10 Oct '11 05:06>3 edits
Suppose a posited entity, called G, meeting the following criteria:
1. G is the cause of all that is the case other than itself (the “world” );
2. G is not coextensive with the world;
3. G is itself uncaused; and
4. G is the only entity meeting criteria 1 - 3.
Q1: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for positing the actuality of such an entity to make sense?
Q2: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for such an entity to be known to be actual by any entity other than itself?
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Basically, I take criteria 1 – 3 to be those minimally required for a strict “causal metaphysical dualism” (e.g., dualistic theism); 2 is a "transcendance" criterion; 4 is a simplifying criterion (that would pertain, e.g., to monotheism). I am happy to entertain corrections and clarifications from those who are more skilled than I at such formulations…. After all, if I’ve muddled the questions, I can hardly expect unmuddled answers.
1. G is the cause of all that is the case other than itself (the “world” );
2. G is not coextensive with the world;
3. G is itself uncaused; and
4. G is the only entity meeting criteria 1 - 3.
Q1: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for positing the actuality of such an entity to make sense?
Q2: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for such an entity to be known to be actual by any entity other than itself?
_______________________________________________________
Basically, I take criteria 1 – 3 to be those minimally required for a strict “causal metaphysical dualism” (e.g., dualistic theism); 2 is a "transcendance" criterion; 4 is a simplifying criterion (that would pertain, e.g., to monotheism). I am happy to entertain corrections and clarifications from those who are more skilled than I at such formulations…. After all, if I’ve muddled the questions, I can hardly expect unmuddled answers.