What are the conditions for G?

On facts and states of affairs

From The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/):

“A philosophical dispute lurks beneath the terminological distinction between "fact" and "state of affairs."”

I will follow a later distinction in the article which treats a fact as a state of affairs which obtains (as opposed to a possible, but non-obtaining) state of affairs. I really don’t want to bring a larger philosophical dispute into this, and am flexible. Nevertheless, it seems that the distinction may well matter for the inference and questions that I am trying to present.

Also, from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy[/I, p. 876]:

“State of affairs, a possibility, actuality, or impossibility of the kind expressed by a nominalization of a declarative sentence. … Some take facts to be actual states of affairs, while others prefer to take them as true propositions. If propositions [i]are states of affairs, then facts are of course both actual states of affairs and true propositions.” (Italics in original)

So, again, I will take a fact to be an actual state of affairs. This is opposite my original understanding. And, again, I would like to see how the distinction plays out in this case.

Originally posted by googlefudge
That isn't a dualist god.

It is and isn't.... which is the point.

You can't create criteria for a God and then quantify it.... that is impossible.

Originally posted by tomtom232
It is and isn't.... which is the point.

You can't create criteria for a God and then quantify it.... that is impossible.

How do you know?

Also I suspect that statement to be self refuting in that you would have to have some
knowledge of god you claim not to be possible to have in order to claim it... I think.

Also this discussion is as far as I can tell about qualifying not quantifying the possibilities
for god/s.

Originally posted by vistesd
No, the laws of phyisics do not fit the bill, as G is defined here as an entity.

How would you define 'entity'?

This question is partly, just asking for clarification, and partly my unease with the concept of anything 'not of this universe' having any attributes whatsoever that we can meaningfully discuss.

Originally posted by googlefudge
How do you know?

Also I suspect that statement to be self refuting in that you would have to have some
knowledge of god you claim not to be possible to have in order to claim it... I think.

Also this discussion is as far as I can tell about qualifying not quantifying the possibilities
for god/s.

You still don't understand and I suppose you can't.

It isn't about knowledge, numbers, words or information.

You are right, God doesn't exist in these things.

You're searching in the wrong place for God.

Originally posted by googlefudge
If you require G to have somewhere to exist in, which seems logically necessary,
I would propose having everything not G be H, with U being a subset of H.

G inhabits H, which contains U.


Also if you are trying to make this a general as possible why are you starting from the position of monotheism?

How about we replace G with D, where D is the ...[text shortened]... ntities of set D are bound by the laws of logic.
Otherwise everything else is meaningless.

I thought I made it clear in the OP (though I’m glad you kicked in on the “first reformulation”—it surely won’t be the last) that I was interested in “causal dualist metaphysics” (though I have removed “cause” because of apt objections). I am a non-dualist (and so I would accept some version of your H as a subset of U); but I really am after what conditions are necessary (and sufficient) for a dualist view to hold.

I’d be happy to consider a polytheist formulation such as yours also—which of course is more general. But I offered the OP version of 2. Above as a simplifying criterion only . I take the dualist view to mean “at least two”.

Incidentally are you defining strong atheism as;

"belief in the non-existence of god/s"
Or
"knowledge of the non-existence of god/s"?

Well, I guess that’s not so incidental, and a good question. I would suggest a first pass of “justified belief that god(s) do not exist”, whether true or not.

Thanks.

Originally posted by vistesd
I thought I made it clear in the OP (though I’m glad you kicked in on the “first reformulation”—it surely won’t be the last) that I was interested in “causal dualist metaphysics” (though I have removed “cause” because of apt objections). I am a non-dualist (and so I would accept some version of your H as a subset of U); but I really am after what condition ...[text shortened]... a first pass of “justified belief that god(s) do not exist”, whether true or not.

Thanks.

There aren't any possible conditions for a dualist view to hold.

Originally posted by vistesd
I thought I made it clear in the OP (though I’m glad you kicked in on the “first reformulation”—it surely won’t be the last) that I was interested in “causal dualist metaphysics” (though I have removed “cause” because of apt objections). I am a non-dualist (and so I would accept some version of your H as a subset of U); but I really am after what condition ...[text shortened]... a first pass of “justified belief that god(s) do not exist”, whether true or not.

Thanks.

I am not sure you can make the dualist view hold in that sense.

If you have G in H completely separate from U then I think you have to
require some bigger place for both H and U to exist in.

If H and U are utterly separate, and don't exist inside some bigger space
I don't see how there can be any interaction between them.

So I would say the problem in this case is not anything to do with god.

It's whether god in a completely different set of 'dimensions' from U (or whatever)
can have any effect or be detectable from U?

My answer being no.

If Beings in H can effect U then both H and U must exist as part of some larger
unifying set.

If such a set doesn't exist then H can't effect U and thus H and all it's contents
are indistinguishable from not existing from the perspective of U.

Originally posted by tomtom232
You still don't understand and I suppose you can't.

It isn't about knowledge, numbers, words or information.

You are right, God doesn't exist in these things.

You're searching in the wrong place for God.

I am not searching for god.

we are talking at cross purposes.

Originally posted by googlefudge
I am not searching for god.

we are talking at cross purposes.

I am not searching for God

...And therin lies your problem. 😞

Originally posted by twhitehead
How would you define 'entity'?

This question is partly, just asking for clarification, and partly my unease with the concept of anything 'not of this universe' having any attributes whatsoever that we can meaningfully discuss.

A possible or actual being that can be identified as distinct and separate from other beings by its properties and relationship with other beings (“object” may be a more proper technical term, but would sound somewhat unusual). According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, an abstract entity is “an object lacking spatiotemporal properties, but supposed to have being, to exist…”. Part of the issue here will surely be whether such an abstract entity is possible, or even makes sense. But I don’t want to get caught in my old semantic box with terms like entity, identity, etc. (I believe that you might recall that thread, since you took a large role, debating lucifershammer; at least I remember that being you&hellip😉.

For an underlying theism, I would use “entity” to refer to G as a being, rather than a nondualist usage like G as “ground of being and being-itself”.

Originally posted by tomtom232
[b]I am not searching for God

...And therin lies your problem. 😞[/b]

It really isn't a problem.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]First Reformulation

Here is an attempted reformulation of the OP, based on suggestions/objections so far—

1. There exists an entity we will call G;

2. There is only one G;

3(a). There exist states of affairs that are not G; (b) the totality of such states of affairs we will call U;

4. U’s existence is contingent upon G’s existence. ...[text shortened]... r now despite recognizing twhitehead’s objection; I would be happy to substitute a better word.[/b]

WRT monotheism it seems to me the entity G can consist of parts, aspects, bundled qualities, etc. I don't think deity should be inferred, as deity normally entails criteria that have not been introduced.

But I wonder why G is called an 'entity' that exists, while U is called 'states of affairs' that exist.

I am drawn to the idea that G encompasses its H or can at least be spoken of as such. I am also drawn to the idea that U is at once a manifestation of G, and is that to which G is manifest. Otherwise we become something not G and not U. But this is just food for later thought.

I'm not following the note on 3b. I do think nondualism has to be at the ultimate bottom of things, but the ifs and woulds leave me wondering, what's the bottom line?

Originally posted by tomtom232
[b]I am not searching for God

...And therin lies your problem. 😞[/b]

Not searching is the solution.

Originally posted by googlefudge
I am not sure you can make the dualist view hold in that sense.

If you have G in H completely separate from U then I think you have to
require some bigger place for both H and U to exist in.

If H and U are utterly separate, and don't exist inside some bigger space
I don't see how there can be any interaction between them.

So I would say the ...[text shortened]... nd all it's contents
are indistinguishable from not existing from the perspective of U.

I tend to agree with all of that (although, since my purpose here has not been to present a particular argument—but to test the parameters of argument—I will wait and see if any counter-arguments are forthcoming). An analogy might be “multiverses” as opposed to a “manifold universe”. If there no information can pass between multiple universes then, at best, their existence is—strictly—immaterial with regard to our U (say, U1). But that addresses the epistemological issue—does it address the ontological issue (Q1)?

If I understand you rightly, the critical condition for the existence of G is, as it were, a nested set of Us such that U = (U1 + U2 + … + Un)—although set-theory notation might be better here. One of those subsets we have called H.

You’re right in that this exercise is aimed at going to dualist metaphysics, which underpins dualist theism but is certainly not the same as dualist theism. (Probably, I should have chosen “E”, rather than “G”—but people, those who know me anyway, would’ve figured it out.)

Thanks for being willing to cast what was likely your position anyway in terms of the experiment I’m trying here.