What are the conditions for G?

Originally posted by JS357
In my mind I've sort of collapsed H ("G-land"😉 into G so that part isn't particularly interesting to me.

Are you saying U necessarily exists if G exists, and U possibly exists (even) if G does not exist?

BTW, I am now toying with "G" meaning "Generator of U." Or U's.

U being all that is not G, if U is possible without G, then it would have to be an u ...[text shortened]... es understanding bootstrapping. That's my answer to what your "what if" would imply.

Yes, I quite like this idea and it might be the only way, in my mind, to generate plausible conditions to answer the questions in the OP.

Originally posted by tomtom232
Yes, I quite like this idea and it might be the only way, in my mind, to generate plausible conditions to answer the questions in the OP.

I was doing an edit when you replied. I asked if you can go further into the one-way connection of G to U.

WRT to your reply above, it seems like we keep failing to deliver a satisfactory dualism. But isn't dualism essential to Western theology? Maybe not.

I can think of some one-way connections, like A, being Tom Cruise, knows that B exists but B is a building in Clearwater and so doesn't know A exists. Is there a specific type of connection you have in mind?

No, I have no specific type of connection in mind but I think something similar to your Tom Cruise example would do well enough given a clear definition of G.
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Is the definition we have of G clear enough to make this plausible? Probably not and once again I can't see a way through these murky definitions.

Maybe G is just a U generator and is useless for anything but that.

Originally posted by tomtom232
Are you saying that G only exists in your own mind? 😀

I was actually thinking along the lines of this where H isn't a physical or real habitat but something akin to "the collective mind" of U and "the mind" of each individual U. In other words, a definition where G is the mind and U is the body but each(or any given fraction of) fact in U has a ...[text shortened]... can't write about it coherently because the thought isn't complete in my own mind.

I wasn't intending to say that. But maybe that's where it's headed.

Terry Pratchett wrote about a species of gods who could only exist while someone believed they existed. I think it was in his book Small Gods.

We could explore the notion that the mind is a sort of habitat for entities not sharing the dimensions of our universe with us. That might satisfy the duality, in fact it approaches Descartes' mind-body dualism. Which I think was wrong-headed or at least, half-baked.

Originally posted by JS357
Well, maybe it is worth spending a little time dedicated to find something that is "rationally implied about a putative G" by our knowledge about U. The first realization I have is that those implications will be provisional to the extent our knowledge of U is provisional. Also, looking at history, many inteligent minds have been going on about this kind of pr ...[text shortened]... f G and where G resides. But "I exist" is a darkly provisional claim. Or is it?

WRT to your reply above, it seems like we keep failing to deliver a satisfactory dualism. But isn't dualism essential to Western theology? Maybe not.

We do seem to keep failing (and I don’t think my talk about “bifurcated nonduality” is helpful (or even maybe sensical—I think I’m spinning brain wheels now). A lot of Western theists (most?) seem to think that dualism is essential. But panentheism has been an option for some (e.g., St. Gregory of Nyssa, to my mind); and the Lurianic Kabbalah actually posits that the Infinite (ein sof generates, by an act of “withdrawal” (tzimtzum) a dimension within itself in which it can generate by emanation a semi-separate universe (no creation ex nihilo; ein sof, being infinite, U can only be “created” out of—ein sof itself).

But strict dualists reject such notions.

I think this is discussion is now taking a more fruitful tack: what is the most that can be concluded from U? I think you’re right that we may have to allow for things “that we are not disposed to know”. I like the CSI analogy.

I’m having computer problems, and will be back—I’ll catch up as best I can.

Originally posted by tomtom232

I can think of some one-way connections, like A, being Tom Cruise, knows that B exists but B is a building in Clearwater and so doesn't know A exists. Is there a specific type of connection you have in mind?

No, I have no specific type of connection in mind but I think something similar to your Tom Cruise example would do well enough give ...[text shortened]... ese murky definitions.

Maybe G is just a U generator and is useless for anything but that.

Maybe G is just a U generator and is useless for anything but that.

I think that is just the character of G we’ve been trying to get at—to see if just that’s possible in a dualist metaphysics. Seems not. But I liked that phrase: “ a U generator”. 🙂

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Maybe G is just a U generator and is useless for anything but that.

I think that is just the character of G we’ve been trying to get at—to see if just that’s possible in a dualist metaphysics. Seems not. But I liked that phrase: “ a U generator”. 🙂[/b]

Yes, but the conditions for that to make sense aren't as easy as the statement is.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Maybe G is just a U generator and is useless for anything but that.

I think that is just the character of G we’ve been trying to get at—to see if just that’s possible in a dualist metaphysics. Seems not. But I liked that phrase: “ a U generator”. 🙂[/b]

Oh I think its possible in a dualist metaphysics for there to be a U and a not-U U generator that is useless for anything but that. I just can't imagine anybody who would be satisfied with the idea. But we could perhaps deduce that the character of G would be revealed in U.

However, we are not necessarily all that smart to see what is revealed, or at least I'm not. My wife had tonight's "Person of Interest" figured out in the first few minutes. Me? No clue. There is no reason that our mental powers have to be up to the task, after all, we would not fault our blue green algae ancestors of a few billion years ago, for not having figured it out. Maybe our equally distant descendants will have more luck.

Originally posted by vistesd
I did not understand “disparate”, I guess, as being strong enough to get it—once I saw that you were right that we had not nailed dualism down. I am happy to substitute it. But, would categorically different also work—or, what’s your understanding of the distinctions?

With regard to your second point: understood. I didn’t consider it a problem, becau use is understood, and hence it's meaning accessible (if I'm putting that clearly).

I think I understand your aim. The problem is that, even supposing you are successful in whittling down further and further, you will surely still be casting things in terms that some do not accept and do not have to accept. For example, some will deny your casting the world as some set of actual states of affairs (or facts or...whatever, it does not matter what goes here…the point is that whatever it is, this conception of the world will likely not constitute part of a necessary "substructure" for the causal monotheism you have in mind). A similar thing will hold if you try to cast causation into terms, since there are many differing views concerning the metaphysics of causation.

Maybe the best we could do, at first pass, is lay out some very general minimal considerations of commitments for S (the causal dualist monotheist you have in mind). For instance, yes, S is committed to there existing some G. Yes, S is committed to there existing only one G. I think S is generally committed to there existing thing(s) that are not only distinct from G but fundamentally distinct in kind (or categorically different, as you mention) from G (although I see no reason at all why he could not also hold that there exist things that are distinct from G but not categorically different from G). And then S will generally have some view on how the things from the different kinds/categories can relate/interact with or effect (or not) each other.

For this last point, the views could be varied. For example, suppose S thinks there are distinct categories C1 and C2. Then S could think that things from C1 can causally effect things from C2 and that things from C2 can causally effect things from C1 (a form of interactionism). Or S could think that things from C1 can causally effect things from C2 but that things from C2 cannot causally effect things from C1 (an example could be epiphenomenalism). Or S could think that there are no causal interactions between C1 and C2 at all (some form of parallelism). Presumably, though, for the present purposes we could probably at least say that S is committed to the idea that the interaction goes at least one way: from C1 (the category containing G) to C2. S may even hold that all things in C2 owe their existence and properties in some way or another to the activity of G.

To give some example (this is certainly not meant to outline a totally minimalist or bare bones view or even a coherent one on the part of S, it is just to give some flavor), consider the following words of Richard Swinburne:

Theism claims that God is a personal being – that is, in some sense a person. By a person I mean an individual with basic powers (to act intentionally), purposes and beliefs….God is supposed to be like us, in having basic powers, beliefs and purposes – but ones very different from ours….God’s basic powers are supposed to be infinite: he can bring about as a basic action any event he chooses, and he does not need bones or muscles to operate in certain ways in order to do so. He can bring objects, including material objects, into existence and keep them in existence from moment to moment....God is not limited by the laws of nature; he makes them and he can change or suspend them – if he chooses….God cannot do what is logically impossible (what involves a self-contradiction). God can make the universe exist and God can make the universe not exist, but God cannot make the universe exist and not exist at the same time….God is eternal in the sense that he has existed at each moment of past time, exists now, and will exist at each moment of future time….All the other essential properties which theism attributes to God at each moment of time follow from the three properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect freedom. Thus God is supposed to be bodiless….he does not depend on matter to affect…the world. He moves the stars, as we move our arms, just like that – as a basic action. It follows too from his omnipotence that God is omnipresent (i.e. present everywhere), in the sense that he can make a difference to things everywhere and know what is happening everywhere just like that…But, although he is everywhere present, he is not spatially extended; he does not take up a volume of space – for he has no body. Nor, therefore, does he have any spatial parts: all of him is present everywhere, in the sense in which he is present at a place. It is not that part of him is in England, and another part in the United States….God being omnipotent could have prevented the universe from existing, if he had so chosen. So it exists only because he allows it to exist. Hence either he causes the existence of the universe, or he causes or allows some other agent to do so. In this sense, therefore, he is the creator of the universe, and, being – by the same argument – equally responsible for its continued existence, he is the sustainer of the universe. He is responsible for the existence of the universe (and every object within it) for as long as it exists….even if the universe has existed forever, its existence at each moment of time is due to the conserving action of God at that moment….God is supposed to be responsible, not merely for the existence of all other objects, but for their having the powers and liabilities they do….God…causes inanimate things to have the powers and liabilities they do, at each moment when they have them….And God is also responsible for the existence of humans. He could cause us to act of physical necessity. But, given that we have limited free will, God does not cause us to form the purposes we do. That is up to us. But God does conserve in us from moment to moment our basic powers to act, and thus ensures that the purposes we form make a difference to the world. God allows us to choose whether to form the purpose of moving a hand or not; and God ensures that (normally), when we form that purpose, it is efficacious – if we try to move our hand, it moves.

Is the view Swinburne outlines here reasonable or coherent? I think not on both counts. But, just considering the basic minimal considerations listed before the excerpt above, I do not see any reason on the face of it why they would be collectively inconsistent or incoherent. I think Swinburne touches on all of them here but also peppers everything with incoherency.

Not sure if this helps at all...😵

Originally posted by LemonJello
I think I understand your aim. The problem is that, even supposing you are successful in whittling down further and further, you will surely still be casting things in terms that some do not accept and do not have to accept. For example, some will deny your casting the world as some set of actual states of affairs (or facts or...whatever, it does not ma them here but also peppers everything with incoherency.

Not sure if this helps at all...😵

Quoting Swineburne:

He moves the stars, as we move our arms...he is not spatially extended; he does not take up a volume of space – for he has no body.

A straightforward reading of the first part of the above is that the stars are to God as our arms are to us. Therefore, God has a body; it is the physical universe; among its parts are those stars. There are some issues regarding the putative existence of free-will agents in the universe, and whether they, and the physical results of their freely willed actions, are part of God's body. It is as though we are a tumor; benign or not…

This may be an example of the hazards of analogy.

Nonetheless, I think that in this thread, it is a good idea to explore various possible theistic end-points like Swineburne's, or perhaps for people to lay out the end-point they now see as most reasonable.

Originally posted by JS357
Oh I think its possible in a dualist metaphysics for there to be a U and a not-U U generator that is useless for anything but that. I just can't imagine anybody who would be satisfied with the idea. But we could perhaps deduce that the character of G would be revealed in U.

However, we are not necessarily all that smart to see what is revealed, or at least , for not having figured it out. Maybe our equally distant descendants will have more luck.

Yes, it is possible; however, how is one to answer the second question in the OP if G is just a useless U generator? U might as well be self generating as have a useless generator.

Originally posted by JS357
Quoting Swineburne:

He moves the stars, as we move our arms...he is not spatially extended; he does not take up a volume of space – for he has no body.

A straightforward reading of the first part of the above is that the stars are to God as our arms are to us. Therefore, God has a body; it is the physical universe; among its parts are thos ...[text shortened]... Swineburne's, or perhaps for people to lay out the end-point they now see as most reasonable.

OK I will lay out my current view on G, as expounded upon in this interesting thread.

G has been posited as the U-generator, and not anything more, so far.

So I'd say G is a sort of absent referent that may rise to the level of useful fiction in discussions such as this thread. Those interested in knowing more about those two designations may google or wiki on them.

It may be that grounding a God-concept on the concept of G is useful to some people other than me. I would call this another case in which G becomes a useful fiction, for those people.

But I see no utility for G in everyday life or in the proper pursuit of knowledge about the world (science).

As for the associated dualism, the dualism that survives is the dualism between referents that are absent and referents that are present. 🙂

Originally posted by JS357
OK I will lay out my current view on G, as expounded upon in this interesting thread.

G has been posited as the U-generator, and not anything more, so far.

So I'd say G is a sort of absent referent that may rise to the level of useful fiction in discussions such as this thread. Those interested in knowing more about those two designations may google or w ...[text shortened]... at survives is the dualism between referents that are absent and referents that are present. 🙂

I suppose if G is a U-generator, and nothing more, then we can explain G thusly:

G = U and G =/= U. (if G is just a generator and useless for anything else then U may as well be self generating and thus equal to G but not G.)

G is an irrational concept that cannot be found in the ratios of any facts of U. Therefore, G cannot be known to any fact of U except through irrationality.

Furthermore, G = pi so let's eat! 😛

Originally posted by tomtom232
I suppose if G is a U-generator, and nothing more, then we can explain G thusly:

G = U and G =/= U. (if G is just a generator and useless for anything else then U may as well be self generating and thus equal to G but not G.)

G is an irrational concept that cannot be found in the ratios of any facts of U. Therefore, G cannot be known to any fact of U except through irrationality.

Furthermore, G = pi so let's eat! 😛

e^(i*pi)+1=0

One of the mysteries.

http://www.philosophical-investigations.org/The_Euler_Identity

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euler%27s_identity

I believe all of the important truths are encrypted in pi. Unfortunately, they are all refuted in e. 🙄