logically entail that my wife is at home).
Does this make sense?
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by veritas101Give me one good reason to think that certainty** is necessary for knowledge.
I would rather say I'm realist. Why are my views on knowledge impoverished?
I seem to have more certainty than you do.
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**considering either psychological certainty, in the sense that the subject is maximally sure or convinced that P; or epistemic certainty, in the sense that the evidence or basis for belief entails or is otherwise sufficient to guarantee the truth of P.
09 Oct 08
Originally posted by LemonJelloI believe I follow what you're saying, but I'm still struggling with the following example:
Rather, it is saying something like I know my wife is at home, but I know it on a fallible basis (say, on the basis of evidence that is insufficient to logically entail that my wife is at home).
Does this make sense?
What if I say 'I know my wife is at home, but I know it on a fallible basis,' and it turns out she is
in fact not home (like, as you said, for some unlikely emergency to get medicine for a child who
has suddenly fallen ill), something I find out after the fact?
The experience of knowledge when I made the statement is already established. It is only in the
face of new data that I can revise my statement after the fact, at which point I would say, 'I thought
I knew where my wife was, but it turns out...'
Again, I'm sorry if I'm fumbling around here...
Nemesio